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1'Throughout the thesis,in referring to the Shelburne Essays, 
and to the New Shel1b_urne_gs"ays, I have given only the number 
and not the title of the volume, in order to maintain a certain 
uniformity of reference, since only the later series of the 
Shelburne Essays have titles. For the ful? titles, vide Appendix 
A. I have,however, used the titles of individual volumes of T^e 
Greek Tradition.
2. For purposes of economy,in referring to a work in a foot- 
note, I have given only the place and date of publication, not 
the firm of publishers. Fuller particulars are included in the 
bibliography at the end.
(1.) Pau.l_Elmer More^Man and Author.
Paul Elmer More was torn on December 12,1864 in St. Louis, 
Missouri, the son of Enoch Anson More and his wife, Katharine
Hay Elmer. Both parents were of Colonial stock,his mother's
1 
family being able to trace back their descent to Saxon times.
His father had started married life as a bookseller in Dayton, 
Ohio, but he and his wife later moved to St« Louis in order to 
be near a minister who had had a profound influence upon them. 
Enoch More had inherited from his New England ancestors a stern 
sense of religious duty. Rigid and literal in his piety,he was 
unfortunately not the sort of man to attract his own children 
to a love of religion once they came of an age to think for 
themselves.Fortunately his wife more than made up for the defic- 
iency, for althought Katharine More was not an educated woman 
in the strict sense of the word, she was a wide and voracious 
reader, with an open mind and a capacity for entering imagin- 
atively into what she read, a gift obviously inherited by her
son» who, at a very early age, was able to hold his small com-
2 
panions spell-bound by the wonderful tales he made up. Nor was
Enoch More's piety without its effect, for Paul More's first
literary effort to appear in print, unknown to the young author,
5 
was a sermon published when he was eight.
During the Civil .Var, Enoch T'ore supported the Union 
and rose to the rank of Brigadier General in the Commissary
I.Robert Shafer, Paul Elmer More and American Criticism,(Yale 
University Press; 1935),p.59.
1937), Sect ion V-
Department; his records were considered models of neatness and 
accuracy in the Department of War. In civilian life, however, 
he was less successful. Naturally ambitious, he had suffered 
his first real frustration when his parents were unable to let 
him take up the architectural career upon which he had set his 
heart,and throughout his.life, inspite of plenty of business 
acumen, he seemed unable to make a success of any of the vari- 
ous occupations he took up. As a fesult, the story of life in 
the More household was a chequered one.Paul Elmer was the sev- 
enth of eight children, and by the time he and his younger 
brother, Louis Trenchard More,(later Professor of Physics at 
the University of Cincinnati) were of age to go to school, the 
family fortunes had improved sufficiently, mainly through the 
self-sacrifice and ingenuity of their mother, to allow them to 
continue their education with a view to passing on to the uni- 
versity. Nevertheless, after he had finished his studies at the 
Public School in St. Louis,Paul More had himself to teach for 
three years before going on to Washington University, where he 
graduated in 1887. His eyesight at this time gave him a good 
deal of trouble, but he was able to go on with his studies through
the help of his sister Alice who read his work to him aloud.
r 
From the calm, slightly aloof dignity of his wltings it is so
to
easy assume that he was one of a select and fortunate aristo-
I.Louis Trenchard More was himself a contributor to the New Human 
ist symposium, Humanism and America t vide p.6^,and More fre^ently 
quotes his authority in support of his own tiews on modern scienc 
as he seeks to appraise the general trends of the day, e.g.Shel- 
Burpe Essays lll^The Quest of a Century',p.244.(Boston and NeW 
Yorksi995.}
cracy to whom scholarship came as a natural inheritance that 
it is salutary to pause and consider the handicaps, both fin- 
ancial and physical, which More had to overcome in his eager 
quest for knowledge, and which doubtlessly played their part 
in bracing and disciplining his spirit.
Upon leaving Washington University, he became Latin 
master at the Smith Academy, St. Louis, where he remained
nominally five years, although he spent the last year in
1 
Europe.In 1891, he took his Master's degree in Washington with
a thesis written in Latin, the result of independent study*
From his high school days, he had been aware of the 
strong discrepancy existing between the religion of his child- 
hood, a Presbyterianism in the vein of Jonathan Edwards,and 
the discoveries of modern science as it was expounded by Darwin,
Huxley and Spencer. He had therefore abandoned Christianity,
2 
not without a keen sense of loss, and had turned instead to
romantic liteature and philosophy, particularly to the German
3 
writers. His keenly 'analytical mind soon became conscious,
howeverx , that it was necessary to decide between romanticism 
and scientific naturalism, as he found it increasingly difficult 
to go on consenting to two mutually exclusive systems of thought.
Later he was to stress the common descent and direction of both
3 
these forms of naturalism, Rousseauistic and Baconian, but at
r. Dr. A. Dak in of Amherst, who is working upon the official bio- 
graphy of More, has assured me that More's Master's degree dates 
from 1891, although More himself was under the misapprehension
that h£ obtained it in. 1892. and Professor Shafer gives the latter date. Vide Shafer, op. cit. ,p; <<K. &.
2. MoreTTaaes Fpom an Oxford ^jajry^Sftetl nn y. 3. Ibid. ,loc. cit .
^ Nove-mtkx- if Jfe, Vol. VMM, No. I , ?.£. y&e~pp. loo-lf ~~ 
* - 
   r
the time of his preoccupation with romanticism, he saw it 
in contrast to, rather than as complementary to, scientific 
naturalism.At one time he had "begun to work out a rational- 
istic system of thought 'more consistent and comprehensive
1 
than Spencer's' which was to have been his magnum opus, but
the project was abandoned and thejmanuscript destroyed, together 
with those of several romantic tragedies and a romantic epic 
composed about the same time. His intellectual doubts were 
aggravated by a naturally nervous sensibility,and this in
turn was accentuated by his tendency to identify himself
2 
with the Romantic heroes of his reading. All the traits of
the Romantic temperament were present in his first published 
worlc of any importance, Helena and Occasional Poems which
appeared in 1890, Several of the poems had previously appeared
3 
anonymously in the Washington University Magazine. The volume
as a whole is remarkable for little except the evidence it 
affords of how completely More himself was under the swa$ of 
Romantic emotionalism. In metre and structure several of the 
poems revealed the influence of his classical studies, but the 
spirit which informed them was unmistakably romantic in its 
wistful melancholy. The young lady who inspired the title-
1.Robert Shafer,op. cit*,p.64.
2. More, Pages From _an_0xf ord Diary, Sect ion V.
3.1 have received from Professor Shafer a copy of an article of 
his reprinted from American Literature,Vol.20,No.l,Earch, 1948, 
entitled 'Paul Elmer More: A Note On His Verse And Prose Written 
IN Youth With Two Unpublished Poems'.I have based toy observations 
upon that and upon Professor Shafer's own comments on More's 
juvenilia in his Paul Elmer More and American Criticism,PTD. in which he publishes selections from fleTena as an appendix. 
The actual vblune itself is unotainable "in this country, nor 
I been able to borrow .1; from an Ameri - 
>.M<yeV SUughkr Mr* 
X\ cop,,, So -fa* \
piece was a Miss Clara Gardiner with whom More fancied himself
in love at the time, although from the mild sentimentality per-
1 
vading the volume it would seem he was rather in love with love.
This 'temperamentalism' persisted during the period 
at the Smith Academy, and it was his romantic sense of genius 
frustrated and his longing for solitude which made him throw 
up his post and go off to Europe. From this period dated the 
incident described by him in his essay on Hawthorne in Series 
One of the Shelburne Essays to illustrate the deep human sense 
of isolation which haunted the work of the American novelist. 
There he describes his visit to the little English church at 
Interlaken, and the sermon preached by £he young Scottish min- 
ister of which the burden was the 'inevitable loneliness which
2 
follows man from the cradle to the grave'. To the visitors there
that morning seeking release from the anxiety which oppressed 
them in town, at home, in the busy market place, he could offer 
no peace amidst the beauty of nature, for man's sin had come 
not only between man and man, but between man and nature. He 
could but advise them to return and bear bravely and patiently
the primeval curse of separation.   'Thin/c not, while evil abides
aloneJ 
in you, ye shall be aught but istHHly for evil is the seeking of3 ' 
self and the turning away from the commonalty of the world.'It
would be interesting to know what the personal effect of those 
words were upon More himself, the young man who had gone to
I.Robert Shafer, Paul Elm^r 3'.;pre*A Note_0n His Verse And Prose 
Written In Youth,With Two Unpublished Poems,p.50.
.More,Shelburne~Essays~T. C^ev7~lork andTondon:l96T)TpB« 25. 
. iBidy ,p. ~o. r
Europe in search of solitude. That he quotes the episode at 
length suggests that it made more than an abjective impression 
upon his mind. His presence in church at all suggests that he 
was still seeking for some satisfaction which his belated 
romanticism could not provide.His break with the traditional 
beliefs of his parents had left him without an anchor in religion, 
his interest in science had been inadequate to supply an alter- 
native and now he was coming increasingly to see that romantic- 
ism was the source,not the consolation, of his own spiritual 
malaise, and as such was unlikely to afford him any true guid- 
ance.
This inner unrest reached a climax in an incident 
which More has described in Series oix of the Shelburne Essays,_ 
and which proved a vital turning point in his inner experience. 
'Having dropped mway from allegiance to the creed of Calvin, 
I had for a number of years sought a substitute for faith in 
increase of knowledge; like many another I thought to conceal 
from myself the want of intellectual purpose in miscellaneous 
curiosity- And then, just as the vanity of this pursuit began 
to grow too insistent, came the unexpected index pointing to 
tjie new way  no slender oracle, but the ponderous and right 
German utterance of Baur's Manichaisches.^Religionssystem. It 
would be impossible to convey to others, I cannot quite recall 
to myself, the excitement amounting almost to a physical
7perturbation caused "by this first glimpse into the mysteries of 
independent faith. It was not, I need hardly say, that I failed 
even then to see the extravagance and materialistic tendencies 
of the Manichaan superstition} "but its highly elaborate form, 
not without elements of real sublimity, acted as a powerful 
stimulus to the imagination. Here, symbolised "by the cosmic con- 
flict of light and darkness, was found as in a great epic poem 
the eternal problem of good and evil, of the thirst for happi- 
ness and the reality of suffering, which I know to lie at the
1 
"bottom of religious thought and emotion.'
This experience he could only compare to the "Tolle, 
Lege 1 of St. Augustine's conversion, and it was undoubtedly the 
new interest engendered by Baur's work which made him determine 
to enter Harvard in order to equip himself linguistically for a 
study of comparative religion^. Here his fellow student was 
Irving Babbitt, a year his junio^ and in every way an admirable 
foil for More's still impressionable and more feminine genius.
Babbitt was virile, dogmatic, rarely moving from his intellectual
1 2 
concusions once his mind was made up. He had graduated from Har-
A
vard, had taught for a time in Montana, and had then spentxa year 
in Paris, studying under Sylvain LeVi. He had a natural love of
the classics which, according to his own account, had been born in 
o
him} the vaguely romantic enthusiasms of his fellow student were 
anathema to him. More says of himself that at the outset of the
1.More, Shelburne Essays VI,(New York and Londoni190917pp-g5~fi^.
2.More, New Shelburne Essays 111,On Being-Human,(Princeton; 1956),
pjj. 28 "9.
3. Ibid.,p.S9.
8friendship he occupied for Babbitt the position later held by 
Rousseau. Irving Babbitt had already made up his mind on many 
of the major issues confronting the age, Llore was still in 
process of being shaped by the influences playing upon him. 
The friendship was therefore from his angle the more fructifying. 
What More was to become, for better, for worse, was largely
determined by the impact of Babbitt's personality upon his
1 
during the .three yeats at Harvard. This friendship may rank
among the great literary friendships of the last two centuries 
which have decided the intellectual destiny of one, if not of 
both, of the two people involved; with the friendships of vifords- 
worth and Coleridge, Tennyson and Arthur Hallam, Arnold and A.H. 
Clough, and less widely known in this country, though perhaps 
more decisive in its effects than any of the others, Renan and 
the young French scientist, Berthelot. The friendship of More 
and Babbitt offers a striking parallel to this last example. 
More, like Renan, '«as passing through an acite religious crisis 
at the time of meeting, and for that reason, his naturally sus- 
ceptible spirit was, just as Renan's had been, all the more sus- 
ceptible to the new influences his companion brought to bear
upon him. In his essay on'Irving Babbitt 1 in On ...Be ing Human, 
More recalls at length the battles of words they waged during
their peregrinations along the old North Avenue and Brattle 
Street,or in their respective rooms whenever wet weather or
the lateness of the hour drove them indoors.'And I can see,
l7The first~of these three years was when they~"were"~students to-
? ether, the second when Babbitt returned to Harvard as instructor n French after an interval of a year at Williams, and a third in 1899-1900 when More was doing special work for Professor lanman 
under whom they had both been students,ci.New Shelburne Essays!llly"—————————————p. 33.
(re. 
almost hear, himAnow as he used to pace "back and forth the few
steps from wall to wall, arguing vehemently on whatever question
might be "breached, o r recounting the adventures of his youth
(a strange and mixed experience), pausing at every fourth or fifth
turn to take huge draughts from the water jug on my wash-stand,
1 
and pretty well emptying it in the course of an evening.' To
Babbtbt
More, it* was greater as a talker than as a teacher or as an author,
2 
a judgment "borne out "by Professor G.R.Elliott of Amherst. As a
listener, he was a strange, almost terrifying phenomenon.He would 
gaze away from the speaker in a manner suggesting remoteness, but 
let the luckless individual utter one rash statement or a logical
fallacy and 'he was likely to be caught up by a swift direct glance
3 
that seemed to shoot out tentacles, as it were, into his very soul*
One such instance More recalls when, as they were strolling along 
North Avenue 1 engaged in debate over I cannot remember what matterj 
Babbitt'suddenly stopped short,faced about upon me, and,with both 
hands rigidly clenched, ejaculated*"Good God, man, are you a Jesuit 
in disguise?"The words may sound flat enough in the repeating; but 
as they were hurled out,with the accompanying gesture and glance of 
indignation, they made an impression not to be forgotten'; and,More
adds^with a sudden stroke of whimsy, 'I^have never been able to
4
answer the question satisfactorily'.______________________ 
E7Gf.l^_Am£rJLc^n_Revi.ew, April 1937, Vol.IX Ho.1,G.R.Elliott, 
'More's Christology',pp.35-36, in which he contr-sts More, 'the 
Hermit_of Princeton' with his sheer joy in writing, with -^abbitt, 
' .the Warring Buddha of Harvard' to whom writing was merely a duty, 
and who rejoiced when he might emerge from the study into the 
larger freedom of a bout of argument.
?.More, leauShelburne Essays 111,p?.26. .Ibid. ,przrr ——
10
The subjects ef these debates were mainly literary. Babbitt 
encouraged More to leave the false glamours of romanticism for 
the sounder beauties of the Classics, and at the same time,to 
find in Oriental literature the calm and detachment from merely 
sensuous impressions which More sorely needed. But even in their 
mutual interest in their studies in Hinduism, there was a dispar- 
ity of outlook. More's innate niysticism led him to concentrate
upon the Sanskrit literature of the Up.anishads,the Shagavad Gitji
1 
and the Vedantic theosophy, while Babbitt's more positivistic and
attached 
practical outlook %x± him to the P&li texts which contained the
most authentic record of the Buddhistic dhamma with its emphasis
2 
upon austere self-discipline. To this early preference Babbitt
remained unswervingly loyal throughout his career, whereas More,
1 
as we shall see evoved away from his early Brahminism to a Plat-
5 
onism supplemented by Christian theology of the Greek type. Thus,
when their discussions were resumed during the academic year 
1925-1926 when More was acting as a substitute at Harvard for an 
absent member of the Classical 1/epartment, the subject of their
debate was changed, although its intensity was unimpaired by the
4 
long interval. Babbitt had lost nothing of his old confidence and
aggressiveness, and night after night in the house which Llore had
taken over for the year, he would sit on one side of the great fire.
c 
place, with More as his ^shall I say, his glad vitim7-«  and pour
I7TbTd._,p.33.——————————————— 
2«Ibid. ,p.32. 
3.Ibid.,p.55. 
4.Ibid.,p.54.
11
'out such a stream of argument, invective, and persuasion as 
had not, I am sure,been heard before in Cambridge^cTwill
*
never be heard again. It was magni.f i£ueJL_et _cj_etait_la guerreJ'^ 
'Naturally', adds More,'I thought at the time I was right, as 
I still think; but if victory ever lodged on my side, it was of
a very private sort, known only to myself when ± crept to bed.
2 But oh the wonder and glitter of those defeats]'
Side by side with I/tore's own impressions of these debates,
It is interesting to set the anecdote he tells of a cultured
latter.
Hindu's reactions to Babbitt.THi had been in Harvard and had
*
mat Babbitt through Here's introduction. When More later had 
occasion to ask him, at a dinner given by Frank Mather, another 
of the New Humanist group, what he thought of Babbitt,the Hindu 
replied,quickly and enthusiastically*'"Oh, Babbitt, he is a 
holy man, a great saintJ"''Now holiness',says More,'is the last 
trait that most of us in the West would attribute to one of 
Babbitt's self-assertive character, but the word came quite 
naturally from an Oriental to whom the saint is a man notable 
rather for his will-power than for meek submissiveness. It was, 
perhaps, because I ventured upon some criticism of this kind 
that the Hindu visitor put me in my place:"You are not a saint 
at all, but only a philosopher"} and then answering a question
of our host about himself added, with a twinlle in his.eye:
3 
"And you, my dear Prank, are the wickedest man I know". 1
J7 Ibid.73i5»
2. IMd. ,pp» 55-56.
5. Ibid.,p.42.
Such a story tells us almost as much about More as it does 
about Babbitt, but this is to anticipate.In 1893, More took 
a second Master's degree, and from 1894-1895, he acted as 
Professor Lanman's assistant at Harvard. The growing influence of
Indian philosophy upon his thought at the time may be seen clear-
1 ly from his next printed work, The Great Refusal.published in
1894. This is obviously biographical, and records the development 
of his own spiritual beliefs and conflicts. The central theme is 
the love of a young man of considerable intellectual promise for 
a beautiful woman whom, eventually, he decides not to marry. The 
book consists of letters and poems sent to her, and Paul More is 
ostensibly just the editor. Actually the letters and poems were 
written by More himself during the year before he went to Har- 
vard to a young lady with whom he had fallen deeply in love. The 
identity of the lady remained a secret for many years, but sev- 
eral years after Paul More's death, Professor Louis Trenchard 
More informed Professor Shafer that she was a Miss Sadie Brank, 
daughter of a Presbyterian clergyman, whom More had met through
her brother, a student at the Smith Academy while he was a teach-
2 
er there. The love lyrics were of the same subjective tone as the
poems in Helena , although F.J.Mather thought highly enough of it
4
as a whole f. to liken it to a new VltaJiUOY_a_. To llim> Paul yjore, 
like Dante, had embodied in the beauty and loveliness of a fair
^ (New
_ _.YorkJ,1894T. This is another of More's early works which I have 
f ailed, to obtain. It would Toe, I understand, from Dr.Dakin, of con- 
siderable importance in an historical study of his thought in its arlier days, but it is less important for a systematic approache  
to tliink ll^h assures me that her father came 
p.Shafer.Paul J^lmer Mo_re,A iTote on His Verse and Progp 3 etc. ,p50
1
woman all his own lofty idealisms. The work is of further 
interest, it would appear, for the light it throws on the author's 
growing discontentnwith his position of intellectual agnosticism. 
He was trying to find refuge in an eclectic mysticism, drawn from 
Oriental, Manichae an and mediaeval sources, but throughout he 
remained at heart romantically introspective and melancholy.That 
he finally decided to abandon so tortuous a love-affair for a 
whole-hearted dedication to the quest for truth, we must give
credit, suggests Professor Shafer, less to his own initiative
2 
than to the good sense of the lady in terminating the courtship.
This was probablyftrue in actual fact, as it appears Miss Brank 
precipitated More's decision no longer to divide his mind between 
love and letters by deciding herself to marry someone else.
In 1894, More became an assistant in Sanskrit and 
Classics at Bryn Mawr College, and the following year contributed 
a short paper, The Influences of Hindu Thought on Manichaei.sm«_____ 
to the sixteenth volume of the Journal of the American Oriental 
Society. In preparing for this, he was amazed by the facility witK 
which he found it possible to prove experimentally any point he 
desired, although to him the inherent truth of the proposition 
might remain in doubt. He had early seen the fatuousness of -so- 
called scientific positivism, and had developed a distrust of 
purely specialist studies RE opposed to a more general humane 
culture. Thus when he took up his studies at Harvard, he refused t
__________ . _______ ___. _________ .. _____________________
I.Frank Jowett Mat her, Obituary Notice on TTore in the ?rpce_e_ii^njs__jf
of The American Academy of Arts and sciences, Vol.LX}:IiT"'sy
" _  ____
2. Shafer, Paulllme _______ re_and_Ame r i c an Critiqj.sm.pf>. 70-76
14
work for a doctorate, knowing that that would have entailed a 
special study of linguistics, whereas he wished in the short 
time at his disposal to cover as wide and literal a course as 
possible. Now, more than ever, he wa.s convinced of the speciousness 
of applying the supposedly infallible methods of natural science 
to subjects concerned primarily with the habits and movements of 
man. He was thrown back more violently than ever upon the under- 
lying dualism of life which his discovery of Manichaeism had 
revealed to him, and in his desire to think out his own position 
clearly and dispassionately, away from the distracting company 
of other men, he gave up his post at Bryn Mawr and retired to a 
quiet village, Shelburne, in the valley of the Androscoggin, where,
with only a faithful dog for a companion, he sought to come to
1 
terms with life.
The dramatic nature of his withdrawal fro-n what had 
appeared his life's work in the university world, the solitude of fcj 
his retreat, the scope and insight of the work v/hich resulted fro^i 
it, have all focussed attention upon this one incident in his life. 
The ideas which matured during the two years' seclusion had obviousi 
ly been fomenting for so:Tie time. Babbitt's attempt to eradicate 
from Eore's system all traces of a belated romanticism and to 
substitute for it the Buddhistic stress upon self- mastery and dei 
tachment from the thraldom of the senses was bearing fruit, al- 
though there is something ironically incongruous in one who was
l.More, Shelburne Essays l,t>p.5-5.
15
to "become the archenemy of Romantic ism seeking refuge in such 
a typicallvy romantic flight from the world. Moreover, More's 
growing interest in the Classics had led him to find a deep and 
vital satisfaction in Platonic philosophy. Here he found the 
same dualistic conception of the universe as that which had
struck him in Manichaeism and which Babbitt found at the basis
1 
of Buddhism, the antithesis of the One and the Many. From the
withdrawal to Shelburne onwards, this antithesis became the 
central motif of all More's work. It was to lead him beyond the 
confines of purely literary criticism, but whatever his subject*, 
history, sociology, philosophy, theology, , there is present through- 
out euery aspect of his work ±feEx a deep underlying unity lent it 
by the recurrence of the one perennial problem, the relation of 
the One abiding Ultimate to the multiform and changing phenomena 
of the natural world.
Prior to his withdrawal to Shelburne, within a year 
of the appearance of The Gre_at Refusal »More had become engaged to 
his future wife, Miss Henrietta Beck of St. Louis. During his stay 
at Shelburne, he completed a small book on which he had been at 
work intermittently for several years, A Century of Indian Epi-
t which WB.S published early in 1898. During the same period,
he prepared for the press translations of the Apology, the Grito
roductory 
and the closing scenes of the Phaedo, which, with an i
essay, appeared as The Judgment of Socrates. The following year, he
published a translation into prose and verse of Aeschylus' Prometheus 
Bound* In addition, he \vrote the essays which were to become the 
First Series of the Shelburne Essays, and in which many of the
ideas which had occupied "both More and Babbitt during their college
1 
discussions were first to see the light of day. More knew now that
2 
his bent was critical, not creative. Helena,The Great Refusal,The
Century of Indian Epigrams, had all been attempts to find the true 
nature of his talents, but for some reason deeper rooted even than 
Arnold's dread of the paralysing effect of the critical mind upon
poetic inspiration ,More was unable to realise his obvious ambition
3 
as a creative writer. This sterility Shafer attributes, in true
Arnoldian vein, to the peculiar spiritual climate of the day which 
was producing men of genius who were nevertheless emotionally stunted 
afad baffled by the lack of any genuine centre about which to organise 
themselves and so become persons in the true and full sense of the 
word. It is to the everlasting credit of More that he recognised in 
himself and in his generation this impotencyas, and although he 
emerged from Shelburne without resolving finally any of the pro- 
blems which he had wanted to consider in solitude, he had made the 
most important of all his decisions, to devote his life to a crit- 
ical analysis of the conditions making for the contemporary Zeit- 
Geist. For this he was exceptionally well equipped by the study 
and mental discipline of the years from 1887-1897, and the complete
1. Of.pp. V/-73.
2. T'ore, Shelburne Essays l,p.2.
3. Shafer, Paul Elmer More ..amd__Ame_rican_Gr.lti.ci§.l» pp.96-98.
lack of all cultural tradition in the outpost society of his
boyhood and youth had brought home to him in all its stark
1 
urgency the need of creating a conscience in intellectual things.
His criticism grew therefore out of no remote and academic curiosity,
"but out of a real and passionate concern with the spiritual and
2 
intellectual requirements of meh in his own generation. It was one
3
of the cruel ironies of fate that More whose whole career was motivate
A
"by a deep-seated interest in humanity should have been regarded by
so many of his contemporaries as merely indifferent to his fellow- 
3
men. In his Pages From an Oxford Diary, he Complained that men,by
a strange mischance, have insisted on regarding him, 'whose life
has been a passage through storms of passion 1 , as 'a cold and heart-
4 
less individual. '
His articles were accepted by the Atlantic Monthly and 
otherperiodicals and he was able to leave Shelburne in the autumn 
of 1899 with a little money in the bank and the prospect of future 
work as. a free-lance critic. He spent the winter in Harvard in 
order to work in the library there, and from 1899-1900, he held
the minor post already mentioned in the University as assistant
5 
to Professor Lanman,whEeh enabled him to engage in the task of
translation from the Sanskrit. He was also producing a short life of 
Franklin for llessrs. Houghton, ''ifflin and Co., to be included in 
the Riverside Biographical Series,, and editing Byron for a volume
l.Shafer, oj)« cit. ,p.99.
2« The ITew RepubliE, 7uly 7, 1957, Vol.LXXXXl, Ho. 1179,Letter from 
Theodore M. Greene, p.254.
3. Cf.pp.'wt-'O.
4. More, Pages From an Qxfo_rd Diary, Section V.
5. Cf.p.^n.
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in the Cambridge Poets^Series for the same firm. This was his 
position at the time of his marriage in 1900, but the precar- 
iousness of such a career soon began to make itself felt, and 
he was glad to accept, through the good offices of William 
Roscoe XXpOl Thayer, a post as literary Editor of Xhe Independent 
which he took up early in 1901, This was followed in 1903 by a 
similar post on the staff of the Hew York Evenifag Post which he 
held until 1909 when he took over the Xi*8xsu?y editorship of 
The Nation, then still cinservative in outlook.Both the New York 
Evening Post and The Nation were then controlled by Oswald Garri- 
son Villard, and were therefore closely connected. In the Preface 
to Series Ten of the Shelburne Essays* More recalls with zest his 
journalistic days, when, in the double role of editor and contrib- 
utor he 'wrote with the pen in one hand and the blue pencil in the
1 
other'. Not infrequently he was accused unjustly of writing the
more severe anonymous reviews, and subjected to the abuse of in- 
censed authors.Nevertheless he was ready to defend the principle 
of anonymous reviewing, for there was to him something far heal- 
thier in anonymous mud-slinging than in the excessive laudation 
found in the signed review. Nor was the mud-slinging of critics 
as despicable as the more insidious jealousy of the university 
world which led ^embers of the faculty to boycott works by any 
author unconnected with their own circle. In fetrospect, More 
obviously felt a certain nostalgia for the joys of battle; rather 
T7Mo~re"7 ShilburnelE"sI^i^"rrSoston''"aiic!riTeiv~Y^r1:: \ 1919T,pp.V-X. ~
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a different More from the austere lhama of literature in whom
1 
Mencken would have us believe. Commenting upon this period of
More's career, Stuart Sherman recalled his personal experience 
of More and Hammond Lament, 'two editors who taught their re- 
viewers to fear nothing but deviations from the truth, and the
2 
insidious vices of puffery and log-rolling'.
The strenuouos duties of his post were not allowed
to interfere with More's own reading. By adopting a strict routine, 
he was able to complete his editorial tasks by Friday- Every 
evening was devoted to the particular critical problem which
was engaging his attention. On Saturdays and Sundays, he spent
3 
twelve to sixteen hours a day on composition. In this way he
was enabled to produce the monumental volumes of The Shelburne 
Essays whilst still, for the greater part, employed in editorial at 
work. The First Series had appeared in 1904, and in the same 
year there was published anonymously The Jes.si.ca Letters . written 
in collaboration with a Mrs. Corra May Harris who had been a 
contributor to The Independent. Out of the correspondence which 
passed between her and the Literary Editor issued the idea of a 
romance in the form of letters exchanged between a Hew York 
editor and the daughter of a country preacher in (Morningtown', 
Georgia. Mrs. Harris carriedfbut her part of the project most 
successfully, and rade Jessica a lively and charming character 
in whom it is possible to belive, More, on the other hand, was
1.H.I.Mencken, Prejudices, Third SetTes7 (London;" 19 2Z I,pp7l7^7 
2.Stuart P. Sherman, Americans.(Hew York} 1925),p.51^. 
o.Ed. 7/illird p^rp,The_Lives_of E^hteen From Princeton,
(Princeton} 1946), WhKney ^a^T^n^mer Mor7?, P . 50 6.
not really suited to the task, and the editor- lover, Philip 
Towers, remains anaemic and unconvincing. The "book throws light, 
however, on one important aspect of More's development, his de- 
cisive rejection of 'humanitarianism'. Jessica is full of lofty social 
sympathies, but her lover points out the dangers of an indisctim-
inate sentimentality which lays too exclusive an emphasis upon
1 
material well-being. It is worthwhile noticing More's attitude
to th problem at a time when Babbitt had not yet published his
2 
Literature_and._the.._Arnerican Co 11ege. The distinction between
humanism and humanitarianism is already implicit in The Jessica
% 
Letters.
More's connection with The Nation came to an end in 1914 
on the eve of the Great War. I am grateful to Dr. Dakin for the 
details of the resignation. From a passing reference, J. "had gath- 
ered the appointment came to a'stormy 1 close.it i s clear from Dr. 
Dakin's fuller account that there was nothing at all stormy about 
the episode, although Ifore had little in COT" on with Oswald Garri- 
son Villard, the power "behind the paper. As long as More was given 
complete freedom in his own sphere, he could afford to ignore this 
lack of sympathy, and Villard realised More's value to the paper 
sufficiently to refrain from interference. More had, however, long 
been feeling the strain ofjdoing his scholarly work with one hand
the* only other wor'c of Here's vrhic'i I have be<?n unable 
to oM.ain for mir-poseF of reference.
A V J Ifa t he r, Jnr. , 0"h Uu ary Notice, r r o_cee..-Uvigi s._o f_;tjie _Amer. ic_an 4.F.J r
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and his editing with another. By 1913, an opportune legacy to 
his wife had made Here sufficiently independent financially to 
retire if he chose, and he sent in his resignation in August 
1913, to take effect /.hen most convenient f or thai ria.Tier,which
s^» 
- - »
proved to be March 1914. The trustees of She Nation prevailed upon 
him to continue to act in an advisory capacity, which he did 
until 1917, by which time !Ir. Villard had so changed the charac- 
ter of the magazine that More could no longer conscientiously 
subscribe to its views.
Weary of the noise and bustle of New York, More
was glad,upon.his resignation in 1914,to withdraw to Princeton. Here 
his services were soon enlisted by Principal Hibben on behalf of
I/ U ££ X c*U. LA a* U C w JL do o t? o
Princeton University where he lectured*on Greet philosophy and 
Classics until his retirement in 1934. These lectures occupied
in the main one term of each academic year,and thus he was left
1 
with plenty of time for independent study. He now had the means
and the leisure to become one of that small select body which 
America so sorely needed an intellectual £lrte_who, not having 
to work for a living, could dedicate their time to the pursuit 
of a liberal culture. 'He was', wrote u. L.Phelps, l an independent 
scholar, completely untrammelled, free from committees and all the 
machinery of education. He loved learning for its own sake and might 
never have produced so many books if it had not been that he also
loved humanity with equal passion} so that he felt it necessary
3 to give to others the results of his learning and meditations. T
22.
But his experience was not only of giving. He found he had 
also much to receive. The intimate contact with young minds at 
Princeton gave Paul More in turn a new stimulation. Unlike 
Babbitt at Harvard whose 'dynamism* had brought him hosts of 
followers ovwr whom he ruled with unwavering rigour, More did not 
attempt to convert his students to his point of view. His great x 
ambition was to make them think for themselves, that each student 
'should forge for himself his conclusions, his convictions, his 
intellectual and spiritual integrations'. It seens that at times 
he was exasperated by their desire to reduce their immediate ex- 
perience to a rationalistic monism, as in the case of the student
to whom he remarked'with a combination of acerbity and good hum-
2 
ours"What?You're not another damned monist, are you? 1 , but on the
the v/hole, he found in thesex discussions the pleasure of personal 
contact with other minds which he had so long had to forego during 
the years of concentration when he was on the staff of TJhe ' Tew 
York_Svening. J?os_t and The. Nation.
His habit of following a strict routine was,
however, too deeply engrained for him ever to abandon it, and 
his days at Princeton were divided regularly and systematically 
between people and reading. During his later years, the first 
fifteen or thirty minutes of every morning were given to read- 
ing the Old Testament in Hebrew, a study he commenced at the age of 
sixty. Then came a period of work on whatever project he had on 
hand. After lunch and a rest, he would walk half a mile to the cent:
tre of the town to a restaurant cabled The Bait for his afternoon 
cup of coffeee, There he met his friends,  amongst them Dean 
Robert K. Root of the University Faculty, and Professor F.J.Mather 
of the Art Department, 'a lifelong friend with whom he waged an un- 
ending but amiable intellectual war 1 ,  and presided over their many 
-sided conversation with the versatility of a modern Dr- Johnson.
V
The evenings were again spent amongst his fiends, in playing 
or Conhr&cJ" bridge,
talking, or entertaining them wit th the flute which it
appears More played none too well. At one time he organised a 
theological discussions group where papers were read by Anglican x 
and Roman Catholic laymen and clergy.
Whatever More was doing, reading, lecturing or dis- 
cussing, he was still ben# on the main quest of his life, the 
search for truth. As a younger man, he had read biography and 
literature always with the one end in view, that of learning the 
secret of existence from the experience of other men. Now in his
later years he turned increasingly to philosophy and theology.
2 
He had, as he put it himself, come around in a great circle, He
had a natural interest in theology, as his sermon at eight might
3 
prove. He had moved away from that centre, but throughout the
various phases of his intellectual and spiritual evolution, he.«as 
still vitally concerned with attaining for himself a working 
philosophy of life and letters. WTien he left Shelburne, he had 
by no means succeeded in solving all the problems confronting
2. More, Pag_es_BBom_an Oxford _D_iarv_, Section V.
3.Cfo p. 1»
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himself and his age. At the most, he had rediscovered a sense of fit 
direction, and the rest of his life was spent in exploring the 
path which opened up, step by step, ahead of him. But as he saw 
the frustration of so many of his fellowmen who, like himself, 
had set out to find truth, he came to ask himself whether the 
world was not after all an illusion, as the Hindus taught. In 
this frame of mind, his ardent curiosity and insatiable thirst 
for knowledge were gradually transformed into a sense of man's
great need for faith- During the last twenty years of his life,
be- 
he came increasingly absorbed in a critical examination of the
grounds of Christian faith, and no# unnaturally in one with his 
classical background, the medium through which he approached 
this growing religious apprehension was that of Greek philosophy. 
'Then began a passionate search to discover the eternal verities 
behind the veil  the realm of Ideas which Plato taught, and in 
which my soul could move, some day if not now, in liberated joy. 
I can say simply and without reservation that to this goal I 
attained and that I shall end my days a conscious, as I was born, 
an unconscious Platonist. The visible world of things has con- 
tracted into comparative insignificance save as a symbol of that
which is unseen? the Ideal world has become the vivid reality upon
1
which al"! my deeper emotions are centred. f But even here Kore had
no permanent resting place; he could not rest in mere abstraction,
2 
Tthe realm of Ideas', 'a cold vacuum of inanimate images'. He needed
the assurance of a living and personal God, and this he could find
T.~More, _
2. Ib.il. > Toe ..cIT.
only in and through the doctrine of the Incarnation. This doc- 
trine "became for More during hie last years the pivot upon which 
his whple world turned.
The development of More's thought during this period 
is contained in the six volumes of The ureek Tr_adltion,ranging 
ffotn Socrates to a vindication of the work of the Council of
C^alcedon which finally defined the Church's attitude to the
1 
dual nature of Christ. He "began work on the project as early
as 1914. The nucleus of the study was present in 1917 in the 
Vanuxem Lectures which More delivered in Irinceton, but this 
was enlarged and developed until at last it grew into a complete 
record of the stages by which More was able to pass from scepti- 
cism to a lively faith in the efficacy of Christianity. Finally 
in 1934 was published The, Sceptical Approach _to. ..Religion _ } the 
second of the three volumes of the ^ew Shelburne "*"ssays, in which 
he concentrated the essence of %he £ree_k Tradition in£o a single 
book, based on the Lowell lectures which he had delivered at Boston
More was undoubtedly inspired in his attempt to work
2 
out his own credo by the influence of his wife, a devout Christian*
but I&Xg. before he had completed The, ij.reek Tradition.. Mrs. More 
had died as a result of heart trouble in 1928/. That he had already
travelled far along the road to belief by that time emerges clear- 
Ay from his spiritual autobiography, Pages FRom an Oxford Diary,
composed four vpp.rs earlier,in 1924,during a visit with his own
l.Cf.pp. 435ff.
P.P. J.Mather, -Tnr. , op.cit. ,-n. 371.
 fc 
1
and his brother's family to Europe. The fiction of the Oxford 
Professor who records his reflections on his own inner life is
sufficiently transparent for us to recognise the book for what
£ it is, More's Confess.i_o_JFi_dei., written out of a deep personal
need o^ faith and revealing the scope and intensity of his read- 
ing in the field of religion. He had intended the book for no 
eyes but his own,and to all intents an^ purposes, the work was 
forgotten, until,only a few weeks before his death, the manu- 
script was found among his papers. More was persuaded to allow it
to be published. It was prepared for the press by the hejji of his
3 and 
daughter, Mrs. Harry Fine,MliH other friends who read it over to
him, and it was eventually finished three days before his death.
So absorbed had More become in the task of examining 
experientially the claims of Christianity that he had had little 
time to consider his own health until, in 1935, a serious oper- 
ation became inevitable. This merely prolonged his life for two 
years at the" cost of great suffering. From the time when he was 
no longer able to 50 out, the conversations over coffee took place
in his living room, and then when he was confined to bed, one or
4 
two of his most intimate friends took turns to visit him every
l.To this period belongs the aneddote related by More in his Mar- 
g_inalia»Americ;an_Rey-_i ew,N"vember 1936,Vol.Vlll,No.l,of how, after 
being reprimanded in the Bodleian for writing on a shteet of paper 
which was lying on an open volume,he asked 'the watch-dog'what 
would be done to the man whp cut the pages of the ancient tomes 
where they were still uncut.'Oh,says he, we thank him for that 1 . 
When next More went in he found at every r<esk in the readin^ room 
a paper-cutter attached to a long abd shining chain.'My epitaph', 
says More,'is prepared and ready to be engraved in marble*Here lies 
one who wrought a revolution in the Bodleian',p.11.
fM^^OT-^^
4-. The Amer^an Re^p, N OV. iqjfc, ]>£ ./*lone//»'\«>rgif\*li& 1 b&yshibutr t four 
CKtst Fne»\cis. l ""<-,B*lii»»*>ar*Afij' i Fr*ner% 6o«l» /ph»r\,wKi>n<.y <W*3i 77-vto
iron-gray aspect. There was in his face much strength and
1 
some nobility, but a curious absence of colour. ' The picture
Wilson draws of More's manner likewise fits in with this ab- 
sence of colour; even the room in which they met was 'sombre 1 .
'A common greyness silvers everything^-
All in a twilight '----- '.all is silver-grey 
Placid and perfect ',2 J
at least for some time, until wilson begins to detect an
acerbity and censoriousness underlying More's outward calm,
3 
in contrast to the blandness and tolerance of Gauss.
It is such views as this which have gone to build 
up the impression prevailing generally of either a humour- 
less, pedantic and acrimonious scholar, or of a remote and 
impassive high-priest of letters, pronouncing his verdicts 
I* i s therefore significant to set beside Wil-
son's description of More, a short letter written by Dean 
Gauss himself in which he maintains a half-way position be- 
tween the adulation of lore's ITev; Huinsnistlf ollowers and the 
unsympathetic impressions of the young Tan he himself took 
to visit Xore. 'One reason for the bitterness of the con- 
troversy about humanism is the fact that Paul Xore, who was 
fundamentally as honest and sincere a man as ever I knew, used 
his pen as a broadsword. On the personal side he was, one of
T7~Edmund '"^ITs^n^The^T r i^pTe Jfhlnjce r i, ( I Ond'on J "~19 38 ) T>78 . It f i r s t 
appeared in The Hew Republic, May 26, 1937, Vol.LXXXXl,No.ll73, 
and evoked a lively controversy amongst More's friends, of .The __ 
Hew Republic June 9,1937,Vol.LXXXXl, Mo. 1175; July 7, 1937, Vol. 
LXXXX1 No. 1179, & July 21,1937, Vol-IXXXXl No. 1181. 
2. Robert Browning, And re_a_d e l._&ar_t o_.
S.Edmund Wilson, op. crU_,p.8; cf. letter written to wilson by 
Stark Young, New RepubTrcT June 9, 19^7,Vol.LZXXXl,No.ll75,p.l30.
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the finest people in the world and to talk to him in little 
groups where we were al.l friendly, even though we disagreed was 
a most profitable and gratifying way of spending an evening. In 
the give and take of such meetings it was possible to check ±JtK 
with a humorous remrjik a tendency on the part of anyone to crusade 
or pontificate or run away with the ball, and it was possible
0
to discuss many of the pints in controversy between More and
A
his opponents. Some of these meetings I remember with very deep 
satisfaction and if there could have been more of them and more 
people could have known More in his habit as he lived, much would 
have been gained. No one that I knew ever left such a meeting 
with the slightest doubt of the depth of More's convictions or of 
his fundamental sincerity or integrity.'
'More', Gauss goes on, 'was to my mind a far abler 
critic than Brunetiere but both harmed themselves by always
writing what Brunetiere called in one of his volumes "discours de
1 
combat". This merely sharpens points of disagreement by arousing
emotional sensibilities involved in pride of intellect and vit- 
iates the atmosphere in which fruitful discussion might take place. 
I very much wish,in the interest of having More and his cause re- 
presented aright, that this aura of controversy could have been
fCi
dispelled'*
This tendency of More's to espouse almost exclusively 
one side of a controversial issue is well illustrated by the
1. Babbitt, it seems, was constantly taking More to task for his 
tendency to alienate his opponents, of, New She'1 burns Essays m
p. 36*
2.The.-Am£j:lc.aii_^itLOjLar, Autumn 1938, Vol. 7, No.4, Letter by Dean 
Graussjr> ^tforc's Q>ro&3 swora. & Pen?
instance of a lecture on Proust which he delivered at Princeton. 
This was to hare been given originally to a small and informal 
gathering, but the news attracted a large audience, so that the 
room was full to overflowing. After handing out a brief tribute 
to Proust's literary powe»e, More plunged into a lively attack 
on the view of life presented in A La iiecherche d'un Temps Perdu 
overlooking almost completely in the heat of controversy Proust's 
strong ethical purpose in exposing the corruption of French soc- 
iety. It was long before the passions roused by the lecture sub- 
sided, but More himself, in private conversation some time after- 
wards, admitted quite freely Proust's artistic merits for which 
he had not allowed at all in public. He was adamant, however, that 
'in the perspective of a total view of life, traditionally Platon- 
ic and Christian, the artistic merits of Proust were irrelevant', 
and that further, his own role was to be concerned, not withaesthetfcj
but with* the evaluating of the comprehensive philosophical issues.
1 
at atake'.
lore's problem and privilege was to have been born with 
a burning desire for the abiding and supernatural values of Beauty,' 
Truth and Goodness in an age when everything, including critical 
opinion, had assumed the kaleidoscopic mutability of nature, Before 
we can fully realise the importance of his contribution to criti- 
cal thought in his day, we shall have to consider the many forces 
at work making for anarchy and confusion in the world of literature.
1-Eds. Willi&m Thorp, op_.__c it., f.314.
arq
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It was generally accepted that, if one was educated, one was 
naturally on the side of the modern "belief in a certain forward 
impetus which was sweeping everyone and everything with it in the 
direction of fuller individual freedom and self-expression. To 
pause to enquire what one was going to do with this freedom or 
to what ends one wanted to use one's right jro self-expression 
was mere hespeyy to the majority of writers in More's day. It was
More's peculiar mission to ask just those unpopular questins./\
and to "bring to "bear upon the answers the light of his almost 
encyclopae die knowledge. TJiere was nothing remote or academic
»
about the questions, and if the vastness of the learning with 
which he supported the solution he put forwaid to the modern 
problem seemed embarrassing to men of lesser culture, the fault 
was not with More. He was simply being true to his understanding 
of the best that had been thought and said, and the underlying 
unity of purpose in applying this knowledge to the contemporary 
problem kept this knowledge from deteriorating into -aere eclec- 
ticism.
'His reading----was inspired from the first by an absorbing 
search for Godj and if that quest took him in strange directions, 
from German romanticism, through hard rationalism, and liindu 
philosophy to Platonism, and finally to Patriotic theology, it 
imposed upon all his intellectual wanderings and upon all the 
writings in which they were reflected and recorded a singleness of 
aim of which he himeelf was, at the time of writing, only partly
J'empis 
aware. This singleness of aim is what Thomas aksooitix called
"purity of intention", and it renders its possessors, as he said,
1 
indifferent to the judgments of men'.
It is this 'purity of intention', this absolute
integrity ivhich emerges most clearly frcom 9,117 picture of Paul
<-, 
^
Elmer T"I0 re when he is judged by his peers, and not "by men rendered 
uneasy anr- prejudiced. by his superior knowledge.The important 
thing to him was to find the cone thing necessary'; r^nd in a time 
of moral confusion, that one thing v;as to hold up before his aud- 
ience clear and impelling standards of behaviour, supported by 
faith in an unseen world. Go convinced was he of the urgency of
er«*tion
this message a.nd its power to meet the deepest needs of his gen-^ 
that he made no attempt to tickle hie reader'& palate to induce 
him to accept it. This unwillingness on lore's part to employ
v.hat Stuart Oherman described, after his secession from the rtjiks
\j 
of the Ilew Humanists, as= 'tat, tec/mi cue of ingi atiation'has been
attributed to his pride and genial imp?ssivity, as '.veil at to
4 
lack of sympathy with the common man. The truth is that iiore felt
too much, not too little, io intense was his feeling of the vital 
importance of what he via?, advocating that he was unable to realise 
that other men required a sugar coating around the pill upon which, 
to J'lore, their immediate restoration depended. He could not see how 
any sensible man required persuasion to make him swallow what was
so obviuusly necessary to his own well-being.
___________ ___ __ __ ____ _ _ P: S: R i ch ard s _ ___
1.The Criterion, October 1937- July l93S,ToI."XVTT, HeYiew 'of'Tages"
_grp_u an. Oxford _^ iary , p
?,.F.J.Mather, Jnr. .Q-J. cit. ,-p. 572 "! "~~ 523 * 
S.Stvart P. Sherman, op,'«"c:it. ,p.3^'0. 
4. Ibidjp'O. 3.-.3-S6.
Nevertheless, I do not believe for a moment that l^ore
was under any illusion about the type of reader his 
criticism was likely to touch. He made no pretensions to be 
writing for the man in the street. The danger og social disin- 
tegration he saw coming less from the ignorance and wilfulness 
of the masses than from the moral and intellectual confusion of
those who should be their natural leaders, and it was to these
12 5 
'blind guides', in university and pulpit and newspaper office
that his criticism was directed. To realise this is to make 
Sherman's accusations irrelevant when he said:'He(i. e. I/lore) 
takes so little pains, I will not say to be liked, but to be 
comprehended, that I sometimes wonder whether he has ever broad- 
ly considered the function of criticism in a democracy as different 
as ours is from that in Athens. He writes as if unaware* that 
our general Beading fublic is innocent of the best that has been 
said and thought in the world. He writes at least half the time
as if he contemplated an audience of Trents, Coleridges, Johnsons
4 
and CasaubonsJ More was writing for the contemporary equivalents
of these men. There was to him,even within modern democracy,need 
for a criticism which should be addressed primarily to the 
intellectual class in whom he believed ultimately the responsib- 
ility for the future of civilisation was vested. 1>Tor can I see 
that such an aim was any different from that of Matthew Arnold
l.CfTp-p. 3as'-3ayrj^eTburre ILslZvsJaCaosbon and New Vort\7Jzi\pp.
?.Cf«pp. V^/-*?.
3.Cf*pp. 5*2.
4.Stuart P. Sherman, op.cit.«p.53Q.
inspite of Sherman's readiness to contrast More's'indifference' 
to the popular taste with Arnold's desire to diffuse his ideas
and make them prevail by rendering them attractive'"outside the
1 
clique of the cultivated and learned". 1
Not that Kore was lacking, as am man, in any of 
the social graces, '"ithough his conversation lacked the spon- 
taneity of his letter-writing, he cultivated in company some- 
thing of the spre.zzat.ura he held to be the hall-mark of the
2 
gentleman. 'In company', says Professor G.R.Elliott, 'he was
very much the pleasant man of the world} carefully attired, 
physically and mentally, lending an ear to gossip, recounting in 
his turn amusing anecdotes; witty, urbane and even suave. He 
seemed at times anxious to display to his listeners a genial 
indulgence that he denied to his readers. He covered his severe
philosophy with a conversational lid. This,now and then, would lift
half 
a little to let out an acid phase accompanied by a^sardonic
smilej but quickly the lid went on again and the smile smoothed 
up its corners. Just because he was so much a hermit of the 
study he was not to be alone when he was in company.'3 It was 
just this power of Paul Elmer I'ore's to defy close classifi- 
cation which baffled his enemies and sometimes even his friends. 
llr- V/hitney J,Gates in his chapter in The_Lives__of...Eightgen from
Princeton already cited, enumerates the many attempts to esti-
4 
mate his achievement, the majority of them hostile and carping.
1.Ibid.,p.332. , 
2.More, Shelburne ^ssavs 3.1,wcxxalNew York and London, 190£ )p.lo2. 5.The Ame7rc_an~^e'view.April 1957,Vol.lX,No.l,G.ri.Elliott, rMore's
Christology',p»36.
4*. Ed. UJillum* Thorp fifit£&> PJP.
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It is significant how often these hostile criticisms cancel
each other out. The charge O f intolerance ejfid peevishness
1brought against More by certain of his antagonists is neutral- 
ised "by the complaint of others that he will not descend to 
their level to engpfage in open "battle, but instead dwells
remote and serene,coldly detached from the passions of the
2 
war of criticism. Both charges can hardly be true, but his
enemies^in their clamour for a victim, are not particularly 
interested in the consistency of their charges, and so More 
is left facing pairs of contradictory and irreconcilable in- 
dictments, of intolerance and indifference,of cold detachment
and fiery partisanship, of excessive concern with the indiv-
3 
idual and of overlooking the claims of the individual com-
4
pletely in favour of the rights of law and property,of advoc- 
ating a rigid and pedestrian conformity to New England morality, 
'the gloomy gospel of tightness and restraint', and of leaving 
the stanords he is advocating confused and merely implicit, to
^
be determined ultimately by the thoroughly romantic procedure
6 
of individual and ± independent appraisal.
The very multiplicity of these accusations sug- 
gests the many-sidedness of More's thought. In an age of critical
7 
specialists, he was that rara_av.is, the general critic. 'But
for each of these more or less unfriendly appraisals there is
T7Ed._ Harold 3.Stearns Civilisation in the United States,Ernest 
~" Boyd. ,'Givilis3,ion as an Irish-nan Sees Tt'TT^ew York 19'??.)
p.493. 
?.H.L.Kenclrcen, PreJ_udices, Third Series,pp. 176-78.
9, 1930,Vol.LXlll,!To.801,Malcolm Cowley,
4.L1 ewellyn11^ oXesJ0SowSf?o SRei.a 2Sooks, (Hew Y~rk,1930) .pp. 57-4C5. The DialjiVoi.LJCXirJuTY^ec.iyyijrrfliddleton Murry, fPuritan or —————— ' 1ji 'Plaonis
.
a %£X.8KSJ$. powerful positive estimate to be made, each in turn 
reflecting only one aspect of this truly remarkable and many-sided 
man. And lying behind these aspects and fusing them indissolubly 
is the personality of a great human being  indeed a man whom 
the genius of our specialised age finds it virtually impossible 
to evaluate. The literary critic carps, the philosopher deplores,
the theologian is suspicious, for More played all these parts, yet
1 
was greater than the sum of them. f
Perhaps no lines can sum up the impression this many- 
faceted mind and character of More makes upon the unbiassed read- 
er than those lines he himself quotes from a poem of Lionel John- 
son's written to 'A Friend's
'His are the whitenesses of soul
That Virgil hadj he walks the earth 
A classic saint, in self- control ? 
And comeliness, and quiet mirth'*
and if from time to time, in the face of the tragic splendour of
man's eternal destiny, there escapes him a cry of wistful pity
o
which links him with the Romantics whom ostensibly he is ludging 
and finding wanting, is it not because the tension he seeks to 
sustain, tharxlimsxaf is so exacting, the balance so delicate, the 
line of demarcation between mediation and excess so tenuous and 
elusive that only a critic of extremely .acute sensibility could 
ever perceive and hold to it-so consistently in an effort to "hrin? 
'hack to society the sanity, integrity and self-mastery in which he
saw our true humanity to lie?
»i ____ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ __. _____._...___ ________
17Ed7~7iITir»sf T~horp, op.cit.,pj. oO2~50:,. 
2~?*crre, Sfrelburne assays l,j.loo.
3.Of.pp.
vital 
It is, I think, something ef this contrariety of parts that
posterity will find where a Stark Young could see only a 'frigid­ 
ity which, as sleep may do on the sleeper's face, leaves the
vital substance cast in the pallor and retreat of death 1 , 1 
for More's portraits are almost as eloouent of the man a? hisO ~
essays. Contrary to the rnodcrnidt legend, they reveal a T^-llo.;- 
ing, not an atrophying, of the whole personality. The earliest 
does perhaps "betray a certain complacency pervading the firm 
stoclcy ^igure, although the eyes have already their look of 
keen penetration. The mouth has its resoluteness too, but it 
has also a warm, almost voluptuous,curve which denies the im- 
pression of the thin-lipped ascetic ginen by his adversaries. 
By the time of the second photograph, the whole face has grown x. 
richer in expression. The eyes, although still penetrating, have 
taken on a more wistful look, the lips, still full, have a 
slightly quizzical curve. The whole face betokens, not so much 
a smouldering indignation with the evils of the world,as an in- 
finite sadness and pity at the follies of men, tempered by an
3 
irrepressible humour which sees the ridiculous even in what it
most deplores. The greyness Edmund Wils6n noticed is there,but
it is the integrity and clarity, not ihe hardness and coldness, 
of steel which pror'orjinattx, In the third photograph, the wist- 
ful ness of the eyes, that almost baffled look, which found so
1. ThVTew_Republic, June 971937, Vol. LXXXX1, "o. 1175 ,Ietter
"by Stark Young, p. 130.
2. The three photographs I h^ve in -.:i:i •.'. are from' 
il) Putna^ ::wnthly, rarch 1907,^.7/6.^
[2] Commeinori.iivc Tribute, The American Academy of Arts and 
/ \ Letters Publication. No.QP 10-^0 r> 4-3 
(s)Ed. Wiliiaa Thorp ' op^c It. .pflof ^ ^ 19^ ? '
'Sidfe of Hoi-gf^ SMgrtfrSkq t>^ his fere.3 i lecHon Tor del-tcJ-iN^. S^pHta, fe". iwh <b. S^etiAl ShtslF >n his |it>r£r»j W6S Jc-vo^e.3; Cp. Ncv
much to wonder at in human eccentricity, has become softened into
yearning
a^tenderness which has, however, lost nothing of its direct and
searching power. It is the expression of the prophet who has been 
rejected by those he sought to save, yet who goes on agonising 
for them inspite of themselves. But the sense of the present 
world seems to be growing increasingly unreal, and the face has
the rapt mystical expression of one whose 'being's heart and home
Maft 1 
Is with infinity, and only there.'
Of the stern, relentless critic, there is little in his portraits. 
It is as though the camera has pierced to the hidden depths of 
the man and brought out the deeper and richer personality which 
he revealed only to his more intimate friendsj. fhe other-world- 
liness, however, is there in his worr's for all wno read to xeelj 
that strong abiding sense that man is but a stranger and pilgrim 
on the earth, whose destiny is with the changeless "eavens, V.ith 
raul Elmer Hore there returns to American literature a fourth and
eternal dimension which lends once more 'an heroic proportion sjid
2 
a tragic mode to the experience of the individual'.
T77"ii T i ira Tc"r :1 Lworth, Tlie]1?re ludc^ 7,ook VI. 
2. Alien Tate, ££._cit..,p.5.
(ll»). A Brief Survey of the Development of American 
Criticism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,
Although every period has appeared to those living in 
it an age of transition, men in the two centuries which have 
succeeded the French Revolution have "been aware of a more 
rapid and radical change in prevailing ideas and traditions, 
resulting in a widespread disintegration of accepted stan- 
dards such as had previously held sway in civilised society, 
irrespective of the lesser differences in thought and con- 
duct which varied with time and place. The chaos of contem- 
porary thought has, however, been accentuated in America by 
certain peculiar circumstances. Nowhere has the mechanisation
of life been carried to such a pitch of speed and efficiency,
benefit 
but whereas technically, America has reaped the full
of modern scientific ingenuity, culturally and intellectually, 
American life and letters have suffered from their lack of the
slow, tortuous development essential to the forging of a nat-
1 
ional heritage of tradition and criticism. This Frankenstein
nad emerged, physically, almost fully grown at birth, and soon 
there were at his disposal all the devices of science to ensure 
his economic well-being, but the only tradition to guide his 
course was that inherited from an England whose yoke he was all
I CT7 George Santayana, Winds of Dgctrinex~TLondon and Toronto
1925T,?.187.
too ready to shake off. This he felt to be an alien and con- 
fining influence, itself a patchwork gathered together from 
a variety of sources, classical, Teutonic, Celtic, medieval, 
 "rench, Italian, u erman, and one therefore to "be repudiated 
as soon as he attained to a certain degree of intellectual 
independence.
Moreover, this tradition had percolated to America
in its most attenuated form, for the early settlers were men
ai 
who had rejected, for its worliness, much of the art and liter-
A
ature available to their age. Their minds were set unwaveringly 
upon the issues of a future life which involved the renuncia- 
tion of every allurement of the senses which might tempt man 
to substitute delight in his own creation for the worship of 
the Creator. But if their outlook was seriously deficient in 
breadth and urbanity, it partly compensated for this by the 
intensity of their contemplation of man envisaged as the Pil- 
grim of Eternity, and rising thereby to tragig heights in his 
struggle against the encroachments of the world, the flesh and 
the devil.Paul Elmer More has brought out forcibly this sense
of terror which dominated New England thought from the settle-
1 
ment to the middle of the last century, as men saw themselves
living beneath the frown of divine displeasure, with the yawn- 
ing abyss beyond waiting to receive those predestined to per- 
dition.The very passion of their fears, an 'expression of the
1. Paul"Elmer More, Shelburne Essays"!,T^ew York and London;
1904],pp. $"4-
agonised conscience', as Professor Santayana described it, 
lent to the writings of even mediocre authors a certain tragic 
grandeur} but with the gradual rejection of Galvinist theology 
under the influence of new modes of thought breaking in from 
Europe, notably Germany, the Calvinist imagination weakened, 
although echoes of it remained in the sensibility of Herman 
Melville, Emily Dickinson, and above all, Nathaniel Hawthorne 
whose Scarlet Letter is the very quintessxence of the Puritan
consciousness distilled from it at a time when it was already
2 
in decay.
Professor Santayana in his 'The Genteel Tradition in 
American Philosophy', points out that such a theology as Cal- 
vinism flourishes normally in a small nation with immense vi- 
tality, beset by impending ruin and doom. Life is seen outlined 
in stark distinctions of black and -white, and the consequences
of one's choices are exaggerated to a point where they become
3 
of infinite and eternal importance. But as the crisis passes,
this element of existentialism is relaxed,and men forget the 
judgment which has not fallen,and repudiate the God whom for- 
merly they dreaded. The spirit of man cannot long sustain the 
tension of 'the agonised conscience', and seeks some relief in
s
a less dramatic, more mundane mode of belief and expression. 
Faith in social morality succeeds, by an inevitable dialectic,
T.George Santayana, op. cit. ,p.l88.
2. Of. Alien Tate, Reactionary Essays on Poetry _and Ideas, (New
York; 1956),pp.5-6. 
?. George Santayana, op. cit.,pp. 189-190.
to the anguished craving for grace, and the pendulum swings 
from an urgent stress on theology to a less urgent and less 
exacting stress on ethics derived from, but also divorced 
from, the theology it supersedes.
By a strange paradox of conscience, the Puritan 
belief in predestination which made one's ultimate salvation 
o£ damnation dependent on the arbitrary choice of God, and not 
on anything the individual did or did not do, left man free
I
to turn his energies to more secular, and more remunerative, 
pursuits.In so far as he had no longer any need to concern 
himself primarily with good works, he could concentrate the
more upon material ends, and, with a creed approximating to
1 
Samuel Smiles' Doctrine of Self- Help in Victoria^ England,
he naturally found that the industrious and vigilant  in
other words, 'the Saved'  amassed fortunes, while the feckless
apparently 
went to the wall. There was thus XKKH a logical connection
between salvation and prosperity} and by the middle of the 
TTineteenth Century, generations of hard-working, God-fearing 
Puritans had built up sufficient reserves of material wealth 
and doctrinal wisdom for their descendants to feel they could 
enjoy their inheritance without adding to its sum, providing 
they observed certain moral principles which they felt were 
somehow connected with it.
.The feeling of uncertainty and impending sdioom Victorian SngJLaricf
1.G .  MTYoungTrPortraTt ~of_an~^e7"7YondQn; 19:^1, pp.1 -?I
which had beset the early settlers in the face of unknown 
dangers had given way to a new sense of well-being and secur- 
ity, and accordingly, Calvinism gave way to a new belief in 
man, no longer envisaged as an outcast, fleeing in terror 
from the Wrath -to-Come, but as the pride and crown of the 
whole process of Hature, himself the Over-Soul, who could not 
therefore do anything amiss. Emerson became the prophet of 
the new religion whose ostensible purpose was to substitute 
for rigid dogma and sombre preoccupation with the Here-After 
a spontaneous idealism and a delight in the Here-and- Now, 
Man looked upon the universe as a glorioua multiform extension 
of himself,Nature was the mirror in which he saw reflected his 
own face, and through Nature and humanity alike pulsed one vast 
benevolent Soul, knitting both into a cosmic harmony. This sense 
of the mystery and ecstasy of life was undoubtedly sharpened 
by Emerson's contact with German Transcendentalism, but it grew
quite naturally too out of the circumstances of an America attaun- 
natural 
ing to self-consciousness, aware of its own teeming*resources
and restless in its awakening response to a whole gamut of sensa- 
tions which Puritanism had excluded from its world.
But the edge of a sensibility diffused over a vast range 
of inter-toned and nuances of experience becomes easily dulled. 
Moreover, with the emancipation of the American imagination from 
tfhe stern discipline of Calvinism there coincided the widespread 
discovery of scientific processes for lightening labour and in- 
creasing leisure. It seemed that America was about to enter into
an abundance of life hitherto undreamt of. But ironically 
enough, the mechanisation of society which bade fair to usher 
in a more varied and exhilarating civilisation was to give 
rise to a uniformity and banality which laid their deathly
chill upon the mounting spirit of men, and reduced the less
1 
virile among them to a stereotyped dreariness.
'Where the old order, formidable as it was, had held all this 
personal experience, this eclectic excitement, in a compre- 
hensible whole, the new order tended to flatten it out in a 
common experience which was not quite in common; it exalted 
more and more the preaonal and the unique in the interior sense. 
Where the old-fashioned puritans got together on a rigid doc- 
trine, and could thus be individualistic in manners, the Nine- 
teenth Century New Englander, lacking a genuine religious cen- 
tre, began to be a social conformist. The common idea of the 
Redemption, for example, was replaced by the conformist idea 
of respectability among neighbours whose spiritual disorder, 
not very evident at the surface, was becoming acute. A great 
idea was breaking up, and society was moving towards external
uniformity which is usually the measure of the spiritual ster-
2 
ility inside.'
As men came increasingly to put their faith in the 
accumulation of wealth and propetjfy, the old sense of a com- 
munal standard of values gave way to the ruthless pursuit of
1.Alien Tate, op. cit.. pp.6-7. 
2   Ibid.,, loc.cjt..
individual success, achieved in whatever way worked best. 
Thus a huge chaotic welter of ends and means replaced the 
common centre of faith which had drawn together men of pre- 
vious generations; and yet, haunted by a sense of their de- 
fenceSessness and isolation in a world without any such inner 
centre, men now sought as a substitute an outward centre in a 
code of social respectability, the Genteel Tradition.By a su- 
preme stroke of irony, Emerson who was the sworn enemy of a 
merely superficial conventionality,became himself involved in 
furthering the very trends he most desired to counteract.Aware 
of the prevailing external conformity, he mistook the effect 
for the cause. He held the Puritan theocracy responsible for 
this soul- destroying influence, whereas it was only the de- 
cline of true evangelical religion which had made possible 
this descent into banality! and he turned to vent his anger
upon Puritanism, thus giving its death- blow to what was al-
1
ready a moribund tradition, and leaving American life defence- 
less against an ever- encroaching tide of industrialism.
Beneath the icy surface of external respectability 
there yet eddied a maelstrom of incoherent and conflicting 
currents of thought drawn from a variety of strange, often 
incompatible sources. With the immigration of new settlers 
came new modes of sensibility,new traditions, new ideas, all 
pouring into the one common stream of iimerican civilisation,
l.Ibid.,p.7.
where they remained, isolated and unsynthesised elements con- 
tending against each other and ready to erupt at any moment 
into strange erratic forms, the primitive vitality of a Walt 
Whitman, the grotesque humour veined with pathos of a Mark 
Twain, the lyric elusiveness of an Emily Diclcinson. Their 
presence helped America to throw off the yoke of a second- 
hand culture such as Calvinism had represented; she now had 
to evolve a tradition of her own, stimulated by indigenous 
subjects, instead of imitating English, or even European,models. 
It seemed that everything warranted the birth of a great nation- 
al literature; the sense of freedom and aspiration/which attends 
the spiritual adventures of a young nation; the vital impulse 
towards creation which the unbounded span of her territories 
and the inexhaustible wealth of her resources could inspire; 
above all, th6 proud confidence in the marvels of science which 
were revolutionising the world of men and making them as Gods. 
One thing only was lacking  a great central idea of things whicVi 
could alone act as a focus-point and save these lesser ideas 
from breaking up into innumerable jarring fragments. Inspite of 
her technical maturity and prowess, in matters of culture America 
remained several decades behind Europe, and on religious, social 
and literary issues, the United States were still, generally 
speaking, at the end of the Nineteenth Century, where England 
had been in the 'Sixties when Matthew Arnold sallied forth in the 
name of Culture against the hordes of Philistia.His chief weapon
in this unequal struggle had been his theory of Criticism,the 
creation of a 'conscience in intellectual matters' whereby one 
might discriminate between essentials and mere periphery decor- 
ations in literary matters. To Arnold, the failure of modern
Romanticism had been due to the confusion of a tumult of new
sensations 
and exciting idtKxx with the best ideas; and unfortunately the
nascent American literature made the same mistake. Because they 
were living in an age of expansion and movement when strange 
winds of doctrine were abroad, American writers of the 'Sixties 
and the 'seventies imagined they had only to draw on the intell- 
ectual atmosphere of the times and they would of necessity pro- 
duce the mighty Epic of the modern world. But by the 'Eighties, 
a new spirit of disillusionment was abroad. It was becoming 
evident that the outcome of the Civil war was not only the 
discomfiture of the Southern States and the triumph of the 
cause of Negro freedom \ it had far-reaching and insidious
effects in the upheaval of individual fortunes and the sub- 
the 
stitution»forAoriginal pride of democracy in producing men
of chracter, of a callow and often unscrupulous ambition to 
get rich quick. It might have seemed to many a Yankee business 
man, growing rich in New York at the expense of those of his 
fellows who could not keep up with him in the financial race, 
that the Age of Gold had come, "but at the best such prosperity 
was a precarious blessing. Fortunes were made and lost overnight 
To the West new towns were springing up, offering to the keen 
speculator still further opportunities of wealth, but involving
1 NUH-he-W Arnold. £SS<V/S Literary Ar><J Cril'i'cfrl, fEvdr^mcan'o Library - Lo
7.M. j>enr and SonS.). p.3o; '
the less fortunate in financial hazards which plunged them into 
ruin.
Such an atmosphere was far from conducive to the trie 
literary artist. In a society given over to the worship of Mam- 
mon, he was driven increasingly into spiritual isolation, having 
to draw entirely upon his own inward resources for his inspir- 
ation. He thereby escaped himself the mediocrity of the Genteel
Traditionbut because of his divorce from society, he was unable
1 
to supply anything to supplant it in others. Further, the com-
mercialised boosting of inferior writers aggravated his scorn
2 
of a society to which he felt no personal responsibility, thus
establishing the now long-standing feud between the artist and 
the bourgeois civilisation against which he had rebelled. This 
isolation was not, however, without its advantages in that it 
drove the more sensitive writers to examine critically their
own creeds and standards. Lowell had said, 'Before we £&jsi have
3 
an American literature we must have an Ameriem criticism' , and
it so happened that the first American critics were themselves
literary artists seeking to understand the ways of their own
4 
craft. Whereas, on the one hand, they faced the disadvantage of
 
having to combine or alternate between the synthetic and analyt-
ical moods, there was on the other hand the advantage of their
h 
greater intimacy wit/the springs of creativity within their own
experience. But although in the sphere of creation, American
1. Santayana, op_._ci.t.. ,pp.192-93.
2. Ed. ^SKKSfS^Msa^^
M.D.Zabel.Literarvgagais Opinion i" America.(New York,1957), 
3- Quoted Paul Elmer More t Sherburne_gssa.ys I,7>t)e.p6.g^
4. Ed. Nottnqn Poets tet. American Crib/CAl Essays, (^London; O3o),p.vi|.
artists believed they had shaken themselves free from European 
influence and could depend upon native inspiration, it became 
'increasingly clear that in matters of criticism, the most acute 
and lucid judgments came from those who were most conversant 
with the great classical literatures of the world.
There were thus two facets to the literary rebellion 
against the sterility of the Genteel Tradition, one in the name 
of Nature, seeking to exalt the primitive and indigenous ele- 
ments of American life, the other in the name of Culture, seeking 
to build up an eclectic tradition drawn from the great literature 
of all times and places.On the one hand stood the New Barbarians 
Whitman and Mark Twain and Emily DickinsonJ on the other, Henry 
James, maintaining in the teeth of the proud self-sufficiency
of his rivals the need of fertilising indigenous matter with an
1
infusion of ideas drawn from other literatures. Between the Bar- 
barians shaking off the past and seeking to build up their lives 
and works from the primitive elements of consciousness, regard- 
less of the critical faculty in man, and the lovers of Culture 
seeking to pass on to the future the best that had been thought 
and said in the paat, there surged the huge self-satisfied ac- 
quiescent mass of those to whom civilisation was at the most a 
mere code of social respectability. They espoused it in so far 
as it threw a cloak of conventional decency over their impulses 
of self-aggrandisement and self- indulgence, but the working 
ethic of the newly- arrived was as primitive and uncritical as
that of the most emancipated of the Barbarians.
Literature, 1880-19.5U, ( T,nndTTnp S^) f p. 65.
The anomaly of the "bourgeois compromise which amalgamated 
strict social conformity with individual abandon in all that 
pertained to business and finance offered the first American 
critics, Emerson, Oliver Wendall Holmes, Lowell,Poe, and later, 
WJD.Howells with an ample scope for their scrutiny, and it is 
not surprising that American criticism should from the beginning 
have been predominantly ethical rather than esthetic in its ap- 
proach. Its interests have lain more frequently on the side of
social,philosophical, historical or psychological issues than
1 
in the realm of pure art. In an essay on 'The Esthetic Judgment
and the Ethical Judgment 1 in The Intent of the Critic, Profess- 
or Norman Foerster has stressed the interdependency and insepar- 
ability of these two sets of values inherent in literature. 
Unfortunately, however, it is rarely feasible to discuss both 
together, and in the process of analysis, they are liable to 
become dissociated and even to appear antagonistic. Logically, 
if not practically, esthetic values, to Foerster, should come
first, as it is they which determine whether a piece of writing
2
deserves to be called literature. Here it is interesting to com- 
pare a remark of Mr.T.S.-^liot's, that although 'the greatness of1 
literature cannot be determined solely by literary standards',
'we must remember that whether it is literature or not can be
3 
determined only by literary standards.' KK£MMiaatffcXKfty-Kftau
Mr.Eliot's use of the term 'literary' obviously corresponds to 
Professor Foerster's use of 'esthetic 1 . The dialectic between
1.Ed.M.D.Zabel. op. cit., p. XVI.
2.Ed.Donald StauTfer, The Intent of the Critir.,1
'The. Esthetic Judgmenl- aoc) TV,e ErHicAl Tudgment'^.,,, lvje. lon - ^^jww/"• 
i. l-S. Eliotr, Essays AnCienl: ^ncJ Modern, Ke.l,g,on ^nd Lirerah-tre!, ( Lono/oh; 1.3^7 ),f>- (
these two aspects of literacy values has dominated the whole 
of American criticism since the time of Poe and his contem- 
poraries, always with the balance tipped in favour of the 
ethical. Frequently the critic, as in the case of Henry James, 
set himeelf the taak of reconciling the two. 'He saw',writes 
Zabel, 'the modern creative problem in its two essential as- 
pects? its oppression by social conflict* and theories of sci- 
entific and  oral determinism, and its acute subtilisation by 
the defenses which the esthetic techniques of the modern sensi- 
bility had set up against these oppressors. He saw modern crit- 
icism confronting the task of reconciling the real and the es- 
thetic,human life in "its unprejudiced identity'1 with the form
1 
and laws of art 1 .
The new and growing concern with criticism as a branch 
of literature sufficiently important and influential in itself 
to warrant certain writers dedicating to it all their time and 
energies did much to tip the balance in favour of a preoccupat- 
ion with the purely esthetic, although it was not until the 
early years of this century that it at last succeeded in gaining 
the ascendancy to such an extent thatct distinction of form seemed 
to have usurped the place formerly occupied by significance of 
content. But even the rise of Formalism did not entirely stifle 
the ethical element in American criticism, although this became 
implicit rather than explicit under the changing conditions of 
art antf society. 
l7Ed7Tf7j7Zabel, op. c it . , p. ————————————————————
£2.
'In the history of American civilisation,'writes Lewisohn, 
'there ie no more important event than the rise of the critical 
spirit during that quarter of a century between the publication
of the first volume of Paul Elmer More's Shelburne Essays in
1 
1904 and Joseph wood Krutch's The Modern Temper in(l929i
Inspite of previous attempts to stimulate the American literary
public to a vital interest in criticism by writers as varied in
23 4 
outlook as W.D.Howellife, W.C.Brownell,and James Huneker,the year
that first marked America's awakening to such an awareness of 
the significance of criticism was, in lewisohn's opinion,1910. 
Paul Elmer More had published by then the first seven series of 
The Shelburne Essays, of which the first volumes at least had 
passed practically unnoticed. In 1908 Irving Babbitt's first 
book, Literature and the American Cqllegg had appeared, followed 
in 1910 by his Hew Laokoon,an attack upon Romanticism, particu­ 
larly in its later guise of Symbolism, for fostering a confusion 
of the senses by the use of synesthetic appeal, and also for
destroying the genre tranche* in literature in favour of a
approximating on the * 
melange of types jafxijcji one hand to the static arts and on the
other to pure music.The impact of More and Babbitt upon contem­ 
porary thought had by 1910 begun to attract attention.As keen 
an observer of the literary scene as Charles Eliot Norton wrote 
to a friend in 1908?'It is a great misfortune for us nationally
TTludwig Lewisohn,Expression An America,TLondonjno date given),p415 
2.Ed.M.D.Zabel,op_._cit. ,p.XXlll. 5. Ibid.. ,pp.XXlll-lY. 
4.Ibid.,p.XXV.
that the tradition of culture is so weak and si limited. In this 
respect the advantage of England is great. But I hail a book of 
Mr. Babbitt's as an indication of a possible turn in the tide of
which another sign is the literary essays of Mr. Paul More from i
1 
time to time in the Hat ion. '
About the same time there w^s delivered at Columbia 
University, J.E.Spingarn's famous lecture on The New Criticism 
in which he gave voice to an esthetic ptofoundly influenced by 
the Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce. The all-important thing 
was to emphasise that every individual work of art was an entity 
complete in itself, which had to be studied in the light of the 
law of its own creation, and not of any extraneous rules or systems. 
Form was an intrinsic and inextricable part of the work of art, 
not an embellishment superimposed upon content; and therefore to 
change the form, howver slightly, was to create a new work of art. 
So far many thinking men and women would have been prepared to go 
with him, but his wholesale rejection of many well-proven aspects 
of criticism in favour of a pure cult of art for art's sake ali-
enated them from a doctrine as fatuous in its bigotry as the most
didactic 
extreme im&KLafc- criticism. The appearance of The New Criticism was,
however, a signal for the malcontents to rally their forces against 
the existing literary tradition, rooted as it rcas in the New Eng- 
land consciousness, with the Concord pioneers for its models, and 
More and Babbitt for its chief exponents.
ElTo t ~Hort on , Letters , VolTiT", TBost on and~New York;i913T 
p. 4015 to H.H.FurnesTrS" May 1908.
For the moment, issue was not joimed. Spingarn moved in a 
different circle from More and Babbitt, and so far, each party 
was concerned only with developing the line of thought which 
seemed to it best suited to the literary needs of the day.Around 
each there gathered, however,a band of followers, led, on the
one side by Stuart P.Sherman, and on the other, by the vociferous,
1 
if somewhat incongruous, figure of H.L.Mencken. Neither section
read the work of the other, but a general feeling of aptipathy was
2
in the air. The 1914-18 War served to accentuate jrhe already exist- 
ing tension, and to lend acridity to the gathering contention!and 
by the end of the Vi/ar, the struggle had reached a climax. In 1918, 
Babbitt answered Spingarn 1 s New Criticism , and Mencken published 
in the Evening Mail his Criticism of Criticism of Criticism. In 
1919, Babbitt's Rousseau and Romanticism appeared and Mencken pub- 
lished the first volume of his Prejudices, followed in 1920 and 
1922 by the second and third volumes. The voice of mediation repre- 
ented by the more disinterested critics such as Van Wyck Brooks or 
Lewisohn went unheeded. It became increasingly apparent that this 
was war gl*outrance, that there was at stake more than the attitude 
of the respective schools to purely literary problems. 
'It was profoundly, if not always consciously understood that crit- 
icism cleaves deep, and that the battle joined between,let us say 
Stuart Sherman and Henry Mencken, was no squabble between rhetor-
1.Ludwig Lewisohn, op.cit.,p.450-51i
2. Ibid..,p.451.
icians, but a philosophical warfare over all that men hold dearest 
and over the future of our civilisation itself*'
It is important to recall that much of Paul More's 
finest criticism was written before the struggle had reached its 
height.Only in the later volumes of the Shelburne Essays, notably 
from Aristocracy and Justice (Series Nine) onwards, does the note 
of a more personal polemic creep in. Hitherto he had been attack- 
ing general movements of thought in their wider context. It is not 
until the New Shwlburne Essays of 1928,1934 and 1936 that we find
those references to contemporary authors which h'.ve given such
2 
offence to liberal critics. By the time of the New Shelburne
Essays., the dust of the first round of the battle had died away, 
and More was able to see clearly the general direction of thw 
conflicting trends of fifteen or twenty years earlier. If at sucft
a distance of time, his tone assumed an unwonted asperity in speak-
3 
ing of living individuals, it was because he saw the tendencies
they represented still very much alive and still threatening the 
integrity of the values he cherished most passionately in life 
and literature alike.
Similarly the unprejudiced reader, looking back upon 
the heats and furies of the battle from the vantage point of time, 
is bound to feel that there was more involved in its fortunes 
than the defence of tradition gainst the clamours of literary
K-s,
1. Ibid. , p. 426.
2. Cf. Rebecca »est, Ending in Earnest- A^Li/berary._Lo£, (New YorkJ
193lT,pp. "31-86. 
. C-L.New Shelburne Essays l t 'Modern Currents in American Literature,'
pp. 53-76.
dissent. Fencken may have joined in the mele'e because it offeried 
him an opportunity of hitting out at opponents by whom he felt
instinctively repelled. But he tfould have felt equally repelled
implications 
had he thought out the logical KHUEinsiiSH of linking himself to
the new esthetic. The real antithesis was not between More and
1 
Babbitt, and Mencken. Mencken was as concerned with ethics as
they were ? although while the 'Professors' chose New England 
ethics, Mencken preferred those of Bohemia. The contention was 
not, in the last analysis, between good ethics and bad ethics,
6but between^primary emphasis on esthetics or on ethics.
In his Introduction to American Critical Essays, Pro- 
fessor Foerster who edited the volume, divided American critic§i 
into two categories; those who concerned themselves with the 
literary foreground, and those who concerned themselves with the 
background of the ideas which sustain literature. In the first 
category he placed these Impressionists, including both those 
who continued the romantic tradition of wide sympathy and! those 
who went further and asserted that criticism is itself mere 
creation, and the Expressionists who held that the critic's task 
was complete when he had repeated in himself the creative exper- 
ience expressed by the work of art and had shown just how com- 
pletely that experience was expressed. The first type of critic 
was represented by Professor Lewis E. uates of Harvard, the second 
by Professor J.E.Spingarn of Columbia. In contrast to both these, 
ig Lew i s ohn , ojD^cJLjb . , p . 4 ZQ~.
the 
stood x second category, also made up of two groups*on the
one hand, the New Nationalists,concerned with the problem of 
adjusting the course of the national literature to the exist- 
ing conditions of national culture, and, on the other, the 
New Humanists, interested in ideas of universal and perennial 
validity. In the first group Pfofessor Foerster placed the 
naturalists,both romantic and realist, including the psychol- 
ogical and sociological critics of the period. These are the 
spiritual heirs of whitman and Melville; here Mencken would
belong, together with Van Wyck Brooks, Lewis Mumford, Joseph 
Wood Krutch,H.S.Canby and others.
The division made by Pfofessor i'oerster between 
the romantic critic's recording of the adventures of his soul 
among books, which he calls 'Impressionism', and the Grocean 
doctrine of Spingarn and his followers, which he calls 'Express- 
ionism',is made also by A.C.Ward in his American Literature, 1880-
3^930, whereas Granville Hicks uses the term 'Impressionism*
2 indiscriminately to describe the two phases of criticism.
Obviously there is a substantial difference between these two 
points of view, although frequently in practice the ±KH distinc- 
tion is blurred. The 'impressionistic' critic pure and simple 
is concerned with the effect of the work of art upon himself, 
the ideas, sensations, associations evoked in him by what he
1.Ed. Norman Foerster,American Critical iis_s_ay_s_, Introduction,p.IX2.Granville Hicks, The Great TraditionTTNew Yorkj1935),p.251.
sr 
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has read. This is the manner of Pater, Oscar Wilde, Arthur 
Symons in England, of Huysmans and Anatole France in Prance, and 
of Huneker and Lewis Gates in America. 2 The Spingarn doctrine 
claims,on the other hand,to be concerned not with the critic 
himself, nor with the author, his family, environment, race 
or age, any more than with external standards or rules of com- 
position, but with the work of art in and for itself.'what has 
the poet tried to do, and how has he fulfilled his intention? 
What is he striving to express and how has he expressed it? 
wnat vital and essential spirit animates his work? What impress- 
_on does it leave on the receptive mind, and how can I best ex- 
press this impression? Is his work true to the laws formulated
3 
by others? 1 ----.But it involves a tremendous effort for the
critic to project himself imaginatively into the artist's mind 
in such a way that he sheds his own personal prejudices. Thus 
in practice, Expressionism does frequently merge into Impress- 
ionism, as A.G.Ward implicitly admits. "Ehe method and its work- 
ing mus£ ultimately be subject to the critic's own mind and con- 
sciences it is dependent upon the moral character of the critic,
upon whether his integrity in relation to the work of art is
4 
above suspicion'.
It is therefore essential, as Donald Stauffer has 
pointed out in his introduction to The Intent of the Critic
r7Ed.M.D. Zabel, p_£._ci.t• ,p. XXV:
2.Ed.Norman Foerster, American Crrtical ja.sB.gy.s_,Lewis E.Gates,
'Impressionism and Appreciation',po.186-88. 
5.A.C.¥ard t gp._cit. ,p. 245. 
4.Ibid.,p.244.
to know something of the critic as well as the work criticised,
in order to be able to separate what is personal and peculiar
1 
in his judgment from what is universally valid. Above all, it
is essential that every critic should recognise the partiality 
of his response to a work of art, and not set up as an oracle, 
considering his own or his school's views as absolute in validity 
'with these provisos,we must, I think, accept the fact that the 
response evoked by a work of art, in passing to the reader tk 
through the medium of the critic's mind,becomes stamped with his 
impressions, so that even the work of the least Impressionistic 
of critics bears to some degree the mark of the critic's person- 
ality.
'The work of art|,writes Stauffer.'is un fait accompli
/
which it is beyond the power of the critic to modify. The crit- 
ic's judgments cannot change the actual objectification in time
and place which is the work of art, but they can influence its
3 
reception by the audience to which it is being introduced.'
THe ai-n of every work of art is to produce 'in each reader an 
experience as near as possible to the original experience which 
the artist wished to communicate. 10 this end, the critic must 
frequently intervene by using the discursive reason in order to 
help the reader to approximate to the original intuition. The 
critic himself begins by responding to a work of art, and this
1.Ed._ Donald Stauffer, op. cit.,Introduction,po.4-5.
2. Ibid.,pp. 8-9. 
S.Tbid..,pp.12-13.
response is intuitive, immediate, natural. But in his second 
role as interpreter, he continues by analysing, explaining, scrut- 
inising his own original and intuitive apprehension. Thirdly, 
the critic must act as judge, estimating the respective values 
of works of art.Upon the inter-relation and proprtion of the 
three phases of the critic's role, as reader, interpreter and 
judge, depends the nature of the criticism. Whereas in the work 
of a Lewis Gates, the first, the impressionistic element, pre- 
dominates, in the criticism of a T,S. Eliot, the second, or intell- 
ectual, element holds in check the first, and the final judgment 
grows out of a fair synthesis of intuitive response and intell- 
ectual research into matters pertaining to the creation of the
1 
work of art. The true exponents of the Spingarn esthetic are
not, in the last resort,the mere rebels against tradition of
the Mencken-Hackett type, but that school of highly serious and
1 
reputable criticism which incudes many of the most earnest of
the younger writers,such as Alien Tate, R.P.Blackmur, and to 
some degree, Yvor Winters. These men are completely cut off from 
the ordinary 'Impressionists' and 'Sensationalists' by their
£j
thorough mastery of formal esthetic theory, a study in which the
5 
were preceded by T,S. Eliot and Ezra Pound.
One unfortunate feature of Spingarn's theory has 
however, been inherited and rigoacrously maintained by the young-
TTEd.M.D.Zabel.op.cit. ,-oXL.
2.Tbid.§-XLlll.
3.Tbid.,Edmund Wilson, 'The Individual Talent',pp.195-94.
er esthetic critics as well as "by the creative writers of the same
1 
school, the doctrine of the moral irresponsibility 6f the artist.
Whatever disintegration of "beliefs may $ave been threatening from 
from the outset of the Romantic period, it was still possible for 
Wordsworth to write with the knowledge that he would be read and 
understood by a public whose standards were not unlike his own. 
But as the Nineteenth u entury wire on, the creative artist in
Europe and in America was plunged in an ever increasing spirit-
2 
ual isolation. The majority of men were absorbed in purely material
pursuits? they were comfortable in their everyday apprehension of 
the world around them and had no wish to be disturbed by.having 
their eyes opened to the power of the poetic imagination. When 
they read at all s it was something on the level of their ordinary 
understanding which flattered their pride, dallied with their 
senses and demanded no great effort of the intuitive reason. The 
artist, his imagination fired by a vision he was no longer able 
to communicate, withdrew more and more into his ivory tower, writ- 
ing simply to satisfy his own desire for self-expression, or, at 
the most, for a small and select coterie of like-minded men. He
sought to heal his wounded pride by cultivating a sense of his own
i
innate superiority, and regarding: the vulgar and uninitiated
 z 
V
throng with a mixture of contempt and indifference. His concept- 
ion of his art, no longer controlled by the demands of communi-
1. American Rev_iew, April 1937,Vol. IX,No.1, Geoffrey Stone,'Morals 
and Poetry',pp.60-63.
2.Cf.pp.4g,
3.Cf. American Review^ May 1936,Vol*Vll,N0 .?,,Alanfi. Thompson 
'Literature and Irresponsibility',pp.192-99. '
cation to his public, became essentially esoteric, and in its more
extreme forms, found expression in the eccentricities of Surreal-
1 
ism, Dadaism and, in visual art, of Cubism.
There was good reason why,on the morrow of the Great War, 
those writers who had upheld the cult of artistic self-sufficien- 
cy should be in high repute, ^"bey had not allowed themselves to 
be betrayed into prophecy or partisanship where international is- 
sues were at stake, nor had they given vent to the transitory pass 
ions of war. Remote from the conflict, they had maintained their 
own artistic integrity, and their work could not be aged or belied 
by the shiftinf tides of events. James Joyce, Proust, T.S.Eliot 
and Ezra Pound became the models of a generation of younger writers 
who repudiated all too gladly the claims of a society perplexed by 
the - aftermath of war,and who sought in their world of symbol and
associationism to revive the keenness of apprehensions which had
by being
worn dull ikrans^fe constantly grasped through the medium of a lan- 
guage grown stereotyped and unevocative.But the continued isolation 
of art from the larger currents of life is bound eventually to 
paralyse the creative imagination. The full circle of the evolution 
of Symbolism has been traced by Edmund 'wilson in his Ax el Is. _G_as_tle 
whero it is seen to reach its logical conclusiofa in Rimbaud's rejec 
ion of his visionary illusions for the more concrete life of a 
trader in 'west Africa. It is not perhaps without significance that 
Wilson himself was to reject the cult of artistic irresponsibility 
l.Cf Frr7Lucas7~"" ~——————————- - -   -
pp .225-oG.
for a creed which took more fully into account the relation 
of literature to society, particularly in its economic aspects. 
The depression of the Nineteen Twenties served to make even the 
most detached of litterateurs realise the acute interdependency 
of life and letters, and many, like Granville Hicks in SheGreat 
Tradition were prepared to feel that the unsatisfactory position 
in which American literature found itself was in no small measure 
due to the failure of criticism to point out what was wrong in 
society as a whole. The financial dSba'cle of 1929 brought home 
from exile many of the younger generation who had frequented the 
more advanced literary circles of Paris and who now found them- 
selves confronting the harsh realities of a tottering economy. 
It was no longer possible to dissociate the visions of Parnassus 
from the facts of Wall Street, and in their criticism, Hicks, -idle 
son, James Farrell, Joseph Freeman, TTpton Sinclair, V.F Galverton
 
and others came increasingly to demand a unifying idea, based on
2 
Socialism. From a preoccupation with the purely esthetic and
formal, criticism reverted once more to an emphasis upon ethics 
and ideas, notably in their relation to modern society.
In addition to the forementioned trends in criticism, 
pure Impressionism and esthetic Formalism, on the one hand, and 
economic socialism,on the other, there vvas also to be reckoned 
with,in the second category, a new element introduced by the
1.Granville H^cks.JThe Great Tra.ditionTT^ew York; 1935J7pp.253-55.
2.Zabel«Op.Cjt. ,p
growing interest in naturalistic psychology. Of this, one of the 
earliest exponents had been Professor George Santayana whose 
Sense of Beauty had, as early as 1896, claimed to be nothing 
but a new arrangement of 'the commonplaces of criticism into a 
system under the inspiration of a naturalistic psychology-' 
The new method reached ita apogee with Joseph wood Krutch's 
life of Edgar Allan Poe, and with Van toyck Brooks' Ordeal of 
Mark Twain* Whilst frequently throwing interesting light on 
biographical problems, it ran the risk of reducing the author 
studied to an accumulation of complexes and inhibitions, and 
his work to an expression of all that was abnormal in his make- 
up. The noble term 'catharsis 1 was brought down from the lofty 
sphere of classical tragedy to describe any process by which the
psychologist's specimen gave vent to his pent-up passions and
2 
instincts.
One thing all these currents of criticism, whether 
primarily esthetic or ethical in their emphasis, had in common. 
Their conception of the universe was essentially monistic.They 
believed it was possible to resolve the human paradox of mind
and matter by absorbing the one term in the other, usually the
3 
former in the latter. Their attempt to reduce the multitudinous
elements in man to a unity could, they believed, be effected 
without any far-reaching revolution in the nature of man himself.
1.Quoted M.D.Zabel.p-p.cit. ,-p.XXVll.
2.1rving Babbitt, Q_nJ3eing Creative. (london;i952Lt).ll.~ ———————
A changed social economy, a psychological analysis of man's 
mental problems, a new esthetic principle, these were in them- 
selves sufficient to bring order where at present there was 
conflict and chaos. It was man's way of looking at his uni- 
verse that was wrong, not man himself,?
In direct opposition to the monistic view of man 
and nature stood the dualism of the New Humanists with its 
emphasis on the division in man. Taking its stand upon its 
belief in three planes of experience, the supernatural, the 
human, and the natural, it saw man's twofold relationship to
his world, to the supernatural through the higher immediacy,
2 
and to the natural through the lower immediacy. The higher'
self was in co^mmunion with all that was permanent and abiding, 
the ultimate principle of Being, the Ideal Good of Platonism, 
whereas through his lower self, man was the victim of the 
eddying currents of instinct and desire which make up the
flux of Becoming and subject him, like the rest of the animal
ism 
world, to the forces of change and decay. Naturally, the
religion of Becoming, had persuaded men that their affinity was 
with the world of flux, and had brought about the dissolution 
of much that men through the ages had considered of constant 
and perennial worth. Not only had moral standards lost all 
absolute value in a generation obsessed with the relativity of
l.The Bookmga_,June 1930, Vol. LXX1 No. 3, Sewald Collins,
'Criticism in America' , p. 25i;cf. American Review* 
X. April 1937, Vol. IX No. 1, Geoffrey Stone, 'Morals and
2. Ed. No man Foers-erilfimanj^sjn* and America, (New York; 1930), p. Vl/
all truth, but the latest development of the thought of phil- 
osophers such as Bergson and physicists like Einstein and 
ISThitehead had resulted in a conception of matter itself as 
part of the ever-flowing stream of change. Man had no perman- 
ent resting-place amid the flux, no single goal, no eternal 
destination. It was small wonder that a generation convinced 
of the transitoriness of all experience should plunge deep 
into the maelstrom of sensation in order to break down the 
last vestiges of a static moral code which had stood "between 
them and their self-identification with the dynamic processes 
of nature. Literature turned away from the study of the conscious 
and rational elements in man to give expression to the subconscio 
the vast, inchoate whirlpool of impressions and desires which 
eddied beneath the surface calm of human conduct and was waiting
to break through into wild and phantasmal modes of being when-
1 
ever reason was off its guard. James Joyce's Ulysses became
2 
the key-work of the age. The psychology of dreams reclaimed for
itself, under a very different guise, the prominence it had 
before enjoyed during the Middle Ages, whilst under the influence 
of Bergson's philosophy, time itself ceased to have any object- 
ive reality and "became a pure dimension of the mind, elastic 
enough for past, present and future to be co-existent in the 
mind of the individual, or transposed and intermingled with
l.Cf.pp.
2.Of.Desmond Mac ar thy, Griticisjn, (London- and New York»1932),pp.5
301-304.
each other through the action of memory and anticipation.
But sooner or later, such a philosophy of flux 
was "bound to evoke a reaction. Although More and Babbitt have 
tended to dismiss him indiscriminately with the rest of Rouss- 
eau's followers, Wordsworth was one with the New Humanists in
perceiving that there is in man an element which calls for stab*
1 ilityJ 'The immortal mind craves objects that endure 1 ,
and it was this aspect of tht immortal mind which now reasserted 
itself in the demand for a permanent ^oint of repair. The mood 
of a liberal criticism which had dissolved into a defence of 
licence and irresponsibility was at an end, and and was replaced 
by a growing desire for authority,order, responsibility. After 
the financial crisis of 1929 with its abrupt shattering of so 
'many dreams of artistic freedom anitt irresponsibility,some of 
the younger men began to remember the writings Qf More and Babb- 
itt, austere and unpopular as they were, and set out to re-dis- 
cover the stern self-control they had advocated over two decades 
before. The 'Thirties saw a violent counter-reformation directed 
against modern literature in the name of the New Humanism. In 
1930 there appeared a symposium of Humanistic essays, entitled 
Humanism and America, edited by Professor Norman Foerster. This 
provoked a response in A Critique ofl Humanism, under the editors 
ship of C.Hartley Grattan, to which many of younger creative 
writers contributed.Superficially it seemed that the Zeit-geist
lT~Wo rdswo rth, Sonnej/TT, Composed after a Journey across the
Hambleton Hills, Yorkshire.
was on the side of the moderns, for most of the contributors 
to AJE Critique of Humanism had themselves produced work which 
their generation recognised as possessing qualities which 
entitled it to be classed as 'literature 1 , whereas the followers 
of More and Babbitt were, with the exception of T,S.Eliot    
whose allegiance to New Humanism was at the bset a very hesi- 
tant one   mere critics. But we can imagine the voice of a 
spectral Matthew Arnold objecting that there is a time to write 
and a time to refrain from writing, an epoch of expansion and 
an epoch of concentration. In an aepoch of concentration, the 
Zeit-geist is with the critics whose task it is to create a 
living current of noble and stimulating ideas to nourish the 
genius of the creative writers of the epoch of expansion when 
it arrives and not with the writers who seek, in despite of 
the Zeit-geist,to force their genius into modes of expression 
whereby it becomes merely eccentric and outre1 .
To the New Humanists of the 'Thirties, Sewald
Collins , Allan Reynolds Thompson, Gorham B. Munson and others, 
there was no doubt that they were living in an epoch of concen- 
tration when the need of the times was to find a central point 
of agreement where men of good will could draw in and consolid- 
ate their spiritual resources.Even as unsympathetic a judge of 
New Humanism as Alfred Kazin admits that there was in the midst 
of so much uncertainty and disorder a. deep hunger for some prin-
.The^New R_eJ3ubHe.,March 26,19oG,Vol.LXLl,Noo 799,Correspondence, 
'V/antedtA Humanist .Masterpiece',p. 155. and 'The New Tractarians* 
A Review of i^mari^s^_a^d_Araeri£a,p. ] 62.
ciple of unity and stability. He reminds us ikatx repeatedly 
that the Few Humanists had no share in contemporary imaginative 
literature and wre completely out of sympathy with modern 
writing and the achievements of democracy. 'But'  and it is a 
large 'But'  'they had, if not an applicable standard, a sense 
of standards, a conviction of the necessity of order, a belief 
in some exterior authority and discipline, and it was the assurance 
with which they inveighed against naturalism in literature and im- 
pressionism in criticism, the deliberation with which they propound*
i 
the need of a literature based on human responsibility and aris-
2 
tocratic dignity that gave them their importance.'
Unfortunately, as Kazin points out, there was the 
tendency among some of its younger exponents to carry its
demand for authority and concentration to its logical conclusion,
3 4 
politically in Fascism, religiously in £ Roman Catholicism, and
thereby to belie two of the priraayy principles of New Humanism, 
its mediatory nature and its distrust of an intellectualisation
which seeks to raise a single tendency into an Absolute philo-
5 
sophy of life. The irony of More and Babbitt's position is that
their names have come to be associated with one of those extremes 
of thought and conduct against which New Humanism was, in its purety 
a protest,and their work has been dismissed as the merely ill-
1.For the New Humanists' defence of their position against the 
criticisms of the younger creative writers, cf. The New Hepubli& 
April 16,Vol.LXll,No.802?Correspondence from O.W.Firkins and F:J. 
Mather,p/247-48, and Sewald Collins,p.248.
2.Alfred Kazin,On Native Grounds t {London;1945) f p.292.
3.Ibid.p.293.
4.Ludwig Lewisohn, op^U. ,p.444.
O.Cf «pp« oo rF., "
natured abuse of the moderns by two resentful reactionaries. 
It is the contention of this thesis that there are, on the 
other.hand, in the thought of the Hew Humanists, particularly 
of Paul Elmer More, elements of a wider and perennial validity 
which lift it out of the arena of the conflicting passions of 
its day and commend it^btiiim to the needs of our generation, 
as it seeks some permanent point of repair fot the spirit of 
man amongst so much that speaks of frustration and change and 
despair.
JTCf.New Repu"bliG7AprIi~9Tl950,Vol.Lxll7No.8Ql, Malcolm Gowley, 
'Angry Professors',pp.207-11.
7'
Thejgthical Basis of American Humanism. 
Few terms hare been used so widely and so elastically 
as 'Humanism'. It was therefore necessary for those who 
adopted such a label in a specific way to define rery clearly
&
what they meant by it. For such a contingency no one was 
better suited than Irring Babbitt. By the time of the appear- 
ance of his first book, Literature and The American College. 
in 1908,he had already reached middle life and had behind him 
several years 1 experience as lecturer in French at Harvard
Unirersity. Like his friend, Paul More^ he had read widely
He 
in both Oriental and Classical studies»juul had formed his
basic attitudes quite early, whilst still a student at Harvard 
and, unlike More in this respect, veered comparatively little 
from his original ©pinions. His mind was forthright and rigor- 
ous , concerned with large currents of thought rather than with
1. Ed, Herman Feerster,op. cit., Preface, p. VI.
2. CTT P. S. Richards .BelleTTn Man. (London:S,P.C.K. t 1952),p»120ff 
and L.J.A.Mercier, The Challenge of Humanism, (New York, 1933)p»» 3-4,
'The Century Dictionary defines humanism as "A system or m*de of 
thought in which human interest predominates or any pmrely human 
element is maifte prominent. But in the Renaissance itself what the 
Humanists came to stress was the principle of mediation between 
extremes which they found in Aristotle's Ethics __and Poe_y.cs base** 
on his psychology and exemplified in Cicero. The power to discrim- 
ate between extremes and therefore to choose judiciously distin- 
guishes man frem the rest of Nature. He has a capacity 0f reason 
mid will. a will to do or to refrain from doing. T (Mercier, op tloc. e J
•#.
its subtler nuances,and his style was correspondingly trenchant*
%
In erery way Babbitt was eqipped to become the leader of a
morement of literary rerolt- a reroltlthe forces of anarchy 
and heterodox^ which he felt conrineed wre undermining the
A
strength of American character, both indiridual and national. 
Ho small part of his campaign was directed against the indis- 
criminate use of phraseology in literary criticism, and it 
therefore behored him to set down unequirocally what he and 
his fellow Humanists meant by many of the terms they used 
repeatedly in their work. For that reason many of the defin- 
itions used in this chapter will be giren in the form in 
which Babbitt couched them rather than in the words of More. 
Babbitt was the theoretician of the American Humanists,whilst 
More was more concerned with illustrating the function of 
Humanism in action. The former 4s,therefore, on such questions 
as the Ethical Imagination,reason ,instinct, intuition,illusion 
the more explicit of the two.Not infrequently he gires his 
reader the impression that he enjoys dallying with definitions 
more than applying them in concrete instances.His naturally 
analytical mind tends to emphasise distinctions, whereas
More appears less eager to dwell on the analysis of ideas for
its 
jfchRtx own sake than to apply it to the experience of indirid-
ual writers in his attempt to find a dux Titae philosophia,a 
new synthesis of ideas which should satisfy his own deep- 
rooted lore of order and wholeness. It is, howerer, yital to 
an understanding of the relatire roles of the two men to
73.
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note that frequently an idea or theme originates with More,
although it is afterwardstexpressed more pungentl££ if less 
imaginatirely, by Babbitt. The general trend of two of 
Babbitt's best known works, Rousseau and RomanticJjaa. and 
Democracy and Leadershi-p.which appeared in 1919\and 1924 
respectirely,had been anticipated by Here's The Drift of 
Romanticism (1913) and Aristocracy and Justice (1915)»and 
the famous phrase,'the inner check',which was to become 
the pass-word of the New Humanists,had occurred in SerAas 
Two of the Shelburne Essays as early as 1905*Whenerer an 
idea originated with More,I hare tried to gire him the 
credit for it« Again, whenerer he modified or departed 
from the position taken up by Babbitt,! hare mentioned 
the fact} otherwise it may be assumed that the two men 
held similar, eren identical,riews,, in which case I hare 
quoted from the one who expresses the more crisply and 
crucially the point at issue,whilst mentioning in passing 
any notable parallels in the writings of the other.
It was definitely Babbitt,howerer, who first 
set down unequirecally at the outset of his literary 
career what he accepted as a working meaning of the term 
'Humanist' in contrast to the widely used 'Humanitarian' 
for which it was popularly considered to be a synonym. 
'The humanitarian',wrote Babbitt,'lays stress almost 
solely upon breadth of knowledge and sympathy.The poet
Schiller, for instance, speaks as a humanitarian, not as a
humanist, when he would 'clasp the millions to his bosom',
1 
and "bestow 'a kiss upon the whole world'. The Humanist,on
the other hand, is more selectire injbestowing its affections. 
His is the philosophy of that which is peculiar to man per se, 
as distinguished from the animal creation,on the one hand, and 
on the other, from the supernatural world. He has therefore 
to take into account the whole nature of man, intellect, 
emotions and imagination, in contrast to the emphasis of the 
humanitarian which lies almost exclusirely upon the emotions.
The distinction between the two terms was not 
original to Babbitt. The late Latin writer Aulus Gellius 
had complained of an indiscriminate use of the word * human- 
i_tas_,which was taken in his day to denote a 'promiscuous 
benerolence,what the Greeks call philanthropy', instead of 
its true meaning which inrolves both a doctrine and a dis- 
cipline of conduct.'It W.T.S some inkling of the difference 
between a unirersal philantropy and the indoctrinating and 
disciplining of the individual that led Aulus Gellius to
tieec)«-el
make his protest. Two words were probably/in his tiaej they 
are certainly needed today. A person who has sympathy for 
mankind in the lump,,faith in its future progress and desire 
to serre the great cause of this progress,should be called
1»Babbi11, Literature and The American College,.,(-^oston and
New York:i900T,p.7.
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not a humanist, but a humanitarian, and his creed may be
designated as huiaanitarianism. From the presant tendency
and convenient to regard humanism as an abbreriated form for humanitarian-
1ism there must arise erery manner of confusion'. As an
instance of this confusion, More,in Aristocracy and Justice . 
cites R.W.Liringstone's The Greek Genius and Its Meaning to 
Us in which the author appears to him to identify humanism
with universal sympathy and the impressionism of the indiv-
2 
idual. More had previously paid tribute in passing to Babbitt's
distinction between the two thorns in a footnote to the essay
3 
on Rousseau in Series Six of the Shelburne Assays , and as
we shall see later he traces in several essays the descent
of humanitarian ism from a marriage of the two erstwhile
4 
antithetical motives of human conduct, altuism and egotism.
In Aulus Gellius himself,a man whom Babbitt con-
fcssesto have been of a somewhat crabbed and pedantic temper-
t
amant, there was little room for sympathy of any kind. His 
'human it as'_ was confined to * aura et disciplina'for which 
he cited the authority of Cicero. In the latter, however, 
Babbitt finds a fuller and rounder conception of humanism, 
combining both sympathy and discipline in just proportion* 
'like the admirable humanist he was, he no doubt knew that
l.Ibid..loc.cit.
2.More, Shelburne Essays IX .(Boston and New York,1915 )p.94f.3.More, Shelburne_E_s8aysVl, (Boston and New York,1909) ,p.218n|
4.Cf.£ja« Appendix P>.
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what is wanted is not sympathy alone, nor again discipline and 
selection alone, but a disciplined and selective sympathy.' 
Sympathy without selection tends to grow flabby, selection 
without sympathy, disdainful. The Ancients,aristocratic by temper 
erred on the side of the latter; the modern age, democratic in 
outlook,errs in -the opposite direction.
The change l^as been generally attributed to the 
influence of Christianity.More,for example,sees in the transi- 
tion from Classical to SkKtktiKH Christian art, a whole series 
of new yalues being introduced, with a consequent confusion 
which has never been properly resolved. Humility replaced 
magnanimity,an exaltation** of the weak and suffering super- 
ceded the praise of honour, nobility and strengthsprivate virtue^
were confused with public duties, the service of God with the
2
seryice of Caesar. Nevertheless, even Tlore would agree, that
the peculiar emphasis on sympathy as the supreme principle of 
conduct, sufficient in itself,apart from any doctrine or discip- 
line, is something essentially modern. Historically, the Christian 
Church reserved its sympathies for those accepting its doctrines 
and discipline, and unhesitatingly excluded all others from the 
enjoyment of the privileges resrved for the elect. Even at theA
Renaissance, when under the impetus of the rediscovery of Class- 
ical wisdom, men threw off the yoke of *i a theology which had 
had become too exigent in its demands upon man, ahd set up in
,.-. 
m", (Boston and New York, !913T,p. 114.om, , , 
2 More, S^urne Essays l,(New York and London: 1904 )pp. 199
ry
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its stead the purely human authority of the Ancients, there 
still remained an accepted discipline implying its own doc- 
trines. If, in the first flush of enthusiasm, Men's imagin- 
ations assumed wild and grotesque proportions, they still 
accepted a deep underlying code of conduct as the norm, and 
though momentarily, they might exceed it in fantastic ways,
they were still unmistakably aware of what being human in-
2 
volved. When erentually the reaction set in, and to an
epoch of expansion there succeeded an epoch of concentration, 
during which the hitherto spontaneous orerflow of mental 
energy became canalised within the narrow limits of formal 
codes, the ideal remained the same, the formation of the 
*c oapl e t e man|although the methods of achieving it differed 
from what had gone before.
The New Humanist, however, sees a law in the 
universe or, as St. Paul put it, in man's members,which 
militates against this attempt to become the complete man.
To him,there are three levels of existence, the divine,the
3 
human, and the natural.Such a division, More suggests in
his article, 'The Humility of Common Sense 1 in Humanism
and America ,is no^ generally held to be out of date,but 
it is none the less grounded in universal experience and 
corresponds to the profound division the thinking man finds
~II ftTsTRichards»op. cifT.-p. 150 ff e
2l Cfl F.R.Barry, The Relevance of Christianity.(Londonil956),
pp.105-110.
3. For an interesting discussion on the validity of this division 
of human experience into three planes,see P.S.Richards,
oj).eit«,pp.l5 6-58.,
y?
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within himself. Man normally lires enthe middle plane, the 
human which, as such, is liable to invasion from the other 
two, and he thns becomes the battle-ground for warring ten- 
dencies besetting him from the two extremes of naturalism 
on the one hand and supernaturalisia on the other. In !Ehe 
New Shelburne EssaysftMore points out that no man is purely
religious or purely naturalistic. Both the 'religious man 1
2 
and 'the natural man' as such are pure abstractions. Man's
true humanity consists of holding the balance between the 
two, a matter of delicate and repeated adjustment. Unlike 
most religious teachers, the Humanist does not advocate 
that man should place his main emphasis on his affinity 
with the divine. Too rapid a transition from the human to 
the divine or supernatural plane may breed eccentricity or 
fanaticism, a problem with which More deals at length in T The 
Religious Ground of Humanism' where he seeks to discriminate 
between those virtues which belong to the kingdom of God
and those that pertain to the rule of Caesar(i.e. to the
3 
divine and to the human planes respectively}, and to point
4
out the chaoe that ensues from a confusion of the two orders.
The world would be a better ^lace if more people were sure
they were human before aspiring to the superhuman! too many
P.
1 Ed.Norman Foerster, ojg. ci\. [More, "The Humility of Common S
More p. 101.
2. New_She^lburne Essays. 111. (Princetontl956) a p. 154.
4.More._Shelburne Essays l.m?.P51~55.
pass abruptly from the naturalistic to the religious level, 
and fall -victim to endless self-deceptions. Man's peculiar 
dignity consists in knowing himself and abiding by the law 
of measure which applies specifically to the human plane.
The Greeks in their day had grasped fully the 
dangers that attend man's proneness to run to excess, and 
had expressed figuratively a vital truth when they warned 
men that the invisible powers were jealously observant of 
human thoughts and actions, and were quick to take vengeance 
on those who,through folly or arrogance, forgot to 'think
as mortals'. Upon such Nemesia descended in the form of the
* 
fury Ate, bringing madness and ultimate destruction in her
wake. To learn this truth was the paramount need of the modern
world which, to More, had,for the past hundred years,been
, 2 
'floating in a haze of arrogant unreality.1 «To think as a
mortal is to compromise, to mediate, to find the golden meanj
wheras we have been hearkening, now to one, and now to another
3 
of'two extreme and utterly opposed philosophies of life'.
This theme More developed at length in two essays in the 
Second Series of the Shelburne Essays.'Delphi and Greek' and 
'Nemesis, or the Divine Envy', in which he sought tojshow that 
the two proverbs on the Delphic temple,'Know thyself and
r7~Ed.Foe"rster7 pp. cTtTT-Babbitt. 'Essay at Definition' )p7g9
  Gf. NINETEETO CENTURY. May 1928, Vol! .DCXV,p. 647.
2. Ilore, Shelburne Essays IX. (Boston and New York»1915) ,p.227.
3. IMd., lp_c_.,c_it_._ .
'Nothing too much',supposedly Apollo's greeting to pilgrims
to his shrine, represented the essential spirit of Greek
1 
temperance and restraint.
Such a law of measure, or decorum, as Babbitt calls 
it,may however easily degenerate into empty formalism, unless 
man's conception of it is constantly renewed by a living appre­ 
hension of its inner meaning.lt must, according to Babbitt, t-be 
shown to be one of the laws unwritten in the heavens of which 
Antigone had the immediate perception, laws that are 'not of 
today or yesterday 1 ,that transcend in short the temporal pro­ 
cess. The final appeal of the Humanist is not to any histori-
2 
cal convention but to intuition.'
This statement of Babbitt's was sharply criticised 
by Edmund 'Wilson in The New Republic for March 1930, in which 
the latter claimed that Antigone's action in burying her 
brother contrary to Creon's edict v^as an act, not of self-con­ 
trol or of disciplined compliance with the laws of the universe 
but of passionate personal loyalty and defiant self-assertion. 
Had the law of measure been universally observed even in Greece 
there wjuld have been no titanic passions for the great drama­ 
tists to depict.
With the second part of Wilson's assertion More and 
Babbitt would be in partial agreement. The Greeks did frequent­ 
ly transgress the law of measure. The Plumanists were,however,
1.More.Shelburne Essays ll,(¥ew York and London} 1905),p.iqoff^
2.E£.Foerster,pjp_i£ii., (Babbitt,'Essay at Definition') P ?7
3.Ee^Sw_ReEublloJMaroh M.lflSO.Vol.imHO.WS.p.llS.'
less immediately concerned with the results of this transgress- 
ion in art than in life*from such a failure to maintain a just 
balance of the natural, the human and the divine came the 
decline of Greece, The Sophists allowed themselves to be over- 
whelmed by their sense of Man's kinship with the physical 
universe with its change and instability, and so undermined 
man's faith in his own peculiar mediative position. The New 
Humanists,on the other hand, held as a basic tenet of their 
creed- a tenet to which they were confident all the greatest 
thinkers,both ancient and modern, subscribed- that there were 
in operation in the universe two distinct laws,a law for man 
and a law for things.On the very first page of his Literature 
and The American College,Babbitt quotes from Emerson the stanza:
'There are two laws discrete 
Not reconciled- 
LWR for man and law for thingj 
The last builds town and fleet, 
But it runs wild, 1 
And doth the man unking'.
This division is confirmed by a study ©f the Classics, partic- 
ularly Aristotle who, throughout his works, recognised that
man was a creature of two laws:the law of his physical or
of 
natural self, awiimpulse and desire, and the law of his human
self which is known practically as a power of control over 
impulse and desire. If man is to be truly human he must not 
let impulse and desire run wifd, but must oppose to everything
T". Babbitt. Literature and The American College,Preface,p.I
excessire in his ordinary self, whether in thought, deed or 
emotion,the law of measure.The Sophists erred "by weakening 
the law for man in farour of the law for thing which sees 
in life only movement and flux and calls for man to lire on 
the natural plane.
Beforejaan free himself from this law of change to 
which,on the physical side of his being, he, like the rest of
creation is subject, he must find some centre to which to 
refer the manifold aspects of his experience in such a way
that he may become a rounded and coherent personality, and
1 
this the phenomenal world of nature does not supply. This
centre is found in the standards by which the individual 
seeks to impose order upon the multitudinous eddy of his 
impressions and sensations, and such standards are to be found 
either in our inherited tradition or in the individual's own 
intuition of an abiding and universal reality behind the 
material forms he can see and touch and handle. The Humanist 
allows that the standards held by tradition may in course of 
time grow stale and lose their authority, and in that case 
the individual has to depend entirely upon his personal 
intuition of an underlying reality, as Socrates had to do 
in an age^like ours,when recognised standards were breaking 
down and man had only the authority of his inner (Spiritual
l.Ed.Foerster, op.cit. t (Babbitt.*Essay at Definitfton'),p.32.
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affirmation. The charge was quite understandably brought
against the Humanists that in the last analysis their
doctrine rested on as subjective and individualistic %
g principle as any form of the Romantic philosophy of life,
just as Socrates was charged with being one with the
of 3 Sopphists in making man the measure ilwall things. H0w
they defended themselves against this charge of impress-
4 
ionism we must see later. Here it is sufficient to say
that they asserted that all men who consider their exper- 
ience honestly, in the light of the corporate wisdom 
acquired by mankind through the centuries, will be aware
that that experience is not simple, but dual. On the one
rr&r^ 
hand foe is aware of 'the* teachings of matter, the many forms
and individuals that arise and perish, that swim in the flux
of time, and the feeling that we too, or some part of us,
5 
are illusions in the great illusion. ' On the other hand,
there ceme moments when he is also aware of an inner reality
which abides, 'the one invisible, eternal, incorruptible, im-
6 of which 
perishable 1 " " the phenomenal forms are but a
shadowy and imperfect reproduction. This is the dualism of
The One and the Many, a motive which runsx right through the
thought of More and BAbbitt, but whereas in the work of the
2.Cf. Alien Tate, Reactionary Essays on Poetry, and Ideas. 
(New York and LondonJ1936l7 p./'2"
slMore, 2.helburne_Essajrs VI, (New York and London; 1909),p.56. 6.1bid« »fbc.cit.
latter, it remains Oriental in tone and derivation, in More's 
later thought it assumes a new complexion as a result of 
his growing absorption in Platonism. From Series Six of the 
Shelburne Essays onwards, it furnishes him with a connecting
motif. There the Oriental and Platonic elements are fairly
1
evenly balanced, "but the scale is increasingly tilted in favour
of the Greek conception, seeing matter not as the enemy of 
spirit, a mere illusion which seduces man from a knowledge 
of truth, but rather as the material upon which spirit seeks 
to work. This idea becomes almost the raison ...dVetrafof The
Greek Tradition, and there in the volume on Platonism, he gives
2 
the fullest explanation of his peculiar use of the phrase.
Plato recognised that men move about in a world of shifting
conduct 
impressions, and are constrained to base their
judgments drawn from an observation of facts which can never 
be complete. In our practical life, so far as it is concerned 
with the world of phenomena, we have only the guidance of 
opinion, i.e. our impressions of the Many. But he also asserted 
that, beside ppinion,we have knowledge, an intuition of the One. 
'The operation of this faculty we may not be able to analyse, 
but Khere^it is, within our souls, giving us certain information 
of the everlasting reality of righteousness and loveliness in 
themselves as things apart from the flux ,and bidding us look
1 .Of.More, Shelburne Essays VI,pp«£&§3Kld£» 315-46. rd 
2.More, The Greek Tradition complementary volume, Platonis_ia_5 n 
(pTincetonj 1931),pp.112-15.
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to the God of these realities for the measure of our nature.' 
The identification of the One with God is a late develop- 
ment in More's thought.Buring the writing of The Shelburne 
Essaya,he was prepared to affirm only the existence of a 
supernatural order of Ideas, the eternal pattern,one and 
immutable, underlying the manifold and vacillating copies of 
it in the physical and human worlds. It is to this super- 
natural and ideal order that man, on one side of his being, 
is related. 'In one directioh we tend toward unity and the 
absorption of separate desires and energies in the knowledge 
of our own completeness.The sense of ourself as a being 
different in composition from other beings is lost in the 
recognition of a higher Self which leaves no room for the 
antagonism of individualities; and the following of that ideal 
we call the spiritual as opposed to the material life. 
As the goal of this tendency we speag of an eternal change© 
lessness, of a self-sufficient joy, and of eternalllife- unmean- 
ing words if passed through the analysing intelligence, but 
to the foresight of experience,nay, to the remembrance of those 
who at moments have risen to the heights of contemplation, 
the great reality without which one half of our nature is 
left halt and impotent. In the other direction lies the 
sense of our personality as concerned with variety and
l.Kore, Platonism«p.ll3.
change and that world of phenomena, whioh is a 
reflection, it may be (who shall say?), of 3. dissipation within 
ourselves. In this way we come to distractions and restlessness 
to self-seeking,competition,envy,jealousy, and strifesjto 
misery,devouring egotism,lust, and violence. Its end is despair 
and the irreparable decomposition of death,
'In its philosophical form this difference of iirect-
ion shows itself as the antinomy of the one and the many', 
Few men,howeverare prepared to accept the paradox
of such a dualism. The majority seek to explain the universe 
in terms of either spirit or matter. The sages of Ancient 
India were seduced bysa the calm imperturbability of^,he divine 
and so lulled their followers into spiritual stagnation, 
devoured by an overpowering sense of the One. The Sophists
on the other hand fell victim to the vacillating influence
2 
of the Many .The true dualist, however, will allow for the
existence of both and seek to discriminate between that whioh 
pertains to the One and that which is associated with the 
Many by means of a Socratic dialectics otherwise,he runs the 
risk of being swept along with theoprevailing current o^he
day,the victim of time,mutability and decay, or of acquiescing
3 
inertly in a dead order which mistakes formalism for reality.
He has thus to mediate between a chaotic impressionism and a 
stagnant authoritarianism.In our day the chief danger is from
1.More, Shelburne Essays VI,pp.321-22.
2.Babbitt, Literature and The American College.pp.24-26*^ 
S.Ed.Foerste-rTopTcrrr, (Babbitt,'iJssay at Uef Tnicrony, p .42
the former in its modern guises of Pragmatism,Behaviourism, 
and other philosophies which connect man with the flux.In 
the New Humanists' own day, the writings of Bergson and 
William James, in their reaction against scientific posit- 
ivism, were drawing men's attention omce more ton: the 
Platonic problem of the One and the Many, but unfortunately, 
to More and Babbitt,they adopted not the Socratic,but the 
sophistical side of the argument, thus sinking below the 
lerel of reason instead of rising above it as they might 
hare done,had they adopted the Socratic-and Platonic- 
method of definition.2 Above intellectualism lies the 
Platonic intuition with its own peculiar type of imaginatio
and enthusiasm: below lies the'Rousseauistic intuition}j[so
2 called for reasons we must consider later) which is faith
in mere instinct or impulse, also involving its own type
4 
of imagination and enthusiasm.
At this juncture it might be well to pause 
and consider the New Humanists' use of certain recurrent 
terms, fIntellectualism'is obviously the action of the 
discursive reason, for which frequently the word 'reason'
alone, with a sm»ll 'r',is used,in contrast to 'Reason'
i 
with a capital letter, which denotes the di/ne faculty of
the term8 
control operating intuitively. Further^Insight or the
Higher', or'"super-rational1, or'Platonic intuition are all
_________________ ___________( London And New _Vor_K _; J^/g)________1.Tlore, Shelburne .Sss.a.jrsJTll^ pp. 201-207. "
2.Babbitt, Masters of Modern French Criticism.rm.lX-X.3.Cf.t)./o3Pf. .. ... _ 0 
     4.Babbitt,pja._c_it._»PP»46-52.
used in contrast to the discursive reason. Much of the confusion 
of human thought throughout the ages has arisen from the iso- 
lation of the discursive reason and its exaltation into the 
supreme faculty, thereby usurping the place which beloggs by 
right to the intuitive Reason^ and giving birth to a vast brood
of metaphysical interpretations of life which ,to More in
1 
particular, are anathema. To the intuitve Reason corresponds
the Ethical, or Religious, or Qualitative Imagination possessing 
a centre of reference in the apprehension of the One, whereas 
the discursive, or as it is sometimes called, the scientific
reason judges quantitatively in accordance with its teeming
2
impressions of the Many. As there is a form of intuition 
above reason, so there is alse an intuition below reason, the 
Rousseauistic intuition, dependent not on insight but on impulse. 
For the sake of clarity throughout this thesis,! refer to the 
higher power as 'intuition 1 or 'insight', to the lower as '±nxix
1 instinct ', although More himself does not hold consistently to
£
this antithesis of terms. The part of man that is under the
control of intuition is the 'higher self'jthat which is swa$yed 
by the dominion of instinct is the 'lower self. To both T 'ore and 
Babbitt, this distinction between the higher and lower selveslis
I
is concerned, not with the traditional division of body and
*
soul, but with an inner dualism of consciousness dependent on
_____________________________ foosfcon Af\3 Nt*y -/orK ; Ml 3] _______________
l.More, Shelburne_Essaj£S_ VI 11^ p. 367. Cf . Babbitt, Rousseau and 
Romanticism, pp. 176-77, and Democracy & Leadersh-f^T=(^S0 sl6H <fc New
York. 1924), pp. 11, 68-69. 
S.More.Shelburne Essays Vl,pp.22,169ff .
vm pp , r
4. Shelburne Essays, S
1
an awareness of the One or of the Many. .Further, the contrast 
is not, as it appeared to the Eighteenth century^between reason
and instinct, an antithesis which has persisted with only a
op 2 
change £»»» emphasis down to the present day v Instead the
New Humanists adfpted the Classical division between reason 
and instinct on the one hand, classed together as the natural 
faculties, and intuit ion, on the other. It was this intuition 
which Pascal described as 'the heart' when he sought to contrast
true religious insight with the perceptions of the discursive
3 
reason. But in popular parlance, the term 'heart 1 has been used
for t>e passions or desires and therefore relates to the l&wer
self, an instance of the necessity of clearly defining one's
4 
terms. This confusion of terms facilitated in no small measure
the blurring of the distinction between the Ethical and the
5 
Rousseauistic Imaginations. The general error of the Roman-
tics to More and Babbitt was just this assimilation of'the 
rebellion of the lower element of our nature with the control
that co^es from above nature. For the infinite spirit which
known 
makes itselfx£s±± as a restraining check and a law of con-
centration within the flux of nature this new aspiration of 
liberty would substitute the mere endless expansion which 
ensues upon the denial of any restraint whatsoever; in place
l.More«_Shelburne Essays JJL1, (Boston and Fe?r York*1905) ,pj».245-51.
s.cf.pp. ica.Mi. vm
5.More^Sh:eIburn_e__E_s_says "S^P»228.
4.Babbitf, M_aste_rs of ModernJFrench Criticism,p. 70.
5.Cf .pp. lo£>-no, //3~//6.
of the higher intuition which is above reason it would commit
1 
mankind to the lower intuition which is beneath reason.'
On the one hand Babbitt would group together all those 
had this higher intuit ion, the sages of the world, including 
Christ and Buddha and Socrates, and, amongst moderns, just a 
few who hare entered rather more uncertainly into this
inner wisdom, Burke, Dr. Johnson, Joubert, and to an even
2 
less sure degree, Emerson, whilst, on the other hand,, he
woulw place all the Romantics and Naturalists from Rousseau 
down to Bergson and William James.
'Possibly the contrast between the intuitiveness of 
Joubert and the sages and that of M. Bergson may be brought 
out most clearly by comparing their attitude towards time. 
Reality is a pure process of flux and change according to 
M. Bergson, and this change takes place in time, so that -feiw 
time is thus the very stuff of which our lives are made. 
We should strive to see things not sub specie aeternitatis,
w
but sub specie durationis. ' With this Babbitt contrasts the 
insight of the sagesJBuddha's 'The sage is delivered from timej 
Michel Angelo's 'Happy the soul in which time no longer courses' 
Joubert 's own 'Time, measured here below by the succession of 
beings which are constantly changing and being renewed is seen 
and felt and reckoned and exists. Higher up there is no change 
or succession or new or old or yesterday or- tomorrow' ,
l.More. SEe3rbuirne 
2Bab'bitt Toasters of Modern French Criticism^. 54. Cf. More,
_bh e Ibu r Tie^say s 1, pp. 71-75. 
3 . Bobbctt , Masters o£ Modern French Q-ifc tosrff, p. 55".
and -^merson's description of 'the core of God's abysm':
'There Past, Present,Future shooti 
Triple "blossoms from one root'.
Whereas in the sage the spiritual intuition must predominate, 
in the critic or the creator of art or literature there :is 
need of both kinds of intuition. 'Perhaps the wisest man is 
he who has "both orders of intuition and then mediates between 
themj who joins to his sense of unity a fine perception of 
the local,the individual, the transitory. Joubert's quality 
as a critic is revealed especially by the fact that he not 
only had standards, but held them fluidly. Fis insistence
on the fixed and permanent is nearly always tempered by the
2 
sense of change and instability.'
Foremost amongst Joubert's intuitive perceptions is Kis 
view of illusion as an integral part of reality, a necessary 
pondition of a working philosophy of the One and the Many. 
Without illusion, natural phenomena are seen in hard isolation 
and not in their interconnection with the whole. In this way 
one arrives at the false disillusion of the decadent who sees 
not only in the outer world but in himself also nothing but
isolated phenomena,who has no countervailing intuition of the
3 
One to oppose to his perception of the Many, and who therefore
after the manner of Arthur Symons,Wilde, Anatole Prance or
1. Ibid.,pp.55-56.
2. Ibjd., 1 oG..Cit.
3. Ibid.,pp.196-97.
Ai
Humelcer, seeks to distil f»om each experience the maximum of 
sensation. To succumb to such a philosophy of relativity is, 
according to Babbitt, to forfeit all claim to be truly modern, 
as opposed to being merely modernistafor it is to refuse to 
take into account the whole of man's immediate experience in 
which the nan who is truly positivistic or critical must recog- 
nise and mediate between two separate orders of perception. 
'Life does not give here an element of oneness and there an 
element of change. It giv<=s a oneness that is always changing. 
The oneness and the change are ins en arable. Now if what is
stable "inrt permanent is felt -F; real, the side o^ life thr.t
si i'o pinn 
is always TSHiKftirigover into something else or vanishing away
entirely is; as every student of psychology knows, associated 
with the feeling of illusion. If a nan attends solely to this
side of life he will finally come, like leconte de Lisle, to
nobile 
look upon it as a "torrent of chimeras? as ?n endless whirl
of vain appearances* .To admit that the oneness of life and the 
change are inseparable is therefore to admit that such reality
as  v.a.n can know positively is inextricably nixed uo v.'ith illus-
3. 
ion. Moreover man himself isKXXSt caught up in tVie processjhe is
a oneness that is always changing, ti-e same person yet infin- 
itely different at the ages of six <?eekd and seventy years. 
'Froiji all this it follows that an enormous element of illusion 
-and this is a truth the East has always accepted more readily
1 .Babbitt .Rousseau and Romanticise, (Boston and 'Tew York: 1924)
pp.Xl-Xll.
than the .Vest- enters into the idea of personality itself. 
If the critia-al spirit is once allowed to have its way, it 
will not rest until it has dissolved life into a mist of 
illusion. Perhaps the most positive and critical account 
of man in modern literature is that of Shakespeare:
*w'e are such stuff
As dreams are na.de on, and our little life 
Is rounded with a sleep".
But though strictly considered, life is but a web of illus-» 
ion and a dream within a dream, it is a dream that needs 
to be managed with the utmost discretion if it is not to 
turn into a nightmare. In other words, however much life 
may mock the metaphysician, the problem of conduct remains., 
There is always the unity at the heart of the change Jit 
is possible, however, to get at this real and abiding 
element and so at the standards with reference to which the 
dream of life may be rightly managed only through a veil of 
illusion. The problenai of the One and the Many, the ulti-
mate problem of thought can therefore be solved only by
1 
a right use of Illusion. '
These two themes of illusion and conduct- or
2 
character- form the main motives of the Shelburne Lssays.
As we shall see later, the theme of trme and false illus- 
ion exercised a profound influence upon the first five 
volumes of More's critical writings, and although tempor-
1. IMd. ,PP»
2. (Jf .pp.-2'oFF.
arily overshadowed from Series Six on by his more explicit 
concern with the 'Inner Check', it remains as an undertone 
to all his criticism, becoming its dominant idea again 
towards the end of his life.He developed the theme first in 
detail in the essay on'Arthur Syraons* The Two Illusions' in 
the First Series of the ShelBurne Essays in 1904,whereas 
Babbitt's first reference to the subject is, I believe, in 
Masters of Modern French Criticism,published in 1913. As
early as Series Two of the essays, More had anticipated the
2illustrations of illusion which Babbitt found in Shakespeare
3 
and BuddhaS i.e.he was using in 1905 examples first occur-
ing in Babbitt in Rousseau and Romanticism (1919).
To the natural order of the Many corresponds 
the e*lan vital, the vital impulse of nature, while to the
supernatural order of the One corresponds the frein vital,
4
the principle of vital control. Right conduct to the Human- 
ist, is the mediation between expansiveness and concentrat- 
ion, rather than an exclusive emphasis on either order of 
intuitions. Nevertheless, Humanism has become known almost 
exclusively as the philosophy of the Frein Vital or the
Inner Check, not only among its opponents,but also among
5 
its advocates.
1.Cf.infra.
2.More, Shelburne Essays ll,pp.24-?5,114, 
3.Ibid.§6-60.
4. Babb i 11, Masters of Modern FrencJi^Criticj^sm, p.251.
5. Llewellyn Jones,How To Read Books,(NewYofk,1950),p.36. LewIs onn,op» cit. t pp 1 45^-34« 
American ttejaieWiVol.Vll.No.2,May 1936,A.R.Thompson,pp. 1^7./oo
The higher will in man,or the higher immediacy,is 
distinguished from the lower immediacy, the merely tempera- 
aiental man with his impressions and emotions and expansive 
desires,"by this power of vital control which likewise dis­ 
tinguishes man from the animals and is thus the character­ 
istic feature of man. f Humanism 1 ,says Foerster in his Preface 
to Humanism and America.* conceives that the power of restraint 
is peculiarly human, and that those who throw down the reins
are simply abandoning their humanity to the course of animal
1 
life or the complacency of vegetables 1 . Indeed the moment of
human supremacy is not that of expansive sympathy, but of 
concentration and selection,and the chief use of any widen­ 
ing out of knowledge and sympathy must be to prepare man more 
fully for that moment.'Now to select rightly a man must have 
right standards, and to have right standards means in prac­ 
tice that he must constantly set "bounds to his pwn impulses.
Man grows in perfection proper to his own nature in almost
2 
direct ratio to his growth in restraint and self-control.'
The term 'inner check' was first used by Jlore in the 
Second Series of Shelburne Essays in the essay on Kipling and 
Fitzgerald in which he claimed to have found it used on one 
occasion by Emerson.^It became more frequent in his work,how­ 
ever, after Series Six,and the fullest definition and analycis 
of its operation is given in 'Definitions of Dualism'*
op. cit..T&^^±±ty±BKgg3exatxSjgl±H±x±aiiA)?ref ace,pa.
2.Babbitt, j&UAAjffijigjjpfr^^ New Laokoon
.. (Boston and Uew ^ork.1929),p.202.3.Morp,Mn1burne Essays 11, OB. rl7«M.I18; of .Shaf er. 0£._cit. 164f. 
1 i TIT—" Tjlftnl ft 1 HJ"T° Vl 111 "DP- £48, 274,279-81, 285, 284.
The idea, if not the term, is present in Babbitt's New Laokoon 
(1910), and in Masters of Modern grench^CritlcJMiJiQia) in 
which he calls attention to Brunetiere's 'principe refrenantj
equivalent to his own frein vital* 2The actual term 'inner
3 
check' occurs more frequently in Rousseau and Romanticism.
~~ 4 
Oriental in its origin, the term was connected by Babbitt, and
by More during the earlier volumes of the Shelburne Essays.with
the Buddhistic discrimination between vital impulse and vital
5 
check,'the Buddhistic equivalent of the 'civil war infche cave}
but gradually More came to give it a content which dr'ew more
6 
on Platonic than on Buddhistic, thought.
Prom a practical point of view, the inner check 
is identified with the conscience, and envisaged as a power 
which sits aloof from and in judgment upon the expansive desire*. 
It is distinct from man's lower and natural self, and constit- 
utes that higher immediacy through which man is in communion 
with the supernatural.But such an affirmation presupposes the 
existence of a power set above the flux of nature on which, 
nevertheless,the flux depends- on what Aristptle termed an 
Unmoved Mover. Otherwise conscience becomes a part of the 
very flux and element of change which it is supposed to control. 
'In proportion as he escapes from outer control man must be 
conscious of some such unmoved mover if he is to oppose a
r7~Babbi'tt, The NewJiaalcaan, pp. 201-202.
? Babbitt, MaiterT of Mod e rn_Fren ch_Crit i c ism, pp. 328-29.
4. To id . p. 150.
5. Ibid. ,loc._c_it."
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definite aim or purpose to the indefinite expansion of his 
desires. Having some such firm centre he may hope to carry 
through to a fortunate conclusion the"'civil war in a cave". 
He may, as the wise o.re wont to express it,build himself an 
island in the midst of the flood. The romantic moralist, on
the other hand, instead of building himself an island is
1 
simply drifting with the stream'.
Such a drifting is, to the Buddhist,_p_amada, the 
unforgivable sin of spir^ial indolence, whereas the man who
curbs his expansive desires is displaying the greatest of all
5 2
virtues, appamada.spiritual vigilance or strenuousness. Simil- 
arly in Greek philosophy, evil is envisaged,partly as spirit- 
ual insubordination, but even ^ore as that spiritual indol-
3 
ence which makes such insubordination possible,rhathynnia.
Moreover, without aome centripetal power such as the Inner 
Check affords, man falls prey to lusts which make him not 
merely supine but dangerous. Unlike the other animals,man'a 
Appetites know no bounds,and this infinitude of desire
makes man necessarily either better or worse than other
4 
creatures. The Humanist accepts the traditional Christian
classification of the three lusts, Jibido dominandi, libido
sciendi and libido sentiendi, and of these three, he would 
      5 
agree with Ernest de Seilliere that the libido dominandi >s the most
1.Babbitt, Rousseau and_Romanticis_m,pp. 160-61Jcf.More,Shel-
£. b_urne_Es_say_s Vlll,p.2S3| X,pp.lS8-40| VI,pp. 223-24, 231-
2.Babbitt .Rousseau and Recant icismp* 150»of .More,Hew Shelburne 
Essays I ^p^oTril^T^SIB^BS^m^^^&da—————— 
STEoreT Religj,on_of_Plato, (.Frinceton,.Lyyi J,pp256- 
4.Babbit :Ty~pemocr'ac.v~and Leadership. (Boston & N eW VorK^AH).
1 . 
exigent, whether it be conceved,as in Hobbes,as a perpetual
' 2 
and restless desire after power, or,as in Machiavelli, as a
3 
law of cunning. With the removal of the check upon personal
ambition imposed by the authority of the Church in the Middle 
Ages and the growing emphasis upon the suprmacy of the indiv­ 
idual, these three lusts assumed ever increasing sway over 
mankind, driving him from one extreme of behaviour to another 
in his search for an ever elusive satisfaction, and culmin­ 
ating in that form of rampant imperialism which More some-
4 5 
times designates Napoleonism and sometimes Nietzscheism.
The position of the Plumanist on the contrary is one 
of moderation, of mediation, 'le have seen that the humanist 
as we know him historically, moved between an extEeae of sym­ 
pathy and an extreme of discipline and selection, and became 
humane in proportion as he mediated between these extremes. 
To state this truth more generally, the true mark of excell­ 
ence in a man, as Pascal puts it, is his power to harmonize 
in himself opposite virtues and to occupy all the space 
between them (tout_1lentredeux).By his ability thus to unite
in himself opposite qualities man shows his humanity, his
6 
superiority of essence over other animals'.
Few men have attained to so exacting a form of
1 rcTTl. J. A.Hercier,The~C'harrenge'~of Humanism, (New YorkTl935Jfrp. *3'
cf* Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticismf p.199. 
2.I.E.jpleonexia> cf. More, New Shelburne Essays III,pp.l09ff.
3. Babbitt, Democracy and LeadershipiPp.58-41.
4.More Shelburne Essays.IX.pp. 229-51.
5.Ibid.pp.118,233-36; cf. Shelburne Essays Vlll,p.l81ff.
6.Bab~Fitt, Literature and the _Amerigan Col^ege t p.22.
excellence. The aim, as Matthew Arnold saw, was to 'see life 
steadily and see it whole 1 ,but no one, not even Sophocles to
whom Arnold applied the phrase, had to Babbitt, attained to
1 
that goal. 'Man is -  a living paradox in that he holds with
enthusiasm and conviction to the half-truth and yet becomes 
perfect only in proportion as he achieves the roundedjview. 
The essence of any true humanistic method is the mediation 
between extremes, a mediation that demands of course not only 
effective thinking bttt effective self-discipline; and that no 
doubt is why true humanists have always been so rare. We are 
not to suppose that because a man has made some progress in 
mediating between opposite virtues and half-truths he has there' 
fore arrived at the truth. The Truth(with a capital T) is of 
necessity infinite and si is not for any poor finite creature 
like man. The most any man can do is to tend toward the truth, 
but the pottion of it he has achieved at any given moment will 
always, compared with what still remains, be a mere glimpse 
and an infinitesimal fragment. If he attempts to formulate this 
glimpse, the danger is that it will thus be frozen into a false 
finality. Any one who thinks he has gdt the Truth finally tucked 
away in a set of formulae, is merely suffering, whether he call 
himself theologian, or scientist, or philosopher, from what may
be termed the errer of intellectual* or the metaphysical ill-
? 
usion'.^This is the error which :lore, borrowing the phrase from
Bacon, calls the Intellectus sibi permissus, or reason run
1. Ibid.,p.23»
2.Babbitt,The New Laokoon,pp.189-90.
into such excesses man is betrayed by the wiles of the De»on 
of the Absolute. And yet although reason is so prone to fall 
victim to an extreme rationalisation, man,in so far as he is 
human, is bound to depend for his understanding of the world 
upon the workings of reason, which needs to distinguish and 
to analyse. 'Though the truth cannot be finally formulated, 
man cannot dispense with formulae. The truth will always 
overflow his categories,yet he needs categories. He should 
hare formulae and categories, but hold them fluidlyj in other
words he must have faith in law, but it must be a vital2 
faith'.
This passage I consider of vital importance to a 
fair and adequate understanding of what Babbitt and More 
were seeking to effect through Humanism, as opposed to the 
grotesque caricature of their work given by so many of their 
opponents. They were at one with the Humanists of the 
Ancient world, as ^ell as of the Renaissance and the Seven- 
teenth Century in so far as they were in search of the 'com- 
plete man', and they saw such completeness to consist, not 
in the absorption of one term of nan's dual nature in its 
opposite, but in the holding of the two terms in just pro- 
portion.
Fron the Sixteenth Century onwards, there have been 
ar work influences militating against this Humanist concept-
iTMore, New_Shelb_urne Essays I,pp. 1-2.
2.Babbitt, T_he Ne_w Laokoon f r>r>» 190.
3.The_B_2okman,June 1930,Vol.LXXl.No. 3J Sewald Collins,'Criti- 
cism in America',pp.242-44.
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sentimental romAnbefSm.
ion of man^ These the Humanist sees as two aspects of a single
hersy, the denial of man's dual nature, the attempt to en- 
visage him as an extension of, not something in contrast to, 
the physical universe around him. This new sense of man's 
unity with the cosmos came as a result of Gopernican astro- 
nomy ,bringing with it a sense of emancipation from the 
tyranny of mediaeval theology and of confidence in man's 
powers to penetrate the secrets of the universe. Moreover, 
with the gradual development of scientific knowledge, there
«
came into the world for the first time a new aspect of con-
2 
sciousness, the belief in human progress. Naturalism or
Naturism,this tendency to regard man as part of the physical
universe,and humanitarianism had co-existed before in the
rfe 
classical period, but without this idea ofA perfectibility of
man which, with the decline of orthodox religious faith,came 
increasingly to be exalted itself into a religion. Already in 
the Sixteenth Century, this new spirit of scientific natural- 
ism was represented in all its vigour and optimism by Francis £ 
Bacon,after whom Babbitt names this one particular aspect of 
the'Romanti^' heresy.In some respects, Bacon remained the 
Renaissance humanist,in others the traditional Christian,but 
to Babbitt, the main drift of his career was unmistakable'.he 
tended to scientific positivism,the setting up of purely 
quantitative and dynamic standards, which were to become the 
norm of judgment amongst his followers,
olLe£e. , P   5 2 .
Vlll,p.?.54 ff . jVl.p. 239. 
5. Babbitt, Literature and the Amejrican_Gjj;ii.e£e. t p.4Q.
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The scientist no longer advocated the training of tfte 
'complete man 1 , but of the specialist, concentrating on a 
single "branch of study with a view to becoming proficient 
in it. The Humanist and liberal education of the Renaiss- 
ance, aiming at a general culture, yielded place to a narrow
and detailed analysis, now "bearing its fruits in the present
1 
American educational system. 'What a Baconian understands
is training for power, training with a view to certain prac- 
tical or scientific results. In getting his technical or 
professional education the student is often,of course,
immensely stimulated by the plain relation it has to his
2 
future livelihood.' The Baconian therefore,like his modern
descendant, the Pragmatist,bends all his energies to a given 
object and expects his progress to be in direct proportion 
to the strenuousness of his efforts. Here he differs funda- 
mentally from the Humanist who seeks primarily to work,not 
an the world, but himself.'By right selection even nore than 
by right the fullness of knowledge and sympathy,man proves 
his superiority of essence, and shows that he is something 
more than a mere force of nature. The humanist will insist 
on the distinction between energy and vi ill, how ever much the
present age seems to have forgotten it. A man may be a prodigy
3 
of energy and yet spiritually indolent.' The Humanist lays
his stress upon spiritual effort, and the disciplining of the
.
2. Babbitt, Literature and the American College,?.107-15»cf.pp.
3. Ibid.,pp.56-57. 43-44,154-59,173-74.
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inner life. Only if a man can control himself can he hope to
1 
control his physical environment. His main aim must be the
2 
Socratic quest for self-knowledge.
Beside scientific naturalism,the Humanist sets 
sentimental naturalism, both offshoots of the same monism 
which seeks to fuse the human with the natural.For the 
embodiment of this second spirit, Babbitt turned to the 
Eighteenth Century and Rousseau. Rousseau was for him, evenxauax 
aiore than Bacon, the fountain-head of all subsequent error 
and anarchy. Admittedly the arid rationalism and pseudo- 
classicism of the period immediately preceding Rousseau had 
made reaction inevitable. For a living faith in G6d it had 
substituted a vague and desiccated deism, for the Aristot- 
elian canon of art as an imitation of nature, it taught that 
art was the imitation of an imitation, the modelling of a 
poem or a drama upon a previous poem or drama by the applic- 
ation of certain rigid and irrevocable rules. It had driven 
a \nredge between emotion and imagination on the one hand, and 
reason on the other;and whilst the latter was enthroned as the 
sovereign power of life, the former had been banished into the 
outer darkness of sternest obloquy. This simple,but fallacious 
antithesis was adopted in turn by Housseau who merely inverted 
the process.Nothing resembles a swelling as much as a hollow,
in Sainte-Beuve's words, and with Rousseau imaginationjknd
3 
emotion were reinstated,and reason banished from power.
rrOTr I,lore7~SEergurne -^ssays,vii7^7l7r8J'~Vl7ppT56^57^ 
» ^he New Laokoon,pp.98-99.
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With Rousseau, certain new ideas began to dominate man's
A
consciousness. Few men have been more wretched and malad-
1 justed to their universe than he was,and in order to make
life tolerable for himself, he seized on certain modes of 
thought which he then proceeded to foist upon other men as 
basic principles of life. That they took root so rapidly 
and widely was a testimony,not to the univeraal validity 
of the ideas themselves, although, be it admitted, they
did correspond to the experience of men generally once
of 
they had begun to tire^and cast aside the stern discipline
of self-control,but rather to the wide-spread weariness 
and maladjustment of men everywhere during the closing 
years of the Eighteenth Century.First and foremost was his 
advocacy of the natural goodness of man. In contrast to the 
teaching of the Classics, stressing man's tendency to excess, 
and of the Church, with its emphasis on original sin and 
man's dire need for grace,humility and penitence, Rousseau 
asserted the intrinsic innocence and. virtue of man who had 
only to follow the spontaneous bent of his nature to find 
harmony and perfection. The present division and dissidence 
rife amongst men spring, not from any evil inherent in man, 
but from a source of corruption outside of man, in the arti- 
ficial restraints and barriers imposed upon him hy society. 
Remove these restraints and man will revert to his primordial
1. Hugh I'Anson Fausset, P_p^s_and_Pundits 1_(Londoria947) ,p.288.
virtue. For t"-;e duajlism within man, Rousseau therefore 
substituted an external dualism, between man and society. 
Man, according to Rousseau, had fallen away from nature in
somewhat the same way as in the old theology, he had fallen
2 
away from God, and salvation depended upon a return to nature.
This change in outlook both More and Babbitt traced back to 
Shaftesbury and the English deists to whom conscience had 
ceased to be 'a power which sits in judgment on the ordinary 
self and inhibits its impulses. 'It tended, as far as it was 
recognised at all to 'become itself an instinct and an emot-
ion' ---'a moral sense, a sort of expansive instinct for doing
3 
good to others'. Throughout the eighteenth century, side by
side with its rationalism, ran an underlying current of strong
as the motive for man's actions, 
sentimentality, advocating altruism in direct opposition to
the previous teaching of philosophers like Hobbes that egotism
4 
was the basis of human conduct. Those capable of feeling such
expansive emotion were a select company of 'beautiful souls', 
Rousseau's ^belles ames' , distinguished from the insensible
herd by the keenness of their emotions and therefore doomed to
5 
be misunderstood by them. Hre we are at the root of the do£-
trine of artistic irresponsibility and isolation.lt is obvi- 
ous that according to such a view morality becomes a matter of 
of mood;man merely has to let himself go in order to find his
1. More , _Shelburne_E^s^iTvT» PP« 215-24 .
2. Babbitt,
5. Babbitt, Rousseau_and Romantici3m,pp*l3l~^»
true self* But feeling not only shifts from man to man,it is 
continually changing in the same man. At the time of doing 
anything,says Mrs. She.lleJ, Shelley deemed himself right,
and Rousseau asserts that in the act of abandoning his own
p 
children, 'he felt "like a member of Plato's republic". 1
'The man who makes self-expression and not self-control his 
primary endeavour "becomes subject to every influence,"the 
very slave of circumstance and impulse borne by every "breath". 
This is what it means no longer in practice to keei a firm
hand on the rudder of one's personality, "but to turn one's
3 
self over to nature'.
This natural drift of Rousseau's new morality 
was reinforced "by the peculiar character of his imagination. 
Himself a misfit in society, he turned for consolation to an 
imaginary Arcadia in the past,an idyllic vision of primitive 
man,free,happy and virtuous. Such a dream of a Golden Age in 
the past was not essentially different from the myth-making 
of former generations, where rtousseau differed from them was 
in his "belief, coloured "by the faith of the scientific natur­ 
alist in the perfectibility of man,that such a state might 
"be realised again if only man could throw off his artificial 
shackles. Itoreover, whereas in the past, dreams of a Golden 
Age had "been but an occasional solace from the serioBS "busi­ 
ness of living,an imaginative dalliance which was not allowed
l,7.Tn> > Sh:elJ2u-gne flssays,,p. -
0 . B abb i 11, _Rouu s s ea,u_and_Romant icism, p. 161.
3.Ibid- ,loc£ciir~
to interfere with the claims of reality, in the Rousseauist
1 
they become a substitute for living, The present no longer
has any meaning for himj he hovers between an impassioned r 
collection of past bliss or an impatient anticipation of 
delights to come. 'The essence of the mood is always the 
straining of the imagination away from the here and now, 
from an actuality that seems paltry and faded compared to the
radiant hues of one's dreams'.---'In Shellyan phrase he
2 
"looks before and afer, and pines fornwhat is not"-' --
'"Objects make less impression upon me than ray memory of
theM%says Rousseau. He is indeed the great master of what
3 has been tremed the impassioned recollection.' This highly
developed emotional memory is closely allied to the special 
quality of the romantic imagination , its wistful yearning 
after vanished joys of childhood, as well as of primitive
life, and its consequent exalting of the child asWell as of
1 4 
the noble savage as the personification of true wisdom.
More,however, in seeking to trace the derivation 
of the Romantic imagination, finds its roots much farther 
back in history, in a fusion of the Oriental conception 
of infinity and the Occidental conception of personality. 
'To that alliance, if to any definite event of history, 
we may trace the birth of our sense of an infinite insat- 
iable personality that has brought so much self-torment
1.Ibid._,p.90}cf7~L.H.Hough,BYangelical Humanism,(London?1925), 
2. B abb i 11, Rousseau & Roman lTcTjm^p7927 PP «112-13. 
3.Ibid.,254. . 
4  I'DToTT, Iqc. cit.
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and so much troubled beauty into the religion and literature
I 
of the modern worldi Whereas in orthodox Christianity, the
more eccentric aspects of the new spirit were counterbalanced 
by a true sense of infinity,dependent on belief in the super- 
natural and a sense of man's responsiblity to a personal God, 
in certain, of the hwresies which were soon to disturb the 
Early Church man's infinite aspirations took on a crude and 
fantastic shape. Of these the most grotesque were Gnosticism 
and Manicheism,both flourishing in Alexandria,the hotbed of 
cosmopolitan superstition..Already in the Second Century,More 
could see in the creed of the Gnostic,Valentinus, as in a 
gulf,'like dim shadowy portents some of the ideas that were 
germinating amidst the decay of the old world. In the iden- 
tification of t:ie intellect with desire and its divorce from 
the will, in this vague yearning of the intellect for the 
infinite fulness of the Father, and the birth of the world 
from emotion (pathos),1 seem to see into the real heart of 
what after many centuries was to be called romanticism»-the 
infinitely craving personality,the usurpation of emotion over 
reason, the idealisation of love, the confusion of the sen- 
suous and the spiritual, the perilous fascination that may 
go with these confusions. It is like a dremm of fever,beau- 
tiful and malign by turns; and looking at its wild sources, 
one can understand whjdfe Goethe called romanticism disease and 
classicism health.He might have added that disease is infect- 
I'.'More'~nJ5^gSIrn''e Ess'ay's' VI1 iTpT^l^
ious,while health must be acquired or preserved by the effort
1 
of the individual.'
More allows, in coazion with other critics as far
2 
removed from his own philosophy of art as Jacques Barzun,
3 4 
Middleton Murry and F.L.Lucas, that there are two romanticisms
a perennial phase of the human spirit found wherever poetry 
rises from the common level to the climaxes of inspiration, 
'when we are thrilled by the indefinable spell of strangeness 
wedded to beauty, when we are startled by the unexpected 
vision of mystery beyond the circle of appearances that wrap
us in the commonplace of daily usage, and suddenly"the im-
5 
measurable heavens break open to their highest";' and a
spurious phase which More finds represented most clearly 
by that historical period known specifically as the Roman- 
tic Movement, of which the distinguishing feature,to him as 
to Babbitt, is f in opposition to the true mystery and wonder of 
classic art, 'that expansive conceit of the emotions which
goes with the illusion of beholding the infinite within the
6 
stream of nature itself instead of apart from the stream 1 .
'Romanticism is a highly complex movement and 
has contributed largely to the world's sum of beauty and 
sublimity. It has been defined as the sense of strangeness
1.Ibid.,p.30
2. Jacques Barzun. Romanticism and the jlodern E^o, (Londonsi944)
p.20.
3. J.Middleton Murry .To_The JJnknown uod, (London: 1924 ) f p. 155.
4. F.L.Lucas,Decline and Fa_l^ ojr^e_jfoma.n;tjk; Idgal (WPW York
London , 19357pp. ^-H* ^ ————
and wonder in things, and such a definition tells us at 
least half thex story. Butlstrangeness and wonder may be qual- 
ities of all great literature} in so far as they are peculiar 
to romanticism and distinguish it from the universal mode 
which we call classic, they will be found to proceed from, or 
verge towards, that morbid egotism which is born of an inten- 
sely felt personality with the notion of infinity as an
1 
escape from limitations'.
In ancient Greece, the conception of beauty depended 
on order,balance,harmony,but this did not mean that Greek 
art was deficient in a sense of the divine.It did mean,how- 
ever,that it expressed this sense of the divine through the 
controlled and concentrated, unlike Eastern art in which 
the attempt to express the divine as the infinite assumed 
grotesque and exaggerated forms. Unfortunately it was the 
more disordered of the two conceptions of divinity which 
passed into the nascent romanticism,combining with the 
Western idea of personality as the expression of an active 
emotional Ego. Had the Greek idea of the divine merged 
with the Oriental conception of personality,voluntaristic
and self-renunciatory,More held that the history of Christ-
2 
ian civilisation would have been very different.Humanism
as envisaged by both More and Babbitt is an attempt to
iTlbid. ,pT36li
2.Ibid.,pp.22-28.
reinstate a comparable union of the divine as a centre of 
control and the personal as the expression of an ethical 
will, in opposition to the romantic fusion of the vast and 
the vague with an inflated egotism. In so far as Humanism, 
in the present state of mankind, is a voluntary acceptance 
of the control of a divine inner check which entails the 
submission of the personality to those very limitations 
from which romanticism seeks to escape, it follows that 
as a historical phenomenon at least, romanticism is inevit- 
ably at variance with the Humanist ideal. That there is, 
however, no inherent conflict between Humanism and the 
spirit of ' essential' romanticism comes out quite clearly 
from the balanced and reasonable statement of their
relation given by one of the most competent exponents of
1 
the Humanist position, P.S.Richards in his Belief in Man.
v'/hereas the growth of the critical and scienti- 
fic spirit in the Baconian gave free rein to the libido 
sciendi , the fiousseauist by allowing his impulses full and 
free expression has turned life over to the rule of the 
libido s e n t i e n d i . Both are, however, in the last resort but 
aspects of that even more fundamental appetite, the libido 
dominandi, that ever restless urge after power which drives
man on from one extreme of conduct and desire to another.
insatiable he is 
The more imaginative a man isythe aiore^likely to become^for it
^j
is the imagination that holds open a door to. the. infinite.
t. P. i3.Kichai'ds,£^^£f~i^Man,Lond.onJ 1-92-jt., $>p. 170-87.
ana csm.
It is therefore all i -<i jortp.nt that t>s imagination should
be under the control of the inner check, as well as for the 
inner check imagination.
to be illuminated by the iHHKrxKksEk For both to
function at their highest and best, it is essential to realise 
that there can be a truly spiritual enthusiasm, as opposed to
the merely impulsive enthusiasm of the Romantics, and in this
1 
inner check and inner light are practically identical. This
conception of the imagination controlled and chastened by
the inner check, Babbitt calls the Ethical Imagination in
2 
contrast to the uncontrolled and eccentric Romantic Imagination.
The original Greek use of the t£rm 'imagination 1 or 'fancy' 
applied to the impressions of the senses, and then to that 
faculty which stored those impressions. The imagination was, 
therefore, primarily the power that perceived. Only later, in 
the West, was the idea of the imagination as a power that con- 
ceived grafted on to the original idea. The imagination now came 
to be envisaged as itself a creative power, acting in despite 
of physical reality and making a world of its own which had 
not of necessity any relation to the external world. This is 
the Romantic conception of the imagination which in its flight 
from reality was seeking to fashion a universe over which the 
reason had no jurisdiction. Both TTeo-cl assicism and Romanticism 
erred by divorcing imagination and emotion fro^n reason, and the 
latter, in vindicating the power of the imagination, had come to 
lAok askance at reason as tbe false secondary power which multi-
1 . Ib i d . , p « 258.
" and
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1 
plies distinctions. But there are various ways of being
imaginative, and analysis is needed not only to build up 
some abstract system, but also to discriminate between 
the actual data of experience, in order to determine the
way it is expedient to follow if one wishes to be wise and
2 
happy. It is therefore necessary to discriminate between
different types of imagination:the Romantic Imagination 
seeks to express the strange, the marvellous, the exotic,
whereas the Ethical Imagination seeks to be true to both
3 
the universal and the local. To More the determining factor
in distinguishing between the fcwo imaginations is an aware- 
ness of dualism ' the apprehension of the One and of the 
Many lifts the work of the higher artistic intuition above 
that of the lower level of inspiration. Although later in
the Greek Tradition t he seeks to define the two terms more
5 
accurately,to all intents and purposes in the Shelburne
Essays., the Ethical Imagination is identified with the
Religious Imagination which fie describes in 'Studies in
6 
Religious Dualism', XK in Coleridge's words , as 'the
faculty by which we-unite the broken and dispersed images
7 
of the world into an harmonious poetic symbol'.
1.Babbitt, On "Being. Greative7(lon'don:Y95P) ,-p. 85ff. 
P.Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism,pp. 199-200. 
5. Ibid.p. 200. 
4.Sore,Shelburne Essays Vj35ff.Jpp.22-25.
5.More,Hellenistic Philosophies,(Princeton*19?3 ),239j PIatoni smr
6.Cf.pf>. /tfy. *~*. pp.187-204.
7.More, Shelburne Essays VI.p.167.
Humanism sees the problem of civilisation itself 
bound up to no small extent with that of the Ethical 
Imagination.In a civilisation based on dogma and external 
authority, there is a lothness to face up to the full im- 
plications of imaginative insight, but in a society where 
traditional standards have been underlined by the positivist 
and critical spirit, -it becomes imperative to examine afresh 
the role of the imagination. The Humanist sees man moving in 
a vicious circle* Man, himself a being ever changing, living 
in a world of constant change, is cut off from immediate 
access to anything abiding and condemned to live in an element
of fiction or illusion.Yet civilisation has to rest on the
2 
recognition of something abiding. It follows that the truths
on the survival of which civilisation depends cannot be con- 
veyed to man directly, since he has no immediate access to 
them, but only through imaginative symbols. But man finds it 
difficult to recognise this disability, and to submit his i 
imagination critically to the necessary control. He consents
to limit his expansive, desires only as long as he believes that
o 
the truths symbolically presented to hira are literally true.
Thus his ethical control is won at the expense of the critical 
spirit which, sooner or later, reasserts itself, as in the 
person of a Voltaire, but which, in banishing credulity,gives 
rise to an anarchic individualism which threatens in turn to
I7lSlgX|j[jQ[TSCSXZZ. Babbitt,Rou53eau~&^omantTc'isa,pp. 176-77. 
2. Ibid.,p.3^9.
destroy civilisation itself, oiiut it is not absolutely 
essential to run through this whole cycle. The man who
has recognised the illusion of physical nature is not bound
of- 
to fall into imaginative dissoluteness. Buddha was as a
natural evanescence as Anatole France, yet he had ethical 
standards even keener than those of Doctor Johnson who,
to Babbitt,was one of the few modern exemplars of the
1 
Ethical Imagination. Such a combination has been rarely
realised in the west, where the critical has generally been 
the negation of the ethical, yet it is in such a mediation 
between imaginative disenchantment and ethical austerity that 
one finds the quintessence of humanism which,like Buddhism, 
is to Babbitt, a 'spiritual positivism 1 .Established on an 
intuition of the true nature of reality on a level far
above the analytical intellect, in contrast to the Rouss-
2 
eauist imagination operating"on a level below reason, the
Ethical Imagination is characterised by an attitude of awe and
humilijzy towards truth, and a respect for tradition; where-
jc e 
as the Rousseauist, s/ks instead to stimulate wonder and
3 
sensation and to assert its own independence.
In the balanced character, the Ethical Imag- 
ination should lend its support to the intellect and the 
will,whereas smnce the Romantic period,the imagination 
has been associated with the appetites and so has become 
itself subject to the flux or the 'law for thing 1 .That
.Nineteenth Century,April 1928, No.DCXlV,P.S.Richards, 
-og Baftatt and the New Humanism',p.438«
is, imagination has teen divorced from the 'Will to Refrain', 
the Higher .V'ill, in contrast to the lower will which gives its 
consent to the demands of appetites or expansive desires. 
Ultimately, Plumanism is voluntaristic, rather than intellectualist- 
-ic; its sides with the Oriental against the Greeks in giving 
the higher will priority over mindj The danger of the intellect- 
ualist is that of pride and over-confidence in the powers of
2 the mind, easily degenerating into Sophistry. The voluntarist
however, needs the help of the intellect in order to exercise 
the will intelligently and not merely to acquiesce inertly in 
tradition. In the modern period the situation is such that there 
is little threat of this latter danger; the element of change 
and novelty is so apparent that what primarily concerns man 
is to achieve some sense of direction and purpose, and to do that 
demands an effort of the will. For an example of voluntarism 
that is at once strenuous and critical, Babbitt in particular 
turns to Buddha. To him >Plato's attempt to solve the problem 
of the one and the many was principally intellectual; Buddha's
was pre-eminently practical, although he always distinguished
5between mere bodily activity and true inner strenuousness.
l.Foerster,op'-cit, (Babbitt,'Essay at Definition'),pp.4 ?-4 3.
?.Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership t p. 171,cf.Qn_Being,_Gi^ea:tive_p.xasooig xvi.
cf. More, Shelburne Essays, VI,pp.2-4, 16,156-39; Vlll.pp.266-70,
298. 
3.Babbitt, Democracy and leadership, p.!95,cf .More,Shelburne_ Essayjs
IIpp210.
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At the .utset of the Shelburne_i;ssa;5rsi. Mere would hare 
agrred with Babbitt's judgment, but with his increasing 
interest in Platonisn, he became convinced that Plato's 
philosophy was founded, not on intellectualisa, but on 
the positiTistic basis of intuition. The first three volumes 
of the Gree_k_T£aditi®n_ are linked by his determination to 
illustrate the purely intuitional nature of Platonism and
its superiority over the rationalistic philosophies which
hodderived from it, but lost that intellectual humility of the
master before the Mystery of human dualism which united
Plato ( on the one hand^with the religious genius of India,
Kad se&\
and -on the othet with^Christianity. All three a&w that
ultimately the problem of human conduct was intimately 
connected with that of the higher will,  a problem of 
supreme importance in the Twentieth Century when mankind 
was suffering acutely the penaljzy of spiritual isolation, 
Not only were men divided within theaiselves, they were 
divided against their fellows. But whereas by the assertion 
of the lower will, they were thrown into inner isolation, the 
effort of the higher will would bring them into harnony with 
their best or ethical selves, and consequently into harmony
with each o'her. This is essentially the same as Matthew
1 
Arnold's solution of the problem in Culture and Anarchy.
But there still regains the further probleinJwhence cones. 
1 Mat thew~Arnaid , ~Cult ure_and _Anarc hjrjjL o nd o n : 1^» T7pp« ^ 4-
II?
this higher will. The Christian equates it with the will of
God, visiting man in the firm of grace, and evoking in man
1
a similar will. This,to the Humanist, is simply another
approach to the problem of the One and the Kany which PI"to 
sought to solve by his doctrine of Ideas,' but in order to 
escape the abstraction of Plato's conception of the Good, 
so it seemed to Babbitt,the Christian sees divine reason 
as subordinate to divine will. In the culminating act of 
the Incarnation, divine v-m takes the initiative, the 
1/vord becomes Flesh, and by so doing bridges over for ever 
gap between the abstract and universal,-the Idea of the 
Good-, and the individual and particular,-goodness .v;ade 
concrete in action. 'The final reply to all the ^oubts that 
torment the human heart',says Babbitt,'is not some theory 
of conduct,however perfect, but the «,an of character.Pontius 
Pilate spoke as an European when he enquired, "<<Vhat is truth?"
On one occasion Christ gave the Asiatic reply!"! am the way,
2 
the Truth and the Life."' with such a conception of the
Incarnation the last three volumes of the Greek Tradition 
are concerned, although by the time of writing them in the 
Nineteen Twenties,?^re had cone to regard the Christian 
conception of truth as the consummation,not the contradict- 
ion.of the Platonist.
Nevertheless, in order to establish the supremacy 
of the will, Babbitt did not consider a religious basis as
i11 democracy & i ,, a ^ PT. BMT,.
a. *bi<3 ~
"7.
indispensable. Both Christianity and Buddhism call ultimately 
for complete renunciation as the only way @f releasing the
true self from the flux of distracting desires. Humanism, on
r 
the other hand, seeks to moderate and harmonise those desijses.
For renunciation, it would substitute mediations, its aim is 
the achierement of justice among men, rather than the purely
religious aim of inward peace. Such a distinction runs through
1 
the Sherburne Essays, although by the time of the later books
of the Greek Tradition. More had cosne to question the possibil-
ity of achieying a justice whicft had nojj its roots in a relig-
2 
ious attitude to life.. Babbitt, however, remained where the
More of the Shelburne -^ssays^ and the first edition of Pj^aton- 
j^sm, had stood. 'The Platonic definition of justice as doing 
one's own work or minding one's own business has perhaps never 
been surpassed--- Justice in the outer world raust, in the last 
analysis, be only a reflection of the harmony and proportion-
ateness that hare resultd in certain individuals from the
5 
working of the spirit upon itself. ' ^hat seemed necessary to
Babbitt was a revival of the ethical will on a purely secular 
level.
-^ n On_Being Creative, however, Babbitt admits that 
without the sanction of a divine will ,hu"ianis~. is apt to lack, 
as it did in Cicero, the tempering influence of hunility. 
Reason is prone to be self-assertive without the support and
2.Cf .pp
3.Babbitt, Democracy and._Le_aders.hrp_i_pp. 197-98.
flo
control of a Higher Will, whereas'the reason that has the 
support of a Higher Will, that is, in Confucian phrase,sub- 
missive to the will of heaven 1 ,would seeia better able to
exercise control orer the natural itan than a reason that
1 is purely self- reliant. To those who assume from this that,
if the humanist seeks support in something high* r than reason, 
he needs must turn to Christian theology, Babbitt has no 
quarrel, but he disagrees with those who deny to humanism 
independent validity, especially in these days when so many 
men of good will are unable conscientiously to accept dogmat- 
ic and revealed religion.Here Babbitt reverts to Buddhism 
which,religion though it is, makes no ,y lace for a God in its 
discipline and denies the soul in the sense- that is usually 
given to that term in both East and West.At the same time,
according to Babbitt,it sets up an ideal of saintliness approx-
2 imating very closely to that of the Christian. Nor wewe
Buddha and his followers saintly in ideal aloneftheir ach- 
ievement raises in Babbitt's mind the acute question whether 
righteousness is to be Pleasured by the degree to which one 
brings forth'thfruits of the spirit or by one's theological 
affirmations'. If one -".aintains that the theological affirm- 
ations are a necessar~ r preliminary to bringing forth the
3 fruits, Early Buddhism supplies evidence to the* contrary.
TT^abb i 117~gn JBeT n'/F~C Feat IV eTp ^
P.Ibid. .p.XXXlll.
3. Ibid. ,pp.XXXlll-lVjcf. Democracy and_LeacLe_rship,pp.l60-65.
Babbitt's attitude to religion is a difficult subject
1 
to entangle. In his'Bssay at Definition 1 , he ranges himself
unmistakably on the side of the supernaturalists, admitting 
the truth of Plato's saying that things human cannot be proper- 
ly known without first insight into things dirine.The relig- 
iou's man can dispense- with humanism better than Humanism can
dispense with religion. But, for him, religion does not necess- 
arily inrolre rerelation|. in Gre< k and Qonfucian philosophy,
humanism is illuminated "by a religious insight completely
2 
unsupported "by any element of r ere si ed religion. Elsewhwre,
indeed, he had refused to co-wit himself to any discussion 
of a plane abore the human »which alone could be apprehended
by that purely human form of knowledge, the working of the
t 
rational intellect. To More, as he loeked back at the end of
his own life after Babbitt's death, it seemed that his friend
had failed to distinguish between the supernatural and the
3 
superhuman. A strong -case for the wisdor of Babbitt's refus&l
to be lured into a discussion ofthe religious plane has been
put forward by Professor L. J. ^ .ilercier who compares Babbitt's
4 
restraint to that of the greater Scholastics. The philosophy
of an Aquinas, howerer, was consummated in the prevailing 
faith of the Catholic Church, and therefore had no need to 
undertake an independent surrey of the grounds of religious,
1.Mneteenth_C£ntury_,May 1928,Wo.DCXV, ^ P.S.Richards, 'Irring 
Babbitt,Religion and Romanticism),P. 653.
2.Ed.Foerster,op._ci_t. (Babbitt. 'Essay at Dei inition' ) .op. 37-38
3. Mo re, ^ w_She,Tgurne _E s saj_s ^ 111, pp.38,41-4°.
4.L.J«A.Mercier,op.cit.,pp.171-70.
as opposed tu philosophical, truth. Babbitt, on the other 
hand, could anly abide in his intellectual scepticism, believ- 
ing that enough light eame to wan on the purely human plane 
te make it possible for him. to walk through this world without
stumbling, and that if only he acted on what light he had al-
1
ready that light would grow . In the existing state of know- 
ledge, many sincere and deyout men were unable to commit them- 
selres to a dogmatic theology, and it was therefore the more 
essential that they should come together on the basis of what
they could believe-the lowest cemraon denominatar ef all 'relig-
2 
ious' perceptions. Undoubtedly a fuller coiraunion is possible
on the level ef the established religions, bufe even within 
Christianity itself difference 0f dogma and Church order raake 
it difficult for various sects to co-operate. If the surrey is 
extended to include Moslems and Hindus and Chinese,the obstac- 
les in the way of a purely -eligious union are well-nigh insup-
3 
erable. On the humanistic side, on the contrary, as we hare
seen particularly in regard to Buddhism, the great traditional
w 
faiths hare much in common, and it ^s upon these fundamental
attitudes to the nature of man that Babbitt hoped to build up 
a co-ordinate^ criticise of life which should be at once 
comprehensive and consistent. In this confederation he hoped to 
unite all earnest seekers after truth in his own day, whatever
1 *3abbi11, De?r.oc.racy__and Leadership,pp.XXXVT -YI.
2.Ed.Foerster.op*cit. H3abbitt.'Essay at Definition'),pp.49-50.
3. Ibid.,p. 50
their background and tradition. 'In this age of juj&ile and
facile communication, it would seem especially desirable to 
brine: together two halves of human experience. An estimate of 
this tetal experience that is based on adequate knowledge and 
is at the same time free from dogmatic preoccupations of any
kind will, I beliere, flash a vivid light on the predicament
1 into which we hare been led by our one-sided naturalism'.
'The solution of this problem as to the relation 
between humanism and religion, so far as a solution can be 
found, lies in looking upon them as only different stages in 
the same path. Humanism should hare in it an element of relig-
ious insight} it is possible to be a humble and meditative
2 
humanist. The type of the man of the world who is not a mere
worldling is not only attractive in itself but has actually been 
achieved in the "West though not perhaps v c ry often from the Greeks 
dewm 1 , and Babbitt cites John Inglesant as one of the race 
examples of this happy combination, with which we shall find
Mere was primarily interested during his writing of the Shel-
3 
burne Essays* 'If humanism may be religious, religion may have
its humanistic side. I have said, following Aristotle, that the 
Iww of measure does not apj$y to the religious life, but this 
saying is not to be understood in an absolute sense. Buddha 
is continually insisting on the -niddle path in the religious 
life itself* The resulting urbanity in Eu^dha and his earlier
ITBab~Mt"t. Democracy and Leadership,pp.156-57. 
2.Of   T.S.Eliot, Selected Essays, TLondon'193a) »pp» 
and G.R.ElllottJs reply.AaericanfieyJew.Sept.1936.Vol.Vll.No.4, 
an 'T.S.Eliot and IrringTfabbftTSpp.442-54. 
3-Cf.pp. 3^-y
followers in India is perhaps the closest approach thatk that
1 
yery unhumanistic land had ever made to humanism 1 .
Babbitt was aware of the dangers of a humanism 
without any support in religion. The pride »f Stoicism was 
in direct contrast to the humility *>£ iks Buddhism or Cone 
fucianism, as well as of Christianity: and man could "be 
conscious only of the inferiority ef his ordinary self by 
submitting it to a higher or divine will,such as one finds
9
in all genuine religions. Further than tftis, however, Babbitt 
weuld not go. The idea of the higher self might be confirmed 
by the testimony of traditional religion, but primarily it was 
known to man positively and experimentally, through an intu- 
itive insight into his own nature.Man must rest in this know- 
ledge and not seek to explore a plane which is not his pecu- 
liar territory. Here as we have seen, More and Babbitt were 
ultimately to part company,for while Babbitt remained in 
the position of spiritual scepticism which both the friends 
had shared up until the end. of the ohelburne Essays, liore 
sought to find the necessary coT&e'ment of humanist mediation 
in the meditation of Christianity anfl the mystical communion
of faith for which humanism as such could offer no immediate
3 
sanction.
But inspite of the fact that More was constrained 
to go further than Babbitt,he did not thereby repudiate the
1 . B abb i 1 1 , _Rous_s_eau and fto_^a.n.t ic_isg!, pp • £ 80 -81 . 
. Babbittjffltaat c:
Leander,
_  .  _ 
2. abbit  , Democracy and Le ad e r shj-p . pp . 1 g l - 65.
»i < Jjf l a :aro^^
>lkeS  'More.Purfta^S'ReSo^Pp.^g.
direction in which both had been travelling.In common with 
other thinkers of the Twentieth Century,they had sought some 
voice of authority which would be acceptable to the 
majority ef »en of good-will who were seeking to escape 
the- atrophifying effects of modern nihilism, and for this 
they had turned to the corporate experience ef the past. 
Like Middleton Murry,they felt the need of a 'Church', coa- 
posed net of orthodox belierers in a. giren creed, but of
those who had reached a deeper insight into the nature of
1 
human experience,whatever their age or race. There was,
however, one condition which the Members of this great 
humanistic body had to fulfil in order to prove to the 
satisfaction of More and Babbitt', that they possessed true insight 
into the isaystery of hutaaniLife*they must be aware of the deep- 
seated dualism which distinguished man's experience from 
the conditions prevailing in the rest of the universe. The 
su"i of human wisdom accumulated down the centuries has been 
preserved under the name of 'tradition', and it is in their 
attitude towards these corporate resoures of -nan's life that 
the Humanist differs sharply fro'-n the Rousseauist and the 
Baconian.With the decline of organised religion and the 
growth of the critical spirit, the standards of conduct and 
judgment formerly accepted throughout Europe have decayed and 
a new spirit of individualism has taken their r)lace.'To be 
modern has -neant practically to be increasingly positive and
critical, to refuse to receive anything on an authority
1 
anterior, exterior, and superior to the individual ', with
effects which will hare t® be considered at length in the
section «f this thesis entitied rfor the sake of brevity
2 
and conrenience rather than elegance, -Chaos. The Humanist,
an the other hand recognises man's need of the inherited 
culturefof the past, and respects every means of ensuring 
their preservation far the future. Not least of these is 
the training of the young in cirilised habits, which entails 
the disciplining of their affections so that theyt may c®iae 
to like and dislike the right things, and therefore involves 
the recognition of those eonrentions which make up the 
ethos of their particular society. 'Here is the chief diff- 
erence between the true and false liberal. It has been said 
of our modernists that they hare only one convention and that 
is that there shall be no ^ore conventions. An individualism 
that is thus purely temperamental is incompatible with the 
survival sf civilisation. What is civilised in T.ost people is 
precisely that part of the-", v.'hich is conventional. It is,te be 
sure, difficult to have a convention without falling into mere
convent ionalis-'n, tw© things -xhic'h t^c modernist confounds? but
3 
then everything that is worthwhile is difficult' .The pri:r.e
need of modern scciety is that men should have standards, but
4
hold them fle.xibjj^.an.d^rjjbic_a;y^^^ 
T7B abb i 1 1 , Deato c racy _and Lead e r ship ^ p .142.
c, Babbitt, Dc v^ocracy_and_Leader5hip,pp.S99-500. 4.Cf,pp. /
/ay
ial that those who realise its need should work together to 
find a solution ef the prevailing problem.   So rcuch experience 
has accumulated in both the East and the^est that it should 
seen possible for these seeking to maintain standards and fight 
an anarchical impressienismisai to come together, not only as
t® their general principals, but as to the Main cases that arise
2 
in the application ef then. ' Actually, Babbitt is envisaging
2 
a movement similar to Matthew Arnold 1 s 'Confederation ef Culture'
As the guides of mankind in this attempt to find ©nee mere sore 
ethicaljknd intellectual centue he proposes the great sages »f 
all ti7«es. Mankind erer the years has accumulated such deposits 
©f thought that he feels,like Arnold,that at this late age, any 
philosophy he has is bound t® be -nade up ef heterogeneous and 
seemingly irreconcilable elements.'Anyone who seeks like myself 
to draw f«r wisdom on such diverse sources, East and West, -aay 
be accused of falling into an undue eclecticism, ^n eclectic 
philosophy is, as a rule, a thing ©f shreds afid patches. I 
would reply by distinguishing with Goethe and others between 
an eclectic philosophy and eclectic philosopher. A philosopher 
who is not in this late s,ge of the world highly eclectic saay 
be viewed with suspicion'.---'Wisdom is finally a natter ©f in-
l.More t Shelburne' Essays.VII,p.2587 IX, pp. 57. G4-^5,117.cT7pTatoinjj3mp.it«j 
2«Eabbitt, JDeittocracy and: Leadership,pp.229-502.
S.Matthew Arnold, Essays in Criticisw, Series II,(London; 18*^),p 
4.Ed.Foerster, op.cit.p.Xi Cf,k Qo-
Bight; but the indiridual needs t® as8imilatd(the best if the 
teaching ef the past lest what he takes te be his insight way 
turn «ut t» be «nly conceit •£ rain imagining.' The r«le of 
the critic is therefore of Tital iaip»rta.nce in mediating 
between the great minds of the past and the men of iJgtt* «wn 
day. But the Humanists saw criticism itself ritiated by the 
sa^ie tendencies as the rest ef msdern life. It became incuabent 
up«n the™ therefore t© start putting their hause in erder by 
defining w«re clearly the aims ef Humanist criticism.
IBabbitt, On Being •Cre?.t_ive t .pp.XXyq-Vll.
K) Humanist Critieie»n T with Special Reference 
To Paul Elmer More.
I
Humanism and America was the manifesto of Humanist criticism. 
In it, in an essay entitled ' Our Critical Spokesmen',one of 
the younger Humanists, Gorham B.Munson, considers the achieve­ 
ments of various American critics and finds them all wanting. 
He goes on to outline his own requirements for the ideal leader 
of American critical thought. These coincide with the general 
conclusions of the Humanists, so that, he seems to be speaking 
not so much as an individual, but rather as a member of a move­ 
ment. The first prerequisite is objectivity; the Humanist 
critic must have standards which allow him to stand, not only 
outside the frame of his own century, but of all centuries, to 
judge, not sub spaAe durationis, but sub specie acternitatis . 
' To do so, one has to be certain of the existence of primary 
laws in the field of literature, as in physics, so that one 
may say that a few laws are true, regardless of the particular 
frame of time and place in which the artist is set. Even a hint 
of an analogy between the realm of physics and the realm of 
literature sounds strangely out of place in Humanist criticism 
with its constant stress upon the separation of law for man 
and law for thing. Nevertheless, it is true that the Humanists 
base their literary judgments upon a few primary laws, notably 
upon the canons of imitation and probe.Mlitv laid down in Aristotj 
le. To Munson, it seems, objectivity speaking,that literature has
t3o
been in decline, not only for a hundred and fifty or even for 
six hundred years, but almost since its classical sources, 
but to recognise this need be no more distressing than to 
contemplate a magnificent mountain from its base. Rather the 
contemplation of the heights to which man has ascended in the 
past should inspire the critical leader with a greater elevation 
of aim 4- the second prerequisite of Humanisto criticism. 
Because of their ignorance of man's past achievements, contemp­ 
orary critics lack grandeur of breadth and elevation of thought, 
as well as a thitd characteristic of the ideal critic — a 
burning zeal for fcferfection. 'This', says Munson.'is the spirit 
that giveth life to standards that otherwise would seem too 
skeletal, too non-human to be glamorous and magical in their 
remoteness; this is the spirit that killeth despair and
compromise. Infused with it, our imagined critic becomes single-
1 
minded and proof against deviations and resting-places.' The
use , however, of such words as'glamorous' and 'magical in 
their remoteness' suggests how difficult it is for even the 
most single-minded of the Humanists ti get back to the integrity 
of Classical inspiration; into the frame of Sfeek architechtonics 
they would infuse a strong draught of Romantic spirit.. Their 
position is essentially one of compromise, of mediation, if 
they would prefer the word; its instability comes from their 
very unwillingness t® admit in Historical Romanticism any
Ed_. Norman Foerster, op. cit, (Gorham B.MunsonV'Our Critical
Spokesmen"),pp.P55-56.
elements worth retaining. It would hare been far more honest 
and easier for them to retain their balance had they admitted 
that there were in HoTnanticisn certain positive qualities 
which hare become indispensable for the fulness of modern
literary inspiration — as indeed Moreii did, somewhat reluctantly
1 
in one or two places — but which need to be tempered by the
firmer fibre and greater lucidity of Classical example. It 
would then hare been possible to define the Humanist idea] 
without tacitly relying upon phrases which borrow their 
heightened colouring from a Romanticism they are ostensibly 
attacking.
There is however one remaining requirement, according 
to Munson; the ideal critic would be distinguised by the cap­ 
acity for relating deeds to words. 'His interest would hot 
cease with a beautiful formulation, but would continue until 
the formulation was embodied in experience. Not words alone,
not deeds alone, but words and actions would be his great
?, 
desideratum' The ultimate aim of Humanist criticism is therefore
purely practical; to inspire men to lire the good life. The 
literature it approves is that which sits before men th^picture 
of the good life in such a way as to make it pre-eminently 
desirable, and the immediate aim of criticism is to make 
known to men the best that has been thought and said in
1. Cf.pp. "7r
2. Ed.Nerman Feerster, op. cit. , loc.cit. .
/32.
literature. It is not surprising that, as an example of the 
Humanist critic in practice, Munson nominates Matthew Arnold as 
one who has the build of a great critic— and the crying need of 
America at that time seemed to be a critic of the stamp and 
dimensions of Arnold.
In his Destination^ A Canvass of American Literature since 
1900, Munson claimed for Babbitt and More that they represented
the greatest maturity of judgment yet displayed in the American
1 
literary scene, and further, more explicitly for Babbitt, that
he combined both the comprehensive attitude to criticism, such 
as is found in Sainte-Beuve, and the cohesive, such as is else­ 
where represented by Boileau. In other words, the ideal Humanist 
critic must be both analytical, examining and defining the 
standards by which he judges, and capable of synthesis, combining 
ideas in new and relevant patterns. But in an age given over to 
analysis of the purely scientific kind,it is difficult to be 
comprehensive. Synthesis demands an ethical centre to which to
relate all one's ideas, iri order\to impose order upon their
2 
multitudinousness. It was because of the presence in the thought
of Socrates of some such centre of reference in an age when the
Critical spirit was abroad and the traditional basis for conduct
3 
was failing that Babbitt claimed him as ^Humanist. The unity of
synthesis doe^ot,however,necessarily entail a -nonistic viewkf the
l.Gorham E.Munson,Destinations}A Canvas_of American Literature 
since 1900.(New YorK. J.H.Seara and Company,Inc.iy^«)p.14.—
2-Matthew Arnold.Letters to A.H.Plough, ed..H.F.Lowry(Xondon;
Oxford University ^ress,19or) No.?4,p.95. ' 
3.Babbi11, Rousseau and Homanticis^,p.245/
world: the critical thinker is "bound to recognise the 
existence of many elements in life which cannet be re­ 
solved into an essential harmony- What is indispensable, 
however, is a fecal Idea around which other subsidiary
ideas may be gnauped as either contributory er hostile
1 
to that central Idea*
Obviously such a conception of the critical 
function takes the critic far outside the-immediate realm a 
of literature. Prom the very outset of his writing career,
Babbitt's desire to counteract the forces of disruption at
art 
work in ±fcat and literature involved him in conflict with the
spirit of utopianism in education described in Literature 
and the American College, a spirit which in turn he saw as a 
reflection of a still deeper malaise which he traced to the 
philosophy of life current in the Twentieth Century.
"ore came more n;r penally to a realisation of the 
need of venturing ^irectly outside the field of literature, 
although as early as these First Series of the Shelburne 
Essays,, he has an essay on 'The Religious Ground of Humanism 1 . 
Such an attitude to criticism naturally leads the critic 
away from the strictly 'literary 1 view of his craft, r.way 
from the genre tranche* _which Babbitt upholds so ri^oarously 
in ot^cr branches of literature, towards the historical, 
ph:!J osophic?..!, biographic?.! or scientific. Babtitt's judgment
1. Matthew Arnold,op.cit., ] o c. c i t.
• f the worv- of Sainte-Beuve Yrhich is perhaps the Tiost striking 
modern example ot the type of cr^tici^m which moves .-*»;'ay fron 
its own centre in the genre tranche* has thus an added signif­ 
icance. 'To read Sainte-Beuve is to enlarge ®ne's knowledge 
not merely of literature, but of life. Indeed the somewhat 
paradoxical charge may be brought against his criticise that 
it is not sufficiently literary. He says of himself, it is true, 
that he was one of those vvhc had the religion of letters, and 
so .indeed he had- in about the xxxst sense, to quote his own 
phrase , that a Hamilton or a Petrenius had it. I do not 
believe that the religion of letters,®r even a sound defanoe 
of literary traditionis, in the long run, compatible with 
Sainte-Beuve T s philosophy of life. His own performance, we
must repeat, was unique. But we have a right to judge it not
in
enly in itself but in its tendency and influence, A its relation
in
to the laws of its genre. Now thus considered tkx criticism •$•? 
Sainte-Beuve is plainly moving away from its own centre toward 
something else* it is ceasing to be literature and becoming
historical and biographical and scientific. It illustrates 
strikingly in its own fashion the orift of the nineteenth 
century awat fro^ the pure type, the genre_tranchi, towards a 
general mingling and confusing of the genres, we are scarcely 
censcious of any change when Sainte-Eeuve passes, as he does 
especially in the later volumes of the Nouveaux Lundis from 
writers to generals, or statesmen'.
1. Babbitt, j-'ast.ers ojf LTodern_j?rench Griticisr:,pp» 160-61-
In any other age, such criticism would be anathema to the 
Humanist, bu-WBabbitt has to admit the existence of such a 
deterministic abstr-action as a Zeitgist. Such an admission 
is, palpably, a weakening of the Humanist doctrines that the 
purely human element in man, which includes his intellectual 
faculties, is free and responsible, and therefore cannot of 
necessity be determined or controlled by powers outside himself.
Nevertheless, from both observation and experience, Babbitt,
1 
and occasionally More, have to admit, implicitly at least, that
there are periods whaen the writer cannot respond to the inspir­ 
ation he feels because of the prevalence of hostile or steril­ 
izing currents playing upon hi^and neutralizing its effect. 
So the modern critic, in order to have some adequate standard 
of judgment, has first to clarify his own mind on issues that ta> 
him far outside the limits of literature. Sainte-Beuve, like 
Babbitt himself, was seeking some ground of inner harmony. Other 
nineteenth century critics, less honest or less acute, were able 
to take some single element of human nature that^was immensely 
important but still/ secondary, and exalt it to the supreme and 
central place. bainte-Beuve, in his effort to see life steadily 
and see it whole, was unable to do this. He had to remain com­ 
pletely detached from any faith which -"ight have provided a 
resting place. In aiming at nothing beyond comprehension, Sainte 
Beuve was destined to become the Wandering Jew of the 
intellectual world. 'That so shrewd an observer as Sainte-Beuve
1. Of.More on Sterne, Shelburne Essays/
'36
could find no firm anchorage for the spirit in the movements 
peculiar to his century may in the long run turn out to be not 
to his discredit, but to tie discredit of the century. It may 
become apparent that something was omitted in the whole nineteent 
century view of life, and that something was the keystone of 
the arch' This 'something' Babbitt tells us in the Preface to 
On_BeinK_CreatiTe_ ls the , Higher Will ,. It is
constituent which is the central idea of Humanist criticism, 
the keystone, not only of Babbitt's own literary thought, but 
of the whole philosophy of life which unites him to other 
members of the Humanist movement, The same principle which 
lends cohesion to the individual life is also the correlating 
force of men in society. T.S.Eliot in his essay in Humanism 
andAmerica points out that at present the problem of the
unification of the individual and of the unification of the
3 
world is one and the same problem.
That the focus-point of Humanist criticism is the 
exercise of the Higher 'A ill lends colour to the suggestion that 
it is primarily interested in ethics to the. exclusion of aesthet­
ics. We have already seen something in passing of the feud in
4 
American letters between the two elements, and Humanism has
been rigorously berated from all directions for this so-called 
6»bbitt .fUsbe^soP Mocker. French CriUciSrw.
2. Babbitt, On_ B e i ng__ C r eat j ,v e j_ Preface, p.
5. Foerster, op/cit. , TT"« S.Eliot , "Religion without Humanism" ) ,p. 112
4. Of. pp. 50 -
exclusive interest in the ethical. That it is so has been 
dictated, says Professor Norman Foerster, not by any intrinsic 
necessity, but by the needs of the time. 'In a given age, 
humanism may have the taste of urging the claims of beauty? in 
another age, the claims of science or of compact. It may hare 
one problem in France, and another across the Channel. So long 
as America tends to set the pattern for the twentieth century
so long will the greatest problem of humanism lie here in the
1 
United States', and the predominating need of twentieth, century
is for some ethical and focal Idea of life to counteract the 
centrifugal trend of the times. But this does not mean that the 
Humanists are per se indifferent to the aesthetic side of ix 
literature, although in that sphere individual Humanists are more 
likely to speak out of their personal attitudes and less out of 
a cUosely co-ordinated and consistent corpus of beliefs. In his 
The American Scholar? A Study in literae Humaniores , Professor 
Foerster has sought to formulate a Humanist aesthetic, and 
through the works of More and Babbitt, primarily concerned 
though they are with discovering a new ethos for society, there 
runs a vein of deep aesthetic appreciation, less of individual
beauties in given works of art than of the universal nature of
also 
Beauty. Nevertheless, More £mx±x reveals from time to time a keen
insight into specific methods by which men seek to create works
o
of art. Again, Babbitt in The New Lackoon gives up a whole volume
°P ge-nres . 
to the study of what is primarily an aesthetic issue, the
"Fnesster. or>. cit. , Preface, p. X.
Here, mere than in any of his other books, he restricts himself 
to the fundamental issues of art and literature, «nd if he 
declares himself unequivocally on the side of the Classics, i.e. 
of form, concentration, centrality, as opposed to the Romantic 
absorption in expression, expansion, uissipation of -emotion in 
response to a wide range of stimuli, he is nene the less moving 
within the field of aesthetics. It is contended te« often these 
days that unless a critic is at one with the Impressienists or 
the se-called Formalists, he is not directly concerned with art. 
Concern with literary technique is, however, none the less real 
because it is envisaged as a means rather than as aa end in itself, 
That tie ideal of Greece was the coalescence of beauty and good­ 
ness did not mean that the Greek artist was^mpervious to beauty. 
Nor did the knowledge that all too frequently he wo ild have to 
cheese between them when they became divorced, and that the wise
man would choose goodness, detract from the keenness of the Greek
2 
appreciation of great »rt»^r i s totla and Horace whose criticism
J.P.Pritchard in A_R^turnjta the Fountains shows to be the Humanist
•7
pattern^wrre none the less concerned with obtaining the most 
beautiful results by means of the methods they advocated because
they held that art shamld strengthen and purify the spirit ©f men
5 
as well as delight the senses.
The perfectly relevant and justifiable query has, however,
been raised why, if these canons of art are still valid in our day,
4 
the New Humanists have themselves produced n® great work of art,
*•
and here, in rushing to the defence of his cause, F.J.Mather 
appeared at first sight to give the game away. In reply to a 
letter from some twenty writers of the younger generation 
published in The New Republic under the title 'Wanted,A 
Humanist Masterpiece 1 ,he wrote*'I further remind these 
aspirants towards Humanism that, since it is not an aesthetic, 
but an attitude in morals, a humanistic masterpiece of the 
creative sort is likely to emerge only from a society in which 
humanistic morals are dominant. Given the morals that actually 
prevail, a humanistic masterpiece of the creative would be a 
miracle. In short, we Humanists can hardly deliver the eagerly 
desired goods until generally our system of morals shall be
taken as seriously as it most gratifyingly seems to be by the
1 
signers of your letter!
Malcolm Cowley and Edmund wilson were not slow to 
point out the apparent discrepancy between this disclaimer to
any pretensions to a Humanistic aesthetic and thex views of
2 
Babbitt and his more orthodox disciples, -out upon closer
examination it may be seen thatjthere is no basic contradiction 
between Mather's denial of any pretension to an aesthetic and 
Professor Foerster's assertion that^whereas in some epochs, 
humanism is primarily aesthetic, in twentieth century America 
it has to concentrate on the ethical side of lifeiand literature, 
More serious is the unresolved question we have already seen
1.The New Rep_ublic, April 16,1930,Vol.LX11,No. ,802,pp.247-48,
2.Tbid.,loc.cit..
of the effect of the Zeitgeist upon contemporary letters. 
Mather's admission that apart from 'the monumental critical 
achievement of Paul Elmer ivlore in the §helburne_iss_ay_s_' no 
critical masterpiece was forthcoming, and that in the existing 
intellectual atmosphere of the day, no creative work was likely
</
to be produced is but a restatement in the twentieth century of 
Matthew Arnold's problem eighty years earlier. Whether More's 
work deserves to be called a 'monumental critical achievement' 
we must decide herafter. It suffices here to say that the 
Humanists, like Arnold,were acutely conscious that each generat­ 
ion needs to draw on the corporate reserves of culture and tra­ 
dition built up by men and women in the past. 3But ln an age
when such reserves ha^H been overdrawn without being replenished, 
would-be creative artists were liable to find themselves lacing 
spiritual bankruptcy. They were unable to enter into an atmos­ 
phere of living and spontaneous ideas inherited from the past, 
and so had once more oo ouild up for themselves a culture drawn 
consciously and eclectically from the wisdom of the ages ana 
resolved into a synthesis by the presence of some central Idea 
acting as a catalytic agent upon other ideas in its orbit. As 
a result they had to waive the hope of creative work while they 
fulfilled the necessary preliminary work of creating an atmos­ 
phere of critical discernment in which true ideas mignt flourish.
1.Ibid..p.247.
loc. cit..
Ml
That the s;reat geniuses of the world would have been able 
to break through the paralysing effects of the Ze_it£e.ist^ none 
of the Humanists would have denied, but for men like themselves, 
of fragile and uncertain inspiration which needed sustenance 
from the ambiance of the times and was therefore the more sensi­ 
tive to the various currents of thought and feeling, there was 
little hope of a flowering of even adequate creative work with­ 
out a suitable intellectual climate. 'Any expression of a 
humanistic society through the arts depends upon the acceptance 
by the artist of some sort of central authority. The authority 
is not that of official organizations or written codes!it is
rather that of approved traditional ideals in which both the
1 
artist and the laity believe, 1 The Humanist contrasts the arts
of earlier ages which grew spontaneously ou of the accppted 
creeds and conditions of their day with the esoteric nature of
modern art, isolated from society and accepting no responsibili*
2 
ity towards it» But there is no easy means of returning to the
integrity and spontaneity of an earlier epoch, when standards 
©f art.were fostered and fired by some aristocratic vision of 
the good life. Difficult though it may appear, the only hope 
for the Humanist is the creation within modern democracy of 
the right sort of aristocracy- an aristocracy of the Spirit, as
opposed to the older prescriptive aristocracy. The central
produce 
problem of Humanism is how to pzkixKJE superiority that is
generally accepted and socially available. 'If we can make
1. Ed.Foerster, op_._£tt., (F.J.Mat her, 'The Plight of Our Arts')»PJ|3
2. Ibid.,pp.116-17.
such an aristocracy, it will foster the artist and the arts 
justlyx and generously* it will proride a world in which the 
creative artist is no longer a tolerated alien but solidly at 
home. Whenever such an aristocracy has a clear and noble vision 
of the good life, it will want symbols for its ideals and will 
call pjion the only man who can provide such symbols- the artist^
1*
Paul Elmer More and Criticism.
The aim of Paul Elmer More in the Shelburne Es&ays is, 
in no small measure, the creation of such an aristocracy, not by
putting the clock back, as it had been suggested by certain of
1 
his critics, but by using the example of history vitally and
flexibly in his attempt to, discover what is the 'good lifejboth 
for the individual and for society at large. Oneof the first 
needs of such a criticism will necessarily be the/ acquiring of 
a right attitude towards the past from which it accepts certain
values and conventions. It is not surprising then that the
2 
Shelburhe Essays were not written merely as literary criticism.
The numerous authors treated in them are considered chiefly for
their bearing 6n the 'good life'— rather than the' artistically
3 
designed life* as J.P.Pritchard suggests.!* modern ears, the
phrase 'the artistically designed life' has an unfortunate connot­ 
ation which smacks of Oscar Wilde and the 'Nineties. That More 
had as his ai^ anything approaching Glide's conception of the 
art of living, one glance at his essay on 'Decadent wit' is
enough to disprove. His aim was rather that of a John Inglesant T 
X R RrutehArel , oft. elf.., f>. \9O. i^More , 
. eifc
to discover from the various teachers he consulted some vision 
which should comprehend beauty, truth and goodness. Amongst his 
critical predecessors, two stand out as the masters whose form­ 
ative influence moulded More's conception of the critic's task, 
Sainte-Beuve and Matthew Arnold. In the Preface to the Selected 
Shelburne Essays, More in explaining his reasons for selecting 
essays ^ainly of a critical and biographical character, to the 
exclusion of those bearing immediately on problems of philo­ 
sophy, religion and sociology, pays tribute to Sainte-Beuve as 
'one of the dominant influences of my literary career', although 
at the same time he underlines the opposite directions in which 
their intellectual courses lay,'his away from faith towards 
complete scepticism and a sort of nature]ism controlled by 
classical taste, whereas >n ine ws? towards a slow submission 
to the dogmas of religion'. His debt to Arnold is nowhere quite 
as clearly recognised, but many of his ideas and, indeed, the 
whole cast of his mind have much in common with the English 
critic* and his essay on 'Criticism' in which he r'eals with 
Arnold, together with his essay on Sainte-Beuve,are amongst 
the most significant of his writings for the light they throw
on his personal attitude to criticism, Kanv of those who have
2 
sought to evaluate More's contribution to literature have,
1. Selecte/ Shelburne Jgssays, Preface p.X]l.
?. Cf .Gorham E.Munson.Our Critical Spokesmen m Foe.rsbg.r. MurnAn i 
Stuart Sherman, Ame r i c an s ( [Ne.w VorK ; o j 5) p. 3 33. . «and
T . H. Hough, Evangelical Humanism (London; »«s)t» foe •* 
T.S.Eliot, Th e _S acr ed_Wo pflTondon y J>a »\ pp. 3^ - "4-f J * ' 
Robert Mahieu , Sainte-Beuve aux ^tats-Un^sCPnne-e-fcon; I9**s) p.
significantly enough, drawn a comparison between More and either 
Arnold or Sg.inte-Beuve, and ultimately it is by the way in which 
he measures against such world critics as these that Uore's 
reputation as a critic must be lost or won. In both Arnold and 
Sainte-Beuve, the analysing intellect had paralysed an early 
poetic impulse. 'The finest poetry',says More Apropos of Sainte- 
Beuve, ' i^written when the discriminating principle works in the 
writer strongly but unconsciously: when a certain critical
atmosphere about him controls his taste, while not compelling
1 
him to dull the edge of impulse by too •Tiuch deliberation'.
Neither Arnold nor Sainte-Beuve was fortunate enough t« lire 
in such an atmosphere, and More himself in turn had known what 
it was to have the edge of an early poetic impulse dulled by 
too much deliberation. Again both Arnold and Sainte-Beuve had 
seen in this paralysis somethin: more than personal failure, 
the effect of the sterilising climate of the times, and both had 
sought to counteract this by creating for their contemporaries 
a living and vital current of thought as Boileau had done for 
his contemporaries in the Seventeenth Century. This More also 
was attempting to do for the Twentieth Century. What he wrote
4
of Sahte-Beuve was true also of Arnold and of himself, that
A
the Democritan maxim Excludit sanos Helicone joetas proved too 
strong for them, and that finding themselves debarred from 
Helicon(not by impotence, as so^ne would say, >ut by excess of
1. More, _Shelburne_._Ls B ays, 111, ppA?iD.
of self-knowledge), they deliberately undertook to introduce 
a little more sanity into the notions of their contemporaries. 
Of a 1 ! tinree it might be said, as of Goethe,that their life was
one long endeavour to supplant the romantic elements fcy of
1 
taste by the classical.
Further, in all three, criticism became in turn 
a form of creative art. In discussing the failure of Sainte- 
Beuve to attain to full poetical status, More seeks to diff­ 
erentiate between the poet and the critic by saying that in the 
former the principle of restrain^ works unconsciously and from
withint, whereas in the latter it proceeds consciously and
2 
from within. Normally the two classes, creative and critical,
rega/i each other with suspicion, even hostility? but there are 
instances of writers where the line of demarcation is so faint 
that the critic appears to be transmuting the experience of/the 
creative writer in a way that makes of it something original and 
revitalised. 'Certainly the best and most durable acts of man­ 
kind are the ideals and emotions that go to make up its books, 
and to describe and judse the literature of a country, to pass 
under review a thousand systems and reveries, to PJ-nt out the 
meaning of each, and so to write the annals of the human spirit, 
to pluck out the heart of each man's tystery, and set it before 
the mind's eye quivering with life,- if this be not a labour
1.Ibid.,pp.72-73. 
2 . Ibi_d., loc.cit.
of immense creative energy the word has no sense to my eats. 1
To enter imaginatively into the corporate experi­ 
ence of men requires a keen interest in men in and for them­ 
selves. The charge has frequently been brougnt against More that
he was indifierent to human beings, and inspite of his own pro-
§ 
testations that he was acutely interested in his fellowiaen,
the fact remains that ever and above any such interest he may 
show towers his impassioned absorption in Ideas. It is not that 
he lacks any personal concern for the authors he studies,not 
that from the pinacle of personal egotism he looks down upon 
them as small and insignificant men.Rather does he see them and 
th ideas to which they give expression against the background 
of eternal verities, sub specie ae t e rn_i t at is,. Against the sky­ 
line of the infinite,More would say, tne finite and human is 
seen in a truer perspective than the contemporary Viewpoint 
affords, as it seeks to study men against the background of 
other men.Sainte- Seuve on the other hand was essentially inter­ 
ested in people*'Literature to him was one of the arts of 
society 1 , and therein lay both his strength and his weakness. 
•If he fails anywhere',says Morefitx is when he comes into the 
presence of those great and inroerious souls who stand apart 
from the common concerns of men, and who rise*: above our homely 
mediocrities, not by extravagance or egotism., but by lifting
1. Ibid.,pp.7~~77.
2. J.P.Pritcharrl, qp_._c_it. ,p.l?Q. < i-
3. T-.IoreiPages of an Oxford Diary, (LondoniU.U.P. . 1957) f pTJ'/D.g r ,^
4. More, SbeHburne Essays. Ill,p. 78. ' ' '
I
wings of inspiration'. It was as common a charge against 
Sainte-Beuve that he was cold to the sublime as it was 
against More that he was cold to the commonplace. Some- 
whwre between the two stood Arnold, veering however in the 
direction of More and sharing with him the charge of lacking 
the common touch. Such a distinction is significant of the 
three men not only as individuals, but as representatives 
of their national traditions. French literature and language,
as More points out, are pre-eminently social in their strength
2 
and weakness; the chief glory of English letters on the other
hand lies in the very field where the French is weakest,'in the
lonely and unsociable life of the spirit, just as-xthe faults
.4 
of England are due to its lack of discipline and uncertain taste'.
may 
That may explain why England never had, and/possibly never have
4 
a critic on any way comparable to Sainte-Beuve',for,'after all,
the critical temperament consists ±n;pUKt: primarily in just this
linking together of literature and life, and in the levelling
5 
application of common sense.'
whatever the respective merits of Arnold and Sainte- 
Beuve, More sees them both as members of'one of the great fam­ 
ilies of the human intelligence,' u (the very phrase is reminiscent 
of Sainte-Beuve),beginning: with Cicero and extending through
1. Ibid.,p.79.
2. Ibid.,p.80.
3. Ibid*,p.8ft.
4. Ibid.,pp.80-81
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Erasmus, -Boj^eau, Shaftesbury and Sainte-Eeuye to Arnold. 
Obyiously it is here too that More himself feels most at 
home, amongst these 1 exemplars of the critical spirit', 
discriminators between the false and the true, the deformed
and the normal, preachers of harmony and proportion and
1 t order, prophets of religion and of taste 'illpiey deal much
with the criticism of literature this is because in literature 
more manifestly than anywhere else life displays its infinite­ 
ly varied motives and results: and their practice is always 
to render literature itself more consciously a criticism of 
life. The past is the field out of which they draw their 
examples of what is in conformity with nature, and of what 
departs from that norm. In that field, they balance and weigh
and measure! they are by intellect, hesitators, but at heart,
i 2 Tery much iriearnest. '
And here again More returns to the question 
of the relative roles of the critic and the creatire writer. 
The critic has frequently been contrasted with the creative 
writer to the detriment of the former, although More himself 
cannot see the that Tennyson and Lucretius added more to the 
intellectual life of the world than Matthew ^rnold and Cicero. 
But the real contrast in lore's mind is not between critics 
and creative artists, but between critics and the fulminators 
of new creeds. He would place an Arnold against the Carlyles
1 . Ibid. , lo_Ci_£.ii» • 
2. Ibid. ,loc.cit..
. T
and Ruskins and Huxleys of Ilia da$,Shaftesbury against Rousseau, 
Boileau against Descartes, Erasmus against Luther, Sicero a- 
gainst St. Paul. Superficially it would appear that the advan­ 
tage is with the man'who seizes on one deep reaching idea,
whether newly found or re-discovered, and with single-hearted
1 
ferrour forces it upon the world 1 . Yet More believes that
the critical spirit ultimately triumphs* 'that the balancing 
spirit of Erasmus is really more at work among us t©da$ than 
that of the dogmatic and reforming Luther* that Cicero's 
philosophy, though they would gape to hear it said, is really
more in the hearts of, the men you will meet on the street than
2 
6s the theology of St. Paul'. The eternal advantage is with
sweetness and light rather than with the fire and fury of 
the prophets.
This flexibility and moderation the critics acquire 
from their acquaintance with the great minds of the past! they 
'stand with the great conservative forces of human nature,
having their fame certified by the things that endure amid
3 
all the "betrayals of time and fashion 1 , iut such a view of
criticism demands an attitude of humility and receptiveness 
before thapast, in contrast to the attitude of the naturalistic 
critic fluctuating from scorn or indifference to a mood of 
asthetic eclecticism. 'We have already seen that according to 
Babbitt, one of the characteristics of the Romantic imagination
1. Ibid., p. 219.2. rrnr. . p.ago.
3* FjTcT' iloc.cit. •
/So
was its tendency to enjoy a vicarious dalliance with the remote
or exotic, or a luxuriating indulgence in the memory of ;oast
1 
sensations. To More this was, an abuse of the critic's function,
all too commen amongst writers of the iiomantic school. 
'When we speak today of the romantic critic, we think of one 
who has joined the sensibility and fluency of the revolution­ 
ary temperamen^jfco the sympathies of the later historic method, 
and has taught his soul to transform itself cunningly into the 
very types that it chooses to study. We associate the word 
with that kind of fluctuating egotism which makes of the critic 
one 'qui raconte les aventures de sen ame au milieu des
r)
chefs d
A frank indulgence of the senses, such as that counsel-
5 
led by a Chesterfield, is to More far less dangerous than the
tendency to gloat vicariously and obliquely over the sensuoas 
gratification of others, such as one finds in Pater's three 
chief works! Plato and Platonism, Marius the Epicurean and 
The Renaissance There the author is less concerned with giving 
an accurate and criticaljaccount of the various periods he 
describes than in portraying in heightened colours aspects of 
of the life of the day which would titillate the reader's
senses and leave hi;n in an ecstasy of mental, if not also
4 
partly of physical, excitement. Nor was Pater alone in tMs
1. Cf . p. 106.
2. liore,_SheTburne_E&s52;s ll£,pp."f4I- (*
3. Morr, Shelburne Essays V..PJ. 215-220; cf. p. 249. A
4. More, gh.elburne"l?5says_ 7111, p. 99.
attempt to create a means of escape from the stark realities 
of industrialism into a voluptuous Utppia of the senses. The 
same tendency prevailed in the work of the Frenchmen, Renan 
and Anatole France, and reached its climax in France with a 
Huysman, and in England with an Oscar »*ilde. Nor was the tragic 
fallacy of attempting to educe from every minute its maximum 
of sensation confined to literature alone: u/ilde and other 
young men of the 'Nineties sought to put infro actual practice 
the principles of 'The Critic as Artist', ariWfort culminating 
in the disaster of Reading Gaol, which, to More,must needs be 
the inevitable conclusion to any such career which takes for
its motive power the unchecked promptings of an imaginative
1 
hedonism.
Unfortunately, the inclination to intellectual dalli­ 
ance found its way into far :::ore unlikely places. The charge
of dilettantism was brought against as devout a study of the
2 
inner life as J.H.Shorthouse 1 s John Inglesant , whilst not
all the moral fervour of such a critic as Arnold availed to 
free him entirely from at least some of the responsibility of 
fostering the prevailing epicureanism. ~-ilthough More recog­ 
nised that Arnold could hardly be charged with the excesses 
of those who derived their aesthetic bent fro-n one aspect of 
his doctrine of culture, he still felt that it behoved those 
followed him and who believed that the critical spirit was
1. More, Shelburne Essays Vll,pp.229-Lo,c5. 
?. Xore, Shelburne Essa/s 111,p. '"41.
one of the powers ln th. worla whion
to examine their terms more rigorously. To Ar
nold, . oaltupe ,
and 'criticise ,er« practically synonymous t
erms, and wtthout
an anchor in Bome definite moral 9rlnolpl. t b
oth
to ab«« by some leSB 8crupulous thin
any intrinsic want of efficiency in the crltl
cal spirit nor in 
any .»* of moral earnestness in Matthew Arno
M or Shaf testury - , 
(to whom More compares Arnold). 'But these aen 
were iacking 
in another direction: they ,lssed a ?hUosophy
 which cou!d 
bind together their moral and their ae.thetic
 sense, a positi.e 
P»lnciple besides the negate force of ridic
ule and irony: 
and mis sing this, they left criticism more ea
sUy subject to 
a one-sided and dangerous deTelop^nt' 1 Be it 
said, in fairness 
to Arnold, that from his early days he had re
alised the need 
of some such central -Idea of things-'as was 
now engaging the 
attention of the HSmanists^he had sought to 
m^e his poetry 
a complete ' niagi ster_sitae } 3md when he turn
ea from creatire 
work to criticise, finding his theory of cult
ure Impotent for 
lack of a religious impetus, he save himself t
o the tas'K of 
reconciling Christianity with the positiTist 
trend of the day. 
If the faith tnat ne afiered as an alternativ
e to Christianity 
was too feeble to hold in check the hedonisti
c impulses of the 
weaker brethren, this was due to no individual
 failing in Arnold,
E»S&v& Vtl,
ew' Arnold, Uet.ers to A.H,__CloaBi1.KB. 40,
p.l24.
1 
t>ut to the peculiar dilemma of his day.
This was the problem which the Humanists were 
facing anew, and it is significant that More himself did not 
always avoid the pitfall* into which Arnold most frequently 
stumbled in his later work* that of enjoying the emotional 
satisfactions and consolations which derive from religion 
without accepting explicitly its dogma and discipline.' In his 
easay on Pascal, having sought to show that we would have g 
gained little and lost much had Pascal lived to complete his 
JLpologie, he adds that had the famous Jansenist 'purposed to 
prove that the religious instinct has no sure support outside 
of Catholic dogma, we "light perhaps at this point, have parted 
from him in sadness and humility? or we might have stayed _with 
him in the assurance that we should find satisfaction for the 
imagination in his unfolding of that sublime symbolism which
for so many centuries was able, _ and, still is able, for so many
2 
believers to speak comfort to the deepest needs of _the heart. '
Or again, Mi»Mfl<in a tone resembling that of Rpnan's romantic
3 
eclecticism, he praises Greek religion fot its very absence of
dogmatic authority which ™ay well save its rnythology from
'that utter condemnation suet v/hich threatens±± to overtake
wore exax 
possible
m cting and, it may be, more spiritual creds. It is
„ that Zeus and Apollo, tha nya^hs and dryads, may
1 f\& __ f r~ —— •- -—• ———-—— ~—™~_,_—.._„ _____ • 01 • p« /o.
2. More, SheJJburne_Es §. e^sVl, p. 143. (The italics are nine.)
Frs.Tn6~.ts Inti^cs. (Pavi fi . i o,l A } jp . ^.. ?f _
retain their appeaiix as symbols of the religious imagination
Hrhen Jehovah and Jesus, Allah and Mahomet have "been dethroned
I as false gods and denounced as priestly impositions'.
Similarly in assessing the tragic effects of New- 
man's secession to Rome upon his spiritual development, More 
suggests that instead of seeking absolute authority in Cath­ 
olicism, Newman 'might have accepted manfully the sceptical 
demolition of the Christian mythology and the whole fabric of
external religion , and on the ruins of such creeds he might
risen 
have xxixKctto that supreme insight which demands no revelation
and is dependent on no authority, but is content with itself'-- 
---'Or, if that task seemed impossible or fraught with too 
great peril, he raight have held to the national worship as a 
symbol of the religious experience of the people, and Into 
that symbol he might have breathed the new fervour of his own 
waiting reverently until by natural growth his people
w^re prepared, if ever they should be prepared, to apprehend
o with him the invisible truth without the forms 't
I fail to, see how such a spiritual compromise
differs in any substantial particular from the position of the 
Vicaire Savoyard whose delem had also demanded no faith in 
dogma or revelation, and of whom I'Tore wrote* 'Rousseau felt 
the instability of such a religion , and recommended a compliance 
with the popular forms of worship in whatever land a man might
1. More, Shelburne Essays VI, p. 325-24.
2. More, She Ibu rn e Es s_av_s_Vl _1 1 , p . y*.
be, as a guide and stay, so to speak, to vague emotionalism. 
It is a pretty theory, not without its advantages, and has 
warmed the fancy of more than one poet to noble utterance. 
But it has one insurmountable element of weakness. It depends 
for its strength , for its very vitality, on the more precise 
faith of those whose worship it adopts. So long as these be­ 
lieve energetically in the virtue of forms and creeds, your 
deist may prey on their emotions: but a lasting Church made up
1 2 
of deists is inconceivable', —or of Sceptics, we may add. It
is comforting to know that More was not destined to remain 
for ever in this limbo of eclecticism which impinged so 
closely upon the enchanted circle of an aesthetic hedonism. 
His stringent criticism of impressionism would carry far less 
weight, had he himself continued to countenance even in part
an imaginatiYB dalliance with sacred things.
shall 
We te#K* seen elsewhere the Romantic points of
view into which More, was from time to time betrayed by some 
inward desire for the infinite and remote, the ideal world 
of dreams and jcxxirats visions and dim haunting perceptions,
, which is at war with his classical love of order, moderation
5 
and clarity. Such judgments as those we have just seen are
pa»t of fhis suppressed Romanticism; More would probably
excuse them as belonging to 'essential 1 romanticism,
the, 
in contrast to Aabhorred excesses of 'historical'romanticism,
1. Shelburne Essays VI,p.233.
2. 5TTelt>urne -Essays" VIII f p.fts.
3. ef.pt
just as he distinguishes between the nobler enthusiasm of 
a Hazlitt and the mere impressionism of later Romantic 
critics. One thing is certain! he never underestimated the 
strength of the appeal of Romanticism, and if sometimes his 
attacks upon it seem unduly violent, they are so in proportion 
to the violence of the attractioniRomanticism still held 
for one side of his nature. That More often uses his pen as 
a "broadsword in attaching a movement whose consequences he 
felt were so far-reaching and insidious was the more unfor­ 
tunate because in theorem his sympathies were not with the 
cruaaders of the world, but with the pure critics, whose
judgments were reached not in the heats and dust of battle,
2 bttt in true detachment from the contending issues of the day.
The criterion of Humanist criticism as opposed 
to the mere personal whim of romanticism was the work of Homer,
recognised by the corporate judgment of the ages to be 'the
3 nearest approach to pure poetry 1 . Such a criterion could
not be absolute or infallible} there have been times when 
opinion has veered away from Homer, but the fact still remains 
that the majority of educated men throughout the centuries 
have adhered to the view that Homer represents the highest 
attainment of human art; as long as men hold to that norm of 
taste , they are within the great tradition, but once they 
cut themselves off, they are liable to fall into all kinds
1. More, Sh eIburne E s s ay s 11,pp.80-81. 
I! §£fgf'^S'Shelburne Essavs.l.PQ. 17-18,
eccentricities and aberrations. Tradition d
oes not create 
standards, but there is evidence that certa
in works of art 
embody qualities which it is our concern t
o appreciate and 
which we may use as a criterion. These qua
lities Coleridge 
examined in his Bioraiaita. It 
is , incidentally,
paradoxical that More should find the clea
rest statement __ 
of these eternal standards in the work of 
a Romantic critic. 
It is, however, noticeable that Coleridge 
nowhere comes in 
for thae adverse criticism which More besto
ws upon his fellow 
Romantics. There is only one^ligntly dero
gatory reference 
to the genesis of KublaJChan | t>e rest is 
silence. But in 
his attitude to the ethical imagination and
 the discursive 
and intuitive reasons, More is obviously in
fluenced by ideas 
which derive in their modern ^ form from the 
philosophical and 
critical thought of Coleridgf.lt is signifi
cant that More should 
so consistently avoid any detailed discussi
on of the thought of 
one whom he must have recognised as one of 
the seminal minds of 
the period.Any such clarification of his^m
ind on the subject 
might well have led to a modification of h
is attitude to certain 
aspects of Romanticism,at leastj and driven
 by a relentless 
terro^ of the direction in which he saw Ro
manticism to be 
moving, More was not prepared, so it seems
 to me, to make any 
concessions even to the saner eiements of 
its thought. His 
criticism would have gained in strength an
d in persuasive power 
had lie faced this issue at the outset of h
is career instead of
1. Cf.p./6 <&. ; c,r» Here, Shelbume KSi
/sx
concentrating on the excesses of the lesser Romantics. Robert 
Shafer, in a rolume dedicated to Mere, de-rotes a chapter to 
a critical study of Coleridge's derelopment whieh brings out 
the importance of Coleridge's sacramental conception of life 
in a way that challenges comparison with Here's own later
sacramentalism. It- vMoufd be inttre-sting to Knovs more, of- the, e.xte,r\t of- 
ckbt b Coleridge,, in this <3irte.ti.on.
Without, therefore, discussing the foundation on
which he accepts Coleridge's approach to criticism, More 
adopts the standards suggested by Coleridge as his own yard-
t
^ick for Humanistic critic ism. The value of a work of art, 
says Coleridge, is determined, not primarily by authority, 
but by its approximation to truth and nature. Secondly, out 
sense of truth and nature in art is revealed by the pleasure 
we derire from ito Again pleasures rary in ralue, and their 
importance can be assessed by applying the criterion of per­ 
manence —that is, how often we can read or hear or see the
work of art — and the criterion of quality — that is, to
3 
what faculty of mind it appeals. The first two stipulations
would seem'to favour the Naturalists who clai^i to take their 
stand on truth and nature, but they -;ust be supplemented by 
a consideration of the two remaining criteria which need to 
define the permanence and quality of the pleasure affprded. 
In these liesthe answer to the question why certain works 
have become standard works able to afford perennial delight.
2o Robert * Shafer, Christianity_and Naturalism, (London;O.U.F;i926]L 
3! More, New Shelburne Assays 17PP»1^"18°
They appeal to the unirersal in nature rather the* to the 
temporary and accidental. But there are, as More points out, 
two kinds of universalityHhe one on the level below reason, 
the other above. The first is that ofiZola's La Terre. but 
the Naturalist* forgets that there is an even prior requisite 
of good art, permanence of pleasure. He seeks to fascinate 
by shock of surprise, or to interest by the intensity ef 
emotion he excites, but surprise and intensity are to the 
Humanist the least stable factors of pleasure which, if 
they appeal, appeal to the animal in us. The universality 
of true art is of q">ite another order, and the pleasure derived 
from it is able to bear the scrutiny demanded by Coleridge's 
fourth criterion! we must examine the quality of the pleasure 
producedo Coleridge graded pleasures according to their fac­ 
ulty or source, iian, he would say, with the Humanists, is not 
s.jmple in being, but duals there is c.iunn man, not only a 
lurking beast, but also a faculjry of control, whether you 
call this higher element reason or the divine or the super­ 
natural. The true artist is aware indeed of tne bestial in 
nan, but he is aware also of something else, and- in t at he 
looks for the meaning of life.The artist is not ILait^ in ^is 
representation of nature by his -icknowle^gement of this law 
of our double being to what is pure and innocent.Homer, Shake­ 
speare and Turgeniev, ell depicted a world shaken by passionate 
ambition and furious desire. ITor does t:ie true artist try to
1
preach. Rather by 'the subtle insinuating power* of the
imagination, by the just appreciation of the higher emotions 
as well as of the lower, by the revelation of a sad sincerity 
--- in his own soul, (he) gives us always to feel that the true 
universal in human nature, the faculty by which nan resembles 
manaLSK as being different from the beast, is that part of him 
that is 'noble in reason', the master and not the slave of 
passion. True art is thus humanistic rather than naturalistic; 
and its gift of high and permanent pleasure is the response 
of our own breast to the artist's delicately revealed sense of
that divine control moving like the spirit of God upon the
o face of the waters. '
The elusiveness of Humanist criticism arises how­ 
ever fffnm the fact that it is not always possible to analyse 
critically the artistic devices by which the Humanist author
appeals to the higher faculty in man. He is concerned not
3 'with artistic means, but with artistic result s_. The reader
will return asain antf ag^in to Paradise Lost, but no£ to 
Blackmore's epic King Arthur. They essential difference is 
something too elusive to be formulated scientifically, although 
the aim of criticism is to train men to recognise the highest 
when they see it. True criticism, therefore, demands the effort 
of an inner discipline which not all men are prepared to make. 
The faculty to respond to the higher and more permanent pleasures
1. Of. More, ffew Shelburne Essays l.pp.
2. Ibid.,pp.23-24. . .3. TbTo:. ,p.24(The italics are minej.
.t art i. present fl ... lt is potentially 
unirersal, tut it lies dormant until it is awakened by some 
external stimulus. Because this actirity demands self-control 
and self-abnegation in one's choice amongst one's natural 
inclinations, it comes to fulfilment only by an exercise at 
first painful and repellent to the natural man,who is ever 
inclined to question the validity of the higher and more 
permanent pleasure unless he is forced to recognise it by
the influence of the opinion of others upon him. Herein lies
1 
the function of tradition and education.
Yet another touchstone of the quality of art
which it seems to me More ases, perhaps unconsciously, whilst 
overtly maintaining!! that it in no way affects his division 
of writers into major and ^linor classes, is his recognition 
of two types of poetic genius, the essential and the contingents 
The work of the essential poet is of interest and of value 
for its own intrinsic beauty, regardless of our knowledge 
of the poet, his background, or the background of the exper­ 
ience out of which the poem has grown. The contingent poet's 
power depends more on our knowledge of the circumstances sur­ 
rounding poem and poet alike. The two examples ilorp cites to 
illustrate the principle are r-eatt; ,.nuse v.orK would be almost 
the same to us if 7/e T:neT nothing of the poet, and Wordsworth
whose verse derives much of its strength and aignificance from
2 
what we know of the Boet's character and philosophy. I do not
knew whether I am reading too much into the distinction, but
is 
it seems to me that this^imply another form of the issue of
the One and the Many which More proposed as the touchstone 
of the highest excellence in art. The contingent poet's appeal 
rests on an awareness of the Many, the essential poet's power 
derives from an intuitive sense of the One. Homer, Virgil, 
Shakespeare would, to More, be the outstanding exemplars of 
essential poetic inspiration. The Romantics in general would
be to him examples of contingent poets, although I personally
2 
would hardly agree with his assessment of Wordsworth's appeal.
Superficially it might appear that More leans towards 
the aesthete's concern with the intrinsic merits of the work 
of art, as against the 'social' or 'psychological 1 critic's 
concern with the circumstances surrounding the work and its 
author, although More, especially irkis earlier essays, was 
not insensitive to the value of biographical detail in criticism. 
But in his evaluation even of 'essential' poetss, More differs 
from the aesthete's attitude to 'essential 1 art. They judge 
solely by internal standards of excellence, varying with the 
individual workj More's criterion remains the one constant 
standard of excellence, fixed by its approximation to external
and eternal Ideas of beauty, truth and goodness, and recognised
awakened 
freely down the ages by those whose faculties have been
to respond to it. But how have their faculties been awakenedf
1. Cf. p
2. Cf. p
'63.
the cynic might ask. By training, would be the Humanist's reply. 
Training according to what standard? presses our cynic. Accord­ 
ing to the traditional standard of approximation to the Ideas 
of beauty, truth and goodness,retorts the Humanist. But without 
an a priori acceptance of that standard, it is impossible to 
train men to discriminate according to its values: It is there­ 
fore impossible to base the Humanist case for standards on 
purely rational argument. Its grounds,as More would willingly 
admit, are purely intuitive, and Humanist criticism must remain 
to those who are not prepared tf accept its conditions purely 
elusive, if not also deliberately evasive,
111
Paul Elmer More and Creative Art.
Hithefcto we have concentrated almost exclusively upon 
the Humanist's criticism of criticism} but inevitably the 
Humanist critic must define his attitudek to creative art as 
well. 'A1**** says Morc in nis 'definitions of Dualism','is 
the attempt,t>y means of the subjective imagination,to estab­ 
lish the experience of the individual in tradition. Serious 
art is thus almost necessarily concerned with the past and 
with ambitions of the future. In so far as it deals with beauty, 
it is an attempt to adapt the beauty of nature as seen through 
the objective imagination to the demands of the subjective 
imagination. It differs from the pathetic fallacy by implying
a distinct and more or less revocable addition rather than a
1 
fusion of nature and soul 1 .
l.More, Shelburne Essays Vlll,p- 265-
The active agent which works upon the raw material of nature 
and transforms its elements into art is the inner check , by 
whose presence the twofold action of the subjective and objec-
tivejlmagination. is, as I understand it, heightened and sublim-
2
ated into the Bthical Imagination. How this fits in with Bab­ 
bitt's assertion that'the Higher Yi/Ill as a centre of controljt
i.e. the 'inner check 1 ,is perceived through the agency of the
3 
ethical imagination is not easy to see.One is left with the
age-old question,which came first, the chicken or the egg, the 
inner check or the ethical imagination? It is interesting to 
set beside the description of art given above an earlier attempt 
of More's at a definition* "Ehe old ideal of art had been 
sought in the union of the higher intellect and the aspirations 
of the will touched with emotion, and the final court of appeal
was thek taste of the man who had attained to the most oerfect
1 
harmony of culture and to the fullest developmentl 0f character'.
Although such a definition was originally set down as xthe 
general ideal of Humanist artists throughout the ages in oppos­ 
ition to Tolstoy's attempt to erect popular impressionism and 
the divine right of the individual, divorced from any pleasure 
in beauty for itself, into a canon of literary judgment, it can 
hardly-.be claimed that such a definition does much to focus
2. Cf«p. //3FF.Ulv 1-f  O O COS.Babbitt, Rousseau and Ro.man.tic.ism, pp. 258-59. 
4.More, Shelburne Essays l,p.212.
attention on the importance of beauty, as it is generally under­ 
stood, as a constituent in art. The wording smacks of a cross 
between Ma|tthew Arnold's famous definition of religion as 
'morality touched with emotion 1 and his equally famous plea 
for 'culture'. What More is trying to convey becomes clearer 
when we consider in relation to it his definition of beauty, 
as it occurs in the passage where he criticises Kipling for 
a lack of 'the desire of beauty as an end in itself, such as 
inspired the opening lines of Keats' Endy_mip_n,.
'In its purer manifestation this element of beauty is but the 
expression of an inner harmony of the faculties depending on 
the same will to refrain; it is the law of the Delphian Apollo, 
Nothing too much, working itself out in perfect proportion of 
thought and form. The very foundation of poetry as possessing 
that higher liberty of the spirit growing out of the harmony 
of restraint lies therein; and such, I gather, was the notion
o
of Coleridge when he traced the source of metre ''to the bal­ 
ance in the mind effected b./ the spontaneous effort which 
strives to hold in check the workings of passion". Even in its 
lower manifestations, in the love of mere beauty of detail as
displayed by the lesser romantic writers there must still
drav/ 
remain something of the power to -rit.h.Kt^nrt t'e mind fron the
immediate uses of things, and re?,d into them ^ 'iifj^«?r signifi- 
3
cance'
1. L'ore, Shelburne Essays 11,p.US.
2. Cf. pp.^-SS1 -
3. More, ghelburne Ess afts 11,p.119.
False emphasis upon any of the component emotions destroys 
the true balance of art, and it is this which spoils for More 
seTeral passages from Dickens, such as the scene in David 
Copperfield where David learns of the death of his mother. 
Dickens seems to him to "be straining for effect beyond the 
needs of the time and place, with th e result that he falls 
into false cadences and an unreal use of language. Thackeray, 
on the other hand, in a similar scene from Henry Esmond, al­ 
though the thought is equally commonplace, manages to maintain
1 
a simple sincerity which gives his style a charm of its own.
Dickens, ii/other words, lacked the will to refrain. Such a 
deficiency is both an ethical and an aesthetic weakness, and
in More's attitude to art, the two elements are inseparable,
2
as he claims they were in Greek literature. To the modern
critic of the Crocean school, on the other hand, an appreci­ 
ation of art which depends on, or is in anyn way influenced 
by, the perception of moral values, is an impure appreciation,
«
for the worlds of lif-and ethics- and of art are fundamentally
A
separate.
More's maturest and most definite views on the subject 
are to beV found in t |h^_^m^n_pX_the._Absolute_, ^n an eponymous 
essay in which he deals at length with 'The Fetish of Pure Art', 
amongst other heresies of the day- Actually there is no fudda- 
mental change from his earlier position, but his views are
1. More, Shelburne Essays V, p.25.
2. More, Shelburne Essays 11,p.119,
applied more fully to the modern aesthetic situation. He 
bases*! his remarks chiefly upon an essay by Jose Ortega Y 
Gasset on 'The Dehumaniization of Art', of which the central 
thesia is that true artistic pleasure is something quite dis­ 
tinct from an emotional response to the human lot which a 
work of art may incidentally present to us. Preoccupation 
with the human element is essentially incompatible with Jtare 
aesthetic fruition. As men are educated to respond truly to 
art, pictures will come increasingly to depend on little or 
no subject, for any association with a human content distracts 
the attention from the purity of the aesthetic pleasure.
t it An artistic object is artisitc only in the measure in which
2 
it ceases to be real". 1 Art, says Y Gasset, is like a window
through which we can see a garden. The ordinary man is absorbed 
with the sight-of flowers and trees, and forgets the glass. 
But the artist seeks to concentrate on the panel of glass 
until the garden fades into a "iere blotch of colour, or passes 
out of our conscious perception altogether. This is the aim 
of the young creative artists who aspire to reach the complete 
dehumanization and derealization of srt, equivalent to seeing
C-
the pure panel of glass instead of tl;e garden.
The concern of the .-'u^anist ?eBti-etic, on t':e con­ 
trary,-as the very nsme sup^ests- is with the human content of art
1. More, Hew Shelburne Essays 'l,pp.S°-35.
". Ibido,lo.CiC.lt.»
3. Ibid. ,pp. 3'b-35.
'Most of us 1 , says More,'would prefer to retain our impure 
perception of the flowers in the ,-To.rden beyond* Leonardo's 
da Vinci's Last Supper appears to "be ^ truer work of art than
the deftest whirl of colour ever tainted, the JfeEneid is richer1* 
in poetical joy than Kubla Khan, not to mention the latest
lyric from the American colony in Paris, and Bach.'s Mass in
B Minor is still a miracle and a rapture of sound. Yet all these
are rich in human emotion, and a brooding sense of the eternal
'2
values of life, and as such,would be suspect to the pure aesthete.
That life and art are not and cannot be identical, 
More agrees.The attitude of the artist to the human scene 
cannot be oneat and the same as that of the actual protagonists, 
but th?,t does not mean that human values have no part in artis­ 
tic inspiration. 'Vv'hat has actually happened', says More,'is 
this ' always the great creators have taken the substance of life 
and, not "by denying it or attemoting to evade its laws, but by 
looking more intently below its surface, have found meaning and 
value that transmute it into something at once the same and diff­ 
erent. The passions that distract the individual man with the 
despair of isolated impotence they have invested with a universal 
significance fraught with the destinies of humanity; the scenery 
of the materials world they have infused with suggestions of an 
indwelling otherworld. And so by a species of symbolism, or what­ 
ever you choose to call it, they have lifted mortal life and its
1. Of. p. - Essays 1, pp. 55-56.
theatre to a higher reality which only to the contented or 
dust-choked dwellers in things as they are may appear as 
unreal. That ,for instance, is precisely what Perugino has 
achieved in his picture of a death- scene entitled The Mystic 
Crucifixion 'where pain and grief and the fear that clutches the 
individual heart in its hand of ice have been transmuted into 
a dream of divine redemption through suffering, while the 
tender "burgeoning of spring thrown against the far-off junc­ 
ture of earth and sVy gives hints of a mode of existence in 
joyous and infinite freedom. Even the lesser creators, those 
who in innocence of spirit have undertaken merely to repro« 
duce what they see, may have done so with a clarity and large?-
ness of vision capable of working a magic alchemy of which
1 
they themselves perhaps never dreamed.'
If art is not the depersonalised, esoteric vision 
of the sur-realist, neither is it the minute preoccupation 
with physical detail which the realists would make of it. 
Of Gissing's obsession wi$h human pov-rty and his characters' 
desire to escape from it by making money, More comments* 
'Waiving the point in ethics, t>ere still remains the question 
of art: what profit is it, one asks, to paint in all its hid­ 
eous colours the death of the soul, to forget the glad things 
of the world for its sh dows, to deny Agamemnon and Achilles 
and choose Thersites for the hero of our ts3e? "Art nowadays 1,1
1. OF.Edmund ..'ilspn,The Triple Thinkers, (LondoniQ.U.P.1958) .p. /8.
2. More, ITew Shelburne Sssays l,pp« 3C-37.
ies boldly,"must be the mouthpiece of misery, for
1 misery is the keynote of modern life, 1" Gassing moved in
later years from such a theory of art, but for the greater 
part of his literary career, it was his obsession with squalor 
and suffering which contrasted so vividly with Dickens' zest of 
life, although both were handling the same materials. 'Gissing's 
aim was to strip off to the last rag those veils of melodrama 
and humour which prevented Dickens from becoming a realist, and 
which yxncntutx, it may be argued, he himself by native right 
possessed in large measure. He would not be waylaid and turned 
from his purpose by the oicturesque grimaces of poverty, but 
would lay bare the sullen ugliness at its corej lie would, in a 
word,write firom the inside.'•'•
Such writing may furnish very striking document­ 
ation and very staging results.G' est magnifique, one might say, 
mais ce n*est pas 1'art.ffor all too easily so-called realism 
seizes upon the ugly and. revolting aspects of life to the exclus- 
of the joy and beauty and humour which go to make up the sum 
total of human experience. Realism, therefore, offers an ill- 
proportioned picture of life, and as such fails to achieve that 
inner beajtty which arises from tT<e just and harmonious synthesis 
of the perceptions of the objective imagination, as opposed to 
the mere outward beauty of sensuous appearances. Moreover, the
final effect if realise, as of sur-realism, is frequently to
terest
suppress the truly human iniiiHE*. The tealist sees man as the
17 More, Shelburne Essays V, p/52.
as the product of certain pre-determined lav/s of heredity and 
environment, and frequently turns his attention from the 
character of man, which to the Humanist is the only subject 
worthy of great literature, to study the external forces which 
according to their theories, -ake him what he is. Gissing in 
nid-career, turned from the themes which gire literature real stx 
dramatic value by showing man, free, purposive and responsible, 
pitted against a hostile uaiverse, to write about the endless
abstractions of his day: feminism, imperialism, pacifism, anti-
i 
vivisection, nti-gambling , ant i -hunt ing, education, marriage,
and so like Zola and the French naturalists, sought reality in 
?. realm below the purely human plane of reason and free will.
'Art, so long as it is human, must concern itself
with the portrayal of character — triumphant or defeated, still
2 
character-----J says the Kumanist. uuch art v/ill seek to portray
its content through syVbols in which thought and feeling coal­ 
esce, and v;hich therefore depict a complete human response in
any given situation. Haturalist art, on the contrary, portrays
purely 
itfcits people from a KocqplKtKljc physics! point of view, and as
a result, falls into the error condemned centuries ago by riato 
of depicting emotion by means of a physical gesture or attri­ 
bute. There is in all art an insidious danger in its tendency 
to relax the moral fibre by translating things spiritual into 
ihtegx corporeal symbols, as Plato clearly saw, but in natur­ 
alism, with the removal of the will from a position of supreme
l7~Ibid'«'»»P* 50. ^ 
§o Mn r « She-lbMrne. Essays X , pjj.
authority, this danger is aggravated by the centrifugal emphasis 
upon a number of individual and disintegrated traits and habit s? 
Even in as great a modern novelist as George Meredith, in whose 
work there is no trace of the sordid or pornographic which mars 
the writings of so many novelists of lore's own day, the natural­ 
istic attitude to life results in the subordination of an active 
and personal human interest to a study of the development of 
character under given conditions of environment and heredity, 
and in a tendency to convey emotion through purely physical 
details. Already in beries 11 of the ohelburne Essays. More is 
aware of the modern tendency to adopt the physically 'kinetic' 
means of eliciting a ready response from the reader, and to this 
issue he returns at far greater length in his essa# on James 
Joyce in Qri__Be ing Human . Aristotle in hi3.Poetj.es had recog­ 
nised in the tragic emotion two phases, pity and terror, both 
of which 'arrest the raind in the presence of whatsoever is
grave and constant in human sufferings and unitej( it with the
3 
human sufferer 1 and therefore are 'static'. On the other hand
the feelings excited by improper art, desire and loathing, are 
'kinetic 1 . In Joyce's use of the terms in The Portrait of the 
Author as a Young Man, this distinction is confused by being 
grafted on to a purely naturalistic conception of the ' static' J
1. Cf.More, TTew_Shelburne^Bsa£3.
Desmond Macarthy, Criticism, (London £ New York. 193? ) ,p^3o 1-302.
2. More, ghelburne Essays 11, pp. 135-07-
3. More, Hew Shelburne Essays lll,pp.<T5-86.
not only should pure art avoid exciting physical sensations of 
desire and loathing, either of which might incite us to immoral­ 
ity, but it should further aim to be neither moral nor immoral 
by imitating the indifference of nature and reproducing the 
facts of the physical universe ,,-ith a realism which eschews any
attempt at interpretation.
merely for art 
Unfortunately, it is impoSsible"to record the facts, and
all the factstArt is essentially selective and interpretive. An 
aesthetic which refuses to accept the authority of spiritual 
law and traditional inhibitions in its attempt to vritate the 
impartiality of nature inevitably ends by selecting from reality 
nothing but the .ph/sitel, and by interpreting it in such a way 
as to exalt the animal in man ^teove the purely hunan, as in^ oe(j 
More sees happening in the later work of Joyce. The very thing 
he set out apparently to avoid had. happened: by his own def in«/totv.
of proper an~l improper art in Thj lortr^it, "l^jBSPgi ™ust stand 
condemned as improper art. Joyce's failure to achieve a true 
'stasis* in art More attributes to an initial error of terminology.
•
He would have been enabled to formulate his principles mote 
correctly, if , instead of contrasting 'kinfctic' and 'static', 
he had distinguished between art that seeks to arouse physical 
lust or loathing, and art that seeks to more to desire and joy
of hyperphysical realities; for to Lore, an 1 art, so far as it is
i. 
alive must be kinetic? for'good or for evil.
17 Ibid.,
For to More in the last analysis there are two kinds of ftinesis. 
that which affects the impressions!* that lie below reason, and 
that which affects those aboTe. Those impressions that lie below 
reason are «haotic,sullen, resistant to good, moved oaly by a 
strong appeal to their physical nature} those that lie above 
reason are at least amenable to a conscious power of selection 
and control.More's aim as a critic is chiefly this: to distin­ 
guish between those literary works ..hich excite to physical 
loathing or desire, and those that lift the soul above itself 
into the purer air of hyperphysical realities, those that drag 
the soul down into the vortex of the IIany, and those that aspire 
to the calm and unity of the One. Such a distinction is all the 
more necessary in an age when all distinctions tend to be 
explained away in purely physiological trems, i.e. in the name 
of what lies below reason. The Humanist is aware of three planes 
of existence.*., the Ideal plane of the divine, set above reason, 
the human plane of reason itself, and the physical, the sublim­ 
inal plane of matter, set below reason* Art exists on the human 
plane, the plane of divisions and distinctions,but the":artist in 
the full flight of his inspiration, enters into communion with 
the Ideal world from which he brings back visions of the eternal 
harmony existing above reason, the One universal truth, itself 
immune from the divisions and distinctions of the world of sense. 
The greater the poetic insight, thfc more free it is fromjponcern 
with the individual ?nd the partieular. Although it necessarily
)_; j _.____________ __ ii-- •••• ~' "—~~ ~~ '""" "° "~
1.
/ys:
uses the individual and the particular, it aspires itself,and
carries its audience with it,to the realm of the universal and
impersonal . 
thexjMiiKalxr. 'Shakespeare',says I/lore,'was not dealing in empty
words when he likened the poet to the lover and the lunatic as 
"being of imagination all compact} nor was Plato speaking mere 
metaphor when he said that "the poet is a lights: and winged 
and holynthing, and there is no invention in him until he has 
teen inspired and is out of his senses and the mind is no longer 
in h4m"-----It is this mood of inspiration which overflows into 
rhythm, and this J.A turn produces on the mood of the reader 
something of^the stimulating effect of music and this effect
is enhanced "by the use of language and metaphor lifted out of
1 
the common mould'. Such a transformation differs to Llore from
merely pantheistic or erotic reverie of romanticism, for the true 
poetic experience involves an acute tension within the poet 
himself "between his ordinary and his inspired selves.The dissol­ 
ving power of genius and the personality of the man can never 
"be quite reconciled; he is detached from nature and attached to 
her at the same time.There is thus set up a tension "between his 
own personality, often of the most ardent, dragging him irresist­ 
ibly to the satisfaction af personal emotions, and his poetic 
mission.
\vere this all, however, it v.ould be difficult to accept
1. More, Shelburne^s^a^s. Ill,
More's discrimination between the romantic and the humanistic 
genius. The true distinction remains, as far as I can see, 
implicit rather than explicit, in More's criticism. We shall 
see later that to More the very act of creativity, in both 
Platonic and Christian thought, involved the imposition of
t
form by a divine activity, upon that which -was before without
1
form and void. So I take it, the divine activity of inspir­ 
ation must of necessity take place through the imposition of 
form on what would ftherwise remain merely inchoate matter. 
In both art and nature, the act of creation is the deliverance 
of matter from its own impotence. The firmer and clearer the 
form,the more complete the deliverance. Hence More, and Babb­ 
itt's concern with an incisive division of art-forms into 
genreg_.
'The various arts are limited to specific fields of 
experience in accordance with the medium in which they work, 
and they rise in dignity as the sense to \vhich they are dir­ 
ected has less of the flux and more of mental stability in its 
activity.^ Thus they may be arranged in a scale of honour as they 
act through the medium of taste and odour, sound, colour and 
line, form. For the same reason, their emotional appeal is 
more personal as they descend in the sc?le, more impersonal 
as they ascend. The so-called confusion of the genres by obs­ 
curing distinctions intro_duces_an._additiQ_nal and unnecessary 
element_^f_instability in the _m.edium_em2lov^d. Its effect
1. Of. pp. 4fo5-yo>
therefore is to enhance this merely personal appeal of anjart
and to lower its dignity and impersonal appeal 1 .
2 
The epic is more impersonal, less emotive in its appeal than
3 4 the lyric, the drama than the epic.Prose remains on the level
of everyday interest, and as such deals with individual detail, 
whilst verse raises the individual above himself into a world 
of universal and eternal truths. All these distinctions to 
More are not mere pedantry, the dead letter of an archaic code 
of literary laws as they became under the touch of pseudo-claas- 
iicism. They are an essential and permanent aspect of creation 
in which the poet, like ^00., brings to life and movement and 
vitality the inert matter flhich he fashions in accordance with 
ideal patternJThe effect of romantic ideology has been to break 
down these distinctions,to confuse the genres»to merge prose and
verse,to dissolve the clear, v/ell-ordered rhythms of the Classics
iaijsxttiE
into the fluid,lilt of a wait Whitman. Unfortunately, he and many
of his fellow Romantics, in breaking away from inch that Tj-as un­ 
doubtedly a sham, forgot iks± too often those eternal conventions 
which grow out of the essential demands of human nature. They did 
not recognise that the more rigid technical forms of a previous
1 . Mo r e » ~Sh e Iburn e 3 s s ay s VI 1 1 , pp . XA-g*.
2. For discussion of epic, see Shelburne Essays l,-o.l59:il,pp.l58-5Q
3. For discussion of lyric, see Shelburne Essays 1,-
4. For discussion of drama, see Shelburne Ess ays, 111, pp. 8^-87. 
5 . Ho r e , Shelburne Essays, 111, loc. cit.
§«e were not necessarily a shackle upon originality, but a
valuable guide towards true flexibility in the poet's art.
2 
As a result,either,like Browning, they fell into the mere
flatness| of a cadenced prose, or,by nature of the Romantic 
tendency to run from one excess to another, they substituted
for the flexible, lucid control of classical prosody, the3 L 
strangely complicated rhythms of a Swinburne or a James
Thamson wh&se City of Dreadful ?Tig;ht Moee likens to 'the
phantasmagoria of a fever subdued to mathematical restraint,
4or the clamour of a mad grief trained into remorseless logic!
The Humanist, on the other hand, seeks to reassert in a rebell­ 
ious and undisciplined age the necessity of those eternal con­ 
ventions. To him, in literary form, as in literary content, 
the choice lies between an imitation of -^ternal Ideas or the 
breakdown of all design and pattern,a return to the formlessness 
and inertia of Chaos and Old >T ight.
IV
More '_s_Qwn^Critical Achievement.
Upon the sincerity and devotion, and even the passion 
of More as a critic of life and letters many of his most keen 
critics would agree, 'where the^ fee"1 his criticism fails is in 
its ability to rise itself to t^e point where criticism becomes
1. More, Shelburne Essays Yll,p.l4: Cf. Shelburne Essays II.T3«128.
Shelburne Essays 111,p. 71.
2. More, Shelburne Assays,111,pp. 156-57.
3. More, Ibid._,pp.115-16.
4. More, Shelburne Bs_s,av.s V,p.l85.
literal*,, in and of itself. And in so far as The New Humanists 
claimed the ShelhurHe.Ess^s, to he their finest original 
creation, ^t is not only More' . own reputation that is at stake, 
hut that. -of the whole movement.
For factual knowledge and the marshalling of ideas, 
for drawing out unexpected and significant analogies, More with 
his- extensive reading in so nany literatures, ancient and modern, 
Oriental and Occidental, Christian and pagan, is hound to he 
recognised as one of the most learned critics of the modern 
period: he was in a position of the greatest advantage for 
making known the hest that had heen thought and said, hut in 
the last analysis, the question remains whether he had the 
capacity for making it loved. Style, I should define, as that 
capacity fcr so presenting one's ideas in a way that makes them 
seem infinitely amiahle and much to he desired: and it is of 
just More's capacity to do that that so many of his critics are 
in douht.
'More', wrote Alfred Kazin, ' could write witfh great 
sympathy of all world literature up to Proust and Joyce. lie had 
a natural love of liter^ture^ where Bahhitt thought most modern 
writers merely wilful and even a little mad; and though he 
always discussed writing within an ethical framework, his apprec­ 
iation of it was often passionate and, in the great passages of
<j
the Shelhurne Essays even moving^' The fourteen volumes of essays
1. Cf. p
2. Alfred Kazin, On Native Grounds . (London, Jonathan Cape, 1943
Iffa
wr»e'a monument to Mere's profound absorption in world literature 
and to a search for salvation and a craving for the ideal that 
are without precedent in the modern literature if criticism.* 
But such high praise is not given without reservation. 
'Yet 1 ,continued Kazin, 'his quality as a critic, so mechanically 
praised by his admirers and so mechanically condemned by at least 
two generations of modernists in America, is not easy to define. 
There was something persistently small in him,something curiously 
provincial and strained, that lies like a shadow over his ambition, 
his stupendous learning and his so carefully wrought essays in 
human failure. He had a great ambition and was certainly not 
unequal to it:he had profound imaginative sympathy,if not parti- 
cularly± imaginative insight, and was a distinguished student of 
ideas. But though he loved literature as he loved nothing else in 
life, he was always a little suspicious of its testimony to human
2 •
frailty and diserderiTo say he was merely cold and bigoted is to 
forget wit& what ardour he could write of figures so different as 
George Gissing and Shelley,Thoreau and Sir Thomas Browne, and how^ 
unlike Babbitt, he could enter sympathetically into the work of 
many writers holding different views from his own. All the same,
'there was a lack ef some final personal distinction in More 1 to
want 
Kazin,'a crabbedness, a fundamental lauak of generesity and ease
that make his ambition to be an American Sainte-Beuve, just a 
little preposterous. Catholic in his learnings Cath61ic in his
1* Ibidi,p.30? « 
2. Ibid.,loc_cit.. (The italics are mine) :
yearning for absolutism and dpgma, he yet lacked more than some 
of the little men who mocked him so facilely a simple catholicit-4 
of human interest and curiosity. Even the courtly old-fashioned 
tread of his style, so solemnly careful and formal a scholar's 
style, revealed the struggle he always waged with himself. It 
was certainly one of the most self-conscious styles ever brought 
into criticism, and for ^11 its intensity and dignity, a kind of 
magnificent patchwork, the style of a man at once passionate in
conviction and hungry f° r w^at he did not have in himself. It v.as
not merely a great bookish style} it was an uneasy style, the 
enormously
style. .of g.n ixTSKHggfcgc learned man who had worked t of hard to get. ————————————— —————— —
himself a style, _ ag_he had worked too hard all his life to attain
1 
a. -perfect faith and spiritual repose* '
The charge of provinciality has been brought against
More by a variety of critics* some have based their criticism on
2 
the over- seriousness of his concern with morality, some on the
3 
consistently solemn tone of his essays, some on his choice of
4 
subject} others hafce objected to the assuption of authority with
5 
which he seems always to be speaking ex cathedra, while yet others
have been repelled by the meticulous obsession with detail which 
led him to an apparently ill-natured exposure of slips of the pen 
in men intellectually his superior, as in the all-too-obvious 
correction of Whitehead's gra-rrnar, singled out for public notice
l.TbTd.,pp. 307-308. .
0 .I7T)7Zabe 1,Literary OT)inion_in_Ajne,ri£a,pp. XLV11.
S.Stuart Sherman, Americans,pp.520-22. ^ _
5 * A . n. v; a.r d. Ame r i c an Lit er aTu r e IggO^T950pp • 8 54 - 8 59.
uTT'Re'5^cca ni/est.^'na-ing ]^ n.ajn_Q,p^ f ("MPV? York,19ol)p, 28|f f.
lay tli« addition of a damning (s^s]_ For this last lapse into 
pedantry there can be no excuse, except to say that iaspite of 
his deprecation of theoretical Absolutes of every kind, ia
praetiee Mere was sufficiently child ef his Puritan lineage to
2 
demand absolute correctness in every detail of human activity.
Here his desire for absolute precision had made him forget that
e 3 
s-erzzatur* he had tried so hard to cultivate. But eprezzatura. _ ,
the ease and grace ef the true aristocrat, can-met be feigned* 
something ef its careless elagaaee has to be inherited, to come 
as naturally as leaves to the. tree or, to adapt Keats' saying, 
it j had better not come at all. In More, the attempt to be urbane 
or even whimsical in his essays is never quite convincing. Only 
ene attempt to adopt a lighter vein to suit the tone of the 
subject stands out as successful; that is his imaginary recon- 
struction of one of Charles Lamb's famous Wednesday evenings, 
and in this the spirit of Lamb is potent to dominate the fantas­ 
ia, although even here we are haunted by memories of that sad, 
strange judgment of Here's inlan earlier essay when, influenced
by Carlyljce's impress ion, he failed lamentably, to understand the*5 
grim courage behind the'bleak mockery of wit'^ and so found
6 
'lamb'sl refusal to face the graver iisues of life' tedious..
1. The Hew Re-public. March 19, 1930, Vol. 1X11, ITo. 798,
Edmund Wilson,Notes on Babbitt and ?-ore|p!20.
2. Cf. Ibid.,,13.11^
3. The American Review. April 1937,Vol.lX,'T0 .l,p,36.
4. More, Shelburne EssayslV. -pp. 171-75. 
'5V Ifore, Shelburne Sssays.ll.-p.102; 
6. Ibid.
Fortunately, even within the essay itself, More thiu^etter 
•f U^refcemberlng Thackeray's tribute tft 'Saint Charles', 
he set.side *• side with this »9od cf revulsion, mother nood 
which. Lamb is capable of inspiring in his readers- a mood ef 
delight and whimsy and gentle devotion to one who ha« suffered 
long and Unobtrusively. Uor did he attempt to reconcile the* tw. 
moods, 'There is a time to look solemnly into the face of life 
and then these letters and essays repel us, as they did Carlyle, 
with teir ghastly London wit. There is a.,time for laughter and 
for quaint fancy that dallies lightly with the emotions and then 
we fefleeton the sublime courage of this man who could smile 
where others would despair, and with Thackeray we lay nz his 
letters to our forehead and call him Saint Charles, And the " 
latter mood is wiser, on the whole, and safer, and more just.'* 
Both moods, however, arw intense and over-serious, and 
impose a strain on the reader's emotions which is inherent, not 
in the subject, but irfthe writer. More's essays afford little 
mental relief^there is all too little light and shade in his 
prose. Hor does he make any concessions to the taste of his 
audience; in many of his essays *he does not even attempt to 
exercise a legitimate charm of manner, but is content to expound 
his views clearly 'on the principle that good wine needs no
&
bush 1 . In moments of increased seriousness, the tone- is not so 
much heightened as tautened by its sheer insistence.
l.tftid. , p. 103.
S.aitTantic Monthly .October 1906, G.M. Harper, $^g§eB B fjhelburne562.
Nevertheless,if More offers no decoration or flourish 
of style to make his material more attractive, it means that he 
is at least saved from any «f the tricks of repetition, of play 
on words or any of the other devices,such as the use of formulae 
or key-words, which "became so exasperating in even such a master
of his craft as Arnold. More's essays proceed upon an entirely
e 
differat structural pattern from Arnold's: they drive steadily to
a conclusion, under the impulsion of their controlling purpose,
instead of advancing sinuously,,often imperceptibly upon the
1 
enemy under cover of some flexible and oft-repeated phrase.
Each essay of Mere's is planned according to the particular 
circumstances calling it forth. Its first objective is to set 
its subject in a clear steSjty light. More does not attempt to 
make his essays an exhaustive, or even a comprehensive,survey of 
the subject. His method demands a rigorous exclusion of non- 
essentials, and as a result, he has to limit his standard of 
judgment to what is needed for the purpose immediately in hand. 
The braad underlying basis of all his evaluations is the presence 
of a dualistic attitude to life, but in individual essays the 
touchstone is not dualism in general, but the one concrete 
aspect of it directly suggested by the crucial points arising 
from the subject. The result is a oiaole coherent structure as 
opposed to the blurred effect -,-hich co-nee from all-inclusiveness.
1. Shafer, op.cit. ,p.M 171,
Only occasionally is this clarity and precision of outline pur­ 
chased at the price of accuracy of statement. The desire for t«o 
clear-cut a distinction between the dualist and the non-dualist, 
"betrays him inthe essay en Disraeli into too sweeping an anti­ 
thesis which delights .Toy its balance of language but lacks the 
complexity and subtlety af truth. 'In comparison with Gladstone 
(Disraelij was a philosopher and a statesman: he was a genius 
opposed to a man of great talent- as it ie fair t0 Bi$ that
conservatism is in general the intuition of genius! whereas
1
liberalism is the efficiency of talent'. But generally More con­ 
tents himself with a plain straight -forward statement of his . 
thesis,less scintillating perhaps, but less dangerous than playing 
with epigrams.
His use of certain master ideas, as opposed to Axxx 
the more superficial use of Icey-phrases we shall see later.^
This at once lends coherence to the individual essay,and cohesion 
to the essays as a whole, .but there is a danger of repetition of 
theme becoming asxiteigEESics monotonous as repetition of lan­ 
guage. G.M. Harper points out that v:hen the essays of the first 
three series with which he is particularly concerned in his review 
were first printed, they appeared separately in various periodi­ 
cals. As a result,'the minds of readers who followed him assidu- 
eusly had time to relaxtwe felt no sense of monotony, but rather 
a grateful admiration of his versatile powers. TTow, however, when
1. Mnrfl, Shelburne Essays lX,pp.#6.
2. uf 49.
the full a*oQi» is marshalled before us, we can' hardly help 
ebseving that rank upon panic wears the same uniform and follows 
in the same direction. The tread at times is heavy* its regu* 
larity is a little oppressive? and there is something vexatioas
j '
in seeing these "brilliant squadrons wheel at the same point in 
one fatal direction. Yet when we discoyer what this objective is. 
when we look "back through the three volumes 1 , (and more., so, 
through the thirteen) T and re-read the passages which by their 
frequent iteration wearied us perhaps 'and made us think Mr» More 
was narrow 1» his conception of art, we shall confess that no 
generalisation about human life could teajly be wider and more r 
richly suggestive than his dominant idea^which reaches perfect 
expression in the last essay of all.'^
The substantial and workmanlike texture of the body 
of the essays is distinguished froma time to time, however,by 
phrases of rare insight or beauty,or even sustained passages of 
striking descriptive power, as in some of the miniature alle­ 
gories -with which occasionally he rounds off the thought of a
3 
essay. In seeking to explain the popularity of Browning, for
whom he himself felt so little sympathy, he could still write: 
'At intervals the staccato of his lines, like the drilling of a 
woodpecker, is interrupted by a burst of pure and liquid music,
as if that vigorous and exploring bird were suddenly gifted with
4 
the melodiou^ throat of the lark 1 .
1. Here the 'illusion- theory''cf. pp 
^Atlantic Monthly.October 1906,pp.562~63.Last essay«"The Quest" 
5* More, Shelburne Essays.lll.i3.264tlV.t).128t lX,p,42,76-77. '
4. More,Shelburne Essa3rg Ill»p.l44.
/gy.
The'pure patriotism of W.B.Yeats 'burns through his 
language like a wlear flame within a vase of thinly chiselled 
alabaster', Hazlitt moves amongst the other members of that 
memorable group of early .Romantics 'like some creature of 
burning skies and flaming horizons amid the cold children ofa
the mist', Swinburne's Tristram of Lyone.sse leaves^the reader 
with the sensation 'of a vast phantasmagoria,in which thw 
Seating of waves and the noise of winds, the light of dawns 
breaking on the water, and the floating web of stars, are 
jumbled together in a splendid, but inextricable confusionl 
Of Morris's Earthly Paradise he wrote!'As .you read on and the 
spell of the song lays hold of the mind, you seem indeed to 
have been wapt away into the dream of a ctrange land. Nothing 
is quite familiar, nothing mite stable.Before you drives a 
broken mist, through the rifts of -Vhich you catch glimpses 
of a changing and disconnected panorama- gold-p° earning palaces 
and grey weather-"be at en c a? ties ,groups of huntsmen driving the 
deer in the deep glades, terrible Icings frowning forward from 
their thrones. Warriors battlin,? within rinrs of fire,women
4wonderfully f°-ir c^l^in?; ~e-i to blind dooms. 1
It is significant how "-any of Llore's metaphors and 
similes are taken from natural jh^nomena, and endowed in the 
crucible of his "iind v;ith a vast cosmic dimension which is of
5
the very essence of Romanticism. Skies and seas and fire and
planets flash and gle?m through his imagery almost as much as
l.ilore, Shg.J"barge,£aaaga ]n f p.lf*
fap.-jb. 
m ,». m .
they d© in,.the.pages of those most inchoate of Romantics,Shelley 
and.Tvtaeia Thompsons But whereas in the poets we are frequently 
dixzied by the grandeur ef such images wheeling in almost 
ceaseless potion, in Here's ascetic prose, they burst in with 
the^beauty of an unexpected constellation upon a bare sweep of 
sky. Moreover, Mare's,use of natural phenomena in his imagery 
eaphasises not the permanence and solidarity and variety of the 
woild of sense, bit its transitoriness and illusion. These too 
will pas vs, and man will be left alone ..with the ultimate mystery 
ef things. ']?•££ we have"traversed many paths in the wanderings 
ef thought" and like Odysseus of old have reached an AEgean
island, where we know neither the rising nor the setting of the
1 
sun and doubt if there be any counsel for us.' No one can enter
2 
mortfully for the moment into the magic of the false illusion,
but he knows it for what it is, and like the Preacher can say 
of it, Vanity, vanity, all is vanity.At such times his language 
takes on the stately poignancy of I'cclesiastesjthe silver cord 
is loosed,the golden bowl broken, the pitcher broken at the 
fountain and the wheel broken at the cistern. More,too,seems to 
be seeking to pierce through the sjimbols of tangible things to a 
perception of the underlying mystery of life. He is like his 
own portrait of George Herbert returning through the Salisbury 
fields.1 It is an afternoon of early autumn,when the grey sunlight 
shimmers infehe air and scarcely touches the earth, brooding over
all things with a kind of transient peace. A country parson,after
—————————————————— 
1- More, Shelburne Essays 
2. Mere,Shelburne Bgsavs
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a day of music in the Cathedral and at the house of a friend 
is walking homeward. In his heart is the quiet, afterglow of 
capture, not unlike the subdued light upon -the meadows, and 
he kncwa that both are but for a little
This wisdom of the true awakening to the transience 
of all created thin&s is very different from the disillusion 
which cones upon the man who is deceived "by appearances, by the 
Mlarikiito a worship of the flesh, the theme with which More deals 
at length in his essay on Arthur Symons. There in the symbol 
of the Watcher King and the Dancing Girl he f indstepitemised the 
slow spiritual disintegration of the man who has yielded to the
spell of the false illusion, only to awaken to satiety and
2 
despair. Few men have a greater power than More to suggest
evanescence and change without introducing the coarses images 
of physical decay. The sense of corruption which broods over 
so much of More's thought is not of the body, but of the spirit, 
and has to be evoked through metaphors which are not of the 
palpable clay, but of invisible and intangible things raised to 
the plane of infinite and eternal powerKs.The, atmosphere of 
Symons' poems is one of 'evanescent reverie'-- — 'of indulgent 
brooding? their warp and woof are of the stuff of dreams woven 
by a mind that turns from the actual issues of life as a naked
body cowers from .e world is seen through a haze
l.More, Shelburne_lss.MSi.iV J P« 90 
?..More.~Shelburne Essays l,pp. 122-28.
5. Ibid., p. 130.
of abstraction, gli*nmeringly, as a landscape looms misty and
1 vague through the falling, fluttering reil of the rain! 'And
human nature is riewed through a like mist, a mist of tears 
orer laughter, as it may look to one who dreams deliberately
while tha heart is young and the haunting terror of the awaken-
that 
ing seems still something srhic can be held aloof at his own2 
sweet will 1 . Symons himself frequently compared the enigma
of beauty to the Mona Lisa's smile, withholding the joys it 
feigns to render up:
'Is there in Tantalus' dim cup , 
The shadow of water, nought beside?'
'The shadow of water' , echoes More, ---'There lies the pity
ef it all. Suppose the thirsty watcher of the play suddenly
pageant 
becomes aware that the ?iay is insubstantial shadows, and that
the cup of this world's delight which he longs to raise to
3 his lips is empty and holds only the shadow of water-what then?'
Individual examples fail to evoke the accumulatire 
effect of illusion which broods hearily over the earlier volumes 
of the Shelburne Es s ay s t T ac i 1 1 at ing from dream to nightmare 
with a strange phantasmagorial movement. The reader is seized, 
as More himself waaseized before the spectacle of nodern 
Socialism, with 'a kind of vague terror, as if (he) had strayed 
into a land swept by armies clashing ignor airily in the night
or had fallen into some dream of the streets of Troy where
4 friend and foe surged together under the same standards. '
Essays Vll,p.l91.
*?'
But although More dwells long and often on the confusion and
disenchantment ofi the world,he is master too of phrases that
ease 
bring serenity and final relist from its tension. The stanza of
Francis Thompson's Hound of Hearer;, in which thought and image, 
emotion and rhythm, are* in liberated and mighty accord' pulses
in the memory like the sound of a bell swaying amidst a waste
I '~ ——————————————————————————— 
of obscure waters'. Of Longfellow, Llore wrote: 'He himself, if he
did not, like Dante and his peers, build at the great cathedral 
of song, did add to it a fair and homely chapel, where also, to
one who comes humbly and reverently, the eternal ages watch and2 ————————————————————— "~
' 0r again there is a companion piece to the George Herbert
O
picture: 'I think of Vaughan as travelling his quiet rounds in 
his Silurian hills, with an eye open to every impression, and a
heart, like Thoreau's always filled with the waiting wonder uf the,"4 
dawn' •
These give a suggestion of a central peace amidst so much
that of necessity relates to the stresses and strains that form 
the dynamic of literature, 'vi/e are apt, says More, in an essay on 
Longfelloft, to take our poets too seriously, and search them for 
deep and complex meanings, and in so doing, f we often lose the 
inner serenity and unvexed faith which it is the mission of the
poet to bestow.Not the stress of our emotion or our intellectual 
rt t &»* measure of ours —- 
understanding,TutTather'the depth of our response to that word
of the exiled Dante,when, in the convent court, he was questioned
* 
as to what he sought—La pace, peace.
1. More. 
ore.^
^PS^ssr^^^'1"''
It may not be the mission of the critic to bestow such 
peace, tut if through the dissection and analysis of literary 
processes, he is able to "bring us into an attitude of acquies­ 
cence towards our world which is -founded neither on ignorance 
nor on a wilful refusal to face the facts of life as they 
actually appear, then it would seem to me that under such 
circumstances, criticism has achieved the highest purpose of 
art, to bestow upon toe reader the benison of man's lost harmony 
whereby he is purged of '-is individual selfishness and separ- 
ateness, and brought into a living and unbroken relationship 
withk his universe.
That J'ore vv?.c unable to sustain uninterruptedly this 
high standard of excellence not even his most bigote.d admirers
co ild deny. Supreme moments of literary insight are evanescent
experience 
even in the x&Slft of the creative artist, and more so with the
critic who works normally on the plane of t^.e discursive reason 
at whose cold touch of analysis visionary gleams arc wont to 
vanish into the light of common day. The greater part of the 
Shelburne Essays is merely efficient, with, from time to time,
recurrent hints of that determination to be precise which lore's
1 critics condemn as 'provincial', reservations, recantations,
9
ouestionings abound, as though the v.riter hesitates to be too
*
dogmatic, and thereby draws the rearer's attention all the more 
to the rigours and rigidity Vb.ich underlie the surface hesitation.
l.Cf.p. l«0.
More's so-called'provinciality' is, I believe, indicative of 
a far-deeper spiritual malaise. In his allegiance to the moral 
law he never wavered* on questions of conduct he held to the 
clear-cut distinctiens of his Puritan upbringing, and it is 
this decisiveness which lends to his sriticism that undertone 
which his opponents dismiss as merely harsh and crabbed. But 
on account <bf the intellectual climate of his age,he was 
unable to accxept those religious beliefs which should have 
given content to his moral code: for a living body 6f doctrine 
he could substitute, during the Shelburne Essays only that mood 
of Socratic scepticism which questions and reserves judgment. 
There is thus set up a conflict between his natural instinct 
to pass definite andl clear-cut .judgments and his intellect 
which seeks to hold judgment in suspense. Kazin is right when 
he describes More's style as 'an uneasy style, the styibe of 
an enormously learned man who had worked too hard to get
himself a style,as he had worked too hard all his life to
1 
attain a perfect faith and spiritual repose'. The effort to
obtain a style and the effort to attain a faith seem to me, 
in More's case, to be fandamentally one and the same,symptom­ 
atic of the inability of this learned and earnest and spirit­ 
ually hungry critic to digest the crumbs gleaned from so many 
tables in such a way that they might become a synthesised and 
and satisfying diet.Because More had to work out for himself
1. Cf.p .181
a philosophy of l ife , instead of being able to accept ready- 
to-hand some adequate corpus of beliefs, he failed frequently 
ti keep his eye on the object he was supposed to be describing 
whilst he strained after significances his subject coiild not 
always afford.
Professor Bonamy JDobre'e has giren an illustration 
of this in his Modern_Prose_St^;le_where he quotes More's own 
opinion t^.at'mere description,though it may at times hare a 
scientific ralue, is, after all, a rery cheap form of literature 
because 'too much curiosity of detail is likely to exert a
deadening influence on the philosophic and poetic contemplation
1 
of nature*. Side by side with this he sets a passage of More's
as an illustration of what More obriously considers a descript­ 
ion should be. f l submit',writes Professor Dobre"e,' that what 
happens when a writer eschews "mere description inrarour of 
philosophic *r poetical contemplation," is that he fails to be 
either philosophic or poetic,and gires us a portrait of himself. 
The only salration for any writer is to keep his eye onthe
object. If the object is a thrush,let him keep his eye on the
inward 
thrush! if philosophy,let him keep his*eye on philosophy! in
either instance, he may achiere art,which he will certainly 
not do if he keeps it on poetry.The passage, we need hare no 
£KXX, doubt, is an excellent portrait of Mr.More. He is an 
incurable romantic trying to extract more out of a definite
l.More, Shelburne Essays I,p.l2.
thing than that thing has to give, and he betrays this by his
of 
continual forcing the^note. To ray ear, though perhaps not to
others, Mr. More's style here is weak because it is false; he
is not speaking in his natural voice; there is falsification
1 
everywhere, a stringing together of word associations. "It is
the fateful summons once morej" Mr. More may have uttered it; 
we may doubt it,but we were not there to hear. We suspect that he 
said,"There's that bird again". Such a phrase,however,as"had 
come to have to my imagination the unreality and mystery of a 
dream of long ago" rouses profound suspicions. When we come to 
"the unceasing harmonies of nature" and "the endless drama of 
natural life" those suspicions are confirmed. It is phrase- 
making, for we feel that the endless drama of natural life is
2 
hardly exhibited by a thrush flitting about from bush to bush. 1
In his description of Prometheus Unbound,in which 
More is evidently seeking ti be fair to a form of beauty for 
which he himself in theory should feel little sympathy,he refers 
to the poem as f a magical incantation, under the spell of which
forms of fleeting iridescent loveliness float before his dream-
5 
open eyes'. The reader of Morris's The Ring Given to Venus
seeas to be standing,like the distracted youth in the poem, 
'by enchanted waters drenched in a magij: light, while dream - 
shadows flit before him, some terrible and some lovely, but
1.Cf.p. /gT
2.Bonamy Dobrl-e,Modern Prose Style, (Oxford at the Clarendon Press
1934),pp.70-71.
3.More, Shelburne Essays Vll,p.20.
the former pass with open mouths that emit no sound and raised
hands that ne»er strike, and the latter gleam only for a moment
1 
on the hillside and are gone'. Not only is there a falseness
of emphasis in the attempt to produce the atmosphere of 
illusion by piling up words that suggest unreality! there is also 
a certain self-consciousness about the procedure which suggests 
that More himself is torn between two or more attitudes to 
his subject. This uneasiness I can only put down to fear- 
fear of the strength of his own romantic urges which he sought 
to repress rigorously because he was afraid of the direction 
in which he saw they might lea^, whilst at the same time he
found a certain sensuous pleasure himself in dallying with
2 
words which carry a romantically charged association.
The Romantic in More nerer quite died, and numerous 
critics hare remarked about its sporadic resurgence. Middleton 
Murry has commented upon his romantic isolation! ' at first
sight he appears to be a scholar gipsy, wandering in a strange
3 
and hardly hospitalle land 1 . Kazin saw in him 'more than a
little of that "romantic imagination" which he came to abhor
4 , 
in others'. ludwig Lewisohn admittedphat 'the icy scholastic­
ism of temper which he affects if often broken by a cry as of
the heart and by the echo of a mystical experience, from the
5 
quality of which no man can withhold his respect.'
T.More, Shelburne Essays Vll,p.l08. 
2. Cf»pjp.iay.
5. The Dial, July -Dee. 1921, Vol. IXXltJ. Middleton Murry, 'Puritan
or Platonist' ,p.256.
4. Kazin, op. cU^. ,p.*£ 305. cf O pp. 306-207.
5. i.ewisofinTo^Tjcrt. ,p.429.
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His suppressed lore of the weird and marrel]ous throbs 
through his description of the land of Arthurian legend where 
'one may follow up some rirer ralley of many-changing charms 
till suddenly he comes out on the wide rocky moors,whose 
rastness seems more lonely than the sea, and whose mysteries 
hare wrought an indescribable fear in the minds of men. 1 He
lingers loringly orer the names of places associated with
2 
Arthurian romance, Tintagel,Slaughter Bridge,Dozmare" Pool.
And in the essay on W.B*Yeats, after a scathing criticism of 
what se ms to him a decadent element in his poetry,More suddenly 
bursts out:If this is the poetry of defeat, it still retains 
a rision of pure beauty that is not without a message for those 
whose ears ring with the din of loud materialistic songs.Nay, 
I am not prepared to say that the poet of failure has not his 
own place in the chorus that chers and soothes us when,at rare 
intervals perhaps, we seek the consolation of Terse. How few 
of us there are who do not feel at tmes the v;anai lethargy of 
defeat steal upon us.It is not easy amid the sordid business 
of life,eren amid the strong calls of generous action when these 
are heard, to pay heed to the still small roices and in our 
moods of dejection there may perchance be some kinship to spirit­ 
ual things in this feeling of defeat, in this surrender to thei«_/
rague fleeting shadows that tremble on the inner eye.'
1.More, She 1 burne Essays _lV,p.5.
2. Ibid.,pp.5-7.
3»More, Shetburne_E&aaaa 1,pp.183-84.
This tremulous note of nostalgia which breaks from More's 
repessed romanticism betrays the intensity of his sympathy 
with the mood he condemns. In his essay on Fiona Macleod, 
he concludes on this note of half-conviction'Zt is wholesome 
at times to withdraw from the struggle for existence and 
wander by the lonely shores, where the sharpness of life's 
outlines is blurred by floating mists, and the voices of the 
world are lost in the lisp and clamour of the tides;where the 
hard sense of our individual personality dissolves into the
flux of vague impersonal forces, and the difficulties of
attained 
thought and the pangs of unzaaiKd desire are soothed into
inconsequential reverie.Especially when the heart is fatigued 
by the harsh intrusions of science and a scientific philosophy,
it is good t© seek refuge in surrender to an impressionism
1 
that acknoWledges no law of control'. But in his innermost
heart he still knows that such an escape is illusory, and 
man's identification withlthe natural beauty he so loves will 
only leave him more closely bound in the toils of the natur­ 
alism which,under the guise of modern science,Jiim±flt has laid
2 
its chill touch on the human spirit. And so ,even inlthe more
intense passages in More's essays there is frequently a flat­ 
ness and lack of conviction,and in his prose,as a whole,a 
reserve which his critics mistake for coldness and sterility. 
But this is not the reserve of a man incapable of imaginativer, pp. 141-4 2.———————
2. Ibid.,Ioc.j5.it..
passion, but of one who had stifled such passion in his attempt 
to attain to that detachment from the world of Bphemeral "beauty 
which he thought necessary to an apprehension of truth.
Such a suppression, howerer, c«uld not be complete 
exigent
until he had substituted for the desires of the natural world*
some faith which could so sublimate emotion and intellect alike 
that More was no longer haunted by memories of that tangible 
beayty he had sacrificed to win it. His problem, to me, was that 
of Gerald Manley Hopkins.Hopkins too had been haunted from his 
jtouth onwards by a fear that his attachment to beauty was inordia 
nate, and all his life, he sought to integrate his Graying for 
beauty in a spiritual vision which at once included and trans­ 
cended the physical. At first he was tempted to relieve the 
tension between the divine and the natural by denying the natu­ 
ral world, and plunging into an austere asceticism. From this, 
he happily passed to a new and truer vaision of the world and of 
man in which he saw 'God in all things and all things in God 1 . 
'In this the goal of poetry and religion are one, whether itlis 
named an imaginative or a sacramental view of nature. And for 
both the unity sought is one that contains the true tension of 
oppositesS'. Hopkins' greatest po^ry is delicately poisedM 
upon the paradoxical tension of attachment and detachment, a 
polarity always hard for the artist to maintain, and especially 
for Hopkins who strove to maintain it at the highest pitch
The true aystics of all faiths hare been acutely conscious of 
this tension, yet hare attained through it to peace with God 
and themselres. Eckhart would declare that he who so does not 
attain to being one with God in spirit is not a really spir­ 
itual man. But to "be one v«ith God in spirit is also to be in 
harmony with God's nature, whi«hi includes the natural world
redeemed by imaginative rision,and no longer dreaded or wrong -
1 
ly desired through selfish attachment.
'Hopkins' ,adds I'Anson Fausset, 'was not a mystic. He was 
rather a noble scholastic, in whom pride of intellect and intense 
physical sensibility strove for a concordat under the unrelated 
control of a lofty spiritual will. The Jesuit discipline con­ 
firmed and fixed this straitened complex in his being. Whether 
a less hard discipline or a richer or at least wider human 
experience would hare released him into a deeper unity, it is 
isximpossible as it is useless to conjecture. He
was of those who are compelled to take the Kingdom of Beauty as
2 
of Heaven by violence, because there was division in his soul. '
What was true of Hopkins might be equally well applied to More 
in his twofold relationship to nature and the supernatural, and 
the intensity of the inner conflict made him the more critical 
of the romantic solution of pantheistic reverie. This explan­ 
ation alone to me accounts for the apparent mal ai s e underlying 
that outwardly calm and self-sufficient style, the sudden bursts 
of descriptive beauty, the lapses into an emotional falsetto. 
the increasing strength and integrity of his style in The
1. Ibid., p.W2. 
2 Ibid.,
3.QI
Breek Tradition and The New .Sh.elbnrne Essays,~ what ever our 
attitude to their contents.
But before More c«uld attain to a co-ordinated 
ahd coherent body of beliefs, he had to examine the grounds 
of the prevailing thought and conduct. The Shelburae Essays 
are primarily an account of More's search for the good life 
as he hpped to find it embodied in the work of writers of 
various periods. Finding instead a marked deterioration in 
nan's conception of life,he had also to consider the forees 
at work undermining the humanist ideal of the complete man. 
The Shelburne Essays are thus also a study of those modern 
heresies which have made the very faith for which More was 
seeking impossible and which are themselves the result of 
the breakdown of an integrated philosophy of life. More had 
himself been infected by some of them at the outset of his 
career, and although he had, by the time of The Shelburne 
Essays,passed through that phase,he saw it was necessary to 
expose the danger which he felt they constituted if he hoped 
to carry his contemporaries with him on his journey t® spirit­ 
ual health.But to exorcise the demon of romanticism was only 
to make room for other demons yet more menacing,unless he 
could offer his age an alternative attitude to life.Within 
the Sh eiburn e E s s ay s themselves, there is a changing outlooks 
at first Hinduism seems to hold the solution of More's pro­ 
blem of the good life, both for the individual and society, 
then a Platonism retaining certain elements of Oriental thought,
But neither cauld satisfy completely his ©wn spiritual seed 
nor could it therefore hold the answer to the dilemma of 
modern society. At the end of The Shelburne Essays, More's 
attempt t© find the good life by the light of purely human 
knowledge is left unfulfilled;the seeker must remain in his 
scepticism. Only later in The Greek Tradition is it consum­ 
mated in his new found faith, and only in the light of that 
final answer to his problem can we fully appreciate the 
direction in which his thought was moving in The Shelburne 
Essays themselves.
(TV.) Illusion and Conduct in the Shelburne Essays*
'Though strictly censidered, life is but a web of 
illusion and a dream within a dream, it is a dreaa that 
needs te be Managed with the utmost discretion if it is 
not te turn into a nightmare. In other words, however
much life nay meek the Metaphysician, the problem ef
1 
conduct remains. r
The Shelburne Essays always seem to me to fall into 
roughly two sections. The one comprises the first fire volumes* 
the other, the remaining six, each offi which, with the except­ 
ion of Series Siren, has a specific title reflecting the 
dominant the^ae. Series Six, Seven, Light and Nine, and the 
New England essays ©f Series Eleven fern a clesely related 
and coherent core of theught. Mere's ®wn criteria ef values , 
are outlined in Series Six,Studies in Religious Dualism.in 
which the traditional dualism ef Christian and classical 
literature is contrasted with the remantic dualism of man
and seciety which Mere and Babbitt feund in its most influ-
2 
ential fer^ in the writings of Rsusseau. The subject of
this clash ef dualisms became the spring-beard for Mere's ±& 
thought in the four succeeding veluwes mentioned above. 
Series Seven^which has n© title, -light welJ be called,
1.Eabbitt, Rousseau and R- -nanticis-n ,-p.XV. ———————
2. IMd. pp.'2.^-31, and T^ore, Shelburne^E^sjs VI,pp. 214-41*
with Series Eight, The Drift of Romanticism. In b«th relumes 
Mere deals with authors of various shades ef the Romantic dye. 
Most ef the essays concentrate upon purely literary topics, 
although in thfe essays an Nietzsche, Huxley, Newman and Lewes 
Diekinson, he touches upon the adjoining territories of science, 
philosophy and religion. In the last essay of Series Eight, 
More gathers up the various Humanist principles and precepts 
scattered throughout the previous essays into a co-erdinated 
"body of theught, and then in the Ninth Series, applies these 
conclusions to the existing political and social situation 
both at home and abroad. This volume,Aristocracy and Justice, 
might equally well be called_The Drift of Humanitarianism,for 
here More isolates this one phase of romanticis:?} and considers 
its effects, including the inevitable reaction it evokes, in 
politics, economics, sociology, education and religion. In 
the first part ©fl Series Eleven, he retraces his footsteps 
and returns t© a study ef the effects ef Romantic ideology 
combined with Galvinist theology on the later New England 
writers in contrast to the militant Puritanism of their pre­ 
decessors, tracing the development ©f the New England soirit
1 
to its logical conclusion in Henry Adams. Series Ten,en the
ether hand, is a study of wit as the intellectual antidote 
to the excesses ©f Romantic emotionalism, and for the greater 
part, looks back t© the sardonic humeurs of the Eighteenth 
17
Century, although Mere finds, side by side with the satiric
rein in many «f the leading writers ef the day the beginnnings
flower 7 
ef an idealistic eptisiism which was te fisraiixk later into
the doctrine ef the perfectibility af man, and the Romantic 
cult ef Natural Goodness and the Noble Savage.
Of the three volumes ef Jhe Shell3urne_Lssays t the 
second, The Sceptical Approach to Religion, is a summary ef 
the essential findings of the six volumes of The Greek Tra­ 
dition, and is best considered in relation to them. The re­ 
maining two, The Person of the Absolute, and On Being Human , 
take up still mere modern develp^OMents ef naturalism, although
both volumes centain ^iiscellaneeus essays whase affinity is
1 
with the niscellaneaus material of the first five vslumes.
Apart from the radical change- in his attitude t® Christianity, 
there is n© break in the continuity af lore's thought between 
%he Shel"burne Essays and the Hew Shelburne Essays.*
The tws main categories into which the whole range 
of the essays falls csrrespond to the two types of criticism 
te which Mare hiwself refers in the Preface to Series Eight. 
'There is a kind ®f criticise that limits itself to looking
at the thing in itself ®r at the parts of a thing as they
2 
successively stride the mind. This is preperly the way of
sympathy, and those who choose this way are right in saying 
thatu it is absurd or merely ill-tempered to dwell en what 
is ugly in a work of art, or false, ®r incomplete. But there
1 • Vide Append ix A.
is a place alse far another kind ®f criticise, which is net s® 
nuch directed te the individual thing as to its relations with 
other things, and t® its place as cause @r effect in a whale 
gr®up sf tendencies* The highest criticism sh«uld hold the 
two ^ethads in a perfect balance, but that his ®wn essays 
fall short «f this ideal Mere is ®nly t®@ ready t© admit. By 
the time ®f Seies Eight he has veered away fr®» the first t®-
wards the secend methed. The general drift of ideas resulting
ears 
the spread ®f Re»anticis?s appMK t® him s® destructive
A*sr*trK«fcfcnic) ef all he helds west dear that he is moved to 
study t,he wider relatm®ns existing between vari®us phases »f 
the w®vefflient rather than t® concentrate on individual writers 
and their werks, arad incidentally t© judge them, not fer 
their intrinsic quality^but fer the tendencies they represent
The firdt five volumes ef SheT.burne -^ssays and 
the miscellane©us essays ©f The _Dem@n g.f the Absolute, and On 
Being Human represent the fomer method of criticism: they 
are cencerned with looking at the thing in itself. More stud­ 
ies a number ©f authors from different periods, considering 
each for his individual merits and achievements. It is true 
•f the Shelburne Essays as a whole that the authers Mere 
chesses are net always the best ©r even the second best «f 
writers. More, hewever, considered it part ef the critic's 
task t© rescue little-kn@wn authers fro^n ®blivi®n.
1.More, _
2.Mere, Shelburne Essays. Vll,p.26.
Sometimes it happened that those wriers bore some resemblance1 A 
te Mere himself, just as Matthew Arnold, whilst advocating that
the critic should make known thejbest that has been thought 
aVnd said, net infrequently chase to write about little-known 
and insignificant writers, usytally because they bore seme 
resewbance ts his fwn temperament and outlook. More generally, 
especially in the volumes representing the second type of crit- 
eism^Mere d^cribes, he seems te me t© select second-best 
authors because they bear a fundamental relation t© some trend 
in their century which he seeks to emphasise, as in the case 
of an Arthur Syrens, a Louisa Shore @r a. Fiona Macleed. Frequent­ 
ly this relation to the intellectual climate of the age emerges 
more clearly in a lesser writer than in the forecast writers ®f 
the day in whom genius and originality overlie what they held 
in common with the rest of their generation.
With the transition frira the first to the second
method of criticism, there is, as More himself suggests, a
authors 
change of technique. In the later volumes,wherfliaatiKX are
considered -^ore as representatives of the age, T/Tore is interest­ 
ed above all in the development of their thought. In the 
earlier volumes, he studies each individual as a separate 
entity. T.Ve are frequently ^iven a detailed description of the 
appearance nn^ habit-? o^ t>p nen and ivorp-n with v;ho rn he deals. 
In PutnaVsffor Msrch 1904, a prepos of t^e essay on 'The Vicar
1 I
of Morwensto?/' ,H. S.Krans draws attention to lore's successful
use of the literary pottrait. 'Here the critic scans an author's 
work far revelations biegraphical and ;: ay cho logical, and studies 
circumstantially what is recorded of his life, his ancestry,his 
kinsfolk and acquaintance,his physical peculiarities, and his 
whole environment in time and place. The data provided by these 
studies then undergo a rigorous process of selection and fresh 
combination, untill the irrelevant disappears, and only what is 
typical and significant of the author's temperament, mind and 
character remains. And the result at last is a reincarnation
of the wan who stands before us,as it were, in the flesh and
1 
attached on all sides xx to the earth.' This was a technique
which Mare used less and less as his work matured; in it, it 
is easy to see the influence of Sainte-Beuve. It is,however, 
a method which is liable to become stereotyped, if everdone, and 
it is to the advantage of More's work as a whole that he came 
to use biographical detail much more flexibly, often almost 
imperceptibly,as his mastery of his craft became more sure.
His inain aira for the first five series of the 
Shelburne Essays is su-vied up in an interesting passage in 
the essay on Fanny Burney in connection with the famous Diary, 
'Just now I should like, if possible, to convey tc the reader 
txxtkKX something ef the exhilaration I have myself brought 
from this renewied acquaintance with so full and sprightly 
a book. I understand, of course, the difficulty «f that task. 
To those wh« do not already know the Diary what notion can be
TTFuTnair'~s~Monthly, voTTT, N oturner,lfirch""l9077THrs7Kraas, 'Three ii£UISSE_5————iiJLDistinguished Critics*, ],p.754.
given in a brief essay of that overflowing story of sixty-two 
years and to those who hare read it, how dry and inadequate 
any sunary will see**.' Yet, with the latter class, at least 
there is a ground of assurance. It is good to recall in soli­ 
tude the speech and acts of a dear friend; it is f^od alse to 
sit with ©ne who has known him and to talk over his generous 
ways. In the interchange of Memories the striking events of 
his life come out «ore prominently, and his clever words ticklr 
the ears again as if newly spoken; we pass frem one point to 
another ef his character as if, in jaurneying over a fair coun­ 
try, we were carried by some seven-league boots from hilltop 
to hilltop with ne care for the humbler valleys where the pros­
pect is concealed. Such a dialogue, indeed, I should wish these
in which 
essays t® be -- a^dial ague ^ taabEHd, the reader plays an equal -part
ELlilL the writer in cherishing the memory of the grea^omejitg and 
persons of our literature. T
Whilst focussing our attention on the personal habits 
and characteristics of the authors who fill his pages, More never 
lets us forget thar they are novin^ against the wider background 
If history. In the edition ff Putnam's Monthly for March 1907 there 
is a note in the Lounger section, containing miscellaneous items 
of interest (including a portrait ef More in early middle life), 
which reads as follows: 'Mr. Paul More has already four volumes ©f 
Shelburne Essays to his credit and be will have many wore before 
he has finished. It is M. Mare's intention to ^.ake a library of
IV,pp. 39-40.
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these essays, which will virtu ally corer the histary of
literature froR $he Eighteenth Century.' If it was
Here's intention t© co^p^.e a histsrical survey «f literature 
during the last two hundred years, his a.mbitiomx regained 
unfulfilled, There are such large ©missions and s© much 
ebviaus everlapping that te f*ll«w ehren®l»gically the 
various movements of thought which he describes is t© lose 
the central significance ©f More's criticise, the search 
for the idea] of the good life, and the incidental analysis
afAtnSt
ef the causes militating ^its realisation in his ©wn day. 
"oreever, his concern with this central Idea led him back 
beyand the limits ©f the last tw© centuries to Ancient Greece, 
to India, to the Elizabethan Age. Through all the essays there 
run, hewever, certain recurrent theses giving an organic unity 
of their own, ancl linking history itself with the l?rger cadre 
•f eternity.
The raost prominent of these theses in the earlier 
volumes of the Sh^eroiAr-ie.JiSL.^^^ is that »f Imaginative illusion.
We have alreadv seen I2p>^itt ' duse of the rjhrase, as it came ts
2 
hi?a fr©ri Joubert, in seeding to assess the highest for-ns of art.
Mere ha^ taken the sa^.e phrase fr©m Joubert as early as 1904, 
and raade it the motive of his essay on 'The Two Illusions 1 in
which he expressed his attitude to rn idea which mas to be of
3particular censemience in the devejjop-.ent of his criticism.
The artist,' after focussin^ our attention upon the manifold
1907,p.-|rfc.
' x ' pp * 122 "24 •
An
appearances cf natural phenomena(jtfe»K«**il|$, their beauty, 
shape and colsur,suddenly, like a magician with his wand, 
wares aside the panorama he has created, the 'illusion 1 ef 
the imagination, and rereals behind the world of appearances 
an abiding Reality. The wise man is he who is aware ef both 
the phantasnag©rial aspect ef nature,i.e. ef illusisn, and 
•f the hidden reality which ultimately supercedes it. This 
is true disillusion, the uncynical disenchantaent ef the sages 
of all times wh® hare penetrated through outward shew te 
the inner meaning ef the universe,and is in direct centrast 
te both the false lllusien by which raan yields te the allure­ 
ments ef the phenemenal world as though they represented 
the ultimate reality, and t® false disillusion, the final
f!i
desperate awakening to the /ptiness which underlies their x
1 2 
superficial glamour- Beth Babbitt and Mare feund that quality
ef imaginatire illusion present par excellence in the work of 
Shakespeare, especially in the scene from The Tempest where 
Prospers, haying eveked befare the eyes of the layers the 
magic spectacle of the wsrld of appearances, makes the illus­ 
ion vanish into thfn air, whilst likening its insubstantiality 
te the transience ©f all created things.
In the essay ©n'The Twe Illusions' in the First 
SeriesjMore had sought to show the effects of false illusion 
upcn the creative arts in an ^esay on Arthur Syraons.Here to®
2." SIr?!"rnc_BS8aatB Il,pp.24-?.5 f 114| cf. Vlll,p.292.
we see most clearly the connection of the. theme with 
Oriental thought which was still exercising a powerful 
influence upon More's imagination. Nature is Maya .the
. /
world of appearances, the eternal feminine who attracts 
men by her beauty,"but who hides from them her true nature.
She is like the dancing girl in the Hindu metaphor, dis-
1 
playing her charms before the Watcher King. The emd of
such absorption in the delight ©f the senses is a sudden 
revulsion ®f feeling and the disceyery that all is vanity. 
To the false sense of peace whieh comes from the gratif­ 
ication of desire succeeds an agony o.f despair, the ver­ 
tiginous frenzy of the man who finds himself suspended 
above the eternal abyss. Only to the man who recognises the 
deceitful wiles of nature and who sees beyond te the true 
responsibility of-man in such a universe can came the true 
peace of Nirvana, the purging away of the passienate desires 
that rend the soul ®f man, and the absorption of that which 
is eternal back int© the all-embracing source of Being. - 
George Maclean Harper in an article on 'More' s 
Shelburne Essays' sees in More's concern with the relation 
of illusion and disillusion the dominant idea of the first 
four volumes of essays, c©louring his attitude to every 
phase of life. Faith is S'that faculty of the will, nayster- 
ious in its source and inexplicable in its operation,whieh 
turms the desire of a man away from contemplating the fitful
f.More. ShelFurne JSssJiys""! Tp«
ehamges ef the wArld toward an ideal, an empty dream it may 
T>e, er a mere name, ef peace in abselute changelessness ' . 
And art is »ethi»g "mere than a mede ef 'eentemplating the 
fitful ehamges ef the werld'.
teaches ', says Harper ef Mere, 'deals «hie|ly 
with the Mat shadewy deeeptiens with which humanity appeases 
itself,- with the lust ef the flesh, and the lust ef the eyes, 
and the pride ef life. Musicians, painters, and peets d® "but 
deck with flewers the derated victim «f perpe'tual change, d« 
but beguile us t» admire "this eyer-shifting mirage «f »ur 
wtrldly life" We may admit nenehalantly eneugh that art finds 
her fareurite pigment in the iris ef «ur dreams, but Mr. M«re 
asks us te lay aside «ur jaunty assurance and f»ll«w hiia ®n 
a jeurney which ?aay raake us blench. What if art herself be 
an illusien? T® Plate she was suspect. Augustine sttpped his
ears t« her reiee as t« a siren's reice. Philasephers and
Hindus 
aseeties, Greeks and ifeferjEws;, and alrnest the Tvh«le if anciemt
and mediaeval Christianity hare felt the eeld teuch «f this 
d«ubt^ It is n« mere passing msed with Mr, M®re, but an in­ 
dwelling, regulating master-th«ught, which dominates and in 
the end formalizes his c®ncepti®ns ef every subject, -the theught,
nalmest the degma, that art is but hthe dream ef a dream.
In many ways and places, here by implication, here again in a
subtle argument, and here a^ain in a Flash of frank abanden, but
ie"r"eT~Shelburnr"liiazs TlT7p~^49 ; cueted Atlantie Mgnthly,Qete- 
——— ber,1907,(tt.M.Harper,'Mere's Shelburne
Essays',p.563.
never at all with petulance er with bravado, he aanifes£s his 
conviction- or shall I say his suspicion- that beauty is i;7i- 
permanant and art deceptire.
' " The haunting dread. "he
.on the *tind that in accepting, though it be "but as a 
i the_beauty »f the world, we regain the dup'es of a sailing 
iJ.lusion.And something of this dread seems to rise to the sur­
face now and again in the works «f those who hare penetrated
1 
w»st deeply iat« art and life." 11
The ralidity »f Mere's application of his illusiin
8
the»ry t» the great geniuse/, t® Shakespeare and S»ph»cles and 
Dante, Harper calls i«t» frequent questi«n. The sense «f the 
i«rper»anenee «f the phen»*enal w«rld d«es not adequately ex­ 
plain f*r him the deeper m»ed »f peace, 'all passi»n spent 1 
which succeeds t« eren the m»st painful experience represented 
by great art. Par Harper,, at least,M®re had failed te emphasise 
sufficiently the obverse side of his illusion theory, that fcx 
the true, as opposed to the false, disillusion opens a door to 
the inner reality, and that only through an awareness @f the 
ultimate decepti©n of appearances dees man attain te -3. perception
of these eternal values with which the great artists of all
n n&t^tr
times are concerned, ihe illusion theory was r^ore relevantA in 
its application t« the analysis of decadent literature, such as 
the poems of Arthur Sy-.ons rnd of Swinburne, and certainsonnets
7~0 c t eb eF
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• f Shakespeare, although even there , te Harper, the solemnity
of Mere's master-idea makes for a lack of detachment and grace. 
'Most of the topics whi^h have to be considered by a jeueral 
literary critic are, happily, not capable of being treated in 
this high tragic way. And the critic is doomed t© fall short
of the highest usefulness who forcibly applies an inappropriate
2 meth®d sr prores to be the servant ©f a system. '
It is not that Harper doubts the sincerity or
integrity of More as a critic, nor that heA uses the illusion 
theory purely as a derice for rsakimg a systematic approach to 
his varied subject matter. T® hroi the danger lies deeper than 
that. Such great preoccupation with the er.iptiness, the yertigo, 
the abyps yawnirg beneath the treacherous beauty of the world 
of art was bound ultimately to recoil upon it £ elf, and render 
itself null and void. As long as M©re's thought was coloured 
by Himdu philosophy, it seeded futile for him to raage throigfeh 
the pages of literature in search of the gsod life, for to the 
Western miiad such a quest is meaningless if the end of all 
things is the annihilation ©f the personality as we ceneeive 
of it. Before it cculd "be redly fruitful for the ,»estern 
is»agination,th£ illusion theory needed t ;> ba "j^ossed with 
Plato's philosophy of Ideas, whereby the phenomenal universe 
is sees, not as a deceptive phantasmagoria, but as a shadowy 
reflection of an eternal and supernatural Reality. From such
2. Ibid. ,p.566.
a synthesis it emerges, strengthened and reyitalised, as ©me 
ef the mest petent elements *f Mere's critical thought.
The ptwer of an imaginatiYe illusion which, .treables 
en the rerge ef true disillusion and thereby acquires axiracK 
aa added peignaney and intensity seems to Mere t« hare "become 
Increasingly rare during the Pest-Remantie periei. The majerifcr
•f Remaatie writers draw the irac inspiratiem fr«m a belief in 
the pantheistic aiffusiea 0f the dirine threugheut the universe 
in which they themselres seek t» be absorbed, t» the blurring
•f all distinetiens between diTime and human, true and false, 
illusien and disillusi®a. Three »r f«ur modern writers sfeand 
(But in Mere's eritieal surrey f«r their deeper penetrataem iate 
the nature ef reality amidst the superficial allurements ef 
time and sense. There is something ef this in Christina Ressetti 
with the haunting refraia ef her p«em,
'Passing away, saith the world, passing away',
2
seiaething ©f it in Emerson, though there it is clouded by a
nebuleus idealism which minimises the power ef CTI! and siag- 
aifies the majesty and slory ®f rtan,but ^ost of all, Mere finds 
it in Carlyle and Tennyson.
Mere's attitude t® Carlyle is one of those bewilder­ 
ing things in his essays wlien^suddenly.,,, amidst much that is
sensible, much that is logically and carefully reasoned., one
bursting 
finds his XBCsbtesiijc upon a \vriter with whsa he feels a strange
inexplicable sympathy just where one would expect him aest to
*
2«More,S
oPety S .1X JL j ^ 1 p • J-<^ < "s"says l,pp.71-73.
t© "be repel? ed, and we are left stru^-ling r o explain this 
affiiiV in ttr.f.s of Ms humanist ideology. But eften it is 
unconvincing: all we can say is that by seme strange whin of 
taste Mere is drawn t» an author,net because ef any cortiaon 
greund ef theught, but because ef the rery differences which 
separate the* frem each ether. Matthew Arneld weuld hare feund
to &e&
it diffieult^Much that was Oriental in Carlyle, yet it was the 
Oriental east ef g his insight that struck Mere. The Hebrew 
prephet Arneld might hare reee'gnised in him, but hardly the 
Hindu seer with his awareness of illusion, that 'sense far 
renoved from the ordinary bustling practical intelligence of 
.Britain and America, a ferar of aysticism, as we vaguely call 
it, which is spurned under that all comprehensive word un-Eng­ 
lish or un-American, which yet here and there creps up unacc-
1 
euntably in eur greater poets'. Freude's life ef Carlyle is
ts More full of the sense of spectral vision,although it is 
never mentioned as such.
'Net Bhartrihari himself, the philosopher ':ing of 
Oujjein, was nore hauntei by the bewildering phantasmagoric 
aspect of the world than this peasant-born son of icclefechan. 
Life in well-ordered England wa£ to Carljle a stru?~le with 
the "-vhirl'./ind an'i wild- pi ~in3 battle of fate". i"ery,vhere it 
wic the sanej whether at Oraij;enputtock or by the weltering 
i^ea or in the roaring streets of London, he was iswed by the 
neisy significance of the world swi~~:in^ threugh the void ©f 
space, by the frantic unrest ef the heart 0f man looking out
mpen the eternal repose of the hills, by the clamorous discard 
af human life beneath the great silences of the sky; ererywhere 
he mered among spectres and illusions'* Hew Mare can admit in 
Carlyle this sense' of true illusion an-3 dismiss a similar mead
*
ef ap,j,rehensi»a in Wardswerth as mere pantheistic rererie remains 
te me a mystery.If 'the sensr ®f "the inscrutable mystery of 
life" weighed on Carlyle in Lendon like"a hideeus nightmare"; 
it seems inacedible that Mere sheuld fail te reaegnise ia ene 
whe b»re almost incessantly'the burden of the mystery' a kindred
s«ul, f»r all the paraphernalia «f Gadwiniswi with whieh his
2
deeper insight was, at tha beginning «f his career, entangled.
TcHnys«n, ta@, iaspite «f his surrenter »n «ne side 
•f his sensibility, te the Victorian c»mpr«mise,had perceired 
the transitsriness af mortality and thraugh its reils ef illusion 
had caught glimpses af a lasting reality. 'It was a sense af 
estrangement frem time and personality whieh took possession 
af him at iateryals fram yeuth ta age's "a kind ef waking trance* 
in whieh^eut af the intensity ©f the consciousness of individ­ 
uality, the -indiriduality itself seemeo t© dissolre away int©
emdless being" in such a -K«y that it seemed "no extinctifn but
5 
the anly true life".'' This sense was present as early as his
jUTe*ile peem The Mystic, but it finds its fullest and Mast 
artistic expressian in The ldzlls_af_the^in& The risian ef the 
Grail whe* the Knights ar^e gathered at the R.u*d Table in 
the absence af the King 'is
- 50.
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sense of that dualisrt ef thai world and of the huaean soul 
beneath which the solid-seeding earth reels and dissolves away 
overwhelming with terror and uncewprehended impulses all but 
these purely spiritual to whom the earth is already an unreal 
thing.' Inspite of superficial resemblances , this, te Mere, is 
something rery different from the false illusion of semantic 
literature whereby the reality ef the auter universe is dissolve* 
into a dream. This false illusion keeps ^en fro*a an awareness of 
a central and abiding truth sbove the transiteriness of natural 
phenomena, and when at last the false illusion fades, men are 
left only with ^nightmare sense of the disselring universe, and 
beyond, the bottomless abyss.
Inti^tely connected with lore's use ef the Illus­
ion theory is the presence of yet another native infused threugh-
2 
out his criticism, that of the One and the Many- Here afeain, as
3 
we hare already seen , the original inspiratien cawe fraiuHindu
thsught.The One was the supreme Reality to be discovered only by 
the complete renunciation of Nature and the final translation to 
the bliss of Nirranaj the Many, the phenomenal world with its 
multiplicity ©f impressions and contending desires. The great 
Tien ef the ages hare been those who have attained to an intuition 
ef the abiding eal^r of the One, amid the shifting illusion of 
the Many. Not that they havejbeen unaware of the transience ®f life, 
Through the writings ©f a ^arcus Aurelius.an Aral el, a Pascal, ±x
Feerster t ep.eit ( P.£-^o»«,,e Htmiih mmon ^nse*..
*. Apr.1 iqAt,Vol.^ N«i«<v(,P.S. R»&h«ara&TAh Amen can HahwiK F-
-
tbrrts a terrer «f the erer yawning gulf of infinity whith
threatens t« swall.w all sten alike: a. feeling «f the brerity
2
•f life perrades the Greek Epigrams. All these whe hare drunk
deep «f the ehalice «f mertal life,whether it be Abd-ar-Rahman 
tr Septimius SeTerns,S»l»n »r Setrates, Samuel Jthasen «r Edisen 
hare always feuad at the bettsm the amari aliquid. 
T It is always the same stery, whether the word eeiaies frem the 
East «r the West, ff»m the tt«rth ®r the S«uth-always the bitter 
truth••!» this w«rld we hare m« abiding city; he wht thinks t» 
find peace ia this mtrtal life is pursuing a phaat»m m«re elus- 
ire tman the winds. It may be possible te aehiere a kind ef 
simulaerum »f happiaess by a dull'®r berine acquiescence in 
things as they are, er by an indefatigable actirity that leares 
«i« time f«r reflectitn, «E eren by a cunningly managed pursuit
•f w»rldly pleasures! but such a state is preearieus always,and
at best deT»id ®f the "high serisusness" demanded «f a genuine'3 
humanist'. But the true men »f genius hare something which «ff-
sets this disenchantment} an insight into
•a central peace subsisting at the heart 
Of endless agitatian'.^
Their w»rk takes en a new dimensien, the perceptien of unirersal
befere 
and eternal yalues, inta; which the impressions af the senses
fade iate nethingnessx »r are transmuted by the alehemy «f an
iateasire imagiaatire 1 experience,s® that they arex seen ej be
but a pale refleetien «f a pre-existent order ef Being. It is
re
. M«re , ITew She^.'&urne.^JiJs s ays 111, p. 19. 
More, Sh«Jbuftt& E»sayS VH, p.
characterised lay an insight into the stable, enduring, permanent 
yerities which are hidden from the man who is caught up in the 
unending whirl ef movement through which the natural xwerld 
eyelyes. Through the ^herburne Essays runs the intrinsic dualism 
•f the eternal and the ephemeral, reflected in the w»rk ef the 
yarieus authors whom he studies. On the ®ne hand are ranged these 
whs are aware ef their ewn part in 'the calm and preud
Procession of eternal things'; 
en the ether, these who can apprehend only the ehanees and changes
ef life, and are "buffeted about by restless passiens and the
12 34 
insecurity cf fate. Shakespeare, Dante, Miehel Angela, Virgil,
§ 
Hemer, all saw man's grandeur and superiority erer the rest ef
creation to reside in his dual destiny, and their perception was
6 78 
shared in a lesser degree by George Herbert, Tennysen, Carlyle,
9 10 
Christina Ressetti and Emersan . These less gifted with this
dirine insight racillate between their perceptiens ©f twe we rids.. 
Byren had something ef .the older sense ef the illusien of life
which his generation was in danger «f lesing,but Ain an age which
fclso 11
was -le sing its faith in the old hereie passiens; in Keats, an
^
aliaest Elizabethan sense ef the brerity of life and the relent-
lessness ef nature was te Mere centaminated by the ccntewperary
12 
Moed ®f sentimentalisEi; Blake had at snce something ©f the
l.Mere. Shelburne Essays 11, pp. 24-25.
S.Ibid.p.llS. 1°' M» re »§MIb_urnej!iS.SM:s l»pp. 
S.Mere^Shel'burHe Essays 1, pp. 206-207. 70-73. 
4 » Mere , Shelburne^ Eg say's 11, p. 113.
5. Ibid> t p. 114,197-98. 11. Mere, Shelburne Essays 111,
6. More, Shelburne Essays IV.pp.gag&S 89-90. ~"ppT167-75
" 12. Me re. ShelburneE "esays
7. More, fTHFTprne flgsqyB"Tll.m) .86-94.,
8. Mere, Shelburne jjssayAa^gBT l f pp.86|97
9 tMore, Sneiourne Assays 111, pp. 127-33.
spiritualvrisien ®f the early Hindu philosophers and the
1 
intense egotism of the Romantic, whilst in many ef the lesser
2 5 45 
poets, Lemgfellew, Arthur Symens, Francis Thompson, Dewsen,
an awareness ef the unirersal breaks only intermittently 
through their absorption in the local and parti«ular. These 
least gifted with a spiritual insight,en the ether hand, 
achiere a unity ef a sort lay repudiating any principle ef 
permanence and eeatrality in eemmunian with which they to* 
•ight know the true meaning «f silenee and inner peaee,and
here M«re places many •£ the 'Moderns' who can see in life
6 
nothing but incessant moreaent and flux: Swinburne,Walt
7 8 9 10 
Whitman, James Thomson, William Morris, Nietzsehe, James'11 
Joyse» all are rotaries af the Many.
• W
As long as More was influenced "by Oriental thought,f
as in the first four Y®lumes ©f the Shelturne Essays, he saw 
the impressions of the Many as necessarily false and deceptirE, 
to be reaoun«ed by the discipline ef ascetieism se that ®ne 
Might e«me to an unimpeded censciousness of the One. But with 
the transitien t© Platenism,he came to regard the werld of 
natural fhen9»ena,net as essentially eril,but as imperfect in 
contrast to the eternal werld ©f Ideas ef whieh it was a
l.More, Shelburne Ess g.yslV . p2S9 - 58 . 10. Mere, Shelburne
2«Mere, 5"h'elburne_ Essays V, pp. 156-57. Essays Vlll.'pp.
3. More, Shelburne Essays 1, pp. 157-40.
4. More. Shelburne Essays Vll,pp. 157ff . EssaysHrPP. 91-92.
5. Mere, Shelburne EssaysX, pp. 285-91. *
6. More, She Iburne -Es s ay s 111, pp. 10^-16. 
7«More, ghe Iburne Ess ay s IV, pp. 203-207.
e .More, Shelburne Es_say_s_ V,pp .191-92. .More, gh.e Ibu rn e "Us s ay s Vll, pp. 101-102.
mere shadewy replica.
The wise wian accepts "both the impressions of the 
Many and these rarer glimpses inte the nature of the One. The 
supreme neality is rerealed te hr«,hewever, enly in dim and
haunting risitatiens, and t© remain true t® such an insight
d 
amid the selicitati®ns ef the senses' denan^ a constant bracing
• f the whole "being. This is the essenee ef Platonic dualism, 
as opposed to the sterner Hindu emphasis upon renunciation 
ef the natural. The Buddhistic insight into the illusion and 
transience ef the werld was,t® Babbitt, preduetire ef a deep 
humility,but te Mere, as he grew increasingly aware ef the 
power ef Plat«nisis te satisfy his own spiritual needs, it seemed 
that it required an eren deeper humility te accept the tw» 
terms »f the human dualism withaut seeking te eliminate one ia 
fareur ®f the ether. The Platanie 'aristecrat', the man ef 
charaeter, was he whe could held the various faculties ef his 
nature in a true balance, s® that the higher Reasen whereby 
he was linked te the werld ef eternal Heality, the realsi of 
Being, might rule erer both the persenal emetions, the thymeeiAcs 
eerrespending in man t® the phenomenal werld ®f Becoming in
nature, aad the instincts,reeted in the dark irratienal sub- 
literature 
stratum of Nen-Being. And in Pest-Renaissance^,it seems te me,
Mere recognises three stages', (l) the Humanistie stage where the 
stress is en the whele personality @f nan existing in a just 
and har»»ni®us balance ef the faculties, (ll) the Reaantic stage 
in which already the thvmeeides. the spirited or egeistic element
are in rebellion against the higher Reas.n, and seek, the 
supp.rt »f the instincts, and (ill) the_PfAlaEMMatttl€ stage 
where the whele personality is surrendered t» the free plajr
•f the instineti, the passire rictim «f the unregulated images 
which fl»at up fr«m the yet-uafathamed gulfs «f the subliminal.
iixxxxxxxxxxxxx "xx
(1) 
B«th in life and art, th* Man wh» has attained t» an
apprehension ef the One manifests it in his esncern with char- 
is distinctire ®f 
aeter, that which iinkx *ian Jest in se far as he is human, in
«pp«siti*n te the sway ef passi«n which links man t« the rest 
ef the animal oreatien. The central saatire ef Humanist criti­ 
cism is the importance «f a right cenceptien sf character b«th
•
in life and art, nanifesting itself in a caneern with conduct*
The artist wh® succeeds in creating «rder amidst the 
manifeld iiapressisns of the senses d®es se by the exercise
•f the 'inner check', the prehibitire faculty which h«lds
in abeyance the canflicting appetites in fareur ©f the working
• fnthe ethiaal imagination, i'he fam®us phrase which became the 
rallying-ery ®f the Humanists,is in itself the key te their 
eeneeptisn «f the rile ®f character in art. G«ntrary t© pap­ 
ular apinion, Hindu literature, fr««i which the phrase ariginally 
came/is rich in its emphasis upen the importance .f character. 
Man, although intellectually impotent to explain and rationalise 
^is experience,is morally responsible; upon his csnduet in the
present world depends his karma, his fate im the next life. 
Both the grandeur and the tragedy of man arise from this .par­ 
adox of his human situation, an insight shared fey the great 
tragedians of Ancient Greeee. The keener a man's awareness 
of the ideal of a rounded ajtd centripetal character, the 
keener his awareness of the forces within him opposing sueh 
an ideal. The great tragedies of all times hare shown men «f 
strtng eharatter,l»«ked in Isattle with the emewy withia, beiag 
drirea t» despair and fikally shattered by state extess in their
•wn nature. Su«h a ««neept is indeed full «f pr«f»u»d dramatic 
pctentiality. It is Shakespeare's e am® en t ration up»n character
which serres tc lift his plays-, in Mere's sight, cut cf the rut
2 
cf Renaissance drama. His plays, like his contemporaries, are
frequently marred "by needless intrigues and unirersal "butchery 
whieh bear ne legical relatiam t® the Main theme and degrade 
the artistic enjeyiaent ©f the hearer, but through all the 
surface crudities ribrates his intense c®neentratisn upen a 
single passion, magnified 'until it assumes the encrmity of
a supernatural ®bsessisn and the bearer is shattered by the
3 
excess ®f his cwn emeticn. 1 The interest cf a King Lear or
* Ma.eb eim i e s 'in the excess of passi»n and not in any un-
raTelling of a tragic nodus? it is a drama of character and
4 
not of plot. '
l.More, Shelburne Essays 11>PP«159. 
2,Ibid.,p.24. 
3.Ibid.,p«22.
Jacobean drama, en the contrary, merited the charge ef 
immorality made against it by its Putitan critics, no/en account 
of the coarseness ef the passions depicted, but because of its 
failure to bring out the meral responsiblity Of man. The stories 
of Euripides are fully as -violent and morbid as those of Beau- 
wont an« yietcher, but the real theme of the elassaeal plays is 
not the passion itself, but the personality or character who 
suffers it. With the loss ©f the sense of eharaeter t® lead a 
semblance of unity to the story, imaginatire freedom in the 
romantic drama of Beaumont and Fletcher disintegrated inte mere 
licence. The withdrawal ef the inner cheek results in art in 
the same confusion as it dees within the indiridual conscious­ 
ness. 'The real meral indictment under which they lie', says 
More of the Jacobean playwrights, 'is rather the more central 
charge that in ignoring that element of our being which stands 
apart from the passions as a gorerning power, they loesed the 
bond ef character, remering fr©m conduct the law of cause and 
effect and leaying human nature as a mere bundle ©f unrelated 
instincts '----- 'We understand a thing as we see a principle of 
unity at work within or behind a changing group of appearances.
E We understand human nature in the sa.ue we,/; we may in a manner——— . T_
--- undcrst and only _character . '
The cause ef this loosening conception ef character 
More found in the failure of the Catholic Church to supply a 
central law of character in place ef its decaying discipline.
are
Tnreugheut the Middle Ages, a peried fer whieh M«re nerer shewed
1 
much predileetiem, the emphasis ef the Chur«h had be CM upe»
ri«arieus salratien, te the ex«lusie» ef aay deetritte which 
eneeuraged man te rely «n his ewn pewer ef self-«entrel, such 
as Greelc philesephy had effered. in the Hippelytus.ef Euripides, 
the human seul is shewn as standing 'naked and unassisted in the 
midst ef great "buffeting*, daememie powers', fighting fer pessess-
ien «f itself, and happy »r miserable in accordance with its
i 
ability »r iaablity te discriminate amongst the 'infinite salieit
2 
atieas «f the ether werld 1 . That this might well appear an «ver-
simplifieatiea »f Mediaeral Christianity, Mere was prepared te 
admitj the Chureh had had its great saints and mysties, had made 
en the whele fer right cenduct, and abere all, had naurished the 
imaginatien with infinite treasures of beauty and fed the emat- 
iens with celestial raptures. 'Yet after all is said, it remains 
true that when ecclesiastical autharity was broken by knowledge 
and scepticisT, the soul was left with its riches of imagination
and enetien, but with the principle of indiridual respsnsibilitv
3 
discredited and the fibre of self -geverraaent relaxed. '
The lack af stress on character at the time of
the Renaissance was ceunterbalanced in some measure Tqy the 'Ref ©rel­ 
ation seeking ta restore the emphasis upon mart's ^oral responsib­ 
ility, but the interaction ef the two currents w^s always complex 
and net least so in England where, in the religious
n
2. Mere, Shelburne Essays X,p.26. 
5. Ibid. ,pp7^^77
nlX7ppT7 7^7 8 ; V , pp
the otntest between Catholicism and Prrtestantisre soan yielded 
t« the eppesiti«n «f Anglican e«»pr«mise and the extreme indiv­ 
idualism cf the Puritaws. Although 3I»re's persanal sympathies, 
mere particularly in his, later years, are with the Amglican eaa- 
prcmise, as appears in his w«rk in e»njun«ti*n with F.L.Cress, 
he pays high tribute t» the centrfbutiens »f Puritanism te Sag- 
lish literature in.restering an adequate e«ncepti»n »f eharaeter. 
A writer in the Berue des Deux Ifandes had s»ught t» prtre that 
Puritan ethies had had a staiteaing effect ®n English letters 
in c«»paris«n with,the greater 7»«ral freedom jf modern Paris. 
But te M«re, as a histerieal phensmenen, Parisian nsn-Herality-, 
like Beau«»nt and Pleteher's variety ©f n®n-iaerality, is Merely 
transitory, whilst Puritan ethies are in the great tradition sf 
uniTersal ralues,the allegery »f Bunyan's H»ly War depending 
like the Hippalytus »f Euripides up®n a sharp division of g*ed
and eril^the -pereeTjtien »f the eternal dualisa cf eharaeter aad
2
passion.
That man's attenti©n sh«uld ence more "be directed t« 
the aentra.! pr»t>lem of human life was all the more i«p»rtant
during the Seventeenth Century beeause ef the new ?a®ressents
3 assailing man's pssitien in the universe. It is interesting
t« netiee that of the -men ©f the Seventeenth Century wheia M«re
treats in his essays, the «a.j«rity are outstanding fer their
ehara«ters as much as f®r their-works,whether they are Anglicans,
1. P.E.M»r"e~and p7L7Cress'TAngli cajeii si,Tlondont 193iT2.Mere, Shelburne Essays X f pp.29-50.(The italics are rine).3.M«re, '|itTFurne~Essays~Vl 1 p.l65Tef.j>p. rooff.
Puritans, or men of independent beliefs like Sir Thonas Browne 
who was famous not only for his attempt to reconcile science 
and tv>e imagination, but also for the harmony and sweetness of 
his «wn lif«. This saiae harraony and sweetness of life character­ 
ised Henry Vaughan and George Herbert, of the latter of whom 
Walton could say: 'His most haly life was such that it beg©t 
such reverence to God, and to hi 1* that (his parishienersj th@ught
themselves the happier when they carried Herbert's blessing
2 
baek with the-1 to their labeur. ' 0-rer against these may be
5 4 
set the outstanding Puritans of the period, Bunyan and Milton ,
notable for their zeal and strong individuality Mere than for 
the harmony and sweetness of life.Ultimately, the advantage 
was te be with the Anglicans, for the Dissenters in their 
enthusiasm f®r individual righteousness, neglected the imag­ 
ination, and consequently the power ef tradition.'The continuitft 
redemption of the past is in the hands of those who have 
imagination, and whose interest falls naturally upon individ­ 
uals and a.^es whieh lived by the same faculty. It is a rule 
from which there is barely,if at all , escape, that these who 
forget the paet are in their turn forgotten. How the lack of 
imagination a~_ong the Puritans showed itself in contempt of the
arts ano" in »any other manifest ways, but in none raore clearly
5 
than in their violent br°ak 'with tne continuity ©f tradition. '
1.Ibid..p.174.
2. Mo r e, JC3GS She 1 b u r n e assays IVa , p. 9 P .
3.Mere, §he_lburne_Esj^v s 71 ,pp'. 189-96.
4.T' /rore, TjTew Sh e Ibu rn e B s's ay s' 111. p p. /S5-<?A, *oi - 2o*. 
$. More, SKelbume E&S»^^ VI, p*. ito -GO.
This "break with continuity ®n the part »f the Puritans 
was to hare serious repercussions, not only «n English, but 
on American, life and letters. As a result of the dirisian 
of England into two camps of King and Parliament, there
>s
resulted a corresponding division in the ^nglish conseiousness 
between the aesthetic and ethical senses. Henceforth imagination 
and character were t« g® their separate ways, n«r hare they 
erer,t» M»re's way «f thinking, been satisfactorily reunited 
in the national eenscinusness. Unfortunately it was from this 
dirided eirilisatian that the Pilgrim Fathers emigrated aertss 
the Atlantis under the pressure «f the Laudian persesutiens, 
and New England, with its pr«f«und ethical pre«ceupati«m, was 
the »ffsh®9t ef this ineo:nplete oanscitusaess. The wender t© 
M«re is, n«t that it sheuld nVa, produced an eeeemtrie^ or eae-
rt
sided literature, but that, springing frsis that part of the
English pe«ple whe csntewned the i»aginati«n as eril,it sh»uld
T 1 
hare nutured any kind of art at all. In England herself,it
A
was pessible te find a balance between the extremes «f passion 
and partisanship rending her unity. There, inspite ofjthe ie«n- 
e«lasai «f the Puritans, there was a certain sedate beauty in 
the writings «f sueh wen as Bunyan and Baxter and ethers, wh», 
by their influenee, tended te restore te English literature its 
l«st ceneeption «f «haracter witheut entirely suppressing the 
appeal .f the imaginatien . But in ilew England the B»re rigid 
spirit tf dissent was reinf.reed by the rig»urs .f life in a .
,pp" 
XI,pp.3-6.
primitire •••vanity where wen were in e.nfliet with a relentless 
nature, and hostile and uacirilised tribes, and s. the dirtsi.n
• f ••nsei.usness was refle.ted in its mtst extreme f.rm in the
_.. rise
literature whi.h, talcing lt B*fm C.tt.n Mather, ..ntinued
., . _. .,. Mrs. Puller, l through Hawthtrne, d»wn t«
NeTertheless the dirisitn persisted in England 
t... The frustration «f the imaglaatire res.urees «f the 
««u»try gare rise t« a spirit ©f satire and eyni«i SM whi«h 
was refleeted in Rest.ratian drraa. Already in the Serenteenth 
Century men had eee«gnised self-lsre'as the metirating pfwer 
•f human etnduet, and with the failure @f the Camnanwaalth of 
Saints, they were the wore ready t» seize an the hyp«erisies 
and egotisms «f humankind as su-fojeets ef the drama. But the 
new spirit differed frtm anything tefere it in English letters
i
in Shifting the emphasis fr«m human personality tt external 
eirtUMstanees. Eren in the reiaanees «f Beauraent aad Fletaher 
the stress had feeen at least in indiridual passions and f«i"bles, 
if n«t en the integrated personality behind them. Resteratisn 
C«medy pr»«eeded *ne step further in disintegratien. It sought 
t9 represent eril as an accident "breught ab®ut by soae con- 
spiraey »f K fate »r constraint «f seciety} instead if lashing 
®r ridiculing the ri*i»us «r the fe«lish, the new comedy tried
t» appeal t« the. sympathies by depisting them as the rictiiis'2 
• f «ireuiastance-». The indiridual was no lenger respensible f«r
his «©nduet. This, in its earliest ferm, was an attitude t* manr " I7TT ————————————
Issays X,pp. 79-80
which was to undermine the Tery foundations of the Humaaistit
. i
concern with «haraeter. The dirisicn of imagination and etljffes 
had "begun to take effect in English literature.
Although More recognises the ResteVtion drama
as but a transitory phase, to be distinguished from what
1 
preceded it and what followed it, this tendency to see man
as the produtt of society had cone to stay. Its snood ®f 'com­ 
placent cynicism' was to yield to a whole new literature of 
optimism and sentimentality, coloured by the exotic imaginings 
of Romanticism, but the central eonceftion of character as that 
which lifts man abore the fluctuating eireumatances of his 
enriroament had dropped out of the field of drama, and was beiag 
gradually undermined in ether fields of literature. To this 
clearage between the imaginatisn and eharacter,More attributed 
England's deeliae from the intellectual leadership of Europe. 
Whereas at the beginning of the Eighteenth Ceatury she was
supreme in the fi'eld of letters, by the end she had fallen
2 
into obscurity. At the beginning of the eeatury, the men of
imagination, the Tories, had been in control of the political 
affairs of the country, but with the ill-opportune death ef
Queen Aane in 1715, power had passed to the Whigs wh® represented 
the practical sense of the country. Heneeferth England was t© 
flourish commercially and industrially where bef©re she had been 
supreme in the things of the spirit. The leading nen of letters,
2.More, Shelfeurae Essays X, pp. 155-36; cf .Ibid. , pp. 107-108.
with the except!** ,f Addisen aad S-teele, were en the lesiag 
side, and deprired ef the eBeeurage*eat ef aa enlightened 
aristeeracy, turned their talents t« 'attacking the time-serving 
and expediency ef the Whigs and the hack writers ef Grub Street 
in the Battle ef the Wits.
Already im the earlier TCIUMCS ef the %elburite 
» M«re-had TDeen aware «f the lessening ««n«epti<sH *f
•haraeter in the EighteenthnCeiitury. A ttmparatirely large 
pr«p«rtien »f essays in the first fire relumes deal with auth-
•rs «f the per ied.G. II. Harper sees this as a» aseape fre* the
•yatitis* «f Mtre's Oriental phil«s«phy and its applieatiea
t« R»maati«is)tt imt« the Eighteeath Century with its'sense • «f
1 
|he reality «f life'. 'Bseud».0rientalis»i played a large part
ia the fusimg together ef suTojest ajad »"bje«t, Ged aad nature, 
which is the least satisfaetery pra«tiee.«f English and Aiaeriean 
Remarati«isai> and it is HO •.vender that ! rr. llore, wh* apparently 
k»»ws Orie*tal literature as Emerssa werer did, sh»uld rerelt 
agaiast his rague fluidity and facile eptisaism. He finds relief
• a»d this speaks well for his taste- in the firaer, th«ugh
2 
less passisnate aad high-esleured theught ef the elder peri®d. '
That uad»ut)tedly Mere was glad t« leare the Ror.antie dissoluti.B 
ef the ccMcrete and tangilole imto the Taporeus ilTueiea «f the 
senses and fimd shelter en the mere solid.groun^ of the rational 
and realistic liteature of the Birhteenth ecn.tury, there can Toe
iTAtl a» t ic JftnthlE, • e t . 1 50 7 , p . 5 66 
2.rbid. , pp. 566-67.
ne d»ubt, but in the light »f subsequent trends ef thought 
i* the Sherburne Essays whieh were ? elesed bo®k te Harper 
in 1907, it beeewes apparent that the ehaage was ne KB re 
es«ape. Already there were te "be seen at werk amengst the mem 
ef the Eighteenth Ceatury influences whieh were te result 
in the disselutiea ef eren their' selid-seemimg gr»uad, axd 
•nlyt Tsy a e«nsideratian of their gradual pereelatian into the
life a»d thought »f the periat was it pesslble t©
1 2what eaase after. M«re's studies »f Chesterfield, Walpele,
Z 4 
Fraaklin, Panny Burney and the pe»ple »f her eirele, 
5
, are all studies «f men and weeen «f sharaeter, but «f
eharacter already meri»g away fr«m its cesitre ef balamee tewards 
an excess »f eeee»tri«ity. In the earlier writers their wit 
retains its firm and trenchant edge,fiadimg expression in the 
"brillianee ®f satire and ireny, but as the eentury wears «n, 
wit degenerates threugh isere hutsiaur^and whimsicality inte the 
sentimentality whi«h «tarks the emd ef the era. By the tiaae of 
Fanny Burney, the elear, salient »4tline ef wit has been blurred 
imte mere eteentrieity ®f manner.
'It must be remembered that her day fell in the dregs 
*f English seeiftiy' life, in what weight be called a kind ®f 
imter-regnum between two different worlds. Literature was dead,
1.Mere, Shelburae Essays V,p.l96 ff..
2.Mere, Shelburae Essays IV,p.254 ff^.
3. Ibid. ,01.129 ff..
5. Mere.ShelbuTiae Essays,111,p." 177 ff.
and only a stale echo of it remained among the blue stocking 
eSteries. Wit was fast degenerating into sentimentality. The 
peculiar rirility and: large insolence of the early Eighteenth 
, Century had passed, awaj, while the new society was yet to be 
born. The *ien .sf the age just gone, fcy had been originals with 
plenty of sins and crudities to answer forj b»-t their origin­ 
ality (I use the word in its old sense) had been one of char­ 
acter, whereas the younger generation w^-e original only in 
manners. The difference is felt strongly if one turns fror. 
the satire of Tom Jones and Roderick Random to that of Eyelima 
and Cecilia, and it is shown equally in the transsript of real 
life. The coarse humours of the men in Walpele's letters seem 
to be.the ebullience of some unused and untamed inner strength} 
i?i comparison with them the eeeentri«it£es of Miss Burney's
circle hare the appearance ef mere whim and sentiment, or of
1 
callous insensibility. 1
Eren the greatest men ef the period failed t®
aehiere a -.ere balanced riew of human mature. For the complacent 
cynicism of the Restoration,Pope and Swift substituted a wore 
earnest indignation with human shortcomings; but whereas Swift 
whilst lashing the stupidity and corruption of mankind in general 
rarely attacked indiriduals,Pepe,whe exposed indiriduals to Mer­ 
ciless ridicule,regarded men in-general as the west beaerclent 
and well-ieserring ©f creatures. This difference betokened a 
further dear age withia the huixan consciousness which had derel-
5HeTburne~EaTayB~'lV,p.56; ef .pp. 26572
tped frcm the tw» currents »f thought we hare already ^enticneel,
th« «ne deriring fresi Kaehiarelli through H»bbes and riewiag
1 
wan as essentially selfish and aggressire, the ether deriring
frem Shaftesbury, Maaderille and Bili«gbr»ke, and riewing i*an
2 
as altuistic and sympathetic . The e®-existenee 9f these tw»
antithetical attitudes t« man within a society cutWardly as
unifer1?. as that «f the Eighteenth Century was in itself an
3 
anoraly, but when, as in the ease «f Pepe, the tw» elements
were present in the e®asci»usness ef the same aan, without 
any attempt at rec«neiliatien, it beeca.es se^ething K©re than 
an aa8-«ialy. Of the twe elements, the mere ©ptr-i.istic riew was 
t« be inred lately ri«t»ri«us, and the triumph »f the one was 
t» nake its fellew seew repulsire t» sueceeAimg generations. 
We are eut »f sympathy with Pepe's satire less beeause the 
references t9 his eenteiaperaries hare l»st their immediate 
piiat than because their whale spirit »f imveetire and dia­ 
tribe is alien t» »ur age. The clash »f the warfare ®f the 
"Wits «»i«ies t« us fr»m a distance with the saund »f
'©Id unhappy far-«ff things 
And battles l9ng
It weuld appear t® us a te^p«rary thing now f «rg«tten.But M«re 
sees it as but ene phase «f a recurrent, eren a perennial, strug­ 
gle between twe unrec«n«iled elements ef hu^an nature still at 
rariance in our ®wm day.^-^en in this liring age, always a few,
1.Mere, Shelburne Essays Vlll,p.l5fiff.
2. Ibid, .pp. 158-59; c£
are still fighting for the righto of the mind against a dull 
and delusive Material ism, for the freedom of the imagination 
against a prosaic tyranny, for a pure patient ambition against
the quiclc successes of vanity and pliant cleverness, for the
1 
reality of human nature against a f atuous self-complacency. '
It is with the element of disillusionment that litre's natural 
sympathies lie, "but rrer against that must be set the optimisti« 
and sentimental strain which already fereshadtwed the far-reaeh- 
ing changes abcut tc take place in human thcught against which 
sc much cf Hew Human criticism was directed. Mere's string 
dissatisfaeticn with the nature cf the Rcmantic imagination 
made him the mere ready tc find traces cf the humanistic imag­ 
ination surriring among the defeated Eighteenth' Century Tories, 
although his more general tendency was to consider the imag­ 
ination submerged during the period as a result of the domin­ 
ation in arts and science alike of the discursive and aaalyti-
2 
cal reascn* Of imaginative illusion, the sense of the allure-
wment of natural appearanees, there is little during the whale
period: deism had reduced the universe to the monotonous regu-' 3 
larity of a wll-ordered machine. Its pure rationalism denied,
or at least minimised, all that was r^sterieus and escaped the 
net ef legie, and se gave rise to the pseude-ClassicisBS of the
day- 
Reason ,i.e. the ratisnal faculty, and imaginatien are,
however, as we have seen "but twe facets of the same general
.More, Shelburne Essays 7111,xro. 229-51
air
tendency of taught} both belomg to the lower element of xan 
ami are subject to change an* flu* tu at ion. Both attempt to set 
up as sole tyrants oyer the whole personality, whereas rightly 
they should exist U juxtaposition, and in subserrienee to the 
higher will. Character, not passion *r rationalism, is the full­ 
ness of the human personality in whioh all subsidiary fatuities 
are to "be co-ordiaatwd.
(11)
With the reaction against the arid formalism ef pseudo- 
Classicism,the i^iagiaationjin its mest rebellious and e.entrifugal 
form,sought t© usurp its place. We hare already studied in some
detail the nature and tendencies of the Romantit imagination,its
1
ImpatAeaoe of restraint, its proneness to run te exoess. Ualike
the humanisti« or ethieal iMaginatian which has a central author^ 
ity in the aetisn of the inner check,the Romantic imagination has 
no common centre to whioh to refer the rarieus impulses that beat~ 
upon man, and ss eaeh impulse claims autecraey. The impulsire 
life is measured, not qualitatirely, for that demands a standard 
of judgment araixidjsx by which t© compare indiridual irapn"1.se« "by 
r^-renee t© sewe criterian outside them, but quantitatirely, 
according to the degree of sensuousness eaeh arouses. The libido 
sentiendi, the lust for sensatien, whieh the ^idlle Ages had 
seen as one of man's besetting sins ta be held in strict check, 
now becomes something to be sought and stimulated.
the Tiluntaristi* eenceftien ef man there was being 
substituted in the late Eighteenth Century, the, «en«eptien ef
»f sentiment, ILeriring, like its ««n«e»itaELt, the idea »f the
Natural Goadness ef Man.frem the deism ef the day. Bath the 
aider disillusionment ef the Wits ami the optimism »f the new 
sentimentalists had this in se^nenJjc they were agreed that 
mankind as th«y saw it in airilised sseiety was th«rfughly 
riei»us, b»th had l«st faith in rirtue as a canseirus self- 
diseipline. What «»uld Tae were ineritable thaa that, >y way 
tf ••ntrast, men shtuld leok bask lengingly t» the primitire 
state «f mankind where they imagined man free, sp«ntaae«us, 
rirtu»us, unt«u«hed "by the Titiatimg h*ad «f se«iety? Thus 
t« Mere, the idea of the neTble garage arese as a sart «f half­ 
way between the m«.«kery »f the Wits and the seatiiaent,»r sensi­ 
bility whieh was finally t« usurp d«.rani«n over literature.
£^j
The idea he already finds in the Or_£onek®_ «f Mrs.Aphra Behni 
as well as in -ethers wh«, in their dissatiff aetian with the
the strait and sterile reign ef ratiamalisw, seught relief in
half 
a^playful indulgence ef the fancy. But the idea ef the Neble
Sarage, together with ether aspeets ef this reaction, might 
well hare remained in the limbe ef fantasy ha1-! it net been fer 
the meiaenteus impact upsn his age @f a single ran wh© was te 
gire direction te all the hitherto vague rnd scattered tendencies 
whi«h s«ught te substitute sentiment fet reason. The dynamic -
l»Cf s ppjD5-log*,lfare,ShelburHe Essays Vlll,pp. 166-69. 
2«l£ere«Shelburne Essays X, p. 95.
which set the whole ^erei-ient im action was Rousseau's pure 
literacy taleat, his gift for unforgettable phrases, together 
with' the daeweaic persoaality of the writer, the inexplicable 
force that imposed the experieaoe »f the man Rousseau— raga- 
bead as hev was, a foe «f coareation, "betrayer of sacred trust, 
wcr>id self-analyst* ending with a fixed halluciaatiaiy «f a 
e»iftspira«y »f s»eiety agaiast him— the «agi« ^lameur that
inptse* the prirate e^etiews «f this ma* up»n the w«rli*.
R«usseau,ia»re than amy »ther man tf his aay,
s«UM*ed the death kaell «f the man »f «hara«ter, the aristocrat 
«f the spirit, as Plats had enrisaged him, and eathraned ia his 
place the man sf passi»n, in whim the thynt»eides, the personal 
feelings, were supreme. la the Plat»nie aristeerat, the thy««.«- 
ides were su"berdiaate, aad «ejrd allegianee, te the Reasea,the 
supreme l^man faeultyj but Reas»n, iw Eur«pe,had "been weakened 
"by the diT»r®e «f the inaaginatien aad the praetieal sense «f
man, the diseursire aad analytieal reasea whieh had turaed frem t
its 
thiags «f the spirit to pursue JthK utilitarian eads , while the
i«agiaati«a had deterisrated into the were whiiasieal play ef 
the fancy, with little »r n® raot in reality. The i:«aginati«H 
was heaeeferth t» be rescued frem the obliTion into whieh it 
had fallea, aad in league with the passitmsl element in »aa, 
was t« set up an »pp«siti«n t© bath reasan, in its limited 
rationalist sense, and te Reasea, the super-rational intuiti®a 
whi«h sh«uld be in supreme control. But the passional elemeat
Vl,p.236.
im mam when it has ne ally in what lies abere ineritably tends 
te ally itself with what lies belew, an* se the thymeeides_t 
which in the man'ef cha'raeter sheuld stand with Reasen against 
the purely instinetire and appetitrre side ef nan's being, en«e 
the Reason is dethroned, throws epen the deer te the free play 
ef the instin«ts.
This, as I understand it, is at th*e re©t ef Here's 
study ef the Remantie writers whi«h ferms the «ere ef the
Shelburne Essays, and als« »f the similar £rend «f thought in
.1
Babbitt and in their Pren«h e»ntemp«rary, Ernest de Seilliere .
The symb«l «f thii meed ef idrid^ extreme egetism and intrespeet- 
ien finding expression in a JOT** itfc restless aspiration after 
seme raguely defined ideal is t« Mere the figure ef the Seliman 
in William Betkferd's Yathejgbhreugh whese transparent besem it
is pessible te see his heart perpetually inreleped in flames,
restless 
whilst areuwd him surges an CTCT seancixg; threng ,noTi»g exefv
with hand alasped upem flaming heart, 'the essential type and
2 
image ef the Remantie life and literature 1 . In The Drift of
t 
Remantie ism Mere studies rarieus manifestations ©f /his Remantie
spirit, 'whether the merbid egotism af Beekferd, the religisus 
defalcatiem ef Newman, the aesthetieis*; of Pater, er the dregs
ef waturalisti® pantheism of Finna Macleod,er the impetent rerelt
3 
frem humanitarian sympathy ef Nietzsehe. ' Various ether studies
in Remantit diseentent are strewn threugheut the remaining rel­ 
umes ef the series, studies of the revelutionary utepianism of
1 • L7jrA7!erI!e r , rpTcTt. , pp . ZZfF.
8« Mere , Sh e 1 bur nejiis says Vlll,pp,36.
1 - 2 
Shelley, the robust priwitisw of Walt Whitman, the wiehtmare
3 
phantasmagoria of James Thomson, the Celtic rapeurings of
4 5 
the early Yeats^, and the ether peets ef the Irish Renaissance,
6 
the inchoate pseudo-mysticism of Fmaneis Thompson.
Ernest de Seilliere diride* the mystiee-imperialism
•f the Romantic Meyement into four phases, passiomal,amatory,
7
•teial a»d »»«ial, a««ordiiig to the pre«Lo»inati»g imterest.
Similarly it is possible, for eonremieiKee in diseussion, to 
fi»4 in More's tret*e»t of RoMamticis* the same four phases, the 
first relating particularly to the Renantic's attitude te the
natural world, the second te sexual lore, the third to his pre-
o 
eccupatjk with the democratisation <sf literature,aad the last
with the awaieniag sease of matiojial pride a»@l solidarity. More 
himself does not diride his studies of .Remantieism inte amy such 
definite categories; "but it will help us t» seize upow the eut- 
sta»dimg features ef his owq critical attitude towards different 
phases «f the Tttoremewt if we can plaee in juxtaposition writers 
whose affinity can be defined rather i»iere precisely than by noting* 
merely a eowsaom delight in expaMsrre er unbridled emotion.
In the past there hare beeia rarimus attitudes to­ 
wards nature. The Oriental, aware of th« twe srders of mature 
and humanity,saw only the iiperrisusaess of nature to the desires
aad efforts of maa,a world of hideeus u«fathamable contiageneies
A 
resulting from the crossing of absolute law and human sentience.
T7Mo'^e'7gherburne~Essays~Vll7pT6ff 5.Ibid. ,
2.Mere f Shelburne Es5ays__lV,pp.205-207. 6.M©re,Shel&urme Essay_s Vll
J:ft5S;ffii3ffl.tfilHVi?p:i^f??' 7.More fUcw Shflbull
Wisdem eensists ef eultirating the inner life in eemplete 
indifference towards the cuter erder ef unending change^ 
The Latin peets saw mature as a realai te lee mastered and
eultirated by man, as Virgil in the Crecrgies extelled the
g lalseur which secures fer man the fruits cf the scil. gut
with the Remantie Merement, "blending the optimism and pan­ 
theism cf deism, there ccmes a ccmpletely different atti­ 
tude tcwards nature. Instead cf the twc distinctly separate 
wcrlds cf man and nature, nature is enrisaged as an exten­ 
sion c"f the world «f wan,while man is seen as a creature 
cf nature, subject tc the same cycles cf grcwth and change 
as his enriranMenttlt is pcssifole for mas by assimilating 
the meed cf his natural surrcundings to be possessed of 
a sense ef breeding calm which bestows upen him a feeling 
of unity where befcre was the tensien of dualism ,and, 
incidentally a feeling ef alsofness f-r©n the ordinary 
werld cf human affairs. The German transcendentalist leaked 
dcwn in eentesspt and ireny upen the ereryday sphere of 
aetie'Et and ecsureree a,s secething far rerored fre?; his ewn 
experience erflife.'Hence the centempt ©f business ana ef 
the Philistines fellews as a kind of seal set upon the 
reiaamtie seul which is coraseieus af itself* It «ultirates 
a dirine idleness? the su-cmens te loaf and inTite ©ne's soul
ea«ie frem erer the sea lon^, "before the scandalous outbreak
3 
ef Walt Whitr-an'.
1.Mcre,i3heTEurme Essays'~Vl,pp. 57~58. 3. Ibid.,p. 116.
2.More,Shelburne Essays V,pp.
IK the first flttsfe »f emotional emaneipati«n, it was enough
that this swooning indulgence of the senses shculd" be ecstatic
1 
eneughf later, there came a demand for acutt ebse rr at ion and
precise detail, as ate suit of the liaisln of sentimental and 
scientific naturalism. Our modern attitude to mature is a 
coalescence of these two phases in the derelepment of r»«a*ti- 
isR. Precise detail and vimute •TDserratieji «f natural pheac- 
weita there had "bee*, prior te the>R«»amtie rerclt, but the 
2>«st-HtMa*tie «cns«i«usaess denaxds that it should be aureoled 
about with the wistful semse of atan's elose kimship with the 
uairersal life about hiw.The laok of this mystical i»fusie» 
ef humam sentience into the processes of nature wakes the 
nature poetry of such a writer as Crabbe, unsympathetic, if not 
definitely repulsire,te our generatiea, inspite of the scienti­
fic accuracy of his descriptien ®f flora and fauna. 'He lacks
sssie 
a certain mote of mysticism, a feeling of*rast and indefinable
presence beyond the finite forms described, a lurking sense 
of pantheism by which the personality «f the obserrer seems
to srelt into what he obserres or is -swallewed up ia a rague
2 
rererie 1 . This is what we look for im the great nature- pass­
ages of the Nineteenth Century, 'the solemn mysteries of T intern 
Abbey, or Shelley's Ode to the West Wind, and we find subtle 
echoes of it in p«ets net professedly of the Ro-nantie schsolj 
time and again, in the peetry ef Matthew Arnold, imbued as he
2. Vore, Shelburme Essays 11,^^.141-42.
is with the classical spirit, there "yet eseapefl him lines which 
suggest all the yearning peignancy ef remantie nature.
This attitude t* mature is extended te include
the human figures the Rcmantic sees against the backgreuKid *f
ceuntry 
nature. Whereas CraVbe saw ssen as they wete,with all their
2 ptrerty and igneranee and imperfeetien, the Rewantie idealised
them as the embodiment ef inneeenee and rirtue.Werdswerth 
repudiated the sham idyllic dreams *f earlier pasteral peets, 
but his «wn n»stalgi« e»n«ern with the 'still sad musi« »f 
humanity' was in its «wn way t» M«re just as «u«h an erasien
• f reality. 'It is the sasae humanity eensidered as a wh»le» 
humanity "betrayed by eirsumstancea and corrupted by luxury, 
Taut needing «nly the freed** ef the hills and lakes t» derel«p 
its mat ire rirtuesj humanity eaught up in sewe tremulaus 
risien *f harmsny with the uwirersal wtrld; it is i» shart,
the rague aspirati«n «f what we hame called huiaanitariaiaisM,
3 
and hare endcwed with the sslemities ef a religieia'. T intern
Abbey itself was yitiated t® More by a deep-lying eonfusien
• f thcught. Orafche ene hand, nature was the rediuna »f expression 
ef the'still sad wusie ef humanity', on the ©ther, the eeasel- 
atien f»r 'the sneers ®f selfish sen 1 and 'the dreary inter­ 
course ef .daily life'. There is always this ' irreconcilable 
ccntradietioB between the general sympathy am«3 the particular 
distaste ef the enthusiast whe sees this mystery ef
refracted-threugh the wist ef settling AUKS* The illusiem 
• f the mature wershipper and the deeeptiem of the humam- 
itariam sprimg,imdeed,fre7t the. same substitutiem ef reverie 
fer judgmemt, ami it is wertfey ef remark that Werdswerth 
whe mused sympathetically •* the let ef the dalesmem abeut hi*
had me pewer ef emterimg imte their imdividual lives, amd was
1 
ee«memly distrusted "by the*'.
Agaim, imspite ef Werdswerth's assertiem that 
Nature merer did Tsetray the heart that Irred her, Mere eites 
ample eridemee tf preve that Werdswerth did beeeme aware ef
a semse ef treaehery whieh east hist upem ether eeaselatiems,
2 
metaTsly these ef religiem. But altheugh admitting the exiat-
emee ef sueh aw imeewsistemey im Weriswerth's theught, Mere 
dees net eemsider its implieatieia of a development withim 
the pact's experiemee. Umfertumately he dwells en the least 
attractive side ef Werdswtrth.He draws atteatieia em the erne 
hand te all that is :*audliia im the semtiiaemt ©f nVersLswerth, 
seeimg him as the peet ®f 'Ome impulse fr»T. a Ternal wood' 
er of the Luey peems, and ©n the ether, to the eold,unrespem- 
sire elememts im his eeiastitutieia. Im his essay ®n ^erdswarth, 
||ere emphasises as sigwifieant t® an understanding of his
peetry his lew vitality, his shrinking fror, str®»g e:7icti®m
3 
amd active exereise. His intellect was keen and penetrating
emeughjVut t® Mere, 'seime viee ef the "blood shut bi« out frea
4 
partieipatiea im the larger current of life 1 . This it was
t¥re"7^e'rhlIr7e~Es7ays~Vll 1 p. IQ."~~3". JJbii.,,p. 31~-37,4S- 
2.^Md., pT4T. 4. Ibid._,p.44.
whi«h «o»pelled him to seek refuge ia the mild aad soothiag
1 
experieaoe of aatural solitude.
There are, howerer, ele»eats Ia Wordsworth 
whioh More igaores or oowgletely uaderestimates,aad whioh 
rereal him'as something rery differeat froa the pretty-pretty 
poet of popular iietagjhtatioa,oir the austere, rather aaaesiio, 
figure of More's portrait. These hare "beea desorifced ia de­ 
tail ia the chapter eatitled 'Tisioaary Dreariaess',ia Pro­ 
fessor D.G. Janes' Soe-ptiaisai aad Poetry^Oae whole side of 
his work rereals that he is oeaeeraed with poor aad illiterate 
people, aot eatirely "beoause they are ol®se to aature aad 
therefore rirtusus ia the Rousseauisti* sease,"but because they 
Iseoo^e to his iMagiaatioa 'symTasls of the great Apocalypse', 
rerelatioas of the superaatural seekiag te "break through iate
the aatural. The sease of illusiea «f the natural unirerse is
2 as raueh preseat ia "ordsw©rth as ia Carlyle or TeaHysea, or
ia the Shakespeare of the Tej§p_e_s_t, "but where Wordsworth is 
eoaeeraed Mere has a persistently "bliad spot.
In oeatrastiag the nature peetry of Thepeau
with that af the Eaglish Re^anties, Mere dwells upon the
r 
differeace "betwwea the Awerioan write/and Wordsworth as it
appears te him. 'Least of all did (Thereau),after the manner 
of Wordsworth, hear in the rsiee af nature any co-passionate 
plea for the weakness and sorrow of the down-trodden.Philaa- 
ihropy and humaaitariaa sympathies were t® him. a deselatio-a•Ai
Cf.
am* a wee'. —— 'Similarly "• "liaaee en the humaa will 
was tee sturdy te lie perturbed fey the inequalities aad 
sufferiags ef mankind, aad his faith ia the iadiridual
was tee uashalcea te lie led imte humaaitariaa interest
1 
ia the masses:*
Sueh a statemeat ererleeks, rather wilfully, 
it seems te me, what is fuadameatal te Werdswerth's peetry 
alieut humble j»e«pl«j the fae^ that they suffer preudly aad 
uaeemplaiaiagly, imperrietis te,aai erea a little disdainful 
•f,the rigeurs ef Fate. The peet is mered te write abeut 
them, aet ia erter te plea* iadulfea^ly fer their welfare, 
tut te giTe expressiea te the aamiratiea, erea the rerereaee, 
whieh their silent, relentless suffering erekes ia him. The 
Leeeh Gatherer,Margaret, the S»i4i«r ia The Prelude .Miehael.
these are aet figures whe stif Werdswerth te write seatimea-
o tally abeat the weakness and serrew ef the Aewa-treddea. They
hare the majesty aad preui ua»ea4iag eaduraaee ef the eharae- 
ters ef elassieal tragedy, altheugh their let is east ea a
differeat seale ef life. Aatigeae er tsAipus er Phmmra are
ia aet mere tragically iatraasigeat toma their attitude te mis-
fertuae thaa the lewly figures ef Werdswerth's peers. But 
this is sji aspeet ef thcjpeems fer vhich 1'ore -^a^es no all DV- 
aaee: Werdswerth*s characters must fee made te fit ia with 
his geaeral strictures abeut Remamtie psyehelegy. Further,
1. Here* SheT»urae jBssayii l,pp.lS»-16> cf.p.208^ 
, Sce^tCfrtsrr, ana Peebry,(London-, 1^87;, pp.
1 
as Has already »eea suggested, Mere *••» aet allew fer
the derelepmeat ef Werdswerth thought.The Lyrical Balladi m
*
are separate* frem »ueh later peems as Staazas en Peel 
Castle ami the Ode te Duty »y experieaees as far-reaehiag 
as these whieh separate the Here ef The Great Refusal frem 
the Mere ef the Greek Traditiea.
Werdswerth*s re a* lag ef life Mere flats •••pressed 
'late a meledieus staaza:
"Oae impulse fr»m a reraal weed
May teaeh yeu mere ef maa, 
Of aeral eril aad ef feed,
Thaa all the sages eaaa——
whiehf »e it said with due respeet is geed Terse tut literal 
felly* Ner dees it yet appear a faet that idle rererie iax
the fields is setter fer a Maa's seul thaa the diseipliae
2 
ef Plate aad ef Jesus*. Werdswerth himself came te this
same eeaelusiea leag sefere the ead ef his writiag days* 
Whaterer he theught ef Plate, he turaed saek ea his fermer 
Remaatie eptimism te a aew attitude ef humility aad aequies- 
ceaee tswards the diseipliae ef Jesus. But this at least 
must »e said: erea sefere he had explicitly repudiated the 
philesephy ef Gedwia fer the wisdem of the Chureh, he had 
leag see* preeceupied with medes ef seasiftility aad pereept- 
iea whieh were iatxiasieally (Jttristiaa, aad his use ef aature 
sym¥els had »eea aa attempt te cearey imagiaatirely these
1. Cf.p
2* Mere, Shelsurac Essays V«»«166.
iatuitieas ef superaatural truth wkieh traditieaal religiea 
had symselised »y £he Cress. His greatest poetry is eeaeeraed, 
aet with impulse* ferm rermal weeds, er daisies, er butter- 
flits, er greea liaaetsjit seizes upea »leak, dertliet laadxcm 
seapes, sarrea meuataia scenery, hungry waters, met as eraa- 
meatal deseriptiea superimpesed upen a greuad ef seatimeatal 
theught, tut as aa imtegral part ef the preeess ef theught 
itself* Meuataia aid reek aad rirer seeeme images la whish 
feeliag is theught aad theught felt, as it is ia the sest 
ef the peetry ef Shakespeare aad thejUetaphpsisals, aad threugh 
the* the peet leads the reader eats aa ethieal eeaditiea ia 
whieh he appreheads iaagiaatirely the reality ef the paradex
ef triumph ia defeat aad jey ia extremity ef suffering. This
idle 1 
is rery differeat irem'rererie ia the fields'** A
Beeause ef this Mere*s eeatrast setweea the atti­ 
tude te aature ef the English Hemaaties aa* that ef Thereau
2 
is hardly applieasle •• Werdswerth. Ualike the paatheistie
e 
•elief ia a Vaiga aad materaal aature ef the Remaaties,
was d 
Thereau's eeaeeptiea ef aature jjt eeleur/ »y the memery el
man's struggle with a hestile aad uasusdued feree,primeral 
fields ana meuataias aad dark uatreddea ferests iafested 
with say age trises* '"We hare aet seea pure aature",he says, 
"ualess we hare seea her thus rast aad drear aad inhuman- — 
Van was aet te he asseeiated with it. It was matter, rast,
2» Mere, anelsurae Jaissavs l,p.!7*
IS I.
terrific,— net nis Metker *artk tkat we kare keard ef, net 
fer him te tread en, er »e curie* la,—-**, it were ee.tng 
tee familiar ere* te let kis senes lie tkere, — tke kerne 
tkis «f necessity and .Pate?* 1 Suck an attitude hringsi a 
tenic and tracing spirit inte literature, in eentrast t«
tke eixeai«a«y »f pauttJteiSM. 'Mature was i« hi» a distiyliae
2•f tke will as Mush as a stimulant to the imagination 1 .
Tkere was, kswerer, ensufk that was harsk and rucced and 
untamed in tke uplands «f tke Lake District t« make Here's 
remarks equally relerant te W«rdsw«rtk, as ke really ap­ 
pears t« tke reader wk« is net klinded t« tke n«»ler as- 
pests «f kis w«rk ky pres»n«epti«ns.
And yet tke ultimate wisdem if nature is nst 
t« ke ftund in Tk«reau*s Walden ,n»r in tke w»rk sf any «f
tke Csnserd cr«up|tke final «ute«me «f tke solitary rererie 
Tkvreav 3•f taJbbdOddoun is tke leafing *f Walt Wkitman. Ratker dees
Mere turn fer tke reiee ef *emm«n sense, in respect tc tke 
natural wcrld, tc Dcnald Mitckell's Edgewccd* *Perka»s*as a 
ckild cf tke city, 'says Uere,'I may ke karred cut frcrn judg­ 
ing these kigk matters. Yet I tec kare kad my skare cf 
Thcrelli am ragakcndage-* wkc kas net in these days?— and 
kare eren relired in kumkler faskicn tke experiment cf 
Walden. I knew kcw easy it is tc wander ky the rirer's hrink,
l.Mcre. Skelkurne Essays l.n»18.
2.Ikid.,p.20 1V
3.ficre 9 Shelkurne Essays lM.».187ff {cf .SkellDurne Essays V.B.129.
meditating upon the eternities, or to diseerer tke Hely "rail 
im tke chalice ef a flcwer* Deuetless these solitary eommun- 
ings with mature are a iesiraele antidote t« the ferer ef the 
werldf they hare their incalculable xmfcu reward, tut their KZX 
rery facility IB a warning net tc trust them tec far. Fcr my 
part, I shall suspect always that, failing the initiation cf 
plough and harrow, I hare still come shcrt cf the greater 
mysteries* It is something tc oeserre idly the fresh miracles 
cf spring, cut I repeat the opening »f the Gecrgics. and knew 
hew far this is frcm the jcy cf feeling cneself a partner in 
the earth's great task cf rencraticn* It is semething tc watch 
with unecncera the tempestucus glcry cf the elcuds, hut again I 
eacall the stern in Virgil and knew hew different are the 
emotions ef ene whe spells his presperity er ruin in the pertents
•
ef the sky* Alas«later imprehus* it is net facile enthusiasm alene
»ut the curse-hern sweat ef the erew that shall at last ering a
1 
man inte harmcny with the stern realities of nature'•
It is unfertunate that Here sheuld hare missed the 
ee*men grcund of thcught in Werdswerth, fcr his misjudgment ef 
ef the earliest ef the great Hcmantics makes his criticism 
suspect erea where it is justly incurred. T^cie are times when it 
is geed tc judge literature aceerdiag to the general trendjjlt 
represents, »ut it is important tee te keep eae's eye en the 
•eject lest cne »e eetrayed inte sweeping assertiens and strict­ 
ures made in accordance with ready-tc-hand formulae which are
V,pp. 167-68. J -—————————————————
1 
only partially true. The Romantic attitude to nature* according
to Mere, depends upem the predominance of the suojeetire imag­ 
ination erer the oojeetirej whereas to litre himself, the apprec­ 
iation of natural heajtty depends upon nature's heing set apart
from •urselTes, and under the control «f seme Eternal and un-
Prineiple. 
changing m«w.«r 'When the phenomena of nature appear to he under
the tontrol of a force corresponding te the inner check, they are
2 
said to he heautiful. More speoifioally, heauty is this partUular
sense of unity in dirersity as manifested hy desifn.form.harmony, 
olear and regular transition,relation of parts. It is commonly 
mingled with other perceptions of the one-in-the-many-* such as 
sublimity,grandeur,charm,grace— more or less closely related or 
subordinated to it. Thus the rery stability of the mountains up- 
reared amidst the shifting panorama of the atmosphere, the endur­ 
ance of great waters in their ererlasting fluctuations,suggest the 
indwelling of some eternal word of command. The quiet gleam of 
light, the purity of colours, the melody of sound, himt at some 
deep-hidden principle of joy* The orare persistence of growing 
things, the stealthy instincts of wild life proclaim the imman­ 
ence of some master rirtue. This formatire power within phenomena
3 
we often think of as Nature personified.• There is one whole side
of the poetry of Wordsworth to which these words apply perfectly,
nor is the work of as'complete 1 a Romantic as Shelley without ele-
4 
ments of this deeper preception. The criticism of the Romantics
should he less that they were consistently pantheistic in helief
.261-62.
than that their work maintained,unsynthesised,traces of sereral 
different modes of thought,seme making for a dreamlike dissolu­ 
tion ef the personality ia pantheist!* re>erie, ethers for a 
hraeing ef personality in the teeth «f a hostile and alien power. 
Mere had eyes enly f»r the presence ef the former whith he con­ 
trasts with the latter as theuffh that were ceafiaed to Classical* 
literature. 'The consolation «f nature is an impersonal emetiea 
arising frem the confirmation ef «ur inner consciousness ef dual­ 
ism; for heauty is, as it were, a risitle image cf the p«ssi»le 
happiness ef the s«ul* This censelatitn is peculiarly liable te 
suffer perrasiea frem the pathetic fallacy and frem the usurpation 
•freason* It is after all hut an illusion that trembles at the 
teuch ef analysis* Hence the sense »f uneasiness that tften accom­ 
panies the perception of beauty, and the difficulty ef reconciling
ethics and aesthetics*
1 
0 nimium ca3Lo et yelagc cenfise sereno**
Closely allied to the Romantic attitude to Nature 
was the Romantic attitude to lore* The passire surrender of the 
soul to the impressions of the outer world makes for a similar 
surrender to the importunity of human passion* The limitlessness 
of human rereri^etaa man seeks to he absorbed in the rast processes 
of nature is reflected in the limitlessness of human desire as 
it seeks a satisfaction it can nerer find in erotic indulgence. 
A« eren raster dimension is lent to desire by the merging of 
physical lore with the lore cf God, as More finds it in
German Transcendentalism where eren a Schleiermaeher yielded 
t« the sensutua appeal ef eretie imagery, and seught te awaken 
a lere ef the dirine ¥y charging his preaching with an erne tire 
pewer whieh played als» en the string human desires prerailing 
amengst the coterie tt whem his discourses were addressed.Such 
a precedure may lie innocent eneugh in itself, hut it recalled 
t« Mere the mere mertid and passionate tendencies whieh were 
werkiag in that rery greup. 'I eannet ferget the mertid life ef 
Reusseau, frem whem all this gefflhlsphilesephie is ultimately 
derired* I remember mere particularly Heinse's yearning fer 
seme wilderness apart frem the werld where he might,like a 
Platenie sage, pass his life in saintly studies— with a Leis 
at his side* *There is a taint ef siekliness in all this* It 
eerrespends tee well te the "hearemly weariness" ef Neralis 
himself, as he might he feund at the grare ef his Sephie,Tewing 
himself te death fer lefty ensample ef 1are's eternal faithful­ 
ness and in a shert while after discererlng his religien incar-
1 
nate in anether weman* *
It is true, I heliere, te say that ef Mere's essays, 
few are taken up with writers whese main theme is lere between 
men and wemenj eren when he dees deal with an auther in whese 
werk lere plays a large part, Mere's emphasis is usually en seme 
ether element ef his theught. The lere element in the peetry ef 
Keats and Shelley,fer example,is enly teuehed upen incidentally^ 
1. Mere.Shelhurne Essays V.<»*126.
83yren IB of interest to him,net for the inten4ty of his passionate 
fanfarennades,but befuse of MB acceptance of the t*adi«tienal 
belief that life is an eternal struggle between good anil eyil 
in opposition to the Romantic faith in human perfectibility.
Christina Ressetti's poetry holds us awhile, not because of its
2 insight into lore, but beeajise of Its inaifht into woman-nature.
Breeniag is non persona grata. n«t primarily because his c«ncepti»n
•f l»re is alien t« Mere, but because that e«ncepti«n springe tut
3 tf a far deeper fissure «f his sensibilities. In these essays where
litre concentrates «»re specifically »n Itre poetry, it is with the 
decadence ef r««antie lere that he is primarily concerned. We hare 
seen abrre that it is the sielcliness and morbidness of German 
romantic lore which repels him. It follows automatically from his 
initial beliefs that human lore, unless held in its proper place 
by the inner check, must deteriorate into license and lust, bring­ 
ing its own nemesis i^the form of satiety and t*t disillusionment. 
It is with this ineritable outcome of romantic lore that More deals 
in his essays on Arthur Symons, Swinburne and the Decadent Wits.
Not, be it said at the rery outset,in answer to his 'Liberal 1 critics
the that he is orer-squeamish on the subject of sex relationship. He
4 finds no harm in Whitman*s insistence on unashamed physical lore,
he refuses to be stirred to moral indignation at the imputed immor­ 
ality of Sterne, he takes up the cudgels in defence of Hazlitt«s
1. More, ghelburne assays 111. ». 167.2. lbid..».155ff.
3.
4. More, Shelburne Essays IV, p. 198.5. More, Shelburne Essays 111, p. 207
i 
Liter Amoris. If he finis something disturbing and sickly in
the young Teats* preoccupation with women's hair, it is because
•f the implication «f a heiffhtened and unnatural sensuous en-
2 
jeymmnt whieh More dislikes far More than open sensuality, an
implication derired rather from the association of the subject 
with Aubrey Beardsley and others of the 'nineties than from 
any internal eridenee in Yeats' work of eren imaginatire, and
certainly not of bodily, corruption.
Kowe-ve-r, 
aMtain, in Swinburne, he finds during the early
phase of hie poetical derelopment, all the symptom* of an imag- 
ation diseased by an excess of romantic passion* 'The satitty 
of the flesh hang* like a fatal web about the Laus Venerielthe 
satiety of disappointment clings "with sullen sayour of poison- 
ous*pain" to The Triumph of Tine;satiety speaks in The Hymn to 
Proserpine, with its regret for the passing of the eld heathen gods; 
it seeks relief in the unnatural passion ©f Anactoria
"Clothed with deep eyelids under and abore— 
Yea, all thy beauty sickens me with lore";
turns to the abominations of cruelty in Faustinei sings enchant-
Z 
ingly of rest in The Garden of Proserpine.---*
The mood of Swinburne's earlier Terse foreshadows 
that of the 'Nineties with Dowson, Daridsen, Beardsley, Lionel 
Johnson, Francis Thompson, Oscar Wilde, seeking to taste to the 
fill each passing sensation. 'In the longing after the fullness
1.More, Shelburne -Essays 11,pp.83-85.
2.More, Shelburne Essays l,p.i91EF.
S.More, ghelburne Essays 111.p.105} cf.glbid«,p.lQ4
of experience without consideration of the lessons of exper­ 
ience we cone close to the heart of the movement, and we also see
how it was no vagary of a few isolated youths, out was the pro-
1 
duct of the most characteristic erolution of the age.' -—'The
root of the whole natter lay in a feorile satiety of the flesh, 
in a certain physical lesion, which thebufferers , haying no
physical resistance to oppose to it, translated into a moral fatzg
2 
-igue', such as Dorian Gray's reaction to A Re»ours« The final
outcome of a philosophy which glorified the perferrid grati­ 
fication of natural desire is the impotence of Oscar Wilde, and 
all the tragedy which closes in upon the curious quest for 
sensation for its own sake.
Less extreme, "but none the less indicatire of the 
dangerous dregs which More suspects at the bottom of the cup 
of romanjsic eroticism is the development of Arthur Symons. 
We have already seen how More applies to hiy. the Hindu image 
which envisages nature as a dancing girl, while the soul is the
King who looks on, and eventually awakens to a sense of the
3
illusion of natural teauty. More traces in detail, using always
own
the image of the watcher,Symons'Agradual deterioration from
false illusion through satiety,false disillusion, artificial 
attempts to stimulate passion through the perversion of good 
and evil down to the long last nightmare hauntings of ulti­ 
mate futility.
•I am weary of loving, and I long to be at rest 
From the sorrowful and immense fatigue of lovet
e.Bhelt>urne~^ls'ay8 X. p.253——3TCf.pp.5/f-/£.—— —————— 
Ibid.,p.285.
I have lived and loved with a seeking passionate zest 
And weariness and defeat are the end thereof. I
Byt the contrition of genuine regret is lost in 'the bitter cry 
of the long struggle resumed half-heartedly between illusion and 
disillusion 1 .
' "0 rapture of lost days, all that remains 
Is but this fever aching in my veins.
I do not know you under this disguise: 
I am degraded by my memories* •'!
'In the ocean of these degrading memories, haunting thoughts, and 
impuissant desires, the poor eouldet us call it soul) of the poet 
is tossed alternately from the exaltation of terror to the depths
of indefinite despair. He learns at last that " to have fallen ±.
2 
through dreams is fce have touched hell". 1
It may be argued that to condemn the cult of romantic love 
from its final disintegration into satiety is no fairer than to
condemn Humanism f»om the Fascism which its enemies claim to be
3
its logical conclusion. It must be judged,not from what it be­ 
came in its decadence, but from its own achievement in its heyday* 
Of its effects on the English Romantics of the early Nineteenth 
Century, More says little; he touched briefly upon the morbidity
and maudlin sentiment of the young Keats, upon the vagueness and
5 
amorphousness of Shellyan love, upon the very lack of physical
6 
passion in Wordsworth^.^or the rest he turns to the minor poets
I.Mere. Shelburne Essays I,p.l41 
2.Ibid..1*142.
3 Cf w oQ.
4.* Mo re', Shelburne Essays !V,p.l09ff«
5.More, gjielburne Essays V11.».2Q.
6. Mo re, rbit. ,pb.55'-3y
of the closing decades of the century. But tm "bring out fully 
the hidden clangers in the spontaneous indulgence of erotic 
desire, he should hare brought before us examples of its 
rarages upon those wfco experienced its first fine careless 
raptures. In the ^nglmnd of the first generation of Romantics, 
however, its worst excesses were held in check by the tradition
of individual character and the Christian modes of sensibility
un 
which wren the most rebellious of the Titans had/consciously
assimilated from the cirilisation into which they had been born. 
That there was much that was uncivilised and unChristian in the
world about them noone can deny, but certain traditional ralues
in 
were still recognised, and from these it was still/possible to
break away completely. A sturdy sense of indiridual responsiblity 
and independence had been too deeply engrained in the past to 
leare English writers entirely at the mercy of the new doctrine. 
More does not state this explicitly, feut from his previous des­ 
cription of the Puritan contribution to literature in stimulat­ 
ing personality it is, I feel, legitimate to deduce that this
stress upon character "bore fruit, net only in the seventeenth
*t Itast
century itself, "but inAthe next two centuriesm though to a di­ 
minishing degree. If,however, the Elizabethan stage fell prey
we 
to the vagaries of the Romantic drama because the makening of
the authority of Roman Catholic dogma left men without a sub­ 
stitute ?owing tftttbe Roman chur«h f s emphasis upon vicarious 
salvation to the almost complete exclusion of personal respon­ 
sibility,^ is fair, I think, to assume that the weakening of the
authority of Roman Catholic dogma in Eighteenth Century Prance 
left men without a substitute there, for the very same reason, 
and therefore it is to Prance we must look for an exhibition of 
what romantic love, uncontrolled by any austere moral code 
inherited from the past, can become in a very short time.The 
evidence we find, not in More, but in Babbitt,in his study of 
romantic love as he finds it in the Prench authors of the first 
half of the Nineteenth Century,evidence drawn from their own
writings and therefore available for all his readers to examine
1 
in its full context. There we see the insatiable appetite, not
only of the flesh, but even more of the imagination which the 
new philosophy begot, the restlessness, the ennui, the sadistic 
cruelty, the final inertia of despair through which passion 
burns itself to extinction. If,in the later English Romantics, 
this same rake's progress is evident, it is partly because the 
values inherited from the past which saved their immediate 
predecessors from complete disillusionment, have by new grown Jkki 
thinjbut even more so, because the men of the'Nineties have
come directly under the literary influence of the later Prench
23 4 
Romantics. Arthur Bymons, W,B*Yeats ,Oscar Wilde, are but three
of their generation affected by the mood of the French cult of
5 
I* art pour I*art f or the mingling of an extremely objective
aestheticiem and an extremelya subjective introspection,as in
6 
the work of Baudelaire.
.Babbitt. RousTeau and Romanticism, pp- 2-2-5 
Shelburne Essays "!•». 178*
*d*K(»'n>iiirnft Essays X,pf>.£<35 ^AQf 
onej.PUrne Jjissays 1,pp. 209-11 <
2.More. l,p,17 . «. Ibid..p.221. 
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In Volume 111 of the Hew Shelfeurne Essays^More considers 
the Freudian attempt to analyse Baudelaire if terms of an Odipus 
complex, outlined fey Dr. Benekaforgue in L'lchec de Baudelaire. 
Par deeper than the impotence of normal sexual feeling, More sees 
at work in him those motires which are the mainspring of feoth 
indiridual and group psychology, the imperialism and mysticism 
which Ernest de Seilliere had seen as particularly preralent 
since the days of Rousseau,that is, since the weakening of any 
ethical check, whether outward in the form of law, or inward in 
the form of the religious conscience. Imperialism is only another 
name for the Patristic lifeido dominandi. the lust for power as it 
had Tee en recognised Vy Hofefees,aztd it becomes mystical whenerer it 
is reinforced fey a feelief that the lust of domination is corrobor­ 
ated and santified fey ultimate forces shaping our destiny. In the
A 
last resort, the ITfeido sentiendi, the lust for sensation, for
erotic desire, is out a subsidiary aspect of Imperialistic mystic­ 
ism, the desire for the unlimited expansion of the Ego fey afesorfe- 
ing, or feeing afesorfeed into, the personality of the loyed one. The t 
final passion, to More, is for autonomy,for irresponsifeility, for 
freedom from restraint, and romantic lore is feut another expreasion 
of the same urge. Man seeks freedom through the denial of the 
supernatural, or at the feest, its equation with the erotic yearn­ 
ing after infinity, and having repudiated any authority on or 
afeore the plane of reason, he seeks for some reality feelow, in 
the gratification and multiplication of sensation and impulse.
l.Hore. Bew 5Ee"lfeurne Essays III»pp.lll-113i
The third expression of the expansive aspirations of 
Romanticism is in the real* of social relationships. As well 
as Becking to find an extension of his own personality in 
nature and in sexual lore, nan seeks also to come into a 
relationship with other men which satisfies hie own self- 
lore. In the past this has found expression in tyranny and 
domination, out the modern phase of the sane assertion of the self 
is more subtle, masquerading as altruism and social sympathy. 
Outwardly, man appears to be concerned ©nly for the welfare 
of his fellows, but Vy so being, he is primarily concerned for 
himself, not only because he desires for others to do unto him 
as he does unto them, out because of the gratification of hie 
personal pride which an appearance of philanthropy gives. Such 
is both More and Babbitt's diagnosis of humanitarianism, and 
it is this aspect of romantic egotism which they deprecate in
modern literature even more than romantic pantheism and erot-1 
icism. Few of the outstanding figures are untouched by the
illusion of alruism as the goal of human activity. A
We hare already seen Here's criticism of Wordsworth's 
idealisation of the poorer classes and of country folk, whilst 
seeking to escape in nature the corruption and selfishness of 
men in towns. In Shelley, the same belief, nurtured upon far 
greater reserves of enthusiasm and vitality, gives rise to a 
perpetual straining after social change. Wordsworth, commencing
1. Cf.pp. 314 ff.
with the same "belief in the essential goodness of human nature 
freed from the shackles of the past, learned its fallacy through 
painful and shattering experience during the final years of the 
French Revolution.'But with Shelley revolution meant the flutter­ 
ing of an opaque and dizzying flag Between the poet's inner eye 
and the truth of human nature—— With a child-like credulity 
almost inconceivable he accepted the current doctrine that
mankind is naturally and inherently virtuous, needing only the
applied 
deliverance from some outwardly^ oppression to spring back to its
essential perfection. With Rousseau the perverting force had been
property. With Shelley it was more commonly personified as Jeho-
1 
vah or Jovet... jU8t as Wordsworth had shrunk from worldly men
whilst extolling the virtue of lowly folk, so Shelley, whilst *.
2 seeing mankind in general as naturally virtuous and generous,
could still castigate the evil-doings of any who opposed him. 
It is noticeable that many of his friends who were at first 
angels of light became to him demons of malevolence when he got
to know them as real individuals and not just projections of hie
3 
personal emotions. For their suffering, he, the most pitying of
men, could feel no pity, for to make them suffer was to avenge 
the cause of righteousness against its enemies. Hence the bru­ 
tality of his treatment of Harriet Westbrook. By birth, Shelley 
was neither a orute nor a maniac. He was a man of acutelsensibil- 
ity, quick to sympathise with the down-trodden of the world, but 
i"7 SheTburne Essays Vll,pp.6-7.
.More, Shelourne Essays Vll,pp.14-16.
his standards of deciding who were the oppressed and who were 
the oppressors were purely subjective. His private passions 
were identified with his indignant revolt against tyranny in 
his poems, and the threats and horrors he breathes out against 
Jove in Prometheus Unbound have the same source as his imprecations 
against the Wcstbrooks, or his indictment of Elisabeth Kitchener. 
His apparent callousness is threfore the outcome of the effect 
on his character of his revolutionary philosophy,itself a form of 
inverted imperialism.
Skelley lacked almost completely the greater 
aesthetio humility which in the end rendered Keats curiously
docile to tradition, and made him critical of the consistency
2 
of his own work as well as of that of others* Yet so obsessed
is More with the bogey of humanitarianism that he suspects its 
presence in Keats also,prompting him to reshape Hyperion.More 
attributes the failure of the first Hy»erion to the division 
of the poet*s sympathies between the dying order*represented 
by Saturn,towards which he felt a natural attraction, and the 
new order,represented by Jupiter.which he had set out ostensibly 
to exalt. As a result, Keats sought to recast his poem in a more 
frankly subjective mood. The poet, about to be initiated into 
the divine mysteries of the temple he beholds in a vision,cries 
out to his guide,lionet a, for help*
'"High Prophetess",said I,"purge off, 
Benign,if so it please,my mind's film . 
"Hone can usurp this height", retuimed that shade, 
"But those to whom the miseries of the world 
Are misery, and will not let them rest".
5*®^L"5"-re2* More, 5He]b wr^TEiS* vtt^VHJp. I ^ 14.
But are there net ethers* eriee thf poet, whe hare felt the agony 
ef the world, and hare laboured fer its redemption? Where are 
they, that they are net here?
•These whom theu spake st ef are ne visionaries", 
Rejein'd that voiee| "they are ne dreamers weak; 
They seek ne wender but the human face, 
^e music but a happy-noted reieet 
They eeme net here, they hare ne thought te come} 
And theu art here, fer theu art less than they* 
What benefit canst theu de, er all thy tribe, 
Te the great werld? Theu art a dreaming thing" •
1 And thereupen, in a vision, she unfolds before his eyes the fall 
of Hyperien and the progress of humanity symbolised in the advent 
ef Apollo. To compare this mutilated version with the poem Keats 
had written under the instructive inspiration of his genius is 
one of the saddest tasks of the student of literature.
'No, it was not any dislike of Miltenic idioms or any impulse
from -^ante that brought about this change in his ambition; it was
1 
the working of the ineluctable time-spirit**
This humanitarian mood More attributes, not so much to the Cockney 
influences of Leigh Hunt, too trivial to hold Keats permanently, 
though strong enough to prepare him for this treachery to his
nature, as to* the richer note of *ordsworth,the still sad music
2 
of humanity running through the poet's mighty song. 1
It is but to be expected that if ''ore misunderstood the 
more virile strain underlying the pantheism and humanitarian ism 
•fperdswerth's peetry because of his failure to take into account
Wordsworth's spiritual development, lie should similarly overlook
More- ShtJburnfr ESSASS N ______ ______ _______ ______ ___ ^^ —————————————
2. Ibid., p. 127.
the amazing erolution in Keats* outlook which within a short 
time was transmuted from a merely epicurean indulgence of the 
senses into a mastery of a difficult and tragic form of "beauty, 
apprehended through the contemplation of human suffering and 
dereliction—' in short through the identical mode of perception 
which characterised Wordsworth*s attitude to scenes of extreme £ 
desolation and human Beings faced with ultimate disaster and
despair, and through it,attaining to the peace of complete detach-
1 
ment. This is something very different from the restless aspiring
after social reform which characterised the purely humanitarian 
thinkers. The great work of ¥oth Keats and Wordsworth has a calm, 
an almost static,serenity which contrasts vividly with the constant
aspiring after ohange and movement in much of the work of other
2 
Romantics, such as Shelley, and later, William ftorris.
The sense of continuous motion common to the work 
of toth Shelley and Morris is not confined only to those elements
which deal directly with social progress and revolution, although
se 
thejc reveal their neoterism in its most blatant form. The lack
of inward *recueillementj »red of a doctrine of social discontent, 
is reflected in the fluidity and breathless onrush of their poetry 
as a whole. Of Morris, More says,'You may sink your plummet into 
his mind but you will touch no bottom} there is no solid core;
all is movement and flux, save this sense of beauty,, which was
3 
itself largely a matter of flowing rhythm.' For the aristocratic
emphasis on order,poise,integrity of conception in art,the new
democratic literature introduced spontaneity,rariety of detail, 
equality of importance for each isolated beajuty. Thus, the 
trends which socialism was bringing into politics were paralleled 
Tiy similar trends in aesthetics? the democratisation of literature 
not only affects the content, but has far-reaching effects en the 
fora*
Something of this was obvious as early as The Lvtical 
Ballads with the almost prosaic flattening of Wordsworth's verse 
when he was writing ostensibly in the language of ordinary men, 
which contrasts so pitiably with the rich sonorousness of his 
poetry when he forgot his theories. But the direction in which 
the movement was heading became fully evident with the work of 
a Walt Whitman in whom the return to nature and the exaltation
of the plebeian meant a far more thorough-going revolt against
1 
poetie convention* 'He observed— as who has not— a certain hoi-
lowness in almost all the poetry of the day, owing to the fact 
that it was not rooted in the realities of modern life. The 
rhythm was merely pretty, and had lost its vital swing; the 
primitive habits which had made it a "bond of union by the clap­ 
ping of hands and the beating,of feet were too far in the past
2 
to lend it any communal force.' Similarly, the spirit of verse
also a thing of the past, a product of feudalism. 'In these 
traditions of form and spirit the poet was swathed until he 
sang no longer as a free individual man in touch with the
p.jfY- 78. 
2.More. Shelburne |ssavs !V,p.l92.
universal currents of life, but was an empty echo of an outworn 
age, a simulacrum (this was the word Walt Whitman applied to Swin­ 
burne) of vanished emotions. To restore poetry to its dominie* 
over the present,therefore, Whitman would first of all abrogate 
the accepted rules of rhythm, and would allow his lines to
swing, so he thought, with the liquid abanderuuDi* of the waves
1 
and winds.'
The belief in the individual and in the brotherhood 
of man had stiill further repercussions in so far as tewy now 
saw the criterion of literary judgment to be, not the considered 
response to a work of the trained and critical taste of an 
intellectual ilite, but the purely emotional reaction of the 
masses.For the former court of appeal in the 'taste of the 
man who had attained to the most perfect harmony of culture
and to the fullest development of culture and to the fullest
2 
development of character 1 ,Tolstoy would substitute the judgment
of the ordinary Russian peasant. 'Art has nothing to do with 
the intellect or with the will, or yet with the exclusive emot­ 
ions of a falsely isolated and corrupted aristocracy, but appeals
to the haart of the humblest man, in whom the universal feelings
3 
of humanity have not been covered over by culture or luxury.*
The effects of such an attitude to art are,paradoxically enough, 
identical with those of the antithetical cult of aestheticism 
which was disputing with humanitarianism for supremacy on the
1.Ibid..P.193.
S .More,Shelburne Essays l,p.213. »Ibid> •Pp.zia-14*
literary scene of the late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries! - 
criticism "became purely subject ire and impressionistic, although 
in the f •naer.it is the individual vision of the artist, the 
man of refined and exquisite sensibility, and in the second,
the pleasure of the unlettered proletariat which decides the'1 
merit of a work of art.
The creation of a democratic or e»en rerolutionary 
literature is the peculiar expression of the awakening sympathy 
of the writer with his fellow-men in the Nineteenth Century and 
after; out parallel to this runs a reviving national conscitus- 
ness, stimulating, the poet to a self -identification with his 
fellow-countrymen* For the humanitarian's vague visionary aspir­ 
ations towards a universal "brotherhood of man in the future, the 
nationalist looks back to his country's past, and there in the
common ground of history and tradition
finds the bond that links him to all those who have descended 
from the same stock. Instead of a semi-mystical "belief in
'one far-off divine event 
To which the whole creation moves',
the nationalist "believes, to varying degrees of literal fervour, 
in the efficacy of a mysterioua cult qf »lood and soil by which 
all the mem* era of the nation are fused into a supernatural and 
corporate unity. This tendency was the more powerful in nations 
whose independence had been threatened by alien forces, and 
who had kept alive their individuality by brooding upon their
inheritance from literature, history and legend. This mood, 
l.Uf .pp
reinforced liy something of the humanitarian's dream of unirersal 
regeneration, lieoame the impetus of the poetry of Fiona Macleod
(William Sharp) te whom More derates an essay *n The Drift of 
Romanticism* It has "been queried why More should attach such im­ 
portance to one who, in the last resort, must! remain one of 
the least of 'minor' poets. But undoubtedly to More, Sharp repre­ 
sented one facet of the Romantic imagination, the desire to escape 
the harsh reality of the present ty absorption into the world of 
legend and magic. As a lad, Sharp had spent his school holiday* 
on lona where he had heard from an He¥ridean priest of the time 
when the island should lie the centre of a regenerative force 
sweeping the world. He had assimilated the ancient legends and
nature-myths lingering on in such out of the wa$ places and »y
past 
dwelling upon the Celtic^came to believe that through his effort
to revive the Celtic consciousness, a strange cosmic revolution
a 
was to be brought about. Here»re all the fitments of Romantic
pseudo-mysticism,heightened by a sense of racial pride and of a 
unique personal destinyj and to the usual Romantic proneness to 
lose any precise outline of its visions in a general evaporation of 
detail into nebulous phantasmagoria, there is added the strong 
Celtic tendency to a nostalgic melancholy. Although Sharp never 
joined the Neo-Celtic school, he was himself victim to the same 
double-misunderstanding as the other writers of the Celtic revival. 
They thought they were renewing the old Celtic idealism, whereas i n 
reality, their inspiration came from a wholly different source.
Similarly they thought they were the heralds of youth, whereas they 
were 'fag-end of * an expiring increment' r--'The new and the old 
schools of the Celt hare nevertheless certain traitd in common—> 
the sense of fateful brooding, the feeling of dark and liright 
powere concealed in nature and working mysteriously upon human 
destiny,the conception of passions as forces that have a strange 
life in themseIres and cone into the breasts of men as if they were 
ghostly visitants,the craving for unearthly but very real beauty, 
the haunting "belief in a supernatural world that lies now far 
away in the unattainable west, and now buried "beneath our feet , 
tr Just trembling in£o vision, the mixture of fear and yearning 
towards that world as a. source of incalculable joys or dark madness^ 
to those who break in upon its secret reserve*----*But withal the 
essential spirit of the sagas is quite different from that of these 
imitators— as different as tremendoud action is from sickly brood­ 
ing* The light in the old tales is hard and sharp and brilliant, 
whereas our modern writers rather like to merge the outlines of 
nature in an all-obliterating grey* The heroes in the sagas are men
and women that throb with insatiable life, and their emotions,
are 
whatever mysticism may lie in the background, kJKK the stark*
mortal passions of love and greed and hatred and revenge and lament­ 
able griefj whereas it is the creed of the newer school, fortunately 
not always followed, to create a literature which instead of dealing
with the clashing wills of men, shall in the words of Fiona Macleod
t 
offer"the sublest and the most searching means for the imagination
to compel reality to dreams, to compel actuality to vision, to
to compel tp the symbMie congregation of words the bewi"dering throng
1 " 
of wandering and illusire thoughts and ideas"!
The same traits mark the writings of W,B.Yeats and other
poet* of the Gaelic reriral. In them, however, the influence
2
•f decadent French romanticism is more easily traced, and it
is possible to analyse more definitely the difference between *\h**
A
virile passion and pathos of ancient Irish literature as seen,
for example, in the translation by Lady Gregory, of the Irish
3
Epic . But even in ancient Irish literature there is a basic weaku
-ness of imaginative power which sets the Celtic far below the 
Greek or Reman epics.Thevwork is marred by naivete" of conception, 
by lack of constructive skill, and above all by a shrinking from 
reality which made the creators of Irish mythology find in thedeli- 
cate and tricksy Fairy race the native expression of the same
principle ©f life and vitality as the Greeks sought in the Diony-
4 
sian vein in drama.' The Irish sagas suffer from the lack of a
centre in a moral sense, Their failure was the same as that of the 
whole range of Romantic literature*the absorption in a false illu­ 
sion,whereby the reality of the outer universe is dissolved into 
a dream .Nature, sexual love,social regeneration,racial mysticism, 
all are forms of the false illusion of romanticism in contrast to
the sagesset the true wisdom of disillusion, of which Jeubert
5 
speaks*
1.More. Shelburne Essays Vlll.p.l38-3?I
2.More, Shelburne Issavs l,p«181.
3.1bid*.ppl59-60.
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And when the desire for sensation is sated,and false 
illusion fades* what then? Man, in a rerulsion of feeling, 
may seek to find some solid foothold in a Realism which seeks 
to record objectirely its observations of the phenomenal 
world, or else,Aenying the existence of any reality,may 
plunge into the erer-dissolring stream of impressions which,
to the Sur-realist,is the only thing we can know. To the
1 
majority of critics, amonfftt them V.L.Lucas, and Edmund
2 
Wilson, Realism is a break-mway from Romanticism; to More
and Babbitt, it was its logical conclusion.'The Romantic 
Morement reflected the abnegation of the will as controlled
by reason, and a substitution in its place of the emotions
of &»vcy. 
guided by the vagaries^ Formlthis untrammelled use of the
fancy, naturalism following in the wake of the materialistic 
adrance of science, turned to the boasted study of reality,
thus learing room neither for the free will nor for the
,3 
imagination. From scientific naturalism came what More and
Babbitt labelled •hard* Romanticism, in contrast to 'soft'or
4 
sentimental Romanticism, and it was this 'hard'Romanticism,
with its emphasis on determinism, which in turn merged into 
Realism. Again, Sur-realism or Symbolism, which to most critics 
is the yery antithesis of Realism, is to the Humanist but 
another aspect of the same tendency of man, resulting in the
1.F.L.Lucas.op.cit.,pp.127-29.
2.Edmund Wilson, Axel's Castle^ New York? 1936),p. 11.
3.More, Shelburne Essays 11,pp.164-65.
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same denial of free will and the ultimate sterility of the 
imagination*Both are phases of a naturalism which* refusing to 
accept the dualism of the natural and the supernatural, 
the divine and the human, the physical and the spiritual, 
seeks to assert itself as the Absolute.The will has "been over** 
- thrown, Reason, dethroned,the personal emotions or thymoeides, 
sated with excess of passion) the day belongs to the instincts, 
to the natural man,now envisaging himself as part of the 
predetermined mechanical order of nature,new envisaging nature 
as shwring in his own consciousness of restless,fluctuating 
impressions, without form and void.
The tendency of man throughout the centuries has 
"been to explain away one or other of the terras of dualism, 
and because of his greater awareness of the physical,he has 
sought to find some monistic solution of the universe, either
as uniform order or uniform movement. Such,we shall see later,
1 
were the rival philosophies of the Stoics and Epicureansi
and since the Sixteenth Century,there has been an ever-growing 
tendency to repeat the experiment.
The increasing importance of scientific law had 
led men to think of the universe as a vast undeviating machine
N*»ft£ *
whose movement,—and the movement of all its parts^nre jiter- 
mined by certain inexorable conditions, but the full conse­ 
quences of such an attitude had only become apparent during
l.More. Shelburne Essays.VI.PP.in /s;cf .pp,44-7-S'o.
the last century, as Realism had sought to depict man as a 
product of a given environment and heredity.'The worldjto the 
Realist,'runs for ever in a set groove under some complex of
mechanical laws, and ---man, like the animals, is no more than a
1 
cog in the large fatalistic machine! To him, as to Taine,vice
and virtue are merely products of certain circumstances for 
which man cannot lie held responsible, for he is impotent to 
"break through the bonds or mechanical necessity. But,whereas 
in the Nineteenth Century, it was generally assumed that the 
direction of the great world-machine,-and man's automatic move­ 
ment with it r* was towards progress, in the Twentieth Century, 
the scientific desire to record objectively and realistically 
facts as they appeared, made it inevitable that they should admit 
the presence of much that was grim and degrading in modern ex­ 
perience. In the past, the castigators of evil and vice had 
always "been able to appeal to man to reform himself, but in 
a world where man is only a helpless pawn, there is nothing to 
"be done but to stand up and record the stages of his death strug­ 
gle with a relentless fate. So it is that modern literature 
'looks upon human nature with the enflamed vision of a monocular 
Cyclops', seeing man as'the slave of his temperament or a mech­ 
anism propelled by complexes and reactions, a vortex of sensations
2 
with no centre of stability within the flux'. Something of this
3 
we have already seen in connection with the novels of Gissing,
z_____New_____________________________________________ 
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and it is this same sense of human helplessness in the clutch of 
an inexorable determinism which distinguishes the modern 'social* 
novel from that of the Nineteenth Century. Mrs. Gaskell's Mary 
Barton or North and South jt Charlotte Bronte's Shirley,Disraeli*s 
§y.>Jl» Dickens' Hard Times. Mrs.Craik's John Halifax Gentleman 
were novels 'with a purpose', written to awaken a sense of oblig­ 
ation and pi$y in the strong towards the weak* The Realist novel, 
when it had any purpose at all, set out rather 'to preach a mill-
enium of brotherly love to be achieved through inflaming the hatred
.1 
of the poor against the richf, quite an illogical aim in so far as
the rich in such a rigorously determined order, were no more 
morally responsible for their actions than the poor. The effect 
of the fiction of the Zola- Tolstoy school, though More admits it
might "be immediately effective, is 'only a harsh contraction of «
2 
spirit, and its end is in hatred and revolution and palsy and decay t
But eve)? within the Realist school there has been a change for the 
worses to the old enthusiasm for social betterment,however mater­ 
ialistic, however earth-bound its aim, has succeeded a mood of 
cynical futilitarianism. In America, particularly, men have 
turned in disdain from! the moralising vein if the Hew England
writers,and when they in turn dweil upon the degradation of
3 
society, itlis in no mood of crusading fervour. The prevailing
philosophy is Behaviourism, and spectator and victim alike are 
impotent t« deliver humanity from its fatalistic grip.All the
1.More.New Shelburne Essays l,p.73.
2.Ibid..p.77.
3.More.New Shelburne Essays 111,p.5.
Aodern author can do is record with callous az\d cynical detachment 
the story of men involved in an unequal struggle with the forces of 
materialism. This is the mood of the modern American novel, of 
Dreiser's American Tragedy, of Sinclair Lewis' Main Street*of 
John Du Passos* Manhattan Transfer!- and if More brought down upon
his head the righteous indignation of the liberal critics by
1 
his reference to the last-named as an 'explosion in a cess-pool',
he did so in no mood of personal prejudice or petulance. He was 
concerned^ as he told us in the Preface to Series Vlll of the 
Shelburne Essays, less with individual books and authors than 
with the direction of certain currents of thought; and with the 
Realists' stress on the purely physiological and animal side of
man's being, he seemed to see art plunged from its concern with
2 
hyperphysical realities and the realm of Platonic Ideas to wallow
in the dark primaeval slough of Matter. What is uppermost in his 
mind becomes clear in his comment upon the novels of Sherwood 
Anderson in which'the withdrawal of any principle of intellectual 
control or discrimination' coupled with 'a kind of low vitality, 
a sickly feverishness of the imagination, sets loose those 
prurient fancy that the normal man holds in abeyance'.'To peruse 
Mr. Anderson is to be reminded of Plato's account of the appet­ 
ites that rouse themselves in a man when, gorged with meat and 
drink,he falls asleep, and the wild beast within him, freed from 
the control of reason, goes forth to commit him to all kinds of
follies and shameful deeds from which in his waking moments he
3 
shrink in abhorrence.'
. Mo r e. teJLaaej, gurne^gggy g—T7y^rT~;——————————————————— 
Ibid. ,p|>.tj- -u ~~——— ^-Ibid. ,p. si.
These aspects of Twentieth Century literature but confirm 
More in fears he had already felt as early as Series Two of the 
Shelburne Essays, when, in an apppeciation of the writings of 
Lafcadio Hearn, he had considered the possible developments of 
science's probings into the beginnings of the human race. In his 
essay The Idea of PreexisteneeHearn had sought to bring out the 
harmony he beliered to exist between evolution and the Buddhistic 
conception of preexistence,in such a way that he lent to the 
Oriental doctrine a new and terrifying significance. 'Prom this 
union with science the Oriental belief in the indwelling of the 
past now receives a vividness »f present actuality that dissolves 
the Sftul into ghostly intimacy with the mystic unexplored back­ 
ground of life. As a consequence of this new sense of impermanence 
and of this new realism lent to the indwelling of the past, all 
the primitive emotions of the heart are translated into a strange 
language which, when once it lays hold of the imagination carries us
into a region of dreams akin to that world which our psychologists
1 ^ 
dimly call the subliminal or the subconscious. 1 Fr©A this dark
backward and abysm of time rise up recollections «f the past 
experience of mankind crystallised in an inherited race-memory. 
To More, ouch a power of corporate mwmory has a rich significance 
for art, but at the same time,a significance fraught with grim 
consequences.Step by step down the ages, the Church has withstood 
the disclosures of science as though terrified of the mysteries
1.MoreT^heTburne Essays 11,pp. 60-61.
it may unveil, and now at last, it seems that such fear was 
justified; the last strong-hold of man's individual life is 
assailed* 'In the ghostly residuum of these meditations we 
may perceive a vision dimly foreshadowing itself which man­ 
kind for centuries,nay, for thousands of years has striven 
unwittingly to Iceep veiled! Not only do 'vague visitations 
from man's primeval state haunt his subconscious mindfc "but 
vestiges of a still earlier stage of evolution may yet be 
enclosed within the lower levels of his consciousness^ As 
the mind recoils before relics of a paleolithic ageJJKbJuw- 
'abhorrent monstrosities, amphibian*, reptiles that beat 
the air with wings of nightmare breaithj'reluctant hidden 
records of "bestial growths, brought to light by man's prob­ 
ing into the past, so it would turn in shame and terror from 
the discovery of some new geology which might lay "bare the 
covered strata of memory in our brain corresponding, to these 
records of the earthJ for there is nothing lost, and in some 
mysterious way the memories of all that obscure past arex 
stored up within us'--- 'Consider the horror of "beholding 
in our consciousness the resemblance of such fears and fren­ 
zies, such cruel passions and wallowing desires as would 
correspond to those gigantic and abortive relics of antiquity. 
Would not the world in all its shame cry out for some Lethean 
draught of sleep, though it were profound as the oblivion of
Nirvana?'5"
l.lbicL.
.Ibid.,pp.69-70.
AlthAugh man as he is portrayed in the Realistic novel 
appears as the victim of such irresistible primal urges,it 
is KM! in its rival literary doctrine,Sur-realism, that the 
full implications of modern science find their most signif­ 
icant expression. The Sur-realiste, the Aesthetics-as More 
calls them more frequently-seeing that a literature depend­ 
ent on such a conception of life as the Realists dejbict
"becomes 'sicklied o'er with the depression of conscious
1 
fjitilityj recognise no reality but what the artist himself
creates within his art. The artist is therefore free from 
all moral responsibility} he owes no fealty to society or 
its laws or conventions} he obeys only the law of his own
inspiration, and he can stand aloof from the life of man-
2 
kind, absorbed in his own esoteric art. The first effect
of such a creed is to exalt its votaries with the feeling 
of their own emancipation from the iron law of mechanism 
which binds other men. They may be haunted by a suspicion 
that our world, far from exhibiting the tight regularity
of a machine, is 'an infinite flux of accidents without
3 t 
calculable plan or meaning,' but that does not disturb/hem.
It only leaves them the more free to design whatever pattern 
their art requires. This suspicion is confirmed by the theories 
of modern science, especially of the psychology of Bergson 
and William James. The individual is no longer envisaged as
Essays l,p.
Essays 1,PX1.
a static entity, tut as a succession of changing states. 
linked by the power of the associative memory. The writer 
cannot seelc t« give a coherent or consistent picture of life; 
he can only give impressions as they arise from the vortex 
of the subconscious mind which is the actual propulsive power 
behind human behaviour. There is for him no objective and 
eternal standard of truth which, when found, demands unwavering 
allegiance; only glimpses of 'some momentary aspect of the
1 
no sooner beheld than lost in the flowing stream of impressions*.
The artist, therefore, owes allegiance to no authority beyond 
that of his own independent vision, and it is this divorce of 
art from social values which drives the artist even more com­ 
pletely into the solitude of his own esoteric brooding. Aesthet- 
icism thus moves in a vicious circle of ever deepening separ­ 
ation from the current of everyday life. It has no means of 
communication with the outside world through the medium of 
ordinary language operating on the level of consciousness. The 
artist can find expression for his vision only through the use 
of symbols evoking various phases of the flux, associated one
with the other by the power pf memory. The Symbolist sees 'the
constantly , , , m solid fabric of life^dissolving into sentiment, which is but
another name for sensations floating up from some dark centre
»
of the subconscious under the sway of accidental associations,
ungoverned by will, controlled by no faculty of selection,
2 
never solidifying into action'.
SEeiourne assays lll,p.29"; —————
But the imagination of man craves reality. The artist, 
therefore, seeking a phantom ideal of beauty divorced frem 
belief in a higher reality ef spiritual ideas, is to More, 
'like a man in a balloon when his moorings are cut. He sears 
up and up, until, overtaken by the dizziness of the void, he 
deflates the balloon, and falls, rushing headlong downwards 
into space. The aeronaut JDK may reach the ground, but the 
artist 'in hi» revolutionary search for reality —— is precipit­ 
ated down and down into the very depths of his own being, into 
that vast dark region of the soul below the plane of ordered 
and rationalised life. Being unable to sink lower he will feel
that at last his feet are set on a foundation of facts which he
ing 
calls the nature of man. "is art will be to reproduce in flowrxjc
language the vapours that float up unsolicited through the con­ 
scious mind from the abyss of the unconscious. Rational selection 
and spiritual authority have been repudiated, and the only law 
governing the flux is the so-called association of ideas, the fact
that one image by some chance similarity evokea another, and one
I 
sensation fades into another.'
With the Aesthete, however, as with the Realist, once the 
active control of consciousness is removed, the impressions t»
which the mind gives way in vacuity, are »f a dissolute, frequently
2 of a bestial, character. Again one is reminded of Plato's warning.
Nothing is more tragic than to trace the gradual loosening of the
1. Ibid. .p. 80.
2.
aesthetic imagination from its initial pursuit of an ideal of 
beauty to its final obsession with the unclean and lubricious 
images which throng up from the loejtid whirlpool of the sublim- 
k inal.
Nowhere d«es More find clearer eridence of the retuen 
of Chaos and dark Necessity as the ruling principle in literature 
than in the work of two of the leading norelists of the day, 
Joyce and Proust. The pilgrim's regress is the theme of More's 
essay on James Joyce in which he fellows the moral deterioration
of the artist from the high hopes and ideals of the young Stephen
1 Daedalus at the end of A gtrtrait of the Artist as a Young ltan»
~ 2 
to the moral slough of Ulysses* Already during the earlier work,
however,there is present the seed of the subsequent dissolution,
in'the self-liberation of the artist from the spiritual values
e 
and dogmatic authority of tradition, and the cons'qaent forging
of conscience out of the uncontrolled spontaneity of his indiv-
3 
idual consciousness! When once that which lies above reason
has been removed from its position of authority, the naturalist 
seeks reality in that which lies below, and so Ulysses becomes 
'a creation of ugliness,a congeries of ugly pictures expressed 
in the speech of Dublin 's gutters. 1 Literature has turned from 
the portrayal of the man of character, and even of passion,to
batten upon a picture of man as a sheer creature of instinct. 
New ————
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'The living man as a vehicle of the soul is not the real 
thing,but enly the putrid corpse: the body as it appears to the 
eye is not the real thing, but to know its reality you must 
strip it of its integument and fumble in its entrails. And 
this identification of realism with the underside of aature 
is the almost inevitable companion of an atheistic philosophy
that dissolves the universe into a frotean flux of meaningless
1 
change 1 .
The end of Stephen's attempt to encounter anew the reality 
of experience, and forge in the smithy of his own soul the uncrea­ 
ted conscience of his race ends in aireligion k rebours,exemplified 
by the Black Mass, celebrated at the wildest moment ofnthe brothel 
scene. To Mr.T.S.Eliot, this is evidence of a deep-rooted convict­ 
ion of sin in Joyce, the perverted expression of a strong sense 
of religious orthodoxy; but to More, such art reveals not a con­ 
viction of sin, but 'the ultimate principle of evil invoked as the 
very enemy of truth reinforced by the .judgment of philosophy and 
theology'• Stephen's descent from grace is marked by three stages 
which correspond to the three assaults of the devil upon Father 
Girdlestone's soul in Wonsignor R,N.Benson f s story The Mtrror of 
Shalott. The order of the three temptations, seeming to begin 
with the most, and end with the least,radical, had puzzled More 
until he saw how it coincided with the stages of Joyce's regress 
from The Portrait to Ulysses. In both cases, the attack upon 
faith opens with a questioning of the validity of all religious
experience as something unreal and devoid of authority, followed 
in Stephen's case by a spiritual relapse into an emotional 
hedonism. This was followed by a more direct attack upon the reason 
the intellectual doubt and desire for proof from which there was 
no refuge save by plunging into the one thing standing sure, the 
world of sense. For this intellectual betrayal Stephen was already 
prepared by his imaginative dissolution, and by the end- of the 
Portrait, he had succumbed to this second temptation. Out of these 
previous treacheries emerged the last and worst rejection, the
rejection of all reality, the dissolution of the solid-seeming
1 
physical universe into the merest phantasmagoria of illusion'.
'In the priest's story this is described as the insurgence from 
its last and most secret lair, a voice crying to him that even
the world of sense is an illusion, a whirling of shadows in the
2 
void beneath which the only reality is some horror of loathing,*
the experience of a Renan in the Dialopues Philesophioues that
3 
the world M^est que le cauchemar d'un Dieu ivrogne.
111 1 understood", said Father Girdlestone,"at this moment 
as never before, how that process consummates itself. It begins, 
as mine did, with the carrying of the inner life by storm. That 
may come about by deliberate acquiescence in sin— I should 
suppose that it always does in some degree. Then the intellect 
is attacked— it may only be in one point — a "delusion" it is 
called; and with many persons regarded only as eccentric the
2.Ibid7,p.95.
3. Ernest Renan, Dialogues Philosophiques, (Parisiie23). Preface, p
process goes no further. But when the triumph is complete, the 
world of sense too is lost— and the man raves. I knew at that 
time for absolute fact that this is the precess. The "delusions" 
of the mad are not non-existent— they are glimpses, horrible or 
feul or fantastic, of that strange world that we take so quietly 
for granted, that at this moment and at every moment is perpet­ 
ually about us— foaming out its waters in lust or violence or
,1 mad irresponsible blasphemy against the Most High9 .
More, in the last volume of essays he ever wrote, had 
returned to the master-theme that had absorbed zhftn in the 
opening volumes of the Shelburne •&ssays« the vertiginous mad­ 
ness of the man who, having confused illusion and sagesse, 
awakens from his false dreams to find before him the nightmare 
of the abyss.
The votaries of Joyce and Proust who, reacting against 
the mechanical determinism of the Realist, begin to think for 
themselves, find thought acting as a dissolvent on the solid- 
seeming fabric of life, until the only certainty left is the
permanent thing discoverable 
principle of uncertainty and the onlyxsutxJtmiHiyxJrftxi
2 
is the law of impermanence'. Such apprehensions can be conveyed
only through the medium of symbolism, whereby all too frequently
the imagination becomes the servant of the flesh or merely evap-
3
orates into the so-called stream of consciousness. But to main­ 
tain the ultimate detachment of natjire before the horror of the
l.ltore. New Shelburne Essays lll,p.95l "" 
2.Ibid.,p.48.
void is more than the self-liberated soul can do, and so frequently, 
as in Proust, there is a vacillation from Symbolism to Realism, 
from an awareness of the Protean flux of human consciousness to 
an awareness of the outwardly tangible phenomena of life in soc­ 
iety. The one thing supposed to lend order and coherence to human 
impressions is memory, in the Bergsonian sense, bjit even memory 
can in itself act as-a solvent soi^that there is no great differ­ 
ence between the memory of reality and the memory of a dream. 
Illusion is the underground of both the sentimental and the 
naturalistic pictures of life in A la Recherche d'un Temps Perdu. 
The word 'nothingness 1 recurs over and over again like a warning 
signal throughout the whole works all is vanity both in the various 
classes of society whom Proust seeks to depict realistically, and 
in the consciousness of the artist who seeks to recreate them im­ 
aginatively through the fragmentary media of his memory. And he
mits 
transn4Jaw this sense of nothingness to the reader who 'has come,
like Dante in his infernal journey, to the brink of the dolorous 
Valley,so obscure and profound and nebulous, that gazing downwards 
the eye discovers no resting place; he has reached the limbo of 
nature where the inhabitants, cut off even from the realm of hell,
know only 1 
"Che eenza speme vivemojni disio* '
Both literature and life in their movement away from the Ideal realm 
of Being,and the intermediate plane of human reason,have sunk into 
the morbid and sullen realm of Not-Being, of that mysterious Necees-
1.Ibid, .p.56.
ity which still resists the imposition of creative form.
without aim, 
'Humanity as portrayed in Proust's imagination is^without joy,
without peace, without outlook of any sort; his people hare no 
occupation save to think about themselves, and in le nlant beyond 
the phantasmagoria of unsatisfied and forever insatiable desires 
the only reality for them is the grinning figure of Pear.*
Having repudiate! any ethical interpretatiw of life, 
Proust, seeking to find reality through ant exploration of the 
psychology of love, can only descend through the superimposed 
layers of sentiment down to the basic fact of animal desire, 
which he finds in its most naked and primeval form in the lust
of the invert, seen S "as nearest to the "fact of pure physical
2 
pleasure uncontaminated by sentiments 1 The end of the non-human­
ist way of the creative imagination is on the kjcdtxrock-bottom of 
nature, envisaged by one of the outstanding novelists of his 
generation as the sadism, or masochism^, of the sexual ^ pervert. 
More is not alone in his recognition of Proust's novel as the 
ultimate expreesion of modern nihilism. A critic as opposed to 
More himself as Edmund Wilson sees in A la Recherche d'un Temps 
Perdu the furthest outpost of the symbolist movement as a react­ 
ion against Nineteenth Century naturalism. Its sin is the ' "medi­ 
aeval sin of accidia, that combination of slothfulness and gloom 
which Dante represented as an eternal submergencein mud".' But 
to More, symbolism is far from a revolt from Nineteenth Century 
naturalism. f It is a revolt from the realistic way of naturalism
27TE £*,'??• 62 ' 63 '
merely to another way of the same bread movement 1 . Unable to 
create any reality of its own, or to escape the narrow limits 
that circumscribe both ways of the imagination , symbolism 
ends by a reversion to the grossest reality. 'These "airy imagin­ 
ings of metaphor and simile are really no more than vapours float­ 
ing up from the abyss of the subconscious where nature lies 
embedded in the double slime of hysterical sadism and hysterical
masochism. The vapours melt away in the infinite void,and we
1 
have left only "nature 1.11
llore's essay has been rigorously criticised for its 
failure to take into account sufficiently the moral indignation 
of Proust as he exposes the depp corruption of all classes of 
French society. But before a man can be justifiably indignant, 
he needs must have standards of reference, and these imply some 
point of repair beyond the reach of illusion,whereas in Proust's 
novel, everything, including the hero himself,partakes of the 
phantom nature of the flux. Yet again More is back with his fav­ 
ourite idea of the contrast of true and false illusion,false 
disillusion and the true disillusion which is wisdom itself* 
Around the purely 'humanistic' essays with their specific stress 
on 'the inner check' and 'law for man and law for thiqgj there is 
a framework of essays of a more mystical and philosophising tone— 
in which illusion manifests itself as the tempter which allures 
man from coming to terms with his universe as it actually is. In 
the last analysis, the inner check, unless it has an objective
1. Phld. ,p. 67-
co-relative in some eternal and omnipotent will is -in danger of 
being itself caught up in the illusion. By the end of his life, 
More comes to the point where he sees despair is the end| not 
only of the false disillusion which comes upon the illusion of
romanticism* but of the true disillusion of humanism unless it
1 
is consummated in the faith which is its affirmative counterpart.
The humanist chain leading up to happiness may be perfected link 
by link, but ultimately it seems attached to nothing. And so More 
asks himself 'reluctantly, almost wishing ray answer were mistaken*, 
whether those who advocate a self-sufficient humanism, are not 
doomed to disappointment. Its direction is right, if we are to 
escape form the waste land of naturalism? but it does not go far 
enough. Is there not need of a happiness based on something beyond 
the swaying tides of mortal success and failure? Will not the 
humanist, unless he adds to his 'creed the faith and the hope of 
religion, find himself at the last despite his protests, dragged
back into the camp of the naturalists . If we perish like beasts,
2 
shall we not live like beasts? 1
In 1936,More had arrived for himself at the answer to 
his rhetorical questions, but to understand how he ultimately 
came to his solution is to pass outside the immediate bounds 
of literary criticism, to explore those springs of thought and 
conduct which must in the last resort supply the imaginative 
writer with his inspiration, and which More came to see increas­ 
ingly draw their vitality from a faith in powers beyond man.
2. More, New_Shelburne Essays 111.p.20.
(vi) 
Chaos* The Confusion of Twentieth Century Naturalism.
'-----Beneath the surface of what we see and feel,beneath the 
very act of seeing and feeling, lies the unredeemed chaos of
desires and impressions, unlimited, unmeaning, unfathomable,
1 
incalculable, formless, dark.'
In his essay on James Joyce, Kore answers T.S.Eliot's 
contention that the bitter obscenity of Ulysses betrays the 
tortured conviction of sin of an erring orthodoxy by equating 
such art, not with a perversion of anything as clear-cut as 
doctrine, but with 'the ultimate principle of evil invoked as the 
very enemy of truth and reinforced by the judgment of philosophy 
and theology'------ 'What is this exploitation of the subconscious
but an attempt to reduce the world and the life of man back to 
the abysmal chaos out of which, as Plato taught, God created the
actual cosmos by the imposition of law and reason upon the prim-
chance 2
aeval stuff of gfragg and disorder.* Joyce's work is but the logi­ 
cal conclusion of the whole trend of Naturalism, as it appears to 
Paul Elmer MO re — the denial of the One and the Many in favour, 
on the one hand, of an arid mechanical determinism, and on the 
other, of the vertiginous eddy of the flux9 In his own day, the 
second alternative had, with the exploitation of the subconscious, 
usurped pride of place over its rival, and so More was faced with
17 More, Shelburne Essays Vlll.p7~S9r»
2. More, Hew Shelburne Essays lll{Princeton;i936),pp.93-94.
the task of plumbing the depths of the contemporary Chaos in 
the hope of imposing upon its multitudinousness some semblance 
of order and design.
Through his former absorption in Romantic philosophy, 
especially of the German school, with its emphasis upon the desires 
of the individual and their identification with the life of nature 
around him, and similarly, through his interest in the scientific 
thought of the Darwin- Huxley school, More's early intellectual 
career had been spent in a world of opinions dominated by a sense 
of the phenomenal. Although outwardly the two phases, romantic 
and scientific, seemea^Dpposed, as More himself had been been only
too well aware, he had come to see that they were but two facets
2 
of ane all-embracing error, the attempt to force man's conception
of himself ahd of his universe into a monistic mould by regarding 
man himself as an extension of nature. In order to counteract the 
prevailing mood of introspection and reverie, melancholy or XK&XJXX 
S?K self-assertive according to the temperament of the individual, 
More set out to draw attention through the medium of his literary 
criticism to the various forces at work in contemporary society 
undermining the harmony and self-reliance of human personality in 
favour of a vague pantheistic drifting with the cosmic tide.
What he saw as he looked out upon the world of his day 
was man painfully aware of his own isolation from his fellows, as 
well as of his utter solitude in the face of nature. Especially
1.Cf.p.S.
2.More, Shelburne Essays Yll,p«55i; cf. Babbitt.Rousseau and 
p.nd Romantic ism, p .179.
2LGJI+
was this s<J in a New England where, from a conscience once 
gripped by a terrible sense of individual responsibility before 
God, belief in the supernatural had dropped out, leaving a deep
and incommunicable dread of some unknown curse brooding over the
1 
soul and dividing the guilty man from his fellows. But not only
was man divided from his fellows and from nature; he was divided 
.against himself by two sets of contending desires within his own 
nature. He might well have said of himself, as Matthew Arnold
said more specifically of the poet; 
'Two desires toss about
oet's feverw blood; 
ip to the world withoOne affluTi ut 
And one to solitude' 2
Man was torn between his desire for movement, variety, activity, 
and his desire for stability and silence. The constant antithesis
between these two unreconciled impulses runs through the Shelburne
3 
Essays, as we have seen, as a unifying motive, and from the indiv­
idual author's awareness of this tension comes the quality of his 
peculiar vision of life.
The type of imagination which is aware only of an 
inchoate eddy of phenomena, or of a rigid and mechanical 'block- 
universe 1 , More describes as the 'quantitative 1 imagination. This 
is primarily 'scientific', as opposed to the 'qualitative' or 
'ethical' imagination which is religious in its apprehension of 
life. 4 Its- concern is with the quantitative extremes of chance and
1 , PP • 25 f f •iHIor e reburnes ,  • • » 
2. MatthelTA7nold,^oems, Obermann S
3. Cf. p. 2
4.Cf.pp.
individualism which seem at first glance to control the 
momentary meetings and separations of men and things. It 
may seek to impose order upon, or to seek law within, the 
flux of primaeval matter, as Newton did, but whenever the 
thinker enters in upon himself, to reflect upon the domi- 
ance of nature,whether it be in the direction of ungoverned 
chance or of inevitable regularity,he betrays a feeling of 
deep disquietude.. Lucretius 1 melancholy outcry,
*0 miseras hominum mentes, o pectora caeca 1 , 
or the anxious awe of Herbert Spencer, contemplating 'the 
unsoundable gulfs of space through which the law of irrespon­ 
sible evolution has extended its sway 1 are but two examples 
of man's uneasiness before a universe upon which his intellect 
would seek to impose an order of its own comprehending.'These', 
More adds significantly,'are the nostalgia of impersonal sciences \ 
as though to imply, how much more heart-rending would be the 
agony of the poet, the artist, the man of letters in the pre­ 
sence of the cosmic maelstrom unless he had some permanent
2 
point of repair.
Man's error right down the ages has been to assume 
from the mutability of the natural world around him, and the 
presence within him of shifting passions and desires that the 
whole world must therefore be in flux and that there is nothing 
stable under the sun; or else, observing a certain rhythm and
, SheTburne"^B^ays VI.pp. 169-70, 
2.More, Njw_She_rburne_^ss_aj.s 111,p.49,
and regularity in nature, he has run to the opposite conclusion 
envisaging the world as static and unchangeable. These two 
antinomies are to be founfl in Greek philosophy; to the Epi­ 
cureans, the whole universe was a whirling dance of atoms, 
whilst to the Stoics, the mechanism of the world was for ever 
fixed and unvarying. In the past, however, both explanations 
of life have remained purely hypothetical, but with the growth 
of positive science, a new importance was attached to man's 
conjectures by the possibility of testing their validity by 
experiment. Moreover, as we have previously seen, the intrusion 
of belief in progress through the centuries tended to betray 
man into the assumption that every subsequent scientific discov­ 
ery must necessarily lead to a fuller knowledge of a truth which 
was ultimately to be revealed to man. As a result, a scientist's 
conjecture rarely remained on the plane of pure, or positive, 
science; it acquired the status of a metaphysical hypothesis,
and from that became, not infrequently, the basis of a whole
2 
philosophy of life,
With positive science, which he defines in
3
'Definitions of Dualism' as primarily'the systematic accumu­ 
lation of accurate knowledge', and, secondarily,'the endeavour
to express the conditioned knowledge of the senses in the
4 
abstract conception of the faculties', More has every sympathy.
But over against the researches of positive science, he sets
1.More, Shelburne Essays VI,pp. 110-13;cf .pp.
2.More, New Shelburne Essays l,p.42 ff.
3.More, Sneipur'ne -kssaxs vin ,pp. Pfifl-.SQ.
the assertions of metaphysical science. To him, every attempt 
to rationalise our perceptions, whether it be theological, phil­ 
osophical or scientific, runs the risk of making unwarranted 
assumptions, and thereby of becoming yet another example of 
the intel 1 ectus _sibi_Sermissus . J The main danger of mataphysics 
of etery kind is that it fosters in man the pride of intellect, 2 
in contrast to the mental humility in which the true sceptic is 
prepared to abide, testifying only to those truths of which he 
has an immediate perception, but refusing to interpret them or
assemble them into a system which he seeks to impose upon other
o 
men,
In the development of scientific thought More dis­
covers three stages. In his essay on Huxley, he defines the
first, positive science, as the observation and classification
_„...,,. phenomena 
of facts, 'the discovery of constant sequences in XUSJSHHXS which
. in 'the/ ise<3 lAng^Age of
can be expressed in mathematical formulae or general^ laws' .This,
More holds to be an 'honourable and profitable study 1 , 'bringing
a vision of order out of disorder, system out of chaos, law out
4 
of chance'. Then comes the warnings 'It must be remembered that
a law of science, howeverynride its scope, does not go beyond a 
statement of the relation of observed facts, and tells us not
a word of what lies behind this relationship or of the cause
5 
of these facts'.
1. More, New Shelburne Essays 1, pp. 1-2.
2. More .New Shelburne Essays 111, p. 182. 
5.More,few_Shelburne Essays l,p. 
IY,pp.l50-53:Vl,2-4,16,i^39,- , -p 
4. More. Shelburne Essays Vlll,p.l9«-QV 111>p
Men in general are irritated by this limitation and 
seek to go "beyond a mere statement of the law to a theory of 
the reality underlying it. This gives rise to 'hypothetical 1 
science, an ambiguous term which More seeks to examine more 
closely. Either it may mean an attempt to express in language 
borrowed* from sensuous experience the nature of a cause or 
reality transcending such experience, or it ±may be taken to
signify merely a scientific law belonging to the realm of
1 positive science, but needing still to be established. For
the second, the term fscience conjecture 1 would be more pre­ 
cise. It is, however, the first which constitutes the real 
temptation to the man of science, for it may easily betray 
him in turn to the insatiable desire in the human heart to
erect the conclusions of his own peculiar hypothesis into an
2 
absolute philosophy of life.
Although these phases were present in the rudimentary 
scientific thought of earlier periods, the menace of science 
crossed with rationalism only became active with the Sixteenth 
Century. The Pre-Copernican universe, caprieious, but conven­ 
iently small and intimate, had at least afforded a home for 
man's imagination, and beyond its bounds, a heaven for his 
ultimate destination. The new science of necessity,involving 
a complete break with the past,limited man's imaginative life
I.IMd.. j.oc«cit. 
2.Ibid.,p. 200.
i 
by confining it within a strictly regulated systeraj and deism
which ^ during the late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, came 
increasingly to be the religious parallel to the rationalising 
strain in scientific and philosophical thought, reduced his spir­ 
itual experience to a cold impersonal acquiescence in the order 
of the universe. It is not surprising therefore that, from the 
middle of the Seventeenth Century, many men of deeper insight 
should find themselves in revolt against the threatened tyranny,
either by openly denying its dictates or by ostensibly accepting
2 
them whilst twisting them to fcther conclusions. r lf the spirit
were to maintain its liberty against the encroachments of a 
fatalism which would reduce the circle of a man's life to a mere 
wheel spinning for an hour in the vast, unconscious mechanism of 
the world, it must be by the action of another principle distinct 
from and unmoved by the laws of physical energy. Bacon, and more 
definitely Descartes, had indeed granted this immaterial law, but - 
guae supra nos nihil ad nosj they were pleased to leave it in the 
sphere of the lofty inane, with no hold upon the heart and actions 
of men, with no answer to the cry of the bewildered conscience,
i, with no root in human
experience-*- an empty figment of the reason or a sop to quiet
3 
the barkings of the Church'.
Pascal, Bunyan, Henry More, Sir Thomas Browne, all
1.MoreTShelburne"Es'says' Vl t p7l607 For earlier examples of ""lore's 
attitude to scientific analysis,cf.Shelburne Essaysi,pp. 
5-9,207j and 111,pp.250-56,263-65.
2.More, Shelburne Essays VI,pp.164-65.
3. Ibid.., pp. 166-67.
sought in their own day to do what More was seeking to do in his, 
reassert in different ways the existence 6f a spiritual realm of 
which science took all too little account, and to stir up in the 
'new men 1 of science and reason the realisation 'that these solid- 
seeming phenomena are "but the shadow, too often distorted and mis­ 
leading, of the greater reality which resides within the observer
1 
himself and obeys its own law 1 .
But with the subsequent domination of the worlds of 
science and philosophy by the genius of Newton and Locke, it be­ 
came increasingly difficult for the individual thinker to quest­ 
ion the apparently all-pervasive sway of natural law. Even such 
writers as Mandeville and Bolingbroke, who warned their fellow- 
men against the conflicting eccentricities of the scientists,
nevertheless,became themselves entangled in a web of assumptions
2 
influenced by the very hypotheses they repudiated. Against this
deterministic philosophy the main protest came from Berkeley who, 
when little more than a boy, had made in his Commonplace Book 
two entries which were to be the foundation of his future philo­ 
sophy' 'We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will 1
and 'Nothing properly but gersons,i-e.conscious things, do exist.
existences 
All other things are not so much gsrxanK as manners of the exist-
3 
ence of persons'. But his xiny solution of the antinomy existing
between the inner and outer worlds was to result in a breaking- 
down of distinctions which did more than any other factor to
r7Ibid,pp.167-68.
2.More, Shelburne Essays ^a»,pp.212-14.
3. Ibid.,p~220.
bring about the romantic naturalism which, even before Rouflsseau, 
was colouring the thought of the late Eighteenth Century, in 
contrast to the scientific and deterministic naturalism of the 
earlier Eighteenth Cen^tury, 'By dissolving the outer world 
into personality, and by depriving phenomena of their object­ 
ive material reality, his logic did more than any other writ­ 
ing of the day to break down the distinction between the law 
of man an«ff the law of things. In his attempt to spiritualise
nature, he was really preparing the way for the conversion of
1 
naturalism into a bastard form of spirituality.'
Berkeley's subjective idealism was, however, but 
one hypothesis among many, strangely fecund in the realm of 
philosophy and literature, but seemingly impotent to shake 
the ojttwardly impregnable rule of law and mechanism in the 
physical universe, where every new discovery seemed to confirm 
the existence of a changeless and inexorable sequence of cause 
and effect.The influence which was ultimately to undermine 
man's faith in the absolute regularity and inflexibility of 
natural law came from, apparently, the most unlikely and par­ 
adoxical of directions. In 1859 was published Darwin's Origin of 
Species, giving to evolution,which had previously been a rrere
conjecture, an importance co-equal with that of the law of
2 
gravitation, and dealing, so it seemed, the coup de grace to
1.Ibid..p.221.
2. Mnre T _Shelburne Essays Vll.p.247*
all pretensions to belief in a supernatural governance of the 
universe. . 'The new law left no place for a power existing out­ 
side of nature and controlling the wotld as a lower order of 
existence, nor did it recognise a higher and a lower principle 
within nature itself, but in the mere blind force of variation, 
in the very unruliness to design or government, found the very 
source of order and development. '
Here already was the seed pf a new attitude to sci­ 
ence which, within the century, was to disrupt the former ser­ 
vile obeisance of scientists before the shrine of natural law, 
although in his own day Darwin was still regarded as the chief 
advocate of a causo- mechanical explanation of life which dis­
missed on positivist evidence any grounds for a teleological
2 
explanation of life. It was this double role of both defender
and saboteur of the position of natural law which made 
Thomas Huxley, one of Darwin's most enthusiastic supporters, 
one of the chief culprits in the confusion of positive, hypo­ 
thetical and philosophical science, as far as More could read•z,
«*/
the lesson of the times. In an attempt to confine himself to 
the evidence produced by pure science, he held the only possible 
attitude for the scientist to adopt towards religious matters 
was an admission of his own inability to pass judgment. This 
condition of mind he called ps;nosticism; it was in essence
l.Ibid..,p.248.2. Cf 7pp. 4 6i #• ^-
3.More, Shelburne_Essajrs Vlll,p.??l-,cf.b.459.
neither dogmatical nor sceptical; it simply rxxxaiHKii examined 
the evidence and refrained from all interpretation. But as prac­ 
tised by Huxley in his mele'es with his opponents, agnosticism 
was sufficiently elastic to allow for truculent dogmatism when
the errors of his enemies were to be exposed, and for elusive
1 
scepticism when the enemy retaliated. When faced with the logical
conclusions of a rigid application of scientific law, he took 
refuge in a sceptical limitation of the term 'law' to a mere 
formulation of objective experience in a \vorld ultimately moved 
by forces beyond man's perception. But when hw himself charged 
against those who escaped into a region beyond scientific law, 
he then made it a principle of his attack'that"the fundamental
axiom of scientific law is that there is not, never has been, and
2 
never will be any disorder in nature". 1
'In moments of attack', comments M°re, 'he virtually, if 
not literally,takes law in the sense of an active thing,' an implic­ 
ation which 'in his manients of defence he vigorously repudiates'. 
Similarly, when on the offensive, he dikes not hesitate to includethe 
spiritual realm within the province of the pperation of scientific 
law, but when hard pressed by his opponents, he refuses to accept 
the logical consequences of his necessitarianism. '"Fact,I know,
Law I know; but what is Necessity save an g empty shadow of my
4 
own mind's throwing?"'
l.Cf. Robert ohafer, Christianity .and lTaturalisTn,lNew Haven £ London"i9?<?T,pp. /3-V3- ''
S.yiore.Shelburne Essays Vlll,p.?l3
3.1bid..»aa
4.TFId". ,p72
tn
Thus he takes refuge which is, to ?Iore,the 'last sophistry
of scientific minds', the denial of any distinction between
1 
materialistic and spiritualistic conceptions. Huxley's error
is therefore fund amen tally that with which the whole of modern 
thought is riddled, the failure to distinguish between law for 
man and law for thingj and, as a result, the false extension of 
the procedure of science into the philosophy of naturalism. 
'Absolute regularity is the sine qua non of scientific law, and 
the moment any element of incalculable spontaneity is admitted
into the system, that moment the possibility of scientific law
law 
is so far excluded; there is noising of the individual or the
impredictable} there is no science of the soul unless man, as
Taine says, is no more than "a very simple mechaniemi which
2 
analysts can take to pieces litee clock-work".' But the whole
body of evidence accumulated over thousands of years points to 
the fact that the whole world of man's inner life is outside the 
block universe of mechanical determinism. The validity of this 
evidence may be repudiated by the man of science, but at least 
he must be consistent, and not himself intrude into a region 
whose very existence he questions. Yet because of Darwin's auth­ 
ority in the world of positive science, his evolutionary hypo­ 
thesis became the determining influence in realms as distinct 
from positive science as education, administration, ethics and 
religion.
2. Ibid., 217-
The ferocity of the battle waged around the rival issues of 
evolution and revelation lent to Darwinism an importance even 
greater than that intrinsic in the revolutionary nature of its 
own hypothesis, and for the most part, men were either dazzled 
into acquiescence by the boldness and originality of its disclos­ 
ures, or else provoked into an attitude, of passionate resistance, 
as in the case of aladstone. Many, after the novelty had begun 
to pall and the new emancipation from religious dogma was seen 
to be only another form of spiritual bondage, grew weary and frus­ 
trate, a mood relect.ed in the readiness of the English people to
wJlcome iny means of mental escape, as, for example, into the
1 
unreal atmosphere of Fitzgerald's Omar Khayyam.Few had the insight
shown by Disraeli in recognising the limitations of the new science2 ' 
particularly in its repercussions on philosophy and sociology.
The majority of men were left with a sense of profound bewilder- 
mentj they were adrift in an unknown sea, and their well-tried 
compass of religious faith had suddenly been snatched away from
them without anything positive being given in its place. This, in
3 4 
the last analysis, was the tragedy of Newman and Tennyson ,Henry
5 6 
Sidgwick and Henry Adams, as well as of others whom More studies
in essays w&ich reveal, especially at the outset, his keen sympath­ 
ies with all those whom the intellectual current of the age had 
forced to repudiate the traditional religion in which they had been
1.More.Shelburne Essays 11,p.123.
2.Of.More, Shelburne Essays Vlll,pp.243-45.
3.Ibid.,pp.75-74;cf.Ibid.p.178.
4.More.Shelburne Essays Vll,pp.81-82.
brought up, as' he himself had been forced to turn away from the 
Calvinism of his fathers,
The progress — or regress-of Henry Adams is in many 
ways an ppitome of the history of the century. Made aware by
personal tragedy of the a-moral ruthlessness of nature, he passed
h h 
from stoicism to a^ism, and from a1ye"ism to a nihilism of his own
peculiar stamp. As he had sought in history for evidence of a 
providential purpose among men, so in science he looked for signs 
of design and progress in the non-human order of creation}
in history he saw evil existing side by side with good, 
physical 
in the Auniverse,he found a lower order of existence continuing
beside the higher, and throwing an element of confusion in;to its
1 
progressive mutation. His discovery was in line with that of
the scientists of the day, who were coming increasingly to admit 
a mystery residing in the dark background of inorganic forces 
where, before, their predecessors had contended that precise and 
inflexible laws were in operation. '"Briefly, chaos is all that 
KK science can logically assert of the supersensuous", and Adams
himself was faced with 'something of the "burden of the mystery"
had 
when this thing called chaos^suddenly lurched forward out of the
background of mystery and enveloped his little oasis of well-loved
2 
order. '
Even the keenest votaries of Darwin came now to see that, 
whilst still acknowledging the greatness of his contribution to
1. "More, Shelburne Essays IX,p.133. 
3. Ibid..,p. 134.
science, they would have to interpret his law of evolution and 
the theory of the survival of the fittest in such a way that they 
no longer implied a rigid causo-mechanical explanation of lifen, 
but instead admitted the basic confusion of nature eddying beneath 
the surface regularity of life.
The changing outlook found its chief exponent in the 
o 
philos£her William James to whom 'nature was no longer an unchafage-
able order, unwinding itself majestically from the reel of law 
under the control of deified forces. It is an indefinite congeries 
of change. Laws are not governmental regulations which limit change^ 
but convenient formulations of selected portions of change followed 
through a longer or shorter period of time, and then registered in 
statistical forms that are amenable to mathematical *» simulation". 
The supreme human factor in comprehending the universe is now no
longer the xa reason, and here More's entire sympathies are with
2 
the enemies 6f rationalism. He had always felt that the Epicur­
eans with their sense of the flux were more likely to be converted
to the truth than the Stoics, the antecedents of the modern deter-
5 
minists, who saw only a static and mechanical order. But unfor­
tunately, in repudiating the error of his predecessors, James ran 
to the opposite extreme. In his assertion that man gets into touch 
with reality, not through abstract reasoning, but by what he actu­ 
ally feels and wills, James is stating More's own view, but once 
he begins to deduce from the fact a whole philosophy of relativism 
iT¥ore, Shelburne Essays Vll.p.255^ ———————————————— • -—— —
3. More, Shelburne ^s_say_s Vlll, pp . 93-94 ;cf . 3helburne_5ss ays^ Vll,p. 20 .
he and More part company. To know reality ,according to James, 
one must dire back into the flux itself; and from a study of 
its phenomena he infers that the truth of the world for us is 
not monistic, as the determinists asserted, "but pluralistic; 
'reality is an infinite group of inter-acting interpenetrating 
forces over which no absolute can be found to govern. Indeed 
the universe itself may be seen to be panpsychic, made up of
various streams of consciousness in constant mutation like the
,1
human consciousness. Thus for the monism of earlier philosophers, not ' 
he substitutes^the dualism upon which More's whole philosophy of
life is founded, but a pluralism which is itself ultimately,to 
More, a metaphysical and rationalistic attempt to account for 
the existence of the forces of unreason.
In our own century the hypothesis of an ever-changing
universe has been extended by the work of Professor Whitehead
2 
in the field of physics. To whitehead, as So William James, More
was grateful for a reaction against Huxley and his militant
brethren seeking to carry in their pocket a cosmic footrule to
3. 
measure the universe. V/ith the new philosophy there is restored
1.More.SheJburne Essays Vll,pp.205-206.
2.More, I"ew Shelburne Essays 1,pp. 43-1>/
Although strictly speaking, the three volumes which for-n the New 
Shelburne Essays, published in 1923,1934 and 1936,respectively,2 
are separated fqrm the eleven previous volumes by a gulf of time 
involving so radical a change in certain of Here's ideas that th*y 
can hardly be taken in conjunction with the Shelburne Essays as 
one unit,nevertheless on the question of natural science, More's 
attitude varied so little once he freed himself from his youth­ 
ful infatuation with Darwinism that we may safely consider ideas 
expressed in The Demon of the A"bsolute__as a continuation of his 
thought in the essays previously mentioned '• n connection with science,.
3. More, ffftw Shelburne, Assays l,p.45.
to science the power of an imaginative appeal and the sense of 
mystery which had been completely lost to it by the arid ration­ 
alism of previous schools of scientific thought. But More is ' 
disappointed to find Whitehead in turn topple over to the oppos­ 
ite extreme when he seeks to mitigate the menace of mechanism 
by trying to show that it is not mechanism.
'Formerly it was held that the human soul obeys the same laws 
as a stone; now we are to believe that a stone is the same nature. 
as the soul. In either case we avoid the discomfort of a paradox­ 
ical dualism and reduce the world to a monism which may plausibly
call itself science, though, as a matter of fact, Mr-Whitehead' s
1 
theory, if carried out, would simply abolish science 1 . White-
head charges his predecessors with failure to take into account 
certain '"stubborn and irreducible facts" 1 in that a human soul 
is patently something other than a stone, yet he himself runs 
equally in the teeth of the same '"stubborn and irreducible facts* 
in failing to recognise that a stone is equally patently not a 
soul. 'Aristotle made the proper and sufficient distinction 
long ago when he said that a stone obeys laws and a man forms 
habits: you may throw a stone in the air a thousand times, it
will continue to do the same thing, whereas a man learns by
2 
experience. '
To More, the merging together of the animate and the 
inanimate makes a travesty of the inorge-nic world, but its real
_ 
3. Ibid. ,p.48.
3/o
danger ft&s to man. According to Whitehead and his school, 'the 
organic and the inorganic worlds flow together in an indistin­ 
guishable flux, wherein the soul also, dissolved by association
into a complex of relationships, loses that central permanence
1 
of entity which used to mark the dignity of man'. And in the
place of Aristotle's God as Prime Mover, Whitehead exalts a
2 
Principle of Concretion which, to More, by the time of The
Demon of the Absolute^ firmly entrenched in his belief in the 
need for anthropomorphism to help us in our apprehension of the 
supernatural, fails by being 'not a person', not 'an entity of 
any sort', but a mere name for the fact that concrete groups of
qualities are everlastingly forming and reforming in the infinite'
3 
vortex of existence.
The influence of such a philosophy is the greater because
4 
as has been already suggested, science and the creative imaginat­
ion-have in this century been once more reconciled and are moving 
together in the same direction. F»»m the Renaissance until recent­ 
ly, the whole trend of physical science had been to establish the 
supremacy of the discursive reason, whilst the imagination, sharply
divorced from it since the Eighteenth Century at least, had sought
5 
its sustenance from intuition. So strong indeed had been the dom­
ination of reason at that time that it was operative not only in 
the domain of science, its normal field, but also in the realm of 
the arts, to the exclusion of the imagination? so that both the
2. Cf. Ibid., p. 45
3. 1 bi 37750.
literature and the visual arts of the Eighteenth Century reflect­ 
ed the same concern with law and design as pertained to the realm 
of nature. But with the revolt against the tyranny of law, which 
More is careful to designate 'pseudo-classicism' so as to distin­ 
guish it from the inner freedom of true classicism, there came
an increasing emphasis upon pure instinct and unrestrained emotion
2 
such as one finds in the poetry of Blake,and the depreciation of
o reason as'the false secondary power that multiplies distinctions*.
Experience, however, found it impossible to preserve so radical a 
break between imagination and reason, between the worlds of scienc
and of philosophy and the arts. The .tendency of science, since
4
Darwin's day has been, as we have seen, so to modify the evolution­ 
ary hypothesis as to bring it into harmony with the spontaneous 
part of human nature, thereby widening the distance between posi­ 
tive and philosophical science, whilst tending to merge together
philosophical science and romanticism, as in the thought of Berg-
5 
son and William James.
Man, aware of both order and disorder in the uni­ 
verse,yet held by the evolutionary hypothesis, was no longer able 
to allow for any principle of control outside of man.He came to 
conceive of the world as an entity containing within itself some 
force of vitalism, the glan vital, which by its inherent limit- 
lessness, was at once the source of constant creation and expansi­ 
on, making the sum of things greater and more orderly. Such a
3. Of. pp. H2-I3.
4.Cf ipp-^ofe- 2io^.
Vll,pp.221,
Si A.
hypothesis seemed to get over the question of scientific law, 
whilst avoiding too the paradox of dualism, and offering an easy
step &5k the modern scientific philosophy of human progress as
1 
self-causative. Moreover the concern of science with the vortex
of change underlying the superficial order of the universe found 
a parallel in the new interest of psychology in the subliminal 
regions of man's mind from which rise promptings and memories 
which break into the even tenour of his normal conduct with wild 
and disconnected suggestions. Pragmatism, the philosophy of the 
flux, had its roots, on the one hand, in the revelationd of psych­ 
ology abo'it the human consciousness, as well as in the disclosures 
of physics on the other, dissolving the outwardly solid fabric of 
the universe into a danse macabre of neutrons and electrons.Reality 
no longer resides in the visible and concrete? as a result, the
artist has to descend into the subliminal regions of consciousness2". 
to find the truth which eludes hiT. on the surface of appearances.
As in an earlier phase of naturalism, the fiealists had repudiated 
the will of man, controlled by reason, as the determining factor
in behaviour, and had instead envisaged man as the product of a
3 
number of inter-acting biological and sociological circumstances,
so Sur-realism envisaged him as the plaything of certain myster­ 
ious and capricious urges in the dark netherworld of the subcon-
4 
scious, defying the ingenuity of man's most deliberate planning
and resisting every attempt to impose upon them the restaint of 
a formal order.
1. Ibid..,pp. 224-25. 4IbicU.,p.55.
The effect of modern science upon literature does not, 
however, end with the disillusion of creative writers. The 
attitude of the scientist to the phenomena he studies has 
influenced in no small measure the prevailing attitude of the 
critic of art and literature in substituting for a fixed
standard of taste the pure impressionism of individual judg-
1 
ment. Nor are the effects of naturalism confined to the realm
of science, on the one hand, and of the arts ,on the other.Its 
influence has permeated every branch of contemporary thought. 
The hypothesis of a self-creating universe, based on limitless 
resources,is reflected in the laiaser faire attitude of the 
'man in the street 1 ,'a belief that as the physical world had 
unrolled itself by its own expansive forces, so human society 
progresses by some universal instinct, needing no rational
and selective guidance, no imposition p of moral restraint,no
1 
conscious insight'. At the root of this attitude, More detects
the confusion arising from the merging of the animate and the 
inanimate, so that it seems man has only to let himself go,
follow his natural penchant, in order to evolve in accordance
? 
vith the elan vital_jw_ithin.
V/ere this evolutionary phase the whole story of natur­ 
alism, however, it might be difficult to explain its current 
manifestations in socialism,pacifism,self- or free discipline
in education,reformatory schemes in criminology, all of which
3 
More traces to a common root.
1.Mo re, SheIburne Es & ay s VI11,.? 55• 
S.Cf.lMd. ,pp. 236-41J Ibid. ,p.!36.
The logical outco-n0 of a scientific naturalism based on 
the law pf the survival of the fittest, however it might be ad­ 
apted to fit in with the later scientific developments, would
1
seem to be the "Tietaschean Superman, not the sentimental opti­ 
mism betrayed in contemporary schemes for social amelioration. 
But Nietzscheism is the outcome of only one aspect of natural- 
isn.In opposition to it may be set the motivating power behind
romantic naturalism, sympathy, in contrast to the classical
2 • 
mainspring of right conduct,justice, with which More's personal
quest for the good life was so intimately bound up. That he 
returned so frequently to the subject of emotionalism as the 
motive of contemporary conduct suggests his vital concern with 
it as the chief enemy of justice, in the classical sense, the
aim of which was to curb those very expansive tendencies which
3 
'sympathy' sought to encourage. 'The whole effect of calling
sympathy justice and putting it in the plcae og judgment is to
relax the fibre of character and nourish the passions at the
4 
expense of reason and the will!'There is', he writes in hiz
'Definitions of Lualism', 1 a common delusion that civic virtue
can be produced by instinctive sympathy and does not need the
5painful restraint of the inner or outer check. jj ow this sym­ 
pathy is that supposed law of personality by which we invariably 
feel the pleasure of others as our plessure and the pain of
1 • More, Shelburn.e. Essays Vlll,p.l81.
2*More, "S^elburne _Ss_says IX,pp. °11-12.
S.Cf.More. Shelburne Essays vi,pp.215-24$ cf. Appendix H>-
4»T!ore,_Shelburne_Ess_ays IX.p. 211.
5.I.E.of man's own higher self,or o$ governmental control.
pthers as our painj and which, consequently, would always lead 
us, if free to follow our instincts, so to act as to affact 
others with pleasure. But by the very nature of the personal­ 
ity such a law cannot exist. The feeling of pleasure and pain 
is the sense of the increase or diminution of our life. In so 
far as the plesaure of another may result in activities bene­ 
ficial to ourselves or creates the expectation of similar
in and thus enlarges our sense of life,it 
pleasures^ourselves, wcxKZRxfcKxxthKXExpsEiatfeiHiixafxx
may awake sympathetic pleasure in us. And pain in another by a 
corresponding process may awaken sympathytic pain in us. But, 
on the contrary, the pleasure of another is equally capable 
of awakening an antipathetic pain in us,when it means an act­ 
ivity in the other that is detrimental to us and diminishes 
our sense of lifej and the pain of another may awaken an anti­ 
pathetic pleasure in us. The notion of this instinctive sym­ 
pathy as a power in itself capable of taking the place of the 
inner or outer check is an error of romanticism which forgets 
that personal feelings belong to the flux, and tend to a var­ 
iety and difference. As it slurs over the distinctions among
men in the abstract conception of ^.umanity, it is called human-
1 
itarianism.'
The peculiar danger of modern sentimentalism is vn.
its fusion with the evolutionary mood of laisser^f airejit
to I'he. Nintte^erv/k £e-*vtury 
seemed^that *nan had only to allow himself to be carried forward
towards that 'one far-off divine event t ? 
To which the whole creation moves',
. More, She-lbur^e. Essays Vlt,
and he would of necessity evolve towards an ultimate perfection. 
The two elements together coluured the thought of many of the
early Romantic writers and determined their schemes for the
ne 
regeration of mankind with Tittle or no effort on the part of
individuals to reform themselves. To the scientific facts of 
progress and evolution More made no objection, but when these 
were made the basis for a philosophy of life, he felt constrained 
to point out the inevitable outcome of what he called *a faith 
in drifting} a belief that things of themselves,by a kind of
natural gravity of goodness in themsusisuKs move always on and on
2 
in the right direction. 1 In 'The New Morality' he underlined
the disastrous consequences of an indiscriminate social sym­ 
pathy crossed with a belief in automatic progress* To the current
humanitarian schemes of would-be reformers More attributed the
3 
increasing incidence of crime and suicide. That the first onset
of sentimental naturalism on a large scale preceded by only a
short period the bloodshed of the Napoleonic Wars was no acci-
|4 
dent. (Babbitt, it will be remembered, had similarly pointed
out that the nightmare of Xhe Terror burst upon a France in-
5 
dulging in dreams of a universal brotherhood.) The effect of
a humanitarianism which relieved the individual of the respoasib - 
ility of controlling his natural self-love by seeking to persuade 
him that his strongest impulse was one of altruism was invariably
1.MoreTShelburne Esgaga 1X, pp.205-20 6.
3. Ibid.,p.IX.
3.Ibid., pp.209-210!cf.Shelbwrne Sssavs Vlll,p.l86,
$• Babbi11, Democracy ..and Leadershio, p. 1 ? 7.4.More, Sh0TT;"'rne "Essays TXjp.iA.
tp provoke conflict and ultimately "bloodshed; and from this 
point of view,More saw the epidemic of sentimental -'isms', 
humanitarianism, feminism,socialismi equalitarianism, pacifism-
as symptomatic of that spirit of indulgent laisser faire which
2 
had made possible the horrors of the 1914-1918 War.
Almost invariably too, the effect of universal 
sympathja with mankind in the mass has been to render the 
potential philanthropist insensitive to the sufferings of 
individual men and women. One remembers Chesterton's comment 
on Thoreau that it would have been better had he loved greens 
less and green-grocers more.Similarly Paul Elmer More recalled 
William Morris 1 complaint to Rossetti that while the latter 
would do anything to help an individual in distress, he could 
not bring himself toftake an interest in the evils of the massws* 
Rossetti, on the other hand, had noticed that while Morris waxed 
enthusiastic about socialistic schemes for the betterment of 
mankind in the abstract? he would not give a penny to relieve
the needs of a poor beggar they might meet.In this respect,to
5 
More,Morris was at one with professional reformers in all ages.
A theoretical and abstract conception of sympathy 
growing out of an abstract conception of human rights had re­ 
placed the personal and concrete bond of sympathy with indiv­ 
idual men and women which should be the bond of a healthy and 
well-knit society founded on the practical experience of history: 
and it was this abstract theory of human rights which gave the
JrTBTcT7^»"'J77 8.Mo re,sne1 buTne'Es'say_s VlI7p~;"li 7-1 tr.—— *'»«Loc»^it*
impetus to modern socialism. From its over-optimistic and 
unreal view of human nature came Socialism's mistaken con­ 
ception of liberty and equality. More maintains consistently 
throughout his work that men are not equal, although it is in 
the last volume of the Hew Shelburne Essays that he gives his 
attitude more explicitly'. Men can be divided into three main 
groups, as the Communist knows as well as the Monarchist or 
Fascist. There are those who must be controlled by fear or by 
blind obedience, there are those who are the natural leaders 
of men, whether classes or individuals, and between these is 
an intermediary class which submits voluntarily t±o directionj
and upon whose allegiance to principles embodied in the actual
1 
government the stability of the state depends. Social justice
and harmony depend onleach of these groups accepting its right 
relationship to the others, for in society, as in individual 
life, happiness comes not from unpitying strength or envious 
striving after equality, but from that order which exists only 
where each subordinate part occupies its own distinct place 
and is recognised and rewarded accordingly. Democracy, on the
other hand, is the rule of the masses, result ing in a complete
2 
break-down of all necessary distinctions. This was the problem
3 Plato was confronting as he tried to imagine his ideal Republic,
to him, as to More, an excess of liberty, whether in states 
or in individuals, seemed only to pass into an excess of slavery,
j/Mor'eT'^iw jShTlburne~Bs s ay a 111 » ppVl 64 - 65 .
2. More, Shelburne Essays IX. pp. 6-7; cf.IbjLd. pp. 122-23, &31-32.
3. Ibid. ,p. 5«
and so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most 
aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme t 
form of liberty. True liberty, on* the contrary,depends on the 
full recognition of the distinctions inherent ih a'hierarchical' 
conception of society, in contrast to the•mechanical' conception 
of a society depending on a Social 8ontract and emphasising the 
natural equality of all men. 'Our most precious heritage of 
liberty depends on the safeguarding of that realm of the indiv­ 
idual against the encroachments of a legal equalitarianism. For 
there is nothing surer than that liberty of the spirit,if I may 
use that dubious word, is bound up with the inequality of men 
in their natural relations; and every movement dm history to 
deny the inequalities of nature has been attended,and by a. fatal
necessity always will be attended, with an effort to crush the
2 liberty of distinction in the ideal sphere 1 .
The mainspring of socialism and its gospel of equality 
has been less altrjiism than a restless, striving personal discon­ 
tent— pj^eonexja, or that insatiable greed which the Ancients
5 
as?/ as the root of all human actions. In William Morris, his
preaching such a Gospel of Discontent was of a piece with his
4 
general impatience at the restraints of order, and the same
mood of discontent is at the root of the Socialism of G.Lowes
5 
Dickinson, as More seeks to analyze it. It seems remarkable to
l.Ibid..,pp. 7-8.
2.Ibid..p.14?. _
3. Ibid..,p. f5M- :, Cf New Shelburne Essays. '" . p. 131.
4.""More, Shelburne Essays.Vll.pp* 116-17- 
5.Ibid.,p7l72-75.
him, however,that a man of Lowes Dickinson's education and 
insight'should not see that by espousing socialism, he is 
embracing the cause of the very conditions against which he 
is reacting. The frustration of the man of culture arises, 
not from the slowness of industrial and social evolution, 
but from the denial of certain basic truths which to him dre. 
indispensable to a healthy society and which under social- 
ism^are brushed aside even more ruthlessly than under any 
other for1"! of government. Socialism seeks to estimate the 
value of work done in terms of labour expended and thereby 
fails to regognise adequately the contribution of the non- 
manual worker whose effort cannot be measured in terms of
labour-value. The old aristocratic ideal of work performed
1 
easily and graciously cannot survive in an order of society
where intangible work, as in the arts or in politics, is no
2 
longer held in honour. The conception of the liberal and
noble has yielded to the utilitarian, and as a result, art
3 
and literature are bound to suffer, as the only criterion
for judging their value is a standard of taste no longer 
respected.
The tragedy of modern society arises from the fact 
that treachery threatens not from outside, but from within
the ranks of the intellectuals, themselves ridden with the
4 
cant of humanitarianism. It is those who have nothing to
1.Ibid.,p.178.
2.Ibid. pp.177-79.
1 .'""ore *jjfipVh" T'" e "Essays IX,pp. 4°-4S^
gain and all to lose if a false idea of equal itarianism gains
ground who are, nevertheless, thernselves|advocating a gospel of 
1
socialism, just as Babbitt pointed^ out that it W3.c the phil­
anthropic members of the aristocracy who fostered the democrat­ 
ic spirit in pre-Revolutionary Prance, thereby putting in the
hands of the people an instrument which \\ as to be used, against
2 
the nobility itself* Similarly, the strength of nodc-rn social­
ism comes in no small measure from the' sentimental adherence of
3 
dilettante reformers' — again viati is of t'ne .no j I of 'laisser
faire' • The phrase 'laisser faire* has therefore, for J!._>re, 
under the stress of -"-wentieth Century Pragmatism taken on an 
almost antithetical meaning from that generally given it in 
the preceding century. Instead of suggesting to More the pre­ 
servation of the existing order, an inert acquiescence in stabil- 
ity often at the cost of justice, the phrase has now come to 
mean an aimless drifting with the tide of change which sweeps
men and nature onwaru in a mere instinctive striving after new
41 
forms of life. Its appeal is to the restlessness and discontent
in man whereby he manifests his affinitv to the flux of nature. 
Whereas the conservative accepts change only reluct ir>tiy Then 
it becomes inevitable, the socialist, like his earlier prototype,
the liberal, is anxioue to try anything new, believing that all
5 
change is necessarily progress. It follows to More that, whereas
and eaersi. P-- 
5»M0re, SVifflhurne Essays 1XT p. 3ft- 3.4-
4. Of. More. Shelburne Essays Vlll,p.236.
5. More, She_lburne_fes e ay §_1X, pp. 1 6t> - 66.
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the conservative's attitude to the pt.st is one of respect and 
willingness to profit by its example and the corporate exper­ 
ience of the ages, the socialist, or literal' s,mood is one of 
indifference or even disdain towards the past. Humanitarian 
literature is characterised by the sense of complete emancip­ 
ation from tradition, the sense that with the French Revolution
2 
a new phase of human consciousness had begun, ^uch of the
confusion prevailing in many contemporary fields of thought 
is due to man's ignorance of the 'best that has been thought 
and said in the past. As a result we have no historical crit­ 
eria whereby to discriminate between tfce fluctuating currents of
3 
the day. It is ironical that in a period when psychology has dis-
submerged 
closed the importance of tjie race-memory with its far-reaching
4 
consequences for the whole of life, contemporary naturalism
has brought about a state where the conscious race-memory, the 
spiritual and intellectual resouEces of the various generations
incorporated in a common heritage of culture, should be no longer
5 
held in respect. Even such philosophers as Bergson and William
James who^more than anyone else, have shown how our conscious­ 
ness carries within it an active la^culty of memory,uniting past 
to present experience, are nevertheless infected with the 'illus­ 
ion of the presnt 1 when face to face with the lessons of history.
1.Ibid.p.205.
2.Cf.Renan, LlAvenir^de^^Scie.nc.e, (Paris* ,iq^.) ,pp.25ff.
3.More, Shelburne Essays lX,p.&i.59'cf. IMd. ,pp. 35-37/
4.More, Shelburne Essays Vll,p.240;cf.Shelburne Essays ll,p.65ff.
5.More,Shelburne Essays Vlll,pp.255-56.
6.More, Sheiburne assays Vll, pp. 2tu-<*2.>
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'Sometimes',writes More,'as I consider with myself how this 
illusion daily more and more enthrals and impoverishes our 
mental life by cutting off from it all the rich experience of 
the past, it is as though we were at sea in sbressel, while a
fog was settling upon the water, gradually as it thickened,
circle 
closing in upon our vision with ever narrowing K±X±OH , blotting
out the far-flashing lights of the horizon and the depths of the 
sky, throwing a pall upon the very waves about usac, until we 
move forward through a sullen obscurity, unaware 4f any other
traveller upon that sea, save when through the fog the sound
1 
of a threatening alarm beats upon the ear. '
Modern man moves about in gross ignorance of the 
lesson of history. Tantamount to his ignorance, however is
his conceit, his unwillingness to learn from the accumulated
2wisdom of the centuries. As a result he has no critical stan­ 
dards, for the one thing that an acquaintance with world cul­ 
ture gives is the power to select and discriminate. In this
3 
respect the conscious or objective memory which stores up the
fruits of tradition differs from the subconscious or subject­ 
ive memory with which modern psychology is concerned. The latter 
retains indiscriminately a chaotic welter of past experience, 
and is apt to throw the_se up into the region of consciousness 
without any conscious co-operation on the part of the individ­ 
ual and, as we have seen, in defiance of any principle of control,
1.MoretShelburne Essays Vll,pp.201-202.
2.Cf.pp. life-Ay.S.Mnre.Shelburne Essays Vlll,pp.255-56.
The Bere;sonian memory is thus a merely passive retention of 
past sensations. The objective memory,on the other hand, is 
active and critical, choosing rigorously its materials in 
order to build up a central fund of wisdom whereby to test 
the value of subsequent impressions, and to impose upon them 
the unity of a harmonious and centripetal experience.
This same impressionistic approach to things of the 
mind and spirit is reflected too in the modern educational 
system. The fallacy of its theory More traces back to that 
fountain head of all heresy, Rousseau. 'To make instinct inS 
stead of experienced judgment the basis of education, impulse 
instead of obedience, nature instead of discipline, to foster 
the emotions as if the uniting bond of mankind were sentiment 
rather than reason, might seem of itself so monstrous a per­ 
version of the truth as to awaken abhorrence in any considerate
2 
readerl And yet it is Houaseau's educational theories as
found in anile that have at least modified, if not entirely 
transformed, educational practice. The results of the change 
are 'seen at work in the vagaries of the elective system, in 
the advocating of manual training as an equivalent for books, 
in the unbounded enthusiasm for nature- study, in the encroach­ 
ment of science on the character- discipline of the humanities, 
in the general substitution of persuasion for authority.To some 
observers certain traits of irresponsibility** in the individual
T.More, Shelburne Bssays Vll,pp.241-42. 
2.More, Shelburne Essays VI,pp.230-31.
and certain symptoms of disintegration in society are the direct 
fruit of this teaching.1 The effects in education of this belated 
expression of laisser faire are all too evident: 'a laxity of 
mind in those who have drifted through our institutions from 
kindergarten to university, a repugnance for good reading) in a
word that lackof real education which is more and more deplored
2 
by instructors in school 3»r college'. That it should be so is
hardl£ to be wondered at when those occupying positions of auth­ 
ority in the political and educational worlds decry the merits of
true scholarship in favour of a certain robust camaraderie with3 '————————'
men at large. The destiny of education is bound up with the
question of social leadership, and unless college,-as in the 
when which 
days^the religious hierarchy it created it was a real .power,—
can once more become f a breeding place for a natural aristocracy,
it will inevitably deteriorate into a school for mechanical
4 
apprentices, or a pleasure resort for a jeuneesw d.ore'e.1 The
danger that American colleges might become mere technical schools
is all the more real when the attitude of such college heads as
5 
President Eliot of Harvard is taken into account. His advocating
jrhe elective system, as Babbitt pointed out in his Literature and 
The American Solleget has had the effect of encouraging students
to dissipate their energies over a wide range of subjects instead
6 
of directing men to a common centre of culture, which to More is
1.Ibid.,p.232;c?7Shelburne~^s¥ays Vll»p.256^
2.More, Shelburne_EsRay_s Vlll,p.?36.
3. MO re, IJhelburne .JTssays 1X, p. 4 ri.
4. Ibid.,loc.cit.
W; °f * Babbitt ' literature andhAn-in College,pp.
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to be found in the discipline of the classics. Many of the
subjects chosen under thevelective system are purely technical, 
and have a vocational, not a cultural, value for those who study 
them. But even in subjects which have a high cultural value, such 
as English or history, the modern craze for specialisation and 
high technical efficiency— in other words, the utilitarian desire
for tangible and measurable results, influenced to a considerable
2
extent by the aims of German education— has led students to con­ 
centrate on those aspects of the subject where pseudo-scientific
or positivist methods could best be applied, or else, by the same
3 
paradox as we have seen in operation elsewhere whereby the desire
for scientific precision is accompanied by a mood of aesthetic
4
emotionalism, they turned to some other branch of the same sub­ 
ject which they sought to appraise by purely subjective impress­ 
ionism.Thus in English, present day students vacillate between
a 'dull memorising of dates and names,'or of Anglo-Saxon grammar,
5 
and 'romantic gush over beautiful passages'. They are divided
therefore into specialists in philology or shallow dabblers in 
literature,but of scholars of a rounded and humane culture there 
are all too few. The nearest attempt at a synthesis of these two 
extremes so far has come from those eccentrics who have sought to 
estimate the comparative merits of poets by a system of statistics 
or who have invented some machine for measuring the emotional
2.More,_Shelbuxne_Essay_s lX,p.8qj cf . Babbitt. op. cit. pp. 90-97.
4. Of. pp.
5. More, Shelburne Essays IX. p. 4 61 cf Babbitt, op. cit. ,po. 114-19. 131
1 
response to a given piece of literature. Even the arts themselves
are thus not immune from the contagion of the technical spirit 
which, to More, tends to spread confusion and anarchy whenever it 
invades a province not its own.
The sweeping away from the university curriculum of 
any core of subjects which all students were expected to take 
has deprived recent generations of students of a common basis of
thought and intercommunication. As? a result, educated men every-
2where are aware of theit isolation from their fellows, a realis­ 
ation which only intensifies the more general mood of individual 
isolation which characterises all men, irrespective of their edu­ 
cation, in a period of chaos and disintegration- The dissipation 
of intellectual energy over an unnecessary wide range of subjects
%
has divided men of learning from each other, although their ultimate 
aims might well have been the same, and so thrown them back on 
their own inner resources, to their personal discomfort and to 
the impoverishment of society, which might be transformed by the
leaven of a corporate intellectual action on the part a nucleus of
i $truly educated men.
-But if education has failed to provide men with a 
bulwark against the corrosion of sentimental naturalism, religion 
has failed equally lamentably. Certainly More saw surviving from 
a period of more virile faith certain values which have delayed 
in some measure the inevitable disintegration consequent upon
1.M0re t NewSheburne -^s^ays 1, pp. £>'-
2.Cf.pp. 
s.Cf.pp.
1
spread of humanitarianism. Equally certainly there existed in
orthodox Christianity from its inception certain humanitarian
2 
principles, but these were counterbalanced by other ideals
5 which kept them from assuming an undue proportion. With the
decline of belief in the divine and the growing confidence 
of man in his own destiny, there dropped out of the modern
consciousness those very elements which had hitherto suc-
4 ceeded in holding extreme humanitarianiam in check. By the
beginning 6f the Nineteenth Century, wvents had conspired 
to substitute for the omnipotence of God, the divine rights 
of the individual and the brotherhood of men» and by the end 
of the century this belief, minus its spiriuality,plus a sort
of moral impressionism abjuring judgment and appealing only
5 to the emotions,had become the humanitarian religion of the day.
In opposition to the belief of orthodox Christianity in the 
fallen nature of man and his need of redemption,humanitarian 
religion taught that man had only to allow his natural expan­ 
sive sympathies free rein in order to bring in the universal 
brotherhood. Similar heresies had rent the Church long before 
the birth of Rousseau, notably the teaching of the Irish Pela- 
gius that evil does not pertain to man's whole character, but 
only to certain acts, and that salvation is within the reach 
of all who choose to practise righteousness.Nature, as it cames
fTHabbi11, Democracy and Leadership,pp. 284 -90 
2»More,Shelburne Essays 1,pp.207-210.
3.Cf.Babbitt,Rousseau and Romanticism,?.199.4.Cf .p. <y£>- ±*5.Mort,_SJi£lhuxne_Essay_s_l,p. 207„
from the hand of the Creator, is essentially good, and a child 
is "born uncorrupted, with natural and ineradicable impulses for
good, which can be perverted only by an act of the will deliber-
1 
ately contrary to reason. From Pelagianism, it is but a step to
the secular belief in the essential goodness of human nature,but 
that step could, none the less, be taken only when the notion of 
man's need of being reconciled to God ha«J been eliminated. Once 
the supernatural scheme of redemption was shown to be unnecessary, 
as it appeared to be during the sway of deism and even more, as 
a result of a philosophy of evolutionary meliorism,a 'Pelagian 
confidence in man's ability to satisfy God might easily pass into 
a belief that human nature,being essantially right, had within
itself the power to expand indefinitely without any act of renunc-
far-off "divine 2 
iation toward some vaguely-glimpsed,fcarxaffcx'event".'
The failure of humanitarianism was due also to a lack
of tfcE discrimination between xne things which belong to God and
3
the things which belong to Caesar. It is this confusion of relig­ 
ious and secular ideals which has brought about the present day 
danger that religion itself may evaporate into'a sort of senti­ 
mental socialism'.'A vague ideal of equalitarian brotherhood, to 
be introduced by an equally vague humanitarian sympathy is accepted 
by many as the modern equivalent to what Christ meant by the King­ 
dom of God and repentance',wrote More in Series Three of the New
4 
Shelburne Essays., and although by this time, his attitude to relig.
l.More, ^hejlburne Essays VI,p.96. 
2.Ibid.,pp.218-19.
4*More, 3Jteig ...Sfr'ftlburne Essays lll,p.-146.
ion had undergone a profound change, on the question of modern 
liberalism in religion he remained unmoved. Although Christian 
altruism has borne fruit in mitigating much of the hardness of 
social life, not infrequently love of one's neighbour grows 
stronger and more clamorous as one's love for God grows vague 
and unreal; but without the sanction of belief in the Divine 
Will— and not always with it — sentimental love for one's
brother is not sufficient to hold in check natural greed and
1 
willto power. To suppose otherwise is the error of modern
Pelagianism,pinning its faith in the New Morality as the 
'Christian Reconstruction of Modern Life.' This, to More,was 
to substitute for the humility and the responsibility of each 
individual soul towards God, a sham righteousness, dependent 
on the existence of virtuous feelings. Such an inverted Phar-
iseeism, for one sermon on man's obligation to God, delivered
2 
twenty on man's obligation to his fellow-men. The result is
a general lowering of the moral tone, of which all too many 
symptoms/were evident to More in contemporary life*-the sensu­ 
ality of prevailing music and dancing, 'the tone of plays
stirring the country as organs of moral regeneration,'the
3 exaggeration of the element of sex in clothing, all suggested
to him a dissolution of the ethical sense which resulted from 
the substitution of religious emotionalism for the strenuous 
self-control and renunciation of true religion.
1.Ibid..p.151.
2. More, Shelburne Essays IX,pp.207-208.
3. Ih1d» ,p.yi2J of. -BaDbitt,Demo£racy_and_Leadership,p.209.
But above all, contemporary religion has failed in the 
task of awakening individual men and women to the reality of 
sin and their need of transformation. Christianity *s task is 
twofold* the salvation of the individual soul and the redemption 
of society, and because of its failure to accomplish the, first, 
it has only helped to add to the confusion of the second. When­ 
ever the distinction between good and evil has been slurred over,
there has resulted a general deterioration in ethical standards,
2 
as in the Restoration drama, and this blurring of values has
itaelf usually been the outcome of a loss of belief in a super­ 
natural dogma and in the reality of sin. This was especially 
true of the Eighteenth Century as a whole, when deism had juggled 
all sense of man's proneness to sin out of the world, and had
substituted for it a naive optimism that 'all was for the best
3 
in the best of all possible worlds'. With ""ousseau there arose jc
the tjcxxHny tendency to recognise the existence of evil, but to
4 shift the responsibility for it on to the shoulders of society.
This readiness to externalise evil and regard the heart of man
5 
as itself inherently good persisted, through Shelley, down to
the later Romantics, including Emerson and. his followers, who
dismissed all too summarily the dark dilemma of sin and suffering, 
and still remains at the root of modern literature where it lies
A
unreconciled with the element of disillusion and despair which 
belie its facile optimism. This is something very different from
I^gw Shelburne Essays 111,p.145• 4.More,SheIburne^Es¥s^iV^ T
2. More, Shelburne Essays X,pp.85-86. * M u ,_ ._P- 226Tv * TK-J ^-TmT-iT-ci—71———, —• V . 5 ' More, Shelburfre Essays Vli,3. Ibid.ip.ZIH'lcf. ShefJ>urr\& E&SA^S IX (j.^o5, *—————————uTT%-2o
the power of true religion which rests on its realisation of 
evil; to close one's eyes to the extent and gravity of the problem 
betokens not a solution of the problem, but some 'deep-lying 
limitation of spiritual experience'. The great religious genius­ 
es of all ages have been acutely isware of the magnitude of the 
?
dilemma, and various faiths have sought to represent it symboli­ 
cally by clothing it in the concrete garb of mythology. Of these, 
to More,ej»ven before his conversion to Christianity, the most
beautiful and the most tragic was the story of Gethsemane and the
o 
Cross. But if the picture of the Atonement portrayed the grace an
the love of God taking the initiative, it did not thereby deprive 
man of the need of strenuous self-control and the effort to im­ 
prove himself. Christianity, no less than classical humanism, en-
4 
joins the importance of self-knowledge and the exercise of the
5 
innerx check. Democracy, on the other hand, and the liberal
theology which accompanies it, assumes that the disposition of
6 
men tends naturally to order and harmony, and the demagogues who
seek to cj.imb to positions of popularity do so by flattering the 
people into believing that they are alright as they are. Such too 
is the effect of the popular press, pandering to the ordinary
selves of men instead of inspiring them to rise to the level of
^
their better, or ethical, selves. This, in no small measure,accor­ 
ding to More, is the secret of Browning's continuing popularity, 
'for his philosophy, detached, as it may be,from its context,
1.Mpre, Shelburne Essays XI,p. 89.
2.More, Shelburne .j^s_s_ags. VI,p. 68,p. 119
___________ IX, pp. Zy- 30.
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teaches just the acceptance of life in itself as needing no
1 
conversion into something "beyond its own impulsive desires.'
More's sympathy is not with any 'such worldly and
2 
easy philosophy' dressed'in the forms of spiritual faith', but
with the moj$ honest scepticism of an earlier writer who,with
true uncynical disillusionment, faced the dilemma of man's
5 
weakness and his failure to find any satisfactory solution.
After interpreting the thought of Lord £ Halifax, as it appeared 
to him — with perhaps rather more of More than of Saville •— 
More adds a significant reflection upon the spiritual chaos 
and frustration of his day:'I am aware that such an analysis 
of human nature will be hateful to an age in which, if we 
believe anything, it is the corafittable doctrine that men are 
by instinct all seeking the welfare of someone else. But, alas, 
there is only one thing to say to this humanitarian theory?it '
is not true. The very element of self-flattery in such a philoe
any 
sophy, the very hesitation to accept ifta harsh name for our
guiding motives, points un-nistakably to that grain of egotism 
in our make-up which is the last source and impregnable strongfc- 
hold of jealousy. Let a nan look inquisitively into the conduct 
of his neighbour, let him look candidly into the secret folds of 
his own heart, and he will discern that feeling, concealed it 
may be, but never qyite KKfatKRfltejected, colouring, though it 
may not entirely overlay, other more generous impulses. Is 
there not in our facile rejection of the past a touch of jealous
1.More, Shelburne Essays 111,pp.163-64,161.
2. Ibid., .p. 165.
X,pp.59-63.
apprehension lest something should be detracted from our 
complaisance with the aims and achievements of the present? 
Indeed, deep down in the democratic view of society there will 
be found a taint of this same egotism,displaying itself in a 
kind of malaise at distinction wherever seen and however mani­ 
fested. He is the leader of men who soothes us with the assur­ 
ance that our native instincts are right and not to be gainsaid 
and who falls in with our suspicion of those who would oppose 
reflection to spontaneity, and would question the clamour of 
the moment. It is the bitter truth that the only safeguard 
against popular anarchy, in this day, as in Halifax's, is just 
the recognition of the egotism that underlies our first motions, 
with its uneasy flattery of ourselves and its readiness to flame 
into jealousy of those who speak from the superior ground of 
knowledge. Certain it is that without this clear insight into
human nature there is no stable authority, for lawas there is
1 
no firm basis for social order.'
In an age that is threatened by the forces of
disintegration, it is not surprising that those who have nothing 
to oppose to their onslaught but the feeble power of humanitar-
ianism should fall victim to the attacks of ^iant ^espair and
2 
his attendant evils, nihilism and 'futilitarianism 1 . This was
the mood of a Gremany suffering the extEeme frustration which
follows in the wake of too ardent and indiscriminate a romanti-
3 
cism. Against such a mood Nietzsche reacted violently,'In the
1.More, Shelburne Essaya X,pp. 63-64. •* Mnre,Shelburne~Essay?ff~v1 n2.More, New aneiourne ^ esayj I, P .AI. 6 ' ———————ppi7?5r"V 6 '
sickness of his soul Nietzsche looked abroad over the Western 
World, and saw, or thought he saw, everywhere futility and pur­ 
poseless and pessimistic uncertainty of the values of life. 
An ideal, as he sees it, is embraced only when a man's grip
on the real world and its good has been wakened} in the end
A 
such supernatural ideals, as they are without foundation in fact,
lose their hold on the human mind, and mankind, having sacrificed ± 
its sense of actual values and having nursed the cause 6f decay, 
is left helpless and joyless. This conditionfae calls Hihilism-i-- 
'And in the first part of The Will to Power he unfolds this mod­ 
ern disease in all its hideousness. The restless activities of 
our life he interprets as so many attempts to escape from the
gloom of purposelessness, as so many varieties of self-stupe-
1 
faction. ' To him the chief cause of the moral relaxation of the
modern world was the humanitarian ism of the Christian Gospel. He, 
like More, recognised the difficulty of reconciling two wholly 
disparate orders of virtue, the civil and the religious. The 
cure to Nietzsche was the complete repudiation of Christian 
ethics for the gospel of the Superman. J?'or an appeal to meekness
and humility and love was substituted an appeal to the libido
2 
dominandi, to Nietzsche, the strongest impulse in ^nan. For the
paradox which exalted the poor and lowly and persecuted, Nietzsche
o 
introduced a "belief in a metaphysical 'survival of the fittest!
2. Ibid. ,p.!77~ S3- 
S.IMd. , pp. 180-81.
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-ihilism, though a state of individual discomfort and social 
anarchy, was yet a necessary transition on the wa£ to health, 
for it entailed the loss of ideals,which was an essential pre­ 
lude to the return to sanity and to order, based on the suprem­ 
acy of the strong as opposed to Christianity's exaltation of the 
feeble. To the man who refused to close his eyes to the naked 
facts of reality,and who was prepared to face fearlessly the 
stark brutality of life,there then occurred a striking change 
of focus,the Transvaluation of all Values, whereby the archaic
morality of good and evil,depending on supernatural rewards,
1 yielded to the non-morality of the purely natural ¥ill-to-Power.
As yet, this Transvaluation of all Values, and the Superman who 
was to be the incarnation of the change, remained in the hazy 
uncertainty of the future, an'ideal' of Nietzsche's own,to which 
he hoped to make his own life approximate as far as possible 
during the existing dispensation of his time. The one thing he 
knew was that the Superman would be the unadulterated product 
of nature,and would seek to raise the level of society by rising 
on the shoulders of those who do the menial work of the world. 
'At the last analysis the Superman is simply a negation of human­ 
itarian sympathy and of the socialistic state of indistinguished
2 3 
equality'. In other words, the imperialism of Hietzsche is the
reverse of the coin bearing the stamp of humanitarianism.Just as
l.lbid.,p.!81. 
2.Ibid.,p.!82. 
3. More, Shelburne Essays IX.pp.118-l?1.5°9-34.
sentimental romanticism is the expression of the 'soft 1 aspects 
of naturalism, altruism, sympathy, service, so Nietzscheism 
derives from the 'hard 'aspects of Naturalism — egotism, the 
lust of power, the survival of the fittest, linking it with 
scientific romanticism. It would seem that Nietzsche's doctrine 
reverts back to the cynicism of Hobbes,but with a substantial 
difference: Hobbes had not to contend with the prevalence of 
an indiscriminate sympathy, the flower of German Romanticism,
nor the morbid exaltation of the 'ego 1 bordering on megalomania,
1 which is the inevitable alternative to a misplaced altruism,
2 embodied for More in the utopist schemes of Tolstoy.
With the underlying mood of Nietzsche's reaction 
More has considerable sympathy; both he and Nietzsche were in
revolt against a system of government and education which en-
expense 
couraged mediocrity at the msxi of the distinguished man, and
a variety of art which pandered to morbid sentimentality .'But 
the cure Nietzsche proposed for these evils was itself, to 
More, a part of the malady. 'The Superman in other words, is a 
product of the same naturalism which produced 'the disease it 
would counteract; it is the last and most violent expression
of the egotism or self-interest which Hume and all his followers
3 
"balanced with sympathy as the two springs of human action'.
Nietzsche's tragedy was that, although seeing the danger of decaa
l.Cf.Hore, Shelburne Lssays« pp.l82-8c.
P . More , Shelburne^s^airs Al , pp . Sto-Jt.; cf Appfcnc// x 3
3. More, ggelburne Es_ay.s Yin, p. 134.
dence ,his very effort to escape only entangled him more desper-
1 
ately in the fatal mesh, with Hume and the Romantic naturalists
he threw away both the reason and the intuition into any super- 
rational law beyond the stream of desires and passions and im-
2 
pulses. 'He looked into his own heart and into the world of
phenomena, and beheld there a ceaseless ebb and flow, without 
beginning, without end, and without meaning. The only law that 
he coUild discover, the only rest for the mind, was some dimly 
foreseen return of all things back to their primordial state, 
to start afresh on the same dark course of chance— the Eter­ 
nal Recurrence, he called it.'-----'The end of it all is the
into
clamour of romantic egotism turned iiitoihorror at its own vac­ 
uity and of romantic sjimpathy turned into despair. It is natur­ 
alism at war with itself and struggling to escape from its own
fatality. As I leave Nietzsche, I think of the ancient tragedy
r 
in which Heracles is represented as writhing in the em)/ace of
the Nessus shirt he has himself put on and rending his own flesfc
3 
in a vain effort to escape it»s poisonous web 1 .
More sees humanitarianism,on the one hand,Nietzsche 
ism, on the other, as the two predominating attempts in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries to solve the perennial pro­ 
blem of social justice. Both are rampant in American society,
4 
the worship of the Superman in the world of 'big business',
l.Ibid.>o.!87.
2.Ibid..pp.187-88.
3.Ibid._,pp.l8e-KS 90. .
4.More, Shelburne -assays IX,p.2.2.8-31-
33?
often evaporating in the same individual into a vague and 
indiscriminate philanthropy. But in the last analysis, the 
problem of social justice is jus* the problem of the individ­ 
ual's attitude to himself. On what he personally thinks of 
life will depend the pattern of his social relationships. And 
so in one of the essays of the last volume of The Shelburne 
Essays, More returns to the problem, finding yet a third sol­ 
ution embodied in the thought of one to whom, as we have already 
seen, the prevailing chaos was an acute actuality. Henry Adams 
was one of the last of the New England Brahmins} his conscience, 
like that of his fellow-countrymen, Emerson, John Fiske, Charles
Eliot Norton, 'was moving, so to speak,iji_vacuo, like a disposs-
2 
essed ghost seeking a substantial habitation'. Unable to hold
the mind in the suspension of judgment required by true scepti­ 
cism, he was faced by three alternative attitudes to the contem­ 
porary dilemma, the imperialism of a Nietzsche, the huraanitar- 
ianism of a Tolstoy, or the nihilism of an escape into the past 
charged with the emotional appeal of an aesthetic dalliance with 
the eternal feminine, stimulating by her irresponsibility and 
caprice the mind of modern man, dulled as it is by the mechan­ 
ical efficiency and the materialism of his age,— the mood of a 
Renan in his Souvenirs d'Enfance et de Jeunes^e or of his 
Feuilles De'tache'eg.
'Conscience, 'comments More, 'was the last tie of New
i . c f . ~Tb ————————
5.More«Shelburae Essays 
4, Ibid. , p- 135.
England to its past. Was it the perfect irresponsibility of
1 
the Virgin, human no doubt, feminine perhaps, certainly not
Puritan that gave to our sceptic the illusion of having reached 
a comfortable goal after his long voyage of education? There 
is a fateful analogy between the irresponsibility of unreason­ 
ing Force and unreasoning love; and the gods of Nietzsche and 
of Tolstoy are but two faces of one god. To change the meta­ 
phor, if it may be done without disrespect, the image in the
cathedral of Chartres looks perilously like that of the ancient
s 2
idol of DinoA decked out in petticoats'. For scholarship, imag­ 
ination, vivacity, range, Adams ranked high in the world of 
American letters of the last generation, but, adds More,'one 
winces a little at acknowledging that the latest spokesman of 
the Adamses and of New England ends his career in sentimental 
nihilism'----^The tragedy of Adams* education is that of a man
who couId not rest easy in negation, yet could find no positive———— 3
faith to take its place.'
As an illuminating contrast, More quotes some words of 
Adams' contemporary, John Fiske* "'tnhen we come to a true phil­ 
osophy and make t,hat our stand-point, all things become clear. 
We know what things to learn and what, in the infinite mass of
things to leave unlearned; and then the universe becomes clear
4 
and harmonious".'
1. The~reference is to~ATams~r 'discovery' of the Virgin of 
Chartres as the symbol of those qualities which the modern 
world has lost, to its own detriment.
S.More.Shelburne XI,p.136 3.Ibid.,loc.cit.4. —— ——— —
The appraisal of Adams' false philosophy is more than 
a merely critical summing up of another man's failure, to Paul 
Elmer More. If ever he spoke straight from the heart it is here. 
To More, Adams' dilemma was his own.Spiritually, if not by birth- 
More belonged to the New England Brahmins. He too had longed to 
rank high in American literature for scholarship, imagination, 
vivacity, range. He too had become terrifyingly aware of the cha- 
-os of modern life, and the inadequacy of conventionalised relig­ 
ion to cope with it. He too looked out upon the world and saw
nihilism 
a humanitarian ism which culminated in aasstuKSX and a Kietzscheism
which culminated in madness contending for the possessxion of
Y"
man's soul. But he saw too another altenative. He remembered
A
Fiske's words, and set out to construct for himself a true 
philosophy. So far we have considered only those elements of 
the Shelburne Essays which describe man's declension from an 
ideal of a rounded and harmonious character to a false apoth­ 
eosis of passion and instinct and the mysterious depths of the
those 
Abyss, and which in turn seek to diagnose the prevailing disease.
Side by side with these lie other elements which reveal his 
personal bracing of the will and purging of the mind in order 
to grapple with the problem of the day in both its social and 
personal implications.
(Vll)
Crisis* The Quest for Justice,Individual 
and Social*
'The desire of peace, as the world has known it in past 
times, signified always a turning away from the flotsam and 
jetsam of time and an attempt to fix the mind on absolute rest 
and unity,— the desire of peace has been the aspiration of 
faith. And because the object of faith cannot be seen by the 
eyes of the body or expressed in terms of the understanding, 
a firm grasp of the will has been necessary to keep the desire 
of the heart from falling back into the visible, tangible things 
of change and motion. Yet blessed are they that believe and have 
not seen. It was the peculiar qjrest of the Nineteenth Century to 
discover fixed laws and an unshaken KXXXJC abiding place for the 
mind in the very kingdom of unrest} we have sought to chain the 
waves of the sea with the winds.'
More saw modern man in his quest for peace vacillating 
between two extreme philosophies, humanitarianism and Nietzscheism. 
There in stark opposition he saw arrayed against each other the 
two power)?s which to him had been contending for man's allegiance 
during the whole of the post-Renaissance period. The sen«e of im­ 
pending disaster in the years preceding the 19H-18 War threw the 
two conflicting trends into a more vivid and fateful relief, but, 
in addition to the temporary passions of a day,they represented to 
More that eternal tendency in man which arises from his insatiable
l.More, Shelburne Essays 111,pp.263-64
longing for an awareness of absolute truth. The nature of man, 
to the Humanist, is made up of desires incapable of self-restraint 
and therefore limitless; and the practical basis of everyday life 
is this limitless sway of unrelated impulses which, left to itself, 
ends, on the one hand, in a violence of self-destruction, ot,on
the other, in a sentimentalism which provokes the nihilism of
2 
satiety. Uore's problem at the time of writing the Shelburne
Essays was how to avoid both the Scylla and Charybdis of this eter­ 
nal dialectic. Nor was it for him a purely academic question. 
Few Twentieth Century thinkers had felt more acutely the longing 
for some resting place for the enquiring mind of man, or the 
atrophying despair which comes upon the man wh> seeks refuge in 
some Absolute only to find himself driven from it by the inevit­ 
able mental reaction which overtakes the one who thinks to find 
security in some rationalised solution of life's dilemma.The wise 
man will accept willingly the control of the inner check, and 
thereby will achieve a co-ordination of his impulses around this 
moral centre of his character. Such a man is no longer subject to 
the alternations of happiness and misery,but will rise to f a state 
of equable activity in repose which we call peace. Yet withal it 
must be that life in its perfection would leave something wanting 
to the soul; some feeling would stil!Athrough to remind us that 
happiness in|all its stages is at best but a negation of the great 
angry flux; we know even more cleraly as we grow in self- control 
that the peace of this life is but the shadow and not the substance.
Remorse and misery we can outgrow, pain perhaps; but there remains 
1. Hore^SHalburne E&sa-yslX. p. %$$\cf- ^ ^ Shel burns. Essays J.^, 
^..^CT-^Shclburne Essays VMl 7 pfr. •"
the dinine discontent. 1
Both humanitarianism and scientific rationalism had 
failed to take into account the reality of mark's craving for 
an inner peace which could not be met either by ambitious schemes 
for social reform or by the mere extension of material progress. 
Their failure was largely due to the modern confusion of two 
distinct types of the infinite which men envisaged as the goal 
of human endeavour. The Humanist, on the other hand, discriminated 
between the true and the false infinities*in contrast to the 
unending and insatiable current of human desires which More calls 
the 'limitless',they set the contemplation of an absolute unity 
which is unmoved amid all that moves,the true infinite. 'This 
unity not of nature 1 ,says More, 1 is the infinite; it is the very 
opposite of that limitlessA-which is the attribute of nature itsfclf;
it is not a state of endless infinite expansion, but is on the
3 
contrary that state of centralisation which has its goal in itselfJ
This distinction lies at the heart of the Nicomachean Ethics; but 
unfortunately, Aridtotle was not prepared to abide merely in the 
immediate apprehension of such an inner unity, and sought to find 
some rationalised explanation of its pperation which removed his
philosophy from the field of pure intuition to that of metaphysics
4
with which, as we have seen, More had little sympathy. Nevertheless
in his recognition of a central power set above the flux of nature
Aristotle had entered into the deep spiritual needs of humanity,
admit 
and so far at least,More was prepared to Babbitt's claim that he
1.More, Ibid.,p.275
2. Mo re, SieTburne gag ays J.ffP»8p.? 026-271 n-r.New Shejburne Essay*3«*ore, STieTDurne Essays vlll. ,pp.^o-<i'f OJ- iJ** TT o^T R -i
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that heA had been a true humanist.
The fundamental distinction within More's thought is, 
as I see it, «n the one hand, between the true Infinite, an intAit- 
ire perception of the One, and the so-called 'Absolute 1 , an intell- 
ectualistic attempt to rationalise man's experience of his universe 
by explaining away the Humanist awareness of a dualism and exalting 
either the One or the Many, into an absolute, monistic philosophy 
of life}, and, also,on the other hand,between the true Infinite 
and the false Infinite,apurely emotional or instinctive craving 
after an imaginary satisfaction, an appetite whigh grows on what
it feeds upon and is therefore merely expansive and ultimately
2 
nihilistic. The Absolute is man's attempt to satisfy the_Lib_ido
sciendii the false Infinite of limitlessness is his attempt to 
satisfy the Libido aentiendi. The true Infiiite, in contrast to 
both, seeks to hold a balance between the conflicting tendencies 
of man's nature, and to impose upon them a control which emanates 
from a power outside of man, the divine Reason which operates on 
the human plane in the form of the inner check. Whether man's 
consciousness of an Infinite had an objective source or co-relative 
with which man could establish any personal relationshipjMore was 
not prepared to speculate during the writing of the Shelburne £3ayes, 
but in his essay on Baron Von Hvigel, in the Third Series of the 
New Shelburne Ess ays,he contrasts the Aristotelian 'Absolute' with 
his own conception of the 'Ultimate', a distinction derived from 
Von Hugel. Such a conception of the Supernatural he was prepared to
2.More, Shelburne Essays Vlll,pp.232-33.
entertain in 1956, although he would hardly have countenanced
1 
it during the earlier series. But his picture of the Absolute
represents an attitude towards tlhe abstractions of metaphysics 
and theology which had not changed during the interim period 
and would have been equally valid had it occurred in the essay 
on 'Delphi and Greek Literature' or 'Nemesis, or the Divine Envy*. 
'The ultimate, forever desired and never attained by man, would 
be the state of a Being who lives in the succession of time,who 
has a past and a future, yet to whom no fragment of the past is 
lost and to whom no possibility of the future is veiled, whose
knowledge is eternal though it move in time with a universe for
2 
ever flowing and drifting and still crying out for guidance. 1
But theology wishes to push further and set up an 'Absolute' 
conceived as an eternity in which there is no succession, no 
past or future but only a static present spread out in infinite 
monotony, with no portion in what lies before and after, with no 
possible reaction to a world moving in time, severed from our
life, alone, self-absorbed in frozen isolation, and to all human
3 
needs perfectly meaningless,' whereas the Ultimate, on the other
hand, partakes of all the complexity of human experience.
Such, however,is the final outcome of a lifetime of 
thought. At the outset of his career, with his repudiation of a 
Romanticism exalting a false infinity of feeling, and of a scienti-
•-77.
2* Ibid,.loc.cit. 
S.Ibid.,p.177.
fie rationalism, seeking to set up a false absolute of positivism, 
on £he one hand, and pragmatism, on the other, More was confronted 
with the problem of finding some working philosophy of life which
should yet satisfy his deep spiritual consciousness of a true
i 
infinity. With Saint Augustine he could still say:Q.uia fecisti
nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donee requiescat in te'.
His own peculiar longing was representative of a desire 
common to everypnan who haft come to a true intuition of the insec­ 
urity of the present world,who has 'seen the treachery that hides
e 
under the smiling face of the world's Jlace' ; 'he knows the
taedium vitae, that like a sullen master drives the world in its 
unresting headlong course; he has caught glimpses of the frenzy 
of disillusion that threatens to devastate the world&'s heart at 
the first moment of repose. Yes, to one whose eyes has opened, 
though it he for a moment only, upon the vision of an indefectible 
peace, there is henceforth no compulsion that can make him rest 
satisfied in passing pleasucesj the end of desire has devoured 
its beginning, and he is driven by a power greater than the hope
of any reward "to fast from this earth". He may, indeed he must,
i 2 
pursue ephemeral things,but he /linnet know his content in them*.
This desire to put on immortality led Hewman to seek for rest in
3 
the Roman Church, the desiderium Romae, "but for the majority of
earnest seekers after truth such a decision was no longer poss- 
iblefro More, throughout the writing of the Shelburne Essays
l7More. Shelburne Essays 1X,p.85
§.More, £Se''':>urne Essays" VI.pp.245-46..More, glgr^TTrnFJiis'savs Vlii r p.47.
tic peace derired from revealed religion in an age when so much 
if the mythology of Christianity had been called into question 
was a spurious peace akin to the Romantic thirst for absorption 
in the vague of infinite desire. The reverent man might not speak 
lightly of the Church or underestimate her services in the past,
but for all that he had to recpgnise that she was a dying instit-
2 
ution, and that it was no longer possible to hold confidently to
the belief in a personal God as anything more than the 'projection
own 3
of man's ASoul into the void 1 . Its symbolism still retained its 
vivid appeal for tha imagination, but its mythology seemed to 
More, prior to 1914, an anachronism which brought the rest of its 
teachings into disrepute.
One of fcis chief difficulties had been the reconcil­ 
iation of the idea of a God at once personal and infinite, such 
as the Christians had attempted. Personality, as the expression 
of individual desire and choice was in itself the negation of 
infinity, both in man and God, as the Indian sages had seen when
they made the conversion of man dependent on a renunciation of
4
personality. Nevertheless,it was this very combination of irrecon­ 
cilable elements which constituted the **** \power of Christianity. 
Of the theology of 8t. Augustine he wrote!'Let us admit, if com­ 
pelled, that his theology includes an element intrinsically illog­ 
ical and ultimately self-destructive, but let us humbly acknowledge
1.Ibid.,pp.77-78.
2.More, Shelburne Essays VI,p.24?.
5.Ibid.,p.243.
4»rbid..p.lOO;Shelburne Essays V,pp.112-13.
also that the worship of an infinite personal God was no dead 
abstraction, but a living reality abounding in the fervour of 
holiness, and supremely and terribly beautiful; that the religion 
of an Augustine and a Pascal is a manifestation of faith beyond
the comprehension of worldly philosophy, and far above the reach
1 
of worldly men'. That it is no longer acceptable in his day is
the worse for that generation.'
But not only is the Christian metaphysic illogical; 
th 
its e;fic is impracticable in its entirety as a code of social
life. Christ had never contemplated the introduction of a religion 
meant to rebuild society. 'His Kingdom was not of this world, and
there is every reason to believe that he looked to see only a few
2 
chosen souls follow in his footsteps.' Both Christ and Buddha, the
two finest exemplars of the religious ideal, agree on those virtues 
most necessary for a life of perfection, but Buddha, at least, 
makes it quite clear that there are two classes of believers, those 
who accept and practise the higher ethic, and those who acknowledge 
the ideal but remain in the world, encouraging, even supporting 
financially, but not themselves practising^fhis higher ethic. But 
if the Buddhistic— and the Christian —ideal is not for men in
general, the world has its own ethical codw, based on the Decalogue
3 
instead of the Sermon on the Mount. To confuse the two orders is
4 
to court disaster. We have already seen how, in the transition from
Classical to Christian art, a whole new series of values was intro­ 
duced. wlt>L^ ronaffqiiftnt pnnfnninn whicVi has novi»v heen property
1 *More.Shelburne Essays VI,p.120. 3.Ibid.,pp.246-47.
2.More.ShelburneEssays l,p.?43. 4.CT7pp
resolved. More discusses the influence of the new beliefs object­ 
ively, as one discussing an historical phenomenon which has no 
immediate concern for him personally. One is reminded of Renan's 
saying that in order to do justice to the origins of Christianity, 
one needed to have believed in order to bring to the subject 
something of the tenderness and sympathy necessary to an under­ 
standing of its influence over men, but to believe no longer in
2 order to be able to discuss it analytically and diepassionately.
Again, when he opposes to ^rowning's sanguine contentment with 
human nature as it stands orthodoxy's sense of man's sin and 
need of redemption, he adds significantly:'It was believed that 
the spiritual life was brought with a price, and that the desires 
ef this world must first suffer a permutation into something not 
themselves. I am not holding a brief for that austere doctrine}
I am not even sure that I understand it, although it is written
3 
at large in many books',
His scepticism is complete; he is entirely dissociated 
from the dogmatic implications of revealed religion. The tragedy 
in the Garden of Eden which Milton adopted for the central theme 
of his great epic may be'lifted up in grandeur and significance 
until it is made to embrace the drama of salvation;'but 'for us 
who merely read and seek the exalted pleasures of the imagination^ 
there lies between the scenes in hell and the panoramic vision of 
the world's shattered life, that perfect and splendid vision of
1. More. Shelburne Essays 1,pp.250-51.
2. Krnest Renan,Vie de_J£sus,(Parisjl923),Introduction,p.CIV.3. More, Shelburne .asjsayjrTTi ,p. i fi*. • '*
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1 
pastoral bliss. 1
Christianity has suffered, because of its dogmatic
elements, more than Greek mythology which claimed no strict
2
religious authority, and therefore has a flexibilty and per­ 
ennial freshness lacking in the more precise Christian theology. 
The failure to synthesftse the two traditions,Christian and 
classical, has been responsible, as we hare seen, for much of 
the tension in the cultural life of the past, and the modern 
method of obtaining unity by sacrificing the one term, the 
Classics, altogether is really but begging the question. Yet 
so convinced is More of the incalculable value of the Classics 
as a means of discipline and purification that he is prepared 
to see the whole of the Mediaeval tradition of Christianity
swept^away with all its riches of intense and uplifting passions
3 
which are capable of supplementing our own impoverished emotions,
rather than lose the wisdom of antiquity's intuitive dualism. 
Upon the basis of the classical insight man may build up for 
himself a £ religious faith inassailable by the forces which 
flourish on the defeat of dogmatic religion. The loss of belief in 
revealed religion does not seem without its compensation to More, 
fir it compels the thinker to seek earnestly for an alternative. 
'Let a man cease for a moment to look so strenuously upon what is 
right for his neighbours—-Let him retire into himself, and in 
the silence of such recollection examine his own motives and the
1.More, Shelburne Essays IV,p.252.
2.More, Shelburne Essays V1 *?* 526 * cf • pp.'53-54.
3.More, Shelburne Essays IX.pp.86-87.
the sources of his self- approval and discontent. He will 
discover that in that dialogue with himself, if his abstraction
is complete and sincere, that his nature is not simple and single,
e 
but dual, and the con/quences to him in his judgment of life and
1 
in his conduct will be of incalculable importance. f
Nevertheless, inspite of More's temporary acquiescence
in scepticism, his detacned and proud forbearance in the face of
2 
the unknown , there are many passages studded throughout his
in 
work'where creeps the eternal note of sadness'.We hear it when
he contrasts the peculiar sense of solitude infusing the work 
of that disinherited Puritan, Nathaniel Hawthorne, with the 
equally profound loneliness felt by the authors of the Hindu
Vedanta, aware, like Hawthorne, of man's isolation, not only
3 
from his fellows,but from the source of universal life. We hear
it again vibrating through his prose when he tells of the sterility 
of grief of a Louisa Shore mourning for a dead brother and sister 
without hope of immortality, and contrasts the impotence of her 
sorrow with the religious resignation of Eugenic de Guferin and of 
Mrs. Augustus Craven. Time and again , More returns to this sense 
of the incompleteness of life without faith, in the haunted pess­ 
imism of James Thomson,seeing only a world of unending motion clash-
a
ing and whirling deliriously down the great grooves of change,
the failure of humanitariarnsm to o^er mankind a hope to replace
JTTbTd. .p.
2.More, Shelburne Essays lll,p.265f€.
3.More, Shelburne Essays 1,pp.48-49.
4.More, Shelburne Essays Vll,pfr ISO-
5.More, Shelburne Essays V,pp.188-89.
l 
the lost consolations of religion, the discontent of Socialism
and Anarchism which is bit a wistful longing for an ideal that 
o
has perished, tha abysmal gloom underlying the individual con­ 
sciousness of our day, with its monstrous depths laid bare by
5 1 the disclosures of recent psychology, —— allibhese are expressions
of a. perpetual hunger in man for the assurances of an eternal dimen­ 
sion to life which shall transcend the mere existence of the present.
It was this same hunger which was to make More, 
unlike his friend Babbitt, unable to remain in the cold, hard 
atmosphere of scepticism, and drove him on to a find a spiritual
home beneath the shelter of a supernatural faith.But faith was
e 
not to be purchased at the cost of intellectual in^grityj More,
like Babbitt, was resigned to walking in the light that he had,
4 
believing that if he did so, the light would grow, Thus during
the period of the Shelburne Essays he was prepared to rest in
the mere statement of what he himself observed, in aa experiential
description of immediate knowledge as it cam *o him on two separate
planes, the plane of the senses and the plane of the ethical imag-
it WAS 
ination, and as Aconfirmed by the experience of the wise men of the
ages. That experience pointed in one directions'There is no reach 
of the human intellect which can bridge the gap between motion and 
rest.Our senses are adapted to a wonld of univeraal flux which is, 
so far as «e can determine, subject to no absolute law but the law
1.More, Shelburne Essays IX,pp.85.
2.More, ggelbur'ne Essays' Vll,p.l93«
3. More.Shelburne Essays 11,p.70.
4.Cf.p.
of probabilities. He who attempts to circumscribe the ebb and flow 
of circumstance* within the bounds of our spiritual needs, he who 
attempts to find peace in any formula af science or in any promise
of historic progree, is like one who labours on the old and vain
1 
problem of squaring the circle'.
Scepticism was, therefore, to Paul Elmer More,during 
the decade frorafa.904 to 1914, the only feasible religious attitude 
to adopt, and by 'scepticism' he meant something quite definite. 
He did not use the term indiscriminately to imply any mood of 
doubt or questioning, but gave it a distinct philosophical connot­ 
ation. Briefly, scepticism came down to this: it showed a sharp 
distinction between knowledge and theory.'Knowledge is limited to 
what we have, not by inference from something else, but directly 
and without the intervention of inferential reason; in the ancient
terminology of the sect, knowledge is what we possess in the form
2 
of immediate affections'. Immediate sensations include those evoked
by colour, shape, size and texture, pain and pleasure. These the 
sceptic sees occurring in certain patterns so that it is possible 
to classify them and order one's actions accordingly. 'The complete
sceptic is perfectly justified in addicting himself to scientific
experimentation among and 
pursuits if by science we mean no more than ikK classification of
phenomena? and he is eaually justified in adapting his life to a
chosen system of ethics. But the sceptic stops there,and stops
3 
sharply'.
TTffiTyp, ShelburneJEssays 111, p. 2 63.
2.More "TTew~!ahelT3urhe .assays ll,pp»-L-^.
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The sceptic, unlike Aristotle and Descartes and Kant and the
1 
rest of the metaphysicians, does not presume to pass judgment on
nature or on the motivation of the objects which cause his sensation,
f\ 
or feelings, or to speculate on the ultimate nature of the world.
On this "basic attitude of the sceptic More remains consistent,but 
whereas by the time of the New Shelburne Essays,he is prepared to 
construct a positive approach to religion and the supernatural 
upon it, in the Shelburne Essays themselves, he is not prepaced to 
pass beyond a consideration of the natural and the human.
In the essay on ITewman, More divides thinking men into four 
classes which he re-groups into ±s. two main divisions. There are 
the two extremes of mystic and sceptic constituting an'outer'group,
and an 'inner' group comprising the non- mystical religious mind
2 
and the non-sceptical scientific mind. The true sceptic is prepared
to abide in the field of pure scientific conjecture, but we have 
seen how easy and how tempting it is for the scientist to pass
from positive science into the realm of hypothetical or even
3 
metaphysical science. Similarly the true mystic has passed beyond
dogma into a direct sense of communion with the spiritual prin­ 
ciple of the universe, but the non-mystical religious mind demands 
the support of definite dogmd and a system of mythology as aids t6 
the apprehension of religious truth. The latter is interested in 
the observation of religious states, just as the scientific dogmat­ 
ist is interested in the observation of material phenomena, bjit
1. More, New Shelburne Essays"!!1, p.172.
2. More, Shelburne Essays Vlll,p.l97.
3. Cf ,
1st
both pass from observation v£ to belief in certain underlying causes* 
'Hypotheses, in other words, are merely the mythology, the deus ex 
machina of science, and they are eradicated from the scientific 
mind only by the severest discipline of scepticism, just as mythol­ 
ogy is eradicated from the religious mind by genuine agmfl mysticism. ' 
Newman's failure to offer his generation any satisfactory solution 
of the religious dilemma, and his subsequent defection to Rome, 
resulted from his inability to see any alternatives beyond religious 
authority on the one hand, and scientific dogmatism, on the other.
In the outer circle of the mystic and the sceptic, the mind 
never relaxes its grip on individuallxtiKJietail for Jojpersonal 
and material law, whilst in the inner cirfcle of revelation and rat­ 
ionalism the mind relaxes its hold to a certain extent on details 
and on individual moments of experience in order to preserve its 
belief in the universality of some supposed personal force or 
natural law. The man to whom religion means revelation holds on 
to the idea of a Personal God, though it means that he must remain 
impervious to conflicting creeds or to facts that appear to contra­ 
dict his belief* Similarly the man of science, to More, appears to 
hold on to his formula for explaining natural phenomena oblivious 
of contradictory formulae and hypotheses. It is generally supposed 
that the scientific mind searches for the actual individual fact 
independently of presupposition or theory, and regardlessly of 
consequence. But rationalistic— or mtaphysical—• science which 
colours popular philosophy today is built up around one particular
theory adopted to the exclusion of others equally valid. And even 
the one theory has frequently to ignore conflicting evidence
in order to formulate an explanation. The method of scientific
dogma- 
rationalism is therefore the same as that of religious xxiiitt-
atism; and both are equally opposed to the habits of mind of 
the sceptic and the mystic. The difference between the genu­ 
ine sceptic and the scientific 'dogmatist 1 may be illustrated 
by the contrast between Sainte- Beuve and Taine; the latter 
dominated by the desire to correlate individual facts by means 
of a general cause, the former, by the desire to grasp the 
individual fact at all hazards and through all losses. Simil­ 
arly the mystic may be contrasted with the religious dogmatist 
-the latter clinging to belief in authority and revelation in 
whatsoever form they might assume, whilst the former, like the 
sceptic, keeps a firm grip on phenomana as they appear and sees 
in them only illusion and no ruling of Providence or of a defin., 
able law. It is perfectly easy for the genuine sceptic to enter 
into the mind of the genuine mystic, as for Sainte-Beuve to 
understand the thought of a Pascal. The mystic, however, un­
like the sceptic, knows within himself an infinite something,
1 
unnamed, indefinable, the one absolute reality. True mystic­
ism is not, however, to be confused with the pseudo-mysticism
of the Romantic with its substitution of limitlessness for the
2 
true sense of the infinite. To More, the best instance he can
I7~Ibid.,pp.68-73T
2. 5f.pp
of-
find^genuine mysticism in modern times is in the work of 
Tennyson whose openness and kumility of mind strike More 
as a welcome contrast to Newman's desperate clinging to 
authority and religious formalism and to the logic by which 
he argued his way to Rome, proceeding on an 'initial assump­
tion which implied a certain lack of the highest faith and
needs 
of that sceptical attitude towards our human *xx&k upon
1 
which faith must ultimately rest. '
In discussing William James* declension from
the position of scepticism he advocated into a rationalistic
2 fc*t 
dogmatism of his own, More goes on to say^/\Forces beat upon
tub.
us from every side-«- we know theit influence upon usj^We are 
bound to hold judgment in a state of scepticism with regard 
to the correspondence of our inner experience with the world 
at large, neither affirming *£ nor denying} while we accept 
honestly the dualism of consciousness as the "irrational 
fact". If I have read correctly the lesson of the past and 
of the present, faith, I dare avow, is something that strikes 
deeper than the mythologies! of religion, or the imaginings 
of a fevered Pragmatism} it is a voice from our own centre of 
calm, asserting through all the noise of contradiction} "I am 
the better self and the higher value, the stronger life and 
the finer joyll . t Many who'have looked steadfastly inti the
2. More/ Shelburne Essays Vll, pp. 209-11.
meaning of this inner life 1 -—'will think that John Woolman 
uttered the truth of dualism and of religion when he saidt
"The necessity of an inward stillness hath appeared clear
1 
to mji mind; in true silence strength is renewed".'
From the withdrawal of man into the central calm 
of his feeing comes true self- knowledge, his safeguard against
error and deception, bearing witness t* a clear and unfailing
2 
consciousness of man's dual nature. This positive function of
self-knowledge More calls insight, and against it he sets 
scepticism, the negative pole of self-knowledge, denying the 
right of the faculties to supplant this dualism by their own 
abstractions and* combinations. 'Insight and scepticism are 
the two arms, the positive and negative aspects, so to speak* 
of truth* Insight includes at oncerooth the higher, or super- 
rational, intuition which is immediately conscious of the
inner check, and the lower or infra-rational intuition which
3 
is immediately conscious of the flux of impulses'. In other
words, the philosophy of dualism, as it appeared to More, did 
not attempt to explain the co-existence ofl good and evil, nor 
to bridge the fculf between negation and affirmation, the One
and the Many.The order of nature and of natural life, 'formed
W 4 
so to speak by eddies in the stream at once changing and stake*
AA
and thereby belonging purely to neither element of our being
fTTbid. ,pp. 211-12^~~
2.More, Shelburne Essays lX,pp/214-16.
3.More, Shelburne Essays Vlll,p.272. 
4.Ibid.,pp.288-89.
but springing from'an incomprehensible relation of the two 
elements; represents f relatiTe good 1 ; and 'of this relative 
world we have no true knowledge, but only opinionJ'To go 
beyond this insight and this scepticism is to pass from 
philosophy to religion.'
The majority of men find the strain of such a 
dualism too tense to be borne and escape into the world of 
dogmatic religion or dogmatic science; but a few men have 
attained through this very dualism to a perfect peace in 
which the soul can rise into a state whreein the desiies 
cease altogether, and the other element of consciousness, the 
higher Self or infinite Spirit, abides in blissful liberation. 
'The complete attainment of the mystical state would mean the 
cessation of natural existence, but to all of us moments may 
come when the consciousness of the inner check is so over­ 
powering as seemingly to sever the continuity of our impul-
2 
sive life.' It is in such moments of vision as these that
man comes to know the positive quality of that inhibitive 
element that otherwise possesses unity only through its nega­ 
tive action.'This conversion by which the heart of man is 
brought to recognise the inner check as the constantly in­ 
dwelling spirit, is called faith. By faith the everlasting 
Ho becomes the everlasting Yes. Fai£h is thus not the will
fTTbid.. loc. cit.~~ 
2.Ibid.,p.29a.
to believf, "but the power of that insight or self- knowledge 
which grows with the will to refrain. Neither is it the arbit­ 
rary "belief, contrary to experience,that all is right. Its goal 
is the liberation from dualism which embraces the possibility of 
infinite evil as well as infinite good.Faith, to those who crave 
a definite anwwer to the demands of reason and of the imagination, 
may seem vague and unreal. In a truer sense it is the definite
and real thing in life, in so far as it implies a constant intent-
1 
ion of character in one direction.'
As insight and scepticism are the two poles of intell­ 
ectual truth, so in spiritual truth the affirmative power of 
faith has its negative counterpart in disillusion,'the knowledge 
that this apparenr order of the world is not of the world itself 
and that beneath the surface of what we see and feel, beneath 
the very act of seeing and feeling, lies the unredeemed chaos
of desires and impressions, unlimited, unmeaning, unfathomable,
2 
incalculable, formless, dark.' In some periods of spiritual
apathy, the sense of disillusion may be unaccompanied by the
corresponding assurance of faith, and at such times, nothing is
3 
real to men. 'They walk in a place of shadows, and feel that
life is continually slipping away from them into a bottomless
4 
abyss'. Unable to surmount the mood of materialism which besets
o 
them, they become cynical and embittered. Insight, the affirmative.
l.Ibid. , pp. 290-91. 
2. Ibid. ,p.291.
3.fpp.a,»i,a.i«i ) 2**-<fc?.
4. Xpre, Shelburne -^ssays till, p. 291. 
n.lDid. .p*<?9«s.
pole of intellectual truth, can, however, exist without its 
religious counterpart, faith, and the negative pole, scepticism, 
without »ZK disillusionment, although the two higher terms, faith 
and disillusion, cannot exist without the lower,-insight and scep­ 
ticism*-from which they spring. Religion, in ordinary practice,
mood
is a complicated ^XJXKKKX into which enter insight and faith,scep­ 
ticism and disillusion, morality and mythology in varying combin-
1 
ations. Where mythology ia accepted as literally true,we have not
2 
faith but belief. This had hitherto been the case with the
Christian mythos, the most powerful and imaginatively satisfying 
of all mythologies which,to More,was seeking to represent symbol­ 
ically through the idea of a Triune God the imaginative blending 
of the three faculties and the inner checkjperhaps the farthest
he ever went in the attempt to reduce the religion of the Incar-
have 
nation to a mere psychological abstraction. To Acome to the point
true 
where he accepted religious mythology as only figurativelyAdid
not necessarily mean that he had attained to true faith,as More 
was to learn, although it seemed to him in 1915 to mark an impot- 
tant step in the transition from belief to faith. Actually he 
was on the verge of the slope which had led others before him to 
wittle down the vital reality of Christianity into a mere system 
of psychological entities to which it was in danger of being 
reduced by an excess of critical analysis. That he was saved frotn. 
that last desperate plunge was due mainly to the concrete qualify 
of his imagination,and the urgent hunger of his nature for faith
in something more tangible than the anaemic shade of a subject­ 
ive Christianity such as a Renan, or even a Schweitzer, had to 
offer.
But until true faith does succeed to scepticism, man
is left
'Wandering between two worlds — one dead, 
The other powerless to be born'. 1
Such was More 1 s own position, and the position of hie generation, 
as he saw it at the time of the Shelburne ^ssaye. He could not 
yet attain to that state of religious beatitude wherein the 
conflict of dualism is suddenly released and man comes to a 
complete and abiding consciousness of his Higher Self } undisturbe^l 
by the warring elements of the flux. The inner check remained 
for him the everlasting No, the inhibitive element denying his 
instincts free play. It had yet to be transmuted into the ever­ 
lasting Yea, whereby its quintessential power was seen to be 
positive and creative. He remained, therefore, on the Humanistic 
plane where his perceptions of life were dualistic, accepting 
both knowledge of the One and impcessions of the Many without 
attempting to reconcile them.
Nevertheless, although as yet More was unable to 
resolve the problem of the otherworld in its relation to man, 
the other pole of religion offered an urgent problem, that of 
conduct. And because of its direct concern with conduct More 
turned for guidance, at the outset of his attempt to find a 
working philosophy of life, to Oriental religion, notably to 
the BhaaavadJ^ljj:. Here he found those elements of religious
l.Cf. fW >h*.1burn«. £ftsa^«,v» , p. Z 6 J.
perception which men ?f faith had previously associated fcy with 
Christianity; but whereas the latter feligion in his own day 
tended to dissolve into what seemed to him an impracticable
humanitarianism, Buddhism had attempted a more realistic recon-
1 
ciliation of faith with the demands of daily life.
'Religion, we are told, should carry us into a sphere 
where the claims of this world hane no meaning to the soul, 
yet withal we are men among men, with imperious needs and
duties; and we see not who shall reconcile the aspirations of
2 
faith with the demands of daily existence'. The majority of
men fluctuate bttween the demands of feligion and practice. 
Of those who have sought to live exclusively on the plane of 
religious perceptions, many have become indifferent to the 
claims of practical morality. This was the experience of the 
Hindus who, seeing no connection between the finite and the 
"infinite, the sphere of faith and the sphere of action, accepted
in full their own ignorance, and as a result of this severed
5 
connection, enjoyed spiritual freedom. Nevertheless, some formula
is needed which is able, if only by a compromise, to reconcile 
the two spheres for daily conduct. This reconciliation is the 
main theme of the Bhagavad G?ta which, to More, represents the 
very essence of the Brahmin teaching. Such an attitude is human­ 
istic in so far as it seeks to achieve a balahce between the two
*
l.Cf .p./)6Al.. and ^helburne~Essays
2. More, Shelburne Essays VI, p. 44.
3. Ibid. ,p.46Jcf.IMdi.»P«*°»
conflicting termd of our nature, rather than religioui, for
religion seeks to achieve harmony by sacrificing the one term
1 
to the other*
The Bhagavad Gtta is, for the most part, taken up 
with the reflections of the hero Arjuna before going into a 
battle resulting from a family feud. Arjuna More describes
as an 'Oriental Hamlet, thrust by fate into the necessity of
2 
stern action and made suddenly aware of the pity of life. '
His charioteer happens to be no other than the God Krishna
who listens to his prolonged meditations patiently and does
not attempt to lull the hero into a false sense of security.
All he can do is to state boldly the paradox of faith and
action, and leave the answer to the sense of dualism within
3 
the soul itself. '
'The world as the god expounds it, is not single but double. 
Above all, is the one invisible, eternal, incorruptible, im­
perishable*
•If the red slayer thinks he slays,
Or if the slain thinks he is slain, 
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep and pass, and turn again".
Besides this are the touchings of matter, the many forms and 
individuals that arise and perish, that swim in the flux of 
time and in the feeling that we too, or some part of us, are 
illusions in the great illusion. No man. however deep in wisdom, 
has ever seen the bond of this one and these many, nor has any
l.Ibid. ,p.Zl'. " ———————————
2
3
): d. ,p.55. 
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man laid his finger on the tie between the knowledge of faith 
that frees the soul from the contacts and the desires and sorrows 
and joys of the soul that hold it down ax a seeming part of the 
world. We may deny our kinship to the many? yet not for a moment 
can we lire and do nothing, for the triple modes of nature(good­ 
ness, passion and darkness) hold us now in their sway and more
1 
us this way and that*•
Man is born into a world of action} he cannot utterly 
renounce action and lire. The only course open to him is to do 
the duty which lies before him, obey the demands of that station 
of life into which he was born, and leave the rest to fate. That 
is, man must concern himself, not with the fruit of the work, but 
with the work itself. 'Equally by aversion as by desire we become 
more integrally part of that which we do or refrain from doingfi 
we must work, but without attachment. In this way we partake of 
the true renunciation, and thus through morality, or a conformity
to duty, and not without morality, we attain to the great liberat-
2 
ion.'
In the Second Series of the Shelburne Assays. More 
quotes to the same effect*
& i "Thy service is in the work only, but in the fruits
thereof never;
Be not impelled by the results of works, neither set
thy heart to do no work".
"Standing firm in devotion, and putting away attachment
so ever work on, 0 Prince.
Also in success or failure be thou indifferent,indiffer­ 
ence,too,is called devotion".
l.More, Shelbur'ne Essays VI,p.56. (The italics are my ownjl 
8. Ibid..,? 57.
36?
"For all works in all places are of a truth wrought by the
blind forces of naturej in
Only he that is deluded by egotism thinketh ** himself, "I
am the doer!!" 11
The commoner Hindu ideal is complete renunciation of works, 
bidding the spirit avoid all contact with tfce world and seek 
for perfect peace ftn its own life of self-contemplation.^ 
The ureek ideal is one of moderation in desire and action. 
The Bhagarad Gtta adopts an attitude somewhere between the 
two. It sees clearly the futile turmoil of the external world 
to which the inner world of the spirit bears no relationship, 
yet it accepts fully the exigencies of this world. Man must ± 
learn, however, to look not upon the changing incidents and 
accidents of the natural world, but into his own heart,where­ 
by he becomes aware of his personal responsibility for his fate.
'At first it will seem that «e too in our measure of 
happiness and pain are the sport of the same blind Fortune} but 
if we hold our gaze persistently upon ourselves, we begin to dis­ 
cern darkly that in some unaccountable way,our sorrow and joy,our 
profit and less, are parallel with our own prudence and morality 
and that cause and effect rule here as they d^o in the mecfcani- 
cal world. It is even true that the difference between the enlight*- 
ened man and the fool lies in this, that the one is aware of some 
deep-hidden responsibility for his own fate whereas the other 
complains of Fortune. And as our vision is purged by introspect­ 
ion, and as we dwell more confidently in our higher intuitions,
1 -ttnre f Shelbumei ..l88JEBjLl > p. 210* 
2.Ibid.,p.211.
we hove always a stronger intimation of some law of moral recom­ 
pense extending from the present into an indefinitely remote past; 
our state is no longer an isolated momentary accident, but the 
inevitable consequence of our own will for ever forging the chain 
in which it is bound. This is the doctrine of karma, of works, 
which teaches that as a man sows he shall reap, and by which man
projects himself into some myth of an original Fall or of trans-
1 
migration!
his 
In ax essay on Carlyle, More quotes from Bhartrihari's
epigrams, stressing the inter-relation of Fate and works*
1 "Before the Gods we bend in awe 
But lo, they bend to fate's dread law;
Honour to ?ate, then, austere lordi 
But lo, it fashions but our works' reward.
"Nay, if past works our present state 
Engender, what of gods and fate?
Honour to worksJ in them the power 2 
Before whose awful nod even fate must lower. H 4'
Carlyle, like the Hindu seers, had this same insight into the 
supremacy of works in shaping a man's fortunes. 'In the midst 
of innumerable mockeries and deception^ he perceived one abso­ 
lute certainty— that the deeds of man wove influences xxooiut
3 
about him which were the creation of his destiny,' and this,
together with his consciousness of the illusion of natural 
appearances, the May a , lifted him above the shifting currents
of the day.
The doctrine of Karma originally had the effect of
1.Mnre. Shelbufne~3S8says VI,pp.58-59,
2.More, Shelburne Essays l,p.94. 
5.Ibid.,pp.95-94.
encouraging and steeling man's resolve to escape from mutability 
and impermanence, so hateful to the Hindu mind, by accepting 
personal responsibility for his destiny. True self-knowledge, 
the turning of our lower to our higher self, and the sense of 
responsibility develop together, and through them, 'we are made 
aware of our real separation from the welter of chance as this 
appears to us in the lived of others where we see only the phys­ 
ical events. Morality is the acceptance of this sense of respon­ 
sibility, springing from intuition, and denying outer vision;and 
thus by duty alone we are carried onward to the dawning of the 
joyous liberation, to the escape from illusory connection with 
the world, and to the consummation of peace* We are moral so far 
as we know ourselves unconcerned, in so far as we act morally,in 
that sphere. Such is the paradox pf worts and inattachment as 
propounded by the sages of India. It is not a rationalised solu­ 
tion of the antinomy of faith and practice, for inattachment is 
simply another name for our ignorance of the relation between the 
two spheres; it is a sufficient, and to him who falters, it may 
be a terrible , rule of conduct 1 .
Unfortunately, in the course of time, this doctrine of 
spiritual encouragement took on a darker hue which accounts for
the generally held belief that Buddhism is a religion of unrelieved
2 
pessimism. The sense of dualism came to weigh increasingly upon
the Hindu mind like'the oppression of a frightened nightmare',
1.More. "Shelburne"^8says Virpp.S8*59 *• 60-
2.More, SKOl&M&XK***^*/, Ibid. ,p.4i;cf .Shelburne Essays11.pp.53
we find men sinking into that state of spiritual gloom which
Schopenhauer portrayed to Europe as the essential atmosphere
1 
of the Upanishads whence come so many contemporary misconcept­
ions of Buddhism. The Hindu 'could not thtow off the weariness 
of ceaseless change and of unresting desiresj he wa^ haunted 
with a vision of the soul passing through innumerable existences 
forever whirled about with the wheel of mutation, for ever seek­ 
ing and never finding peace; and from that weltering sea he 
p reached out toward salvation with a kind of pathetic despair.
"•0 world, I faint in this thy multitude 
Of little things and their relentless feud? 
No meaning have I found through all my days 
In their fantastic maze.'**
More divides the religious development of the Hindus into 
three periods* first, the early worship of wonder and fear, second­ 
ly, the symbolic assumption of divine powers in the ritual of
worship, and thirdly, the relinguishing of the symbol for the
5 
self-sufficient Jiife of the spirit. The Uaani shads belong ,inlthe
main, to the last period. Beyond that lies tha period of decline
with its sense* of weariness and gloom. There is little of that 
in the writings of the Forest Philosophers} man still thinks more
of the ultimate liberation of the self than of the weary cycles
he 
of change through which tiwgcmay have to pass to achieve 4t. The
Forest Philosophers have no systematic philosophy to offer, but 
a gradual groping after truth through successive stages of spirit­ 
ual discovery, frequently with an admixture of nalvea mythologi-
l.&tore. She'Tburne Essays VI, loc. cit. ;cf .Shelburne Essays V.p.188. 
2.More, Shelburne_Essavj. VI,pp.41-42.
cal elements.'Through amaze of grotesque and infantile imagery, 
one eventually becomes familiar with underlying truth 1 ; 'the 
eternal and infinite expectation of the soul is not to be sought 
in submission to an incomprehensible and inhuman force impelling 
the world, nor yet in obedience to a personal God, but is already 
within us awaiting revelation, is in fact our very Self of Self 1 . 
"The Self is not found out by study, nor by the understanding,
nor by much learning. To whomsoever it listeth, the S elf becometh
2 
manifest, and to him it belongeth."*
The discovery of the true Self is the great Awaken­ 
ing, the dispelling of that illusion which,to the Hindu mind, is 
inextricably bound up with the world of natural appearances.This 
is M|sri 'the creative force of all this wonderful web of appear­ 
ances that enwrap the spirit in their mesh and charm the spirit's
3 
attention by their mystery af beauty and seeming benevolence'
To the Oriental, as to the Western, mind, Nature, the manifest­ 
ation of May»\Ls envisaged as the eternal feminine, unfolding her——— 4 
allurements before the male on-looker. She is elusive, mysterious
loving to shroud herself in illusion, 'the very person and power
of deception, whose sway over the beholder must end as soon as
5
her mystery is penetrated'. But not only are beauty and the de­ 
lights of the senses illusoryJ so too are evil and suffering whic 
are also of the body, andthey too will pass. The 'truth' of Budd­ 
hism is that sorrow is the attribute of all existence. Birth is
i7lbTdT7pT5l7————————s.TJioTe • _ BheUjufruTJIS^yB" VI • t>. 0.
2.Ibid.,pp.38-39.
3.More, Shelburne Essays I,p.l24.
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sorrow, old age is sorrow; every desire of the heart is sorrow; 
and tfte mission of Buddha was to deliver men out of the bondage 
of this sorrow as from the peril of a burning house. The song 
of victory uttered by Gautama when the great enlightenment shone 
upon him, and he became the Buddha, was the cry of a man who has 
escaped a great evil* The one predominant note of Buddhism is 
therefore a note of joyJit is a gospel of good tidings. The 
builders of our prison houses are our desires; and these we may 
control. 'To the worldly this teaching of Buddha may seem wrapped 
in pessimistic gloom, for deliverance to them must be only another 
name for annihilation; but to the spiritually minded it brought 
ineffable joy, for they knew that deliverance meant the passing 
out of the bondage of personality into a freedom of whose nature 
no tongue could speak. It is an austere faith,hardly suited in 
its purer form for the sentimental and vacillating— austere in
its recognition of sorrow, austere in its teaching of spiritual
1 
joy'.
To More, as to Babbitt, such austerity is a challenge, 
bracing the sinews of the will, and holding out the promise of 
ultimate peace.'To both Brahmin and Buddhist this representation 
of life as made up wholly of sorrow and mutability was but the
foil to infinite exultant faith; the shadow of the earth was all
2 
black because the light of the spirit was so transcendentally pure.'
Hinduism, as it was represented particularly in the Bhag.
1.Mor*,"s^pThurne^lssays 11,p.54.
2.More, She_lburne_EsjBay^ V,p.l88.
ay ad Git a ^has for More, several things to commend} it is based 
on immediate affections as opposed to abstract reasoning it is 
prepared to abide in an ultimate scepticism on all questions for 
which we seek an answer by intellectual processes; it stresses 
the moral responsiblity of the individual, and ih both the Bhag- 
avad Gita and the Up an i shads, its mythology is sufficiently super­ 
ficial and palpable to be removed without damaging the fundament­ 
al truths which underlie it. So far More would agree whole-heart­ 
edly with the estimate of Hinduism given by Irving Babbitt, although 
More's interest lay in the Vedas and the Brahminite teaching, while 
Babbitt concentrated on Buddha and the Dhamma. or law. Nevertheless 
bith «ought to be critical and experimental in their approach to 
the supernatural which neither, at the time of the Shelburne Essays 
was prepared to explore. To be ' a critical and experimental super - 
naturalist 1 means 'first of all that one must deny oneself the 
luxury of certain affirmations about ultimate things and start 
from the immediate od consciousness. It is hard to see, for example, 
how one can affirm on strictly experimental grounds, a personal 
God and personal immortality. If a man feels that these tremend­ 
ous affirmations are necessary for his spiritual comfort he shoul<3 
turn to dogmatic and revealed religion which alone can give them, 
adding with Dr. Johnson that "the good and evil of Eternity are 
too ponderous for the wings of wit H ' —— (By the time these words 
of Babbitt's were written at the end of his career, Thyrsis of 
his own will had gone away! his erstwhile fellow-sceptic More•
had deserted him for the 'spiritual comfort' of those tremendous 
affirmations, and obviously Babbitt had in mind his 'defection* 
as he was Iwriting those words). 'What one is able to affirm 
without going beyond immediate experience and falling into dogma 
is, in Arnold's pxhrase, a great power not ourselves that makes 
for righteousness,a phrase that reminds one of Buddha's concept­ 
ion of the dhamma, or human law, as one may render it, in con­ 
tradiction to the law of physical nature. Not being/ble to find 
any personality,human or divine, superior to his own, Buddha
got his humility, as he himself tells us, by looking up to the
1 
Law'.
Inspite of More's equal concern with righteousness and 
humility, the impression that emerges from those of his essays 
which have to do with Oriental religion is that of the illusion 
and treachery and ruthlessness of the world rather than of man's 
power to achieve peace amid its wiles of which he sets out to 
persuade us. He tries to convince us that it was only in the 
decadence of Hinduism that men felt the sombre destiny they 
were called to endure to be unbearable and fell into the torpor 
of fatalism, thereby killing all moral effort, but throughout 
his writings on the subject there runs a brooding tone of pity 
which betrays his own uneasiness at the spectacle of man pitted 
alone against an indifferent natural order which is none tlfae 
less inexorable for its transience. Less partial critics than 
More might have been prepared to admit that Hinduism, even in
its heyday,had within itself the seed of future pessimism and 
defeat. One is reminded of a similar note of weariness under­ 
lying the meditations of the Western sage,Marcus Aureliusx,ax
he looked out upon a world coldly indifferent to the fate of
1 
man. Hinduism and Stoicism both opposed to the mutations of
nature the inflexible courage and endurance of man, but in 
both the ultimate reaction is the same! sooner or later, the 
heart fails before the inexorable laws of the universe, and a 
mood of blank despair succeeds to the calm aloofness of the 
earlier belief. Man requires, as he always has required, faith 
in a power beyond himself if he is t<b confront triumphantly both 
the chaos of desires within and the welter of changing phenomena
without. But to establish such a belief any more definitely than
2 
the sceptic can allow is to pass from the purely humanistic
plane to the plane of religious, or supernatural, values.,This 
entails the creation or the acceptance of a system of mythology, 
seen not as symbolism but as fact. This was a step Babbitt never 
too]|; one which More came only gradually to accept.
He was to find increasingly, however, that the 
austerity of Hinduism and its goal of self-abnegation was a
mode of thought too alien to the Western consciousness to offer
3 
a constructive solution in the existing chaos of ends and means.
That part of his own nature found a deep satisfaction in the 
contemplative mysticism of the East there can be no doubt to
l.Ibid.,p533. 
2.Ibid.,p.530.
3»More,Shelburne Essajrs VI,p.245.
any one who lingers over those passages of poignant beauty 
when he speaks of man's sudden insight into the illusion of 
the tangible world. But in More**,as in the Romantics, accord- 
ing to his own definition, thete was also a very real aware- 
ness of human personality; Xtfi&da&e^^
*P&$&ttTSxSVVVpi and because the Oriental conception of person­ 
ality dissolved into an ultimate ideal of Nirvana,More turned 
away from it to seek a solution to the dilemma of contemporary 
conduct in a tradition where the ideal was not renunciation,
<C
but mediation.
The desire for discipline, order,harmony permeated
3 
the whole of Greek literature, but it was Socrates who raised
it into a conscious ethical principle, making self-knowledge 
the touchstone of true human wisdom. There were several reasons 
why More should,in turn, be drawn away from the Orient to 
Socrates? the Socratic method commended itself to his naturally 
sceptical turn of mind where religious issues were involved? he, 
too, like Socrates, lived in an age when social and religious 
conventions were breaking up, and it was necessary for the man 
of mental integrity to rebuild his scale of values upon an actual 
experience of life; they both had,as opponents, men who denied 
the existence of any stable and consistent centre of being, and 
who therefore saw life as a series of ever-changing motion pic­ 
tures thrown for a moment on the screen of nature and then
... 
2.More, ShgTburne Essays 11,pp.208-209
passing into the eternal nothingness. Oriental religion offered 
a doctrine too austere and remotejChristianity, so it seemed 
to More, prior to the 'Nineteen Twenties,was vitiated by'an
inherent illusion which cannot be severed from its body of
1
truth 1 . But of Socrates and Plato, More could say*'I am assur­ 
ed they are seeking what I seek, and that they attained what
2 
hardly and with their borrowed strength I may at last attain 1 .
This common aim was to teach'men to look into themselves,for iiir 
through self-knowledge lay the only path to truth and virtue 
and happiness; and these three are one. Justice,uut temperance, 
courage— all the virtues are but different manifestations of 
the one comprehensive virtue which is wisdom or self-knowledge. 
The reasoning of Socrates is quite simple? every man aims to 
do what he thinks best for himself,and if he does what injures 
himself, it must through ignorances virtue ia the knowledge 
of what is truly best, what is best for the real self. Socrates 
takes no account of the estrangement of the will and the under­ 
standing, of that morbid state which led Ovid to cry out:"I 
see the better things and approve, I follow the worse".He had 
indeed never dissected the soul into these divergent faculties,, 
and in Greece until his time the harmony of man's nature scarce­ 
ly permitted such an analysis. The separation, first carefully 
noted by Plato, came with this very self-consciousness which 
was introduced into Greek life by Socrates more than by any other 
If to us, with our larger experience,so simple a view of human
Tgore.Shelburne Essays VI,pp.246-47. 
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nature may seem superficial, we must yet remember that tiday the 
great struggle for each man is to restore himself to just that 
state of health wherein the will and the understanding are in 
harmonious equilibrium. 1
The achievement of such a harmonious equilibrium 
of the will and understanding based on a perception of the dual­ 
ism of the human and the natural became from 1909, and More's
'Studies in Religious Dualism.the motivating power behind his
form of humanism
pculiar. His concern with an ideal offpeace which had predominated
at the time of his interest in fiindu thought was now seen to be 
intimately bound up with the question of justice,both social and 
individual. A sense of inner peace came to the man who had learned 
to control his impulses in such eforay as to give the various fac­ 
ulties their appropriate place; in other words, who had discovered 
the true meaning of justice. To the question of the relation of 
morality and rationalisnuHore was to return in far greater detail 
in his volume on Platonism where he devoted far more attention 
to the three strands of Socrates' thought, his scepticism, his
spiritual assertion, and the relation of virtue and knowledge,
2 
especially as they were subsequently developed by Plato. For the
present, his concern with Platonism was predominantly practical,
the re-establishment of an ideal of conduct in an age which had
individualisjn. * 
had confused personality and KluutastKr. The nexus of the Shelburn^
Essays, as we have seen in an earlier section,lay in just More's 
attempt to illustrate from literature his answer to the age-old
lo: STTac'ques
questionJWho is the Just Man?
In'The New Morality 1 in Aristocracy and Justice, More 
states the problem in its relevance to the modern situation. 
'Justice is nothing but the v alance within a man's own soul 
self-imposed and self- sustained, the will to know clearly the 
middle truth between the philosophy of egotism, which declares
that it is for the strong and prudent to take whatsoever they
1 desire, and the contrary philosophy of equalitarian sympathy. 1
This is the eternal problem with which Plato was concerned in 
The Republic .Plato, in seeking to decide the nature of indiv­ 
idual justice, adopted the device of deciding first the nature 
of social justice, seeing the state as a macrocosm of the indiv­
idual, in which the rlations between the various classes were aA
magnified feflection of those existing between the various fac­ 
ulties. The three divisions in Plato's society, rulers, soldiers,
producers, corresponded to the three faculties within man, reason
2 the personal emotions, and the instincts, tach had its corres­
ponding virtue. Reason, the ruler of the individual character, 
like the rulers of the atate, should be inspired by wisdom; the 
personal emotions, like the soldiers, should excel in courage; 
whilst the ixfe instincts, li#e the labouring classes, should be 
governed by temperance, restraint and industriousness. The fourtft 
virtue, justice, did not belong exclusively to any single class 
in the state, but permeated all three, depending upon the main­ 
tenance of a proper and balanced relationship between them.!
2 . More , Platonism » PP» 63M
For example, justice demanded that the divisions within society 
should "be clearly recognised, and that each class should fulfil 
the peculiar function allotted to it; that the rulers should 
govern, that the soldiers should maintain the order and secur­
ity of the state, that the workers should supply the material
citizens. 
needs of the starkExx Once, however, the strict line of demarc­
ation between the various classes was blurred, or the ruling
power corrupted by the desire for glory or money or popularity,
1 
the inevitable outcome was anarchy. It was therefore essential
2 
that the rulers should be 'natural aristocrats', and not demV
3 gogues or sycophants pandering to the appetites of the mob. Only
thus could it be ensured that just relationships would prevail 
between men in all stations of life. Otherwise, Plato foresaw 
a gradual deterioration in the standard of government, from 
aristocracy, through the ever-declining stages of oligarchy, 
timocracy, democracy (in its Platonic sense of Mob-rule) to the 
final degradation and misery of tyranny.
Similarly, within the individual , unless each faculty 
fulfils its appropriate function, there is confusion. But over 
and above the virtue which corresponds to the right operation 
of each function — wisdom to the healthy activity of the reason, 
temperance to that of the instincts or appetites, courage to 
that of the will or personal emotions — there is a simple quint-
TTMnrf> t _Shelburne Essays IX,pp.8-9»22-29,
2. Cf .pp. 2.X3;/-.
3.More, Shelburne Essays lX,pp.5-9.
essential virtue infusing each division of the personality 
and uniting them into a single 'character'. 'In sooth real 
virtue is one and not many; it is the health and happiness 
of the whole soul, whereas the virtue of each faculty may have 
the effect of vice if exercised without proper subordination; 
it may be called justice in so far as it signifies a just equi­ 
poise of the faculties,permitting each tb fulfil its own office 
without encroaching on the rights and duties of the others'. 1 
In Plato's own words, "'the jus* man does not permit the sev­ 
eral elements within him to interfere with one another, or
any of them to do the work of others,— he sets in order his
life, 
own inner karax* and is his own master and his own law, and
at peace with Mmself J and when he has bound together the 
three principles within him, which may be compared to the 
higher, lower and middle notes of the scale, and the inter­ 
mediate intervals— when he has bound all these together, and 
is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and 
perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he 
has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treat­ 
ment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private 
business; always thinking and calling that which preserves 
and cooperates with this harmonious condition, just and good 
action, and the knowledge which presides over it wisdom} and 
that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call 
l.More, Shelburne Essays VI,p.33~&»———————————— ——————.
1
unjust action,and the opinion which,presides over it, ignorance!" ?
The impulse of modern man has "been to look for an 
objective standard of justice in the law and operation of na­ 
ture in the animate world, where he finds the 'survival of the 
fittest'prevailing. But although our reason may tell us that 
much of the cruelty and suffering and annihilation involved 
in evolution is inevitable, our feelings as human beings are 
frequently outraged by the ruthlessness of nature's processws. 
This two elements enter into our attitude to nature, and our 
sense of justice demands the satisfaction of both our reason 
and our feelings? but nature is impervious to our demands. 
'The fact is', says More, 'the very idea of justice and 
injustice has no real application to Nature. She proceeds 
by a law and for a purpose of her own, and to judge her by
our human standards as we in evitably do if we judge her at
2 
all, is a pure fallacy] The very irrelevance of our mikral
standards to the natural world suggests ,however, 'that our 
sense of justice is not derived from watching her calm method 
of dealing with her own, but springs fro^ something within our 
breasts that is not subject to her sway, — from a law, that
is, that transcends the material law of evolution, being, if
5 
we use words strictly, not natural at all, but supernatural.'
In the demands of our sense of justice upon nature, 
More here sees reflected man's idea of what the condition of
1. Quoted Ibid.,p.557
2. More, Shellrurne Essats IX,p.108; cf .Ibid.,pp. 104-105.
3.
justice in the soul must be. As Plato saw more clearly the 
nature of individual justice by drawing an analogy with the 
role of justice in the state, so More proceeds upon the 
similar principle of drawing an analogy with our attitude 
to nature. Here ,as in Plato's analogy of the state,'the mind 
unaccustomed to the painful labour of self- study can here
AS
see itself magnified, so to speak, and projected upon a1 * 
screen 1 . In so far as our sense of justice would be fulfilled
if we saw nature satisfying two different faculties of the 
soul—'the reason which demands that what is the stronger and 
more lige itself should prevail, and the feelings, which demand 
that the higher should prevail with no suffering, but with
a
the happy acquiescence of the lower.,U*re may infer that the 
soul itself would be in this ideal state if the relation of 
its own members satisfied these demands. Justice is therefore 
'that government and harmonious balance of the soul which 
arises when reason prevails over the feelings and desires, 
and when this dominance of the reason is attended with inner 
joy and consenting peacej it is the right distribution of
power and honour to the denizens within the breast of indiv-
3
idual man*.
But not infrequently the triumph of reason is 
accompanied by the mortification of the feelings.'"We can have 
the approval of conscience only by controlling and, on occasion,
1 .Ibid. ,p.l09." ~ 
2« Ibid* ,loc.cit. 
3. Ibid.,p.110.
denying a stream of desires which spring up in the breast 
and clamour for free course; and this act of control, when
it is exercised in the form of denial, is necessarily attended
1 
with some degree of pain.'
Were this all, man would naturally shrink from a 
subordination of his feelingd, with its attendant pain, and 
like the sophist, Thrasymachus, equate wisdom with the grat­ 
ification of sensual pleasure. He would feel the same repug­ 
nance in seeing the higher part of his nature triumph over 
the lower as he feels in seeing the higher triumph over the 
lower forms of life in the field of natural evolution when 
that entails the suffering of the lower. The difference lies 
in the fact that in nature, the higher and the lower of her 
creatures are separate and unrelated entities, whereas in man, 
the feason and the feelings are part of the same essential 
self. 'The just man may be, and often is, torn by the very 
conflict between the knowledge that he is satisfying the demands 
of his reason and the feeling of pain that arises from the 
suppression of certain desiresj but the soul of the just man 
is nevertheless one soul, not two souls, however it may be di­ 
vided against itself; and besides the feelings of pleasure and 
pain that trouble one of its members, he has another feeling, 
greater and more intimate, that belongs to his soul as a unit. 
This is the feeling of happiness which is not the same as pleasure
1-Ibid.,p.111.
and may exist in the absence of pleasure, and despite the 
presence of painj and opposed to it is the feeling of misery
which is not the same as pain, and may exist in the absence
1 of pain, and despite the presence of pleasure'. — -'Happiness
is a state of the whole soul, embracing both the faculties of 
reason, on the one hand, and of the desires, with the feelings 
of pleasure and pain, on the other hand: or, one might say, it is Jc
the state of some superior element of the soul, which finds its
2 good in the harmonious action of those faculties. ' Not only
is happiness the reward of that deep spiritual health which we 
call justice, but it is the warrmnt and test of that condition 
as well. Although at a given moment we may err in our judgment 
of what is right, we have a sure monitor of the will to act 
righteously in the (resent feeling of happiness or misery, and 
we have a hope — a divine illusion it may be, for it has nelper
among men been verified by experience — that in some way and
pleasure 
at some time happiness and h&pgiiKKgs shall be completely recon­
ciled by nature 'who, by mysterious deviationsbeyond our mortal
3 
ken, is herself also a servant of the law of justice'.
But with this reconciliation, More was not immed­ 
iately concerned during the Sh_e_lbur_ne Ess ays . Any attempt to 
pass beyond a merely positivist .affirmation would lead into
the realm of metaphysics, and although he did not minimise the
m 
proble/of evil at work frustrating the human attempt to achieve
a balanced harmony of the faculties, at the time of writing
ss ay V l2. More,Shelburne assays IX.n.115.3. lbid.,p-TTg:—————————— '*
Series Six of the Shelburne Essays (1909), he was sufficiently 
satisfied with the Platonic psychology of The Republic to accept 
that as a working basis of his humanism, whilst repudiating 
Plato's attempts to go beyond the merely human in order to
establish a theology and a cosmogeny as aberrations of the
1 
meddling intellect. *It was in this direction that his outlook
was to undergo so complete a revolution in the last two decades 
of his life. There is something almost prophetic in his words 
in the essay on 'The New Morality' in Series Nine when he wrote: 
'To some few the only way out of what seems a state of moral 
blindness is through a return to an acknowledgement of the 
responsibility of the individual soul to its maker and inflex­ 
ible judge. They may be right. Who can tell what reversal of
belief may lie before jus or what religious revolution may be ——— — — 2
preparing in the heart of infidelity? '
Between Series Six and Nine of the Shelburne assays, 
evil, for him, had taken on a darker hue | contemporary events 
had tended to focus his attention on the imminence of the dis­ 
aster following in the wake of the disruptive trends of which 
he had long been aware, but even in 1914, he was still convinced 
of man's ability to restore to his nature its lost wholeness by 
the strenuousness of his inner e^fortjand the application to 
his own experience of an all- embracing Socratic dialectic.
___ _____ _1. More. Shelburne Basays VI, pp. 324-25.
2. More, Sheltmrne Begayg_lX,p*215*
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Virtue More defined as a mean lying between the two extremes 
of vice. 'This, temperance is the mean lying between intemper­ 
ance, which is an excess in the indulgence of physical pleasure, 
and austerity which is a defect in such indulgence. Courage is 
the mean lying between rashness which is an excess of desire 
to venture or attack, and cowardice which is a defect *f such 
desire. And so with regard to the other virtues and vices——- 
The real defect does not show itself in the vices,properly 
speaking, but in the lack of elevation, the petty faults, the
ignoble hesitations, the tepid dullness which form the vast
is 
background of life. This meanness as contrasted with the golden
A
mean, feebleness of temperament as contrasted with the control
1
of the inner check'. Even moderation itself may become an excess
as it did with the Greeks, and thus became ISKKXKJE the cause of
2 
moral degeneration. Indeed it is noticeable that nations have
degenerated by virtue of the excess of their best characteristics 
tfce Jews by virtue of their intense monotheism, the Hindus^of 
their ideal of religious renunciation, the Romans,of their 
imperial policy, just as individuals are betrayed into extremes 
of conduct by those very virtues which distinguish them from 
the common run of men.
Justice demands therefore an eternal vigilance 
lest even the best of men slip over inadvertently into some 
extreme of conduct.The ideal man of KSHchc character is a
T\Mnr^SheTburne~&s s ay s Vlll,p.?78. 
P..Mnrft T 5^eTburne Essays 11,p. 216.
perfect "balance of all the faculties. To achieve this requires 
years of self-discipline, a strenuous effort to hold in check 
the expansive desires, and a steady cultivation of the ethical 
imagination* 'A man of character is one in whom a vigorous 
disposition is continuously controlled by the habit of attention 
or the will to refrain. As character developd, the disposition 
takes on a more regular pattern; the impulses become harmonious 
as if arranged upon a centre, and display a kind of unity in 
multiplicity. The outcome of this in conduct is consistency, 
self-direction, balance of faculties,efficiency,moral health, 
happiness. At its highest development, the will would appear
to act automatically, as if the troublesome choice among hetero-
1 
geneous impulses had been surmounted.' Such a man gives the
impression of such ease and grace, such sprezzatura , that it 
would appear all fcsus his actions and desires arise spontaneously 
but such spontaneity is not to be confused with submission to 
the merely headlong rush of expansive desifes. It is the out­ 
come of an arduous and prolonged mediation between extremes of 
conduct which involves a tension made bearable only by constant.
Much of More's most rigorous criticism is directed 
against those who flagrantly despise the golden mean in favour 
of an excessive enthusiasm. This is his main quarrel with Tolstoy, 
Swinburne and Browning. They offend against the fundamental 
tenet of the Humanist ethic, the exercise of the inner check,
1.More,_Shelburne_Sss_ay_3 Vlll,pp.274-75.
and the fundamental tenet of the Humanist aesthetic,that
good taste is the mediation between sympathy and selection, the
1 
expansive and restrictive tendencies in literature. He admires,
on the other hand, men of balance and moderation, even if by 
the world these characteristics are misinterpreted as compro­ 
mise and time-serving. 'The place of Halifax is. with those 
moderates who in the noise of tumultuous times often seem to 
be jostled about as weaklings, yet in the end, somehow,when 
sanity returns, appear to have had the stars and the forces 
of nature with them. When Falkland lost his life at Uewbury— 
deliberately threw his life away,said some,in black despair- 
it may have looked as if his temporising course between King 
and Parliament had been as futile as it was perilous. Yet 
after Charles and Cromwell had played their parts, it was at 
the last the policy of Falkland and his kind which became the 
government of the najrion,and, on the monument ra ised where 
he fell in battle we now read with commendation the inscription
taken from Burke:" The rest is vanity,the rest is crime". 
And so, when Halifax died in retirement,it may have seemed 
despite the titles and decorations which were mocked by the 
Bishop of Salisbury, that his powers had been spent in a 
career of vain protest against the forces of the age; yet in 
the longer event England of the eighteenth century can be seen
1.Babbitt, Masters of Modern French Criticism,pp.49-50; cf. 
Rous se au and Romant i_c lsm,j?p. £4.
to have owed its strength mainly to the balancing policy of
him and a few men with him who resisted the current of the
1 
day.'
More'a sympathies are with all those who,like J.H.Short-
house in John Inglesant.are anxious '"to promote culture at the
2 expense of fanaticism,including the fanaticism of work"S&X'
He too seeks to '"to exalt the unpopular doctrine that the end 
of existence is not the good of one's neighbour, but one's own 
culture"! It is because of this that he resents the intrusion 
of humanitarianism with its constant emphasis on social service
where he feels men would be better employed in cultivating their
2 own souls. Similarly he resents the utilitarian or socialist
conception of work, seeing it always in terms of labour value,
which has replaced the intangible but invaluable achievement of
4
working upon oneself. The ideal of the humane and rounded char­ 
acter has yielded to the emphasis on an aggressive and egocentric 
individualism, replacing XB reason as the ruling faculty with 
the personal emotions or even the instincts; and this chaos 
within the individual in turn aggravates and is aggravated by, 
a parallel confusion in society at large.
We have already seen that what is true of the inter­ 
relations within the self is true also,with reservations,of the 
state. More, however, saw the problem was not so simple as it
l.More, Shelburne gSayg^ Xf pp.50.. S\.
2.Morei Shelburne Essays 111,p.238.
3.IbJ.d. ,p.239.
4.Ibid, .loc.cit. jcf.pp. /oa.-
had been posited by Plato. The unity within the individual 
is necessarily more intimate than that which exists within 
even the most organically conceived state. If the triumph 
of the higher element has frequently to be accompanied by 
the pain of the lower, the supremacy of the leaders, Plato's 
guides,must entail a certain hardship on the part of the 
working masses. Although when illuminated by the ethical 
imagination, the hierarchical conception of the state has 
a powerful appeal to the affections of men, moving them to 
cooperate of their own volition and this operating on the 
purely human plane,nevertheless, for the majority of men, 
authority has to be imposed from above in order to coerce 
the various classes into a right relationship.^"Society, there­ 
fore, partakes in part of the nature of the natural world 
where the advantage of the higher form of development is 
achieved at the expense of the lower, by the operation of 
law. That,however, is but a half truth, and, by erecting it into 
a whole philosophy of life, the Uietzschean has brought into
society the spirit of the jungle, the survival of the fittest,
2 
with its code of might is right. But equally false and dangerous
to More is the erecting into a whole philosophy of the other 
half-truth, that an appeal to the imagination is sufficient to 
establish social harmony.This is the error of humanitarian!sm, 
socialism, equalitarianism. It would be pleasant, no doubt,says
1. More, Shelburne Essays IX,p.117.
2. Ibid..,pp. 117-19.
More, 'to feel that every man had all his desires gratified, 
but reason which is the faculty of seeing distinctions,"binds 
us to believe that tha State cannot progress in the orderly 
manner of evolution unless there, as in Nature, a certain ad­ 
vantage of honour accrues to those individuals who are them­ 
selves governed by reason, with the privilege of imposing their
will upon those who, from the rational point of view, are infer-
1 
ior to them'.
'Social justice, then, is neither Nietzshean nor equal- 
it arian. It is such a distribution of power and privilege, and
o 
of ppperty as the symbols and instrument of these,as at once
will satisfy the distinctions of reason among the superior, and 
will ndt outrage the feelings of the inferior. And if no precise 
rule can be given for striking this balance in law and institu­ 
tion, any more than an absolute code of morals can be formulated 
tor the conduct of the individual, yet we have the same criteri­ 
on for determining practically our progress towards this ideal 
as towards the ideal of individual justice. Fir there is a 
"pursuit of happiness" which is the right of every society and 
which differs totally in principle from the license of pleasure— 
a feeling, which, by permeating society, may in a measure trans­ 
cend and reconcile the envious divisions of discontent. Social
2 
justice and personal justice are both measured by happiness'.
In society itself there is a perpetual tension between 
the individual and the social unit. To find the middle way
betwwen these two extremes was the dilemma of the Nineteenth
1 
Century. Whereas in the individual, the principle of control
is the inner check, in society this function is fulfilled by 
law, the sovereign $ower behind all government. For More the 
wisest attitude to law is represented by Halifax and the Trim­ 
mers. '"He looketh upon them as the chains that tie up our 
unruly passions, which else, like wild beasts let loose, would 
reduce the world to its first state of barbarism and hostility. 
The good things we enjoy we owe to themj and all the ill things 
we are freed from is by their protection.-——---When all is said 
there is a natural reason of State, an indefinable thing ground­ 
ed upon the common good of mankind, which is immortal, and in 
all changes and resolutions still preserveth its original right 
of saving a nation, when the letter of the law perhaps would 
destroy it, and by whatsoever means it moveth, carrieth a power 
with it that admitteth of no opposition, being supported by 
Nature, which inspireth an immediate consent at some critical
time unto every individual member to that which visibly tendeth
2 
to the preservation of the whole." 1
Such a conception of law is based, not 6n the 
Rousseauist belief in the natural goodness of man, but on a 
settled mistrust of the first motions of human nature. 'It is 
the experience of time against the desires of the present, a 
restraining force imposed upon the action of the nation com-
4.. More, Shelburne Essays X,pp.54-56 
*• at** •**»•»**•
of Modern French Crih'ci'sm,^
parable to the habits grafted upon the individual man in child-
1 
hood! With the decline of the older prescriptive aristocracy,
it becomes essential that authority should pass to those best 
fitted to rule by right of natural, rather than of inherited, 
nobility. But they must first clear their mind of much tkzi 
of the prevailing cant of equalitarianism, and answer honestly 
questions which to More are fundamental to a true conception 
of the ruler's function*'What is the true aim of society? 1 
Does justice consist primarily in levelling the distribution 
of powers and benefits, or in proportioning them to the scale 
of character and intelligence? Is the main purpose of the 
machinery of government to raise the material welfare of the 
masses or to create advantages for the upward striving of the 
exceptional? Is the state of humanity to be estimated by num~ 
bere, or is it a true saying of the old stoic poets humanum 
paucis vivit genus ? Shall our interest in mankind begin at the
bottom and progress upward, or begin at the top and progress
2 
downward.'
The answer More finds in ^hakespeare, in two 
speeches of Ulysses in Troilus and Cressjdai'Take but degree 
away,untune that string' and 'For time is like a fashionable
host'} nor was it an accident that these words were put into
3 
the mouth of the wisest of the Greeks. The same vision of
universal order and degree has been shared by men of insight 
in many periods. More quotes from Sir Thomas Elyot's Boke
l.Ibid. ,loc.cit./(e..S*«-ic« x.iy.fr-rt), r... 57- so. 2 • * ;3-*d.-57 60.
Morfc,SheIburne Essays
Named the Governour. published in 1531, which he describes as 
'the Magna Carta of our education 1 ; a book to which attention 
has bee directed even more recently by Mr.C.S.Lewis in The 
Abolition of Man. '"The scheme of the humanist might be describ­ 
ed in a word as a disciplining of the higher faculty of the 
imagination to the end that the student may behold, as it were 
in one sublime vision,the whole scale of being in its range 
from the lowest to the highest under the divine decree of order
and subordination, without losing sight of the immutable verac-
2 
ity at the praise and surname of virtue".'
The power of such a conception of the State,blended 
with a belief in the mysterious and God-given power of law, is 
in its appeal to the Ethical imagination. It was upon this secret
•
that Burke seized in order to add colour and warmth to his advoc­ 
ating of prescription and prejudice. To the ideas of Hobbes on 
the social contact he added those of Hooker on the sweeping of
divine universal law,harmonising them both with the newer con-
3 
ception of evolutionary growth, and appealing to the public,not
on the plane of discursive reason,but of a living and vibrant 
insight into the mystery of Past, Present and Future as they 
are caught up in the primordial organism of the State. Much of
Burke's appeal to man's profound love of pomp and pageantry is
4 
now no longer valid or desirable, but the ethical imagination
1«C.S.Lewis. The Abolition of Man, (London? 1943&n1on p-So^
2.More, Shelburne Essays lX,p.56.
3«Ibid.,p.!5.
4.Ibid.,pp.18-20.
is still the instrument whereby control of public opinion is 
to be effected, and a respect of law and social order restored. 
But whereas in Burke 's union of aristocracy and inherited oli­ 
garchy with its outward splendour and dignity, there was a 
visible appeal to the corporate imagination of the people, the
new 'spiritual 1 aristocracy which More hopes will take its place
• 
someday as the ruling body in society, has nothing definite or
tangible by which to capture the native affections of men in 
general. More sees the educated classes comprising this new 
aristocracy, and before they can appeal to others, they must 
themselves recapture a sense of pride in their heritage and
their destiny, in order to help them grasp in a single firm
1 
vision the whole course of human history. At present, education
with its stress upon specialisation and individualisation is
against such an objectj but More looks forward to a restoration
tfie, 
of the former ideal of an education inspired itself by A principle
of mediation, a rounded and harmonious culture, holding iiXEli! ones
ility 
responsible to society and the perfecting of one T s own inner life
2 
in a just and adequate balance. To this end he advocates the
reintroduction offehe Classics into the univessity curriculum as 
a compulsory mode of disciplining and humanising the intellect,
in place of the existing elective system with its emphasis upon
3 
vocational training.
In so far as New Humanism is patently a reaction
1.Ibid.,pp.56-58.
2.Cf. Babbitt, Literature and the American College.p.24 f lQ7-]fi. 44
3.Mr.rP T Shelfrurne" Essavs IX,pp.46*49,88-92.
against the cult of humanitarianism, it is obvious that, pressed 
to its extreme, it would of necessity pass over into its anti­ 
thesis of Nietaschean imperialism or totalitarianism, as many
1 
of its opponents have accused it of doing. But this to fall into
the trap of running to extremes against which More inveighed 
consistently during his whole career. Humanism, on the contrary, 
claimed to be a middle way, a philosophy of mediation,in which­ 
ever of its aspects we consider it,individual, social, religious 
or literary- More's own ideal for the just society was one 
which depended on an attitude of mediation,temperance,toleration 
permeating all classes so that every man might go about his own 
business with integrity of purpose and freedom from jealousy and 
covetousness» holding in check his own expansive desires and 
working for the corporate good of the iitate, not only in its pres-
«
ent actuality, but also in its symbolic potentiality,embracing
2 
past, present and future generations. Such an ideal is founded
on an enligt^ened recognition of class distinctions and division 
of labour , on a conservatism infused with the light and warmth 
the ethical imagination can bring to play upon it and examining 
vitally its own premises lest it relapse into an inert author- 
itarianiam. Such an ideal More claimed to hold in common with the 
men of insight throughout the centuries, from Plato through
Burke down to Disraeli, and in theory at least it has a majesty
himself 
and,as far as More atxlsaxt is concerned, a disinterestedness,
which engage the respect of ewen those who cannot accept it as
2 . More, She-Jburr.^ £s>SftyS J_* , pp.
their own. Socialism he saw seeking to level mankind to a common 
mediocrity and uniformity; Conservatism, he believed, sought to 
raise men in accordance with their individual capacities, thus 
maintaining all the variety and|efficiency of which nature is 
capable. Unfortunately, however, when it came to examining the 
state of contemporary society, More too often equated justice
with the status quo*In his dread of social anarchy he saw threat-
A
ening on all sides, he was prepared to tolerate injustice and 
individual hardship rather than unsettle further the social fabric 
by seeking reforms of which he was unable to foresee the conse­ 
quences. 'It is better that legal robbery should exist along with
the maintenance of law, than that legal robbery should be suppres-
1 
sed at the expense of law'. Such an assertion outrages our modern
sense of justice to such an extent that that, and similar state- 
mentSjhave alienated from Paul Elmer More the sympathy, not only 
of out-and-out radicals, but of moderate thinking men who see in 
them only the vituperation of a sinister and obstinate reaction­ 
ary. The majority of those who condemn him overlook the paradox­ 
ical basis of his thought. His dualism is founded on the conscious­ 
ness of a deep and concise cleavage between the condition* of our 
physical life, on the one hand, and our spiritual life, on the 
other,between 1 our',rfociaf'selves and the deep underlying reality 
which no legislation or economics can touch.That there is an ele­ 
ment of cruelty in the existing nature of law, More admits,but he
a large portion of human activity 
also holds that 'there is amxEiKHHHfcxa^xKjnzcKliyxiJix&iie lying quite
outside of the domain of physical constraint and legislation, and 
it is supremely jealous that the arms of government should not 
extend beyond their true province. All our religious feelings, 
our aspiring hopes, our personal morality, , our conscience, our 
intellectual pursuits, all these* things, and all they mean, lie
"beyond the law — all our individual life, as distinguished from
a 
the material relations of man with man, r/ches far beyond the
1 
law's propjer comprehension 1 . But only in a society where the
framework of legislation is fixed and stable has man freedom to 
develop his personal relations, just as only in a society where 
property is secure is it possible for men to be sufficiently free
from financial cares to be able to develop the things of the miidd
2 
and spirit without material distractions.
When it comes to applying his Platonic theories of 
statecraft to the actual situation in the Amarica of his day, 
More tends to overlook the fact that society is already deeply
vitiated by the false worship of Mammon, and that by upholding
i 
the order already firmly entrenched, he is seeking to sta#Lise
the power, not of a true aristocracy, but of a plutocracy which
has the virtues of A either a prescriptive^or a natural superior-
2 ity to commend it, Too often in point of fact, during his Aris-
t o c racy and Justice, in seeking to re-establish some unpopular and 
forgotten truth, such as the necessity of each man's cultivating
the just balance of his own inner life before becoming absorbed
social 
in schemes of iisfcixaLX amelioration, More appears to be addressing
I-Ibid. .p.142: —————— 2,rbi4.,pp.i4v-4B.
ReptJbli'e ,fonl » ,iqi6,Vol.Vf,No. Y4, Randolph Bourne, c Kev,eW OF 
——— Justice? p. ~
his admonitions exclusively to the underdogs of society, and to 
the demagogues who claim to represent them, whilst overlooking 
the crudeneds and selfishness of the leaders of industry and 
finance. It is this tendency which gives colour to the charge
of his liberal critics that More was at heart one with the J.
2 
Pierpoint Morgans of his day, of the'same temperament and habit
3
of mind as a conservative banker'. Plato would never have advoc­ 
ated a society in which power depended on an accumulation of pri­ 
vate property, for, as H.E.Cory pointed out in discussing More's 
plea for private property, property today is private in a sense 
formerly unheard of, and its influences upon its owners are eth­ 
ically such that it cannot 'arouse the old spartan integrity, the
4 
old Horatian tenderness and solicitude 1 . Gory can sympathise with
the demand for an aristocracy, for in the past the stability of 
an aristocracy 'gave the leisure necessary for the development
of that kind of spirit which makes its economic necessities beauti-
5 
ful to a considerable extent.' But nowadays its influence has
passed to the middle-class'democratic' regime which might in turn 
produce its own species of art, were it not for the instability of 
fortunes made in industry and commerce. The bourgeoisie is the 
victim of financial fluctuations such as the landed aristocracy 
never had to undergo. Fortunes are made and lost overnight, so 
that its world is one of paupers and nouveaux riches, the latter,
jTThe~DralTJune 22,1916,Vol.LX1,No.721,K.£.Gory,'An Aristocratic
Voice in the Wilderness 1 ,p.18.
2.The New Republic,April 1.1916,Vol.VI,Uo.74,Randolph Bourne, 
———— 'Review of Aristocracy and Justice' t p.245.
3.The New Republic,April 6,19?1,Vol.XXVI,No.331i,Francis Hackett
4. T*
as Ruskin and Morris knew,too vulgar to found a great art. 
Before they have time to develop aesthetically and ethically,
their money evaporates, and there is a new crop of nouveaux
1 
riches* This world of American plutocrats was certainly not
the New Humanist dream of the new aristocracy which was to
2 
foster the claims of art in F.J.Mather's vision of the future.
Not that More himself was under any such illusion,
"but to him the evil he knew was better than the evils he foresaw
resulting from a widespread reign of socialism and culminating
•
in the inevitable reaction of tyranny and repression. Against 
such a prospect of chaos, he sought to foster the gradually leav­ 
ening effects of culture, the awakening of men of education and 
goodwill to a. realisation of their responsibility towards thems
selves first of all,and than towards their fellow men,in making a7 5
right conception of the good life prevail. But in the intransig­ 
ence of his absorption with justice, More at the time of Aristo­ 
cracy and Justice seems to me to have made two mistakes. He failed 
to see that, in the onslaught against the positive powers of evil, 
the practical crusader has frequently to ally himself with others 
who may not be of 'the identical shade of opinion with himself,but 
whose ideals nevertheless tend in the same direction. In his dis­ 
satisfaction with humanitarianism, feminism,liberalism, he refused 
to discriminate between the true and the false elements within 
each idea, and because of the excesses to which certain phases
l.Ibid..loc.cit.
2.fffTpp.i*H-*U.
.^.More.Shelburne Essays IX,pp. 34-38, 58-67.
of each movement had run, he repudiated violently the whole idea, 
thus denying in practice the very spirit of humanistic mediation 
he sought to expound in theory. He failed to make that very vital
and pregnant distinction with which V.A.Demant is* concerned in
The 
his^Religious Prospect between liberal dogma, the naive over-optim­
istic belief in the natural goodness of man advocated by the 
Rousseauist school, and liberal doctrine, the balanced and tem­
perate assertion of the ultimate wottl of the individual, inspite
1
of all his weaknesses and inherent contradictions.
More serious, however, was ^ore's failure to realise 
that few men are in a position to free themselTes from their 
situation in society or from their own spiritual condition by a 
mere effort of the will. Dewey has commented on this weakness in 
the humanist campaign for moral re-armaments 'To ask the individ­ 
uals who suffer the consequences of the general undermining and 
sapping produced by the Industrial Revolution to put an end to
the consequences by acts of personal volition is merely to pro-
2 
fess faith in moral magic 1 . But, as it happened, it was not to
e 
the masses that More's appeal for str/uous inner action was
in the first instance addressed, father it was to the natural 
aristocracy that he appealed, that its members Fhould be prepaid 
to walk in the light as they saw it, and if anything of that light 
was conveyed by them to the benighted multitude, the better. Other.. 
wise, the masses had to abide in their darkness, and be led by the
few men who had seen the gleam. In the last resort, More f s only 
TyTT. Demaii I f 'J'^e Kei igi ous "Tr^spTg^TtTonaonTl^y )pp . ±2-
2.Quof«d The American Kfcvtft^, OcJC* fe«r 1937, Vol. IX, No. 4, Pol Re 
" n be we ^/ ana -ftc- ClAssie*! Tr^dihon*, £. $"17.
message to the masses was the injunction that they should 
allow themselves to be led, ftf* suppress their truculent, 
self-assertive appetites, and submit to those to whom they 
owed allegiance as their natural leaders. It was the leaders 
who had, by an effort of their personal volition, to bring 
their various faculties into a right and balanced relationship, 
to assume authority and responsibility, in short to become 
perfect in order to bring others to perfection,or at least 
to an approximation to it. But such an effort involved a tension 
wellnigh more exacting than could be borne, for not only wa;- 
it necessary for such men to mediate and hold a balance between 
the claims of society and of their own individual lives. Even 
within themselves they had to mediate between two separate 
orders of values, religious and social. In their haarts 'the 
religious instinct murmurs' and yet 'at the same time the 
voice of the world may speak with equal weight '.In days of 
faith, as in the time of St. Francis, it was not so diffi­ 
cult to keep to a chosen path, but v/hen faith grows dull and 
the 'all-levelling power of democracy has brought things 
spiritual and things worldly to the same plane — or so at 
least it looks to the eyes of men f , the path is beset by counti* 
-less difficulties'. The essential is to try and keep one's 
balance. In Emerson's words* '"A man must ride alternately on 
the horses of his private and his public nature, as the 
equestrians in the circus throw themselves nimbly from horse
j7Mor <=', SVifiTburjie' Essays 1, pp. 251-52.
to horse, or plant one foot on the back of one and the other foot
1 
on the back of the other", T
lead, 
'Such a double life 1 , c6raraents More, 'he must Z±*K balanc­
ing between the two laws, but above all things taking care not to 
confuse the regions in which these laws are valid or to lose the 
distinction between this public and his private djrty. To lose 
such a distinction is to fall forthwith into the shadows of hypo­ 
crisy and charlatanry; to maintain it ever before the inner eye 
and to judge honestly between the conflict of claims is the great
problem which is left to the conscience of every man and to him
2 
alone '• But this is to reimpose upon the heart and conscience of
man the very burden from which the Ancient V/orld had, according 
to Matthew Arnold in his essay on 'Marcus Aurelius 1 so gratefully
escaped into the fuller liberty of a religion of vicarious redemp-
3 
tion; to bring back a religion of law for the religion wf
which, to More, had become watered down to a mere impotent and 
anaemic sentimentalism. New Humanism, in its purely secuiar 
form was little more than an attempt to put back the clock to
the pre-Christian era, to re-introduce the mood of Stoicism with-
4 
out its intellectualistic philosophy. In the last analysis, its
philosophy of the just life for the individual presupposes that 
man has within him the power to follow the light as he sees itj 
that, knowing wherein his true interest lies, he wi!3 be strong
l.IMd. ,pp.?52-53. 
2.Ibid.,p.253
3. Matthew Arnold, Essays Literary and Critical.(London; Everyman
Series 3>3«) ,pp.lS7?F.
and swift to pursue it. But to believe this is to overlook the 
deep fissure within human nature of which thinking men have been
agonisingly aware since the dawn of civilisation. Ovid's meliora
ae,be*-- 
video proboQue.Mriora sequor has been the experience of all men,
in varying degrees, but especially of those who,wise and just 
themselves, have sought to lead others to the fullness of wisdom 
and justice. The question is bound to arises'Can humanism of itself, 
unaided, provide the purpose and values it needs for its fulfils
ment, and without which it cannot pass from the purely critical
1 
to the productive? 1 During the period of The Shelburne -Essays More
had sought to prove it could, but there was something wanting. He 
was still left at the end of his spiritual journey through the 
realms of Hinduism and Platonism, like another Marcus Aurelius,'wise,
i
xjust,self-governed,tender, thankful, blameless} yet, with all
this, agitated,stretching out his arms for something beyond—
2
tendentemque manus ripae ulterioris amore*. It had become increas­ 
ingly evident to him that man's deepest aspirations could never be 
met on t;he purely human plane, and it was now imperative that he 
should explore how far he was entitled to probe into the realm of 
supernatural verities without forfeiting the claim to be still 
critical and positivist.
2.Matthew Arnold,
VI l. Cosmos* 
( 1 ) PI at on ism? The Idea of
'Such then is the dualism of Plato in his latter years! on 
the one side God and Ideas, and on the other side this Necessity 
in the nature of things, which is his name for the incomprehen- 
si"ble fact that has kept men wondering since first they began to 
observe and question — the fact that somehow this world of har­
monious interplay, this cosmos, is built upon a chaos of clashing
1 
individual forces. 1 —————— 'But where is the place of man, and
what in the cosmos corresponds to the innate sense of moral res­ 
ponsibility and judgment which sets him apart from the rest of 
creation? What in the sum of things responds to the cry of con­
science for a spiritual peace that resembles the pacification
2 
of nature yet demands more than nature can give?'
In an earlier chapter 'Chaos' we saw certain currents of 
contemporary thought which to More were militating against man's 
achieving a complete and satiafying life, whilst in 'Crisis' we 
examined various attitudes which More contrasts with the modern 
outlook and which he sought to adopt as a substitute for itp 
notably Orientalism, Platonism and then a fusion of the two in 
Humanism. The three were never as clearly defined or clearly 
distinguished from each other as the use of such terminology
1. More, New Shelburne Essays II, (Princeton; 1934 )p. 77.
2. Ibid.. p. 81.
might suggest, but the emphasis upon the respective constituents 
of his thought varied accordingly during the years of the 
Shelburne Essays, Hinduism yielding pride of place to Greek 
elements, which nevertheless were tempered and supplemented 
by vestiges of his former Orientalism.
The two basic questions of Plato's Republic were still 
possessing his mind even at the end of the Shelburne Essays! 
who is the just man, and what is justice in the state? With the 
second he had dealt in the Ninth Series of the Shelburne Essays 
Atistocracy and Justice . and the conclusions he had reached ix 
through an examination of the state of contemporary society 
confirmed him in his adherence to Platonssm. Nevertheless, 
there still remained the question of i$t±jigx finding a motive 
power sufficiently strong to put the conception of the just &ix 
State into action once it had been formulated/. And here once a. 
again More was faced with the problem of the individual. Even 
if the State tfe^jcwfax* reflects on a magnified scale the inner 
harmony and integrity of the just man, our contemplation of 
the State does bot necessarily help us to discover what makes a 
man will to be just.
The Socratic thesis in the earlier dialogues, notably ix 
the Gorgias, had equated virtue and knowledge; it is ignorance 
that makes a man act wrongfully. No man would deliberately act
contrary to his true interest, which is to do justly. XWts^X**
HJixxHHxaLxiigiKxafxSKM^K|q^xxxxxxxxxxiJcx
Nevertheless, the Dialogue ends on a note of scepticism; how is 
a man to know in what his true interests consist; does happiness
i.e., the satisfaction which derives from right-doing, coincide 
with pleasure; is it better under all circumstances to act 
justly, even if it involves present pain, or will the wise man 
enjoy his pleasures even though they are purchased at the price 
of justice? This is the issue which Plato takes up in The Repub­ 
lic, and in reply to the sweeping assertions of 1'hrasymachus
and the more timid and tentative suggestions of the two sons 
of Ariston, he uhdertakes to show that it is better to be just 
under any circumafcances. To make his case the more convincing 
he will imagine the most extreme instance in which the just man 
is adjudged unjust by his fellows and as such, subjected to the 
utmost ignominy and persecution, while another man who is really 
unjust and depraved has the reputation of justice and is loaded 
with every kind of honour. Is it better to be just or unjust 
under such circumstances, even if there is no hope of redress 
in a future life?
To the problem as he actually posited it, Plato fails 
to provide an answer within The Republic, what he does prove is 
that the unjust man cannot be happy under any circumstances,and 
he concludes that, conversely, the just man must be the happy man 
But that is not to prove that the giust manf however much he is mx 
misjudged and persecuted, is still, although without any hope 
of a reversal of his lot hereafter, the happy man.
The realisation of Plato's failure to come to grips 
with the fundamental thesis of the Dialogue became for More the 
turning-point in his own attitude towards religion.
1 The fact is that Plato's evasion of the issue raised by himself 
tacitly anticipates the verdict pronounced "by Aristotle:" Those 
who say that a man on the rack-----is happy, if he be good, eitlief* - 
wittingly or unwittingly speak nonsense 1,1 How can fct be otherwise? 
How indeed cam there be any question of justice or the effect of 
justice?how can there be any moral philosophy in a world so 
constituted that the good man, for no fault of his own, with no 
prospect of release, with no hope of a future life with no lesson 
to learn, with nothing but the blank and hideous present,may be x 
subjected to killing torment? In such a world is/tit anything but 
mockery to talk about eternal Ideas and the blessedness of 
dwelling in their contemplation? And so suddenly, in the Tenth 
book,Socrates makes his appeal to the belief in the immortality 
of the soul and in the providence of a Uod who so governs the 
world that in the long lapse of time the justice of circumstances
shall correspond with our inner sense if what is just, while
1 
righteousness and happiness become truly and fully synonymousX 1
But to introduce the gods and an after-life was to go back upon 
the very condition proposed, for belief in the immortality of the 
soul and in the existence of a just God had been voluntarily sus­ 
pended at the outset of Plato's argument as non-essential to the 
purely philosophical thesis that the just man may be shown to be 
happy eiren in extremis*
'There is, I admit 1 , Llore continues, 'something start­ 
ling, almost disconcerting in this view of The Republic* Did Plato
really believe, as he seems to assume, that the unmitigated 
hypothesis of the second book was established by the illustrations 
given in the eighth and ninth books? Did it escape his notice 
that the religious concession of the tenth book is not, as he 
declares it to be, a mere addition to, or confirmation of,the 
argument of the earlier books, butjis virtually an admission 
that the great philosophical thesis, if taken literally,was 
untenable and at bottom meaningless? I will not presume to 
answer this question, but I can see that what lies behind the 
apparent opposition of the two theses of the dialogue is a 
shift in interest, or emphasis, relatively to the two elements,
morality and otherworldliness, which enter into religious phil-
1 
osophy.'
This was something which More had not realised at the time of
2 
writing The Religion of Plato, and which was to have far-reaching"
effects upon the direction of his thought in the final volumes 
of The Greek Tradition . Its importance has been strangely 
under-estimated by "iany of his critics who do not appear to 
recognise the clear break it was bound to cause with More's
previous views, including those expressed in the earlier volumes
& 
of The Greek Tradition. More himself.however, made no secret
1. Ibid,pp.257-258.
2. Ibid,p#.257,no_te_.
1
of the change. We have hie Confessio Fidei in the Preface to
2
the third edition of Platonism. 19ol,in v/hich he reviewed the
final scope of Xhe Greek Tradition, and put forv/rad his explan­ 
ation of the inconsistency tVie reader might feel "between the fir&t 
edition of Platonism and the later volumes on Christianity &. nd 
The Catholic Faith . To illustrate the shift of emphasis which oc­ 
curred some time after the first edition of Platonism. More 
quotes fro- the Preface to that volume, and then sets "beside it 
comments which reflect his attitude at the time of the third 
edition. The two passages are of the utmost importance to a 
correct understanding of the development of IJore's religious 
thought, and so, in spite of their length, I give them in full.
'"Only through the centralising force of religions faith or 
through its equivalent in philosophy can the intellectual ligkfc 
life regain its meaning and authotity for earnest men.Yet, for 
the present at least, the dogmas of religion have lost their hold, 
while the current pholosophy of the schools has become in large 
measure a quibbling of specialists on technical points of minor 
importance, or,where serious, too commonly, has surrendered to JctoK 
that flattery of the instinctive elements of human nature which is 
the very negation of mental and moral discipline.
'"It is in such a belief and such a hope, whether right or
r^Cf.Horn_and_Hound, Vol.V,October 19ol-bummer 1932, H.Bamford 
Parioei", 'Paul Elmer LTore, Manichaean 1 ,pp.481-82. 
Vide Appendix^
2.The change had, however, tai<en place before the Second edition, 
Vide, Platonism,(Third Edition),p.90.n.
wrong, that I have turned back to the truth, stilllpotent and
fresh and salutary, which Plato expounded in the troubled and doubt-
which 
ing days of Greece— the truth ±ha± is in religion but is not
bounded by religious dogma, and which needs no confirmation by 
miracle or inspired tradition. The first task before me was to 
see this philosophy in its naked outlines, stripped of its confus­ 
ing accessories and cleared of the mis understandings which, start­ 
ing among the barbarians of Alexandria, have made of Platonism too 
often a support instead of a corrective of the disintegrating forces
of society. This I have attempted to do, -with imperfect succesj^io
1 
doubt, in the present volume"
'T_ge truth which is in religionJbut is not bounded by relig- 
ixms dogma^— it is this that I sought #o clarify and expound in 
the Vanuxem Lectures, and it is to this that I looked fer a guid­ 
ing thread through the projected study of Christian origins. And 
from that point of view there has been no retreat.lt seemed to me 
then that in the Platonic doctrine of Ideas such a truth was once 
given the world, and that without t. conviction of spiritual and 
moral values as dynamic realities to which all our thinking and all 
our acting are in some wa$ held responsible, to which even the Jower 
behind the world, whether it be named the Demi-Urge of Plate or the 
Jehovah of Christian theology, must subnit for the norm of Stoeative 
energyr-it. still seems to me that deprived of this convicjrion our
1.Platonism, Series I.
talk about philosophy is empty chatter and our religion a progress 
to the atysmal void of pantheism or absolute transcendentalism. 
It is the same truth, somewhat differently formulated, that, in 
the wisdom of the East appears as the stupendous belief in Karma. 
It is the truth, I am sure, by which the man in the street, so long
as his mind has not been perverted by confused echoes from the
o 
schols, guides his faltering footsteps. It springs from the deepest
and most constant experience of life, deeper and more constant 
than the syllogistic conclusions of reason, and without it our 
discussions are vain and our hopes of mutual understanding fore-­ 
doomed. As St 9 Augustine aaysJ Si non sit intus qui doceat inan*- 
j^s fit strepitus noster«
'But ifc it a fact that this truth needs no confirmation 
or inspired traditiQ.n? Fresh and salutary the Plat­
onic doctrine of Ideas still is, as it has ever been, but of 
its pttency, unsupported by outer signs, I began to be not so 
sure. Longer reflection on the events of history, and on the 
needs of human nature raised the persistent question whether 
just such a confirmation was not required if Flatonism was to 
be converted from a cental luxury for the fevr to a faith which
heart of the world, to a power indeedcould stir the
which could meet the spiritual demands of the individual soul.
So it happened that I ca*ne in the course of ray studies to see
in the central dogma of Christianity as it were a realisation
in fact of the "ualism which Plato hao divined as a theorem of
philosophy, and the foreordained consummation of the Greek 
Tradition. What had allured the mind as a beautiful myth 
assumed gradually the awful dignity of revelation. In this 
sense it may be affirmed that Chris t_the_Aord and The Cath- 
2lic_Faith are not inconsistent with this introductory volume 
though the point of view has in a manner changed. '
Exactly how and when the change took place, apart 
from its preceding Christ the Word and The Catholic Faith , More 
does not tell usj but obviously the crux of his thinking was 
the issue of the Platonic Ideas, of the potency of which, he 
tells us, he began to be in doubt, It is not too much, I believe, 
to identify this shift if emphasis with More's discovery of 
Plato's failure to answer satisfactorily the problem he had 
posed at the beginning of The_Rep_ubl_ic_, a discovery which
we "know took place between the composition of The Religion of
2 
Plato in 1921, and of Chri^t^the Jv_ord_ in 1927. Even J?rofess-
or Shafer, in his most competent treatment of the genesis and
\j 
growth of The 5re ek _T_ r ad i t lgn_, tends, I feel, to overemphasise
the shift of opinion between Pi at on i sm and The _ jit. 1 ig i o_n__oJ!;
4
Plato, at the expense of the much more radical break with his
previous thought which occurred FO-.eti-iP ~fter The Hellion of
Plato.
The core of the volume on PljitonJLsjn is More's study
2.Cf .p«^0,and PI at on ism, p.90,H, giving note fro^ Seconfl Edition.
3. Shafer, op. cit. .pp. 250-^2707
4. Ibid. , pp. 252-53.
of the three Socratic theses which prompted Plato's search».
for truths an intellectual scepticism, a spiritual affirmation, 
and a tenacious "belief in the identity of virtue and knowledge".
Scepticism to Socrates was no mere indifference to the truth.
rigorous 
It entailed a xanx questioning of the solicitations of both
reason and the senses, and a continuous exercise of the will 
which made it the most difficult of all intellectual positions
(~i
to maintain. Honest doubt was to Socrates the beginning of both 
philosophy and morality; 'of philosophy, since only those are 
prompted to philosophise truly who are ignorant and, at the same 
time, aware of their own ignorance; of morality, since only
those will feel the compelling of a higher will who have seen
3 
through the illusory curtain of the senses.' Scepticism is,
therefore, complementary rather ~^han antagonistic to true spirit
ual insight, 'the negative aspect of the same intuitive truth of
4 
which spiritual affirmation is the positive aspect.' Only by a
constant interrogation of a host of affirmations which claim to 
speak in the name of the spirit can one guard against deception. 
But whereas scepticism and a spiritual affirmation may welt
\
concur, it is not so easy to see where the third thesis fits in. 
Tfte 'term 'Knowledge', as used by Socrates, obviously refers, no 
to a Pyrrhonic acquiescence in the solicitations of the present, 
but to that larger calculation of life in the terms of pleasure
nilore"7~Tlatoni.s.rn, p. 4. 
2. Ibid. ,p.6. 
3.Ibid.,pp.6-7. 
4.rbid. fp.8.
and pain which from his day to this has been the mark of the 
rationalising utilitarian. As we Inow better, he would say, the 
near and remote consequences of our actgs in those terms, we are
enabled to conduct ourselves more prudently, and this prudence
1 
is virtue.' 'How,'goes on T.T0 re,' one asks In some bewilderment,
can a teacher maintain such a thesis as this, yet as a sceptic 
reject the authority of the senses, and as a mystic avow that his
morality depends on a superrational intuition? How can the same
2 
man be ax rationalising utilitarian and a sceptical mystic?'
It is of interest to noti-ee, at the outset of The Greek Tradition, 
More's own awareness of the paradox, for this is the very incon­ 
sistency with which Ivlr H.Bamford Parkes taxes More himself when he 
accuses him of confusing a morality which answers to certain trans­ 
cendental laws, i.e. a spiritual affirmation, with a. morality
3 
which is purely empirical and utilitarian. The difficulty, it
would appear, lies not in More's thought, but is inherent in the
4
Socratic approach to philosophy, and it was with this very para­ 
dox that Plato himself sought to grapple in order to find some 
means of reconciling the three separate strands of Socratic thought. 
Socrates himself, it seems, never attempted to find an interpret­ 
ation of the 770rd 'knowledge' whic"h would reconcile his third 
thesis with the other two. For the most part, he was content to 
enunciate his three principles as independent truths, and to
l.Ibid.,pp.9-10.
2.Ibid.,p.lO.
S.Cf^pi^. , and Appendix £.
4.Cf. ?fore, P_latc:ni5'n t pp.41-S5«
an 
enforce now one and now ikKxother of them as occasion prompted,
leaving to his disciples, the creators of the so- called Socratic
schools, the labour of constructing from them what properly may
1 
be regarded as a philosophic system'.
At the outset of his philosophical career, Plato was 
thus beset by a double problem, first of justifying separately his 
rationalism and his higher intuition, and then of harmonising theme 
two seemingly contradictory positions. According to the evidence, 
it would appear that Socrates himself had faced and solved the 
problem of iciifcaK rationalism raised by hid identification of
virtue and knowledge, and to this extent Plato could dnstw upon the
2 
philosophic experience of his master. At the end of the CharmidLes
Socrates drops a hint that virtue and knowledge may both be iden­ 
tified with the sum of pleasures ordinarily called happiness, and 
upon this hint Plato proceeds to build in the Protagoras ? 'Virtue 
is an act which will result in a greater sum of pleasure, and he 
will be the virtuous man who has the know"1 edge that enables him 
to calculate the consequences of his conduct , and to strike a 
balance in the terms of sensation. Knowledge has been defined by 
the content of pleasure and pain, and by such a definition we can
say that no man errs,or sins, willingly, but only through ignor-
4 
ance 1 . Such is the kernel of the Socratic equation of vittue and
knowledge which still persists in the form of utilitarianism in 
the modern world.
2.l* »P- 3S 
3.md.. ,P-41. 
id.. ,p.43.
When combined with other teachings of a different order, 
utilitarianism ,or hedonism , as More alse calls It, has an ele­
ment of truth, but when taken alone, as it is expressed inthe
~ t* 
Protagoras, it is inadequate, if not false. T^iis brought out in
the Gqrglas where Call ides, the advocate ofi sensu?! indulgence 
is forced by Socrates to admit at last that some pleasures are 
so degrading that even those with the most coarsened appetites 
recoil before them. This admission introduces a qualitative 
standard of discrimination where before Callicles had been up­ 
holding a purely quantatative standard, and so, under the 
pressure of Socratic argument, he has to confess that it is the 
temperate man who is the good man. '"And the good man must do 
well and honourably whatever he does, and he who is doing well
must be blessed and happy, and the bad man who is doing ill
1 
must be miserable". 1
So Socrates appears to have won a victory over his adver­ 
saries, but, as ITore points out, it is a victory illegitimately 
gained. 'To do well in Greek means both 'to prosper', 'to be for­ 
tunate' and 'to act righteously, justly'. Callicles would have 
been ready fro™, the first to admit that to do well in the sense 
of 'being fortunate' wa? 'to be happy'. If now he makes no ob­ 
jection to the other meaning, that 'to do well*1 in the sense of
'acting righteously' is 'to be happy' it is because he has been
2 
browbefcten by Socrates into subjection. But such a confusion
2. Ibid. , pp. 50 -51
"between the natural standard of prosperity and the moral stan­ 
dard of ij-ghteousness, which More, with typical humanistic
optimism, calls also'the corrnom sense of mankind 1 , ought never
silence 
to have teen allowed to pass without comment. Plato's sti
is obviously evidence of his dilemma, whether conscious or 
unconscious, and Socrates is made to fall back on his usual 
scepticism, saying that he caanot tell'how thesex things are' 
although he still affirms that virtue is happiness. The moral 
standar<* s would appe^ar to be based, not on rational argument­ 
ation, but on an insight frequently at variance with the evi­ 
dence which reveals the just man suffering and the unjust en­ 
joying the prizes of life. In support of his affirmation, Soc­ 
rates can produce no positive logic or facts of observation. 
Instead he turns for his vindication from philosophy to mythol­ 
ogy, ending with an account of the pagan day of judgment when 
the soul is sentenced to reward or punishment according to its 
merits. If the myth were true, the sanction of religion would 
certainly strengthen the common intuition of morality, but what 
if the myth be rejected? llore hiinself at the time «as far from 
willing to admit such a succedaneum to a feeble cause. Unless 
the case could be proved within the limits of philosophy it was 
suspect, ""o grapple with this problem, Pla.to in the Republic 
sets himself, as we have seen, to prove that even if there be 
no gods, or if they are unjust or indifferent, the just man± 
is still, even in an extremity of suffering, the happy man.
U^on his ability to prove his case depends the legitimacy of 
his assumption in the Goraias.
kave already seen the outline of Plato's argument in 
The Republic, and Icnow that after tracing the moral declension 
of* the tyrant into the slough of abomination, he concludes that
the happy man must necessarily be his opposite, i.e. the just and
2 as 
temperate man. Nevertheless, we know too, sifext More did not
realise at the time, that Plato had not fulfilled the original
3 
premises. At the time of the first edition of Pl^to_nlsm More
was perfectly satisfied with the conclusion Plato had reached 
and felt that it confirmed philosophically the truth already
reached intuitively by the exercise of the 'common sense of
4 
mankind' in the Gor_g.i.as. So far the outstanding merit of Plat on -
ism_ to More was -that it proceeded upon a philosophical basis,
actorily 
and only when it had satisfis&x established that did it soar
5 
into the realr.s of religion and mythology.
We are still left, however, in some doubt about the 
Platonic use of the term 'knowledge'. It becomes plain that Plato 
not only distinguishes between the natural and the moral, but 
also between the corresponding emotions whicft are experienced 
within those two separate orders, pleasure and happiness. Like­ 
wise the activities which those emotions accompany and tae motives 
underlying them will be distinct, xleasure, deriving as it does 
from our contact with the phenomenal world of nature, depends on
-d. ,p«55. , ^ 
P. Ibid. ,p.77}c£pp-3««'c?S- 5. ibid.. ,p.lOO. 
3.Cf.p.90,note to Second edition. 
4.IbicU ,pp. 77-79
those impressions and sensations which are known to us by 
means of opinion* But Plato asserts that besides opinion we 
hare knowledge. 'The operation of this faculty we may not be 
able to analyse, but it is there, within our souls, giving us 
certain information of the everlating reality of righteousness
and loreliness in themselves, as things apart from the flux,
the 
and bidding us look to God of these realities for the measure
1 
of our natureJm The 'knowledge* with which virtue is equated
in the Socratic hedonism is mere opinion, as distinct from the 
knowledge of the spirit; but in contrast to"virtue" taken ti 
indicate correct conduct and including the specific Tirtues of 
courage,temperance and justice, there ia a wider meaning of 
virtue as synonymous with 'morality', used for that higher unity 
in whieh the individual virtues converge and are consummated* 
'It is a kind of wisdom*- not prudence, but the mind or intell­ 
igence— working in him who is able not only to discern the 
many different activities of life but to look beyond them; the
divine vision of him, who, whatever may be the field of observ-
behold 
ation, is able to taddutthe changeless law above allchange. It
is the knowledge, religiously speaking, of the gods, that they
2 
are and that they govern the world by a beneficent design* *
It is this spiritual intuition which constitutes true knowkedge, 
and it is in this context that Plato employs normally the name 
of Reason* When, however, he passes from epistemology to ethics,
1. Ibid. .p. 113* ———————————————————
2.Tbid.,p*104.
he fails to distinguish clearly between his use of the term for 
the higher of the two element a of the soul whereby it aspires 
to true knowledge, and the prudential element of the lower ele­ 
ment whereby it operates on the lerel of opinion. The higher 
reason, according to More's interpretation of the Platonic ethic,
manifests itself negatirely in the form of an inner check upon
1 
man* s restless appetites and personal emotions, but w$en it
eomes to explaining the relation between the inner check, or 
spirit, or higher Reason, and the concupiscent element of the 
soul, man has nerer been avle to find a satisfactory answer* 
All the same, the heart of man erares for some solution, and 
here it is that Plato introduced his great doctrine of Ideas, 
seeking through an effort of the imagination to effect practi­ 
cal ly and intuitirely what could not be effected intellectually*
'The central truth of dualism is a recognition of the 
absolute distinction between the two elements of our conscious 
being, and an admission of the impossibility of finding any 
rational positive explanation of the mutual interaction of these 
two elements--- But the human mind cannot rest comfortably in 
this state of mere negations it is impelled by its rery nature 
to sek some positire expression for these supervational facts 
of consciousness, and it is just here that another faculty, the 
imagination, steps in to perform what was impossible to the
2.1bid*,p»169*
reason. In its lower actirity the imagination is the power by 
which the sensations derired through the organs of sight and the 
rest are projected outside of the mind as objects of perception. 
The imagination ean also go byyond this function and, after recom- 
bining at pleasure the data of pwrception, «an project these new 
combinations into the roid as things haying to the mind a certain 
degree of independent existence. Thus, the landscape coneeired 
by the poet is thrown out into the world of objectire existences. 
And so,by a still higher actirity, the imagination essays to deal 
with those of sensation. Justice, which, to the reason, was only 
a negation of our positire impulses, is, like the creation of the 
artist, projected outside the soul so as to become a positire en­ 
tity with a life and habitation of its own, and the soul under the 
control of moral force seems itself to be reaching out to touch 
and take into possession that to which it has gircn form and 
motion from its own experience.
'These imaginatire projections of the facts of moral 
consciousness are the true Platonic Ideas.'
There is here abriously a certain confusion in More's own mind 
with relation to Idealism.He recognises the ralidity of the 
Platonic myth of pre-existent and eternal Ideas in human exper­ 
ience, but when he seeks to discuss it,he tends inspite of him­ 
self to gire the impression that he is attempting to dissolre the
1. IMd. ,pp. 187-88.
Ideas into a mere imaginative projection of the human desire 
for a centre of abiding calm and reflection amid the impressions
of the fluxj in other words, a mere wish fulfilment without a
1 
reality prior to,or separate from,the human mind. He thereby
seems to fall into the very error for which he blames the modern
2 
romanticists like Professor Santayana, who, while seeing clearly
enough that Ideas are the property of the image-making faculty, 
treat* them as if they were something created by a purely spontaneous
power ex nihilo, and so deprive them of their eternal and author-
3 
itatire validity. Such an attitude Plato would have repudiated
scornfully,as More knows. He 'would not say precisely with Santa­ 
yana that the imagination furnishes to religion those large Ideas 
in which alone a great mind finds itself at home, but rather that
the imagination gives vitality to the moral facts that are fur-
4 
nished it by religion. 1 Further Plato would have denied that the
correspondence of Ideas with truth cannot be demonstrated} the 
work of the imagination unless it answerw in the fullest measure 
to known truth is not an Idea at all.'Ideas are the product of the 
imagination, but of the imagination working upon material given to 
it by the immutable law of morality} the truth is present to our 
consciousness before thia act of transformation, and has no more 
authority, though it may be clothed with more persuasion, after it
has been evoked for the inner eye as a form than it had previously
5 
to that evocation 1 . Without this amplification, More's 'imaginat-
l7Cf.pp.7/o-/3;
2.More, Plat6nism,p.l91.
3. Ibid.,p.190.
4.1b:"d.,g.l95« S.TTTTa. »P».
ire projections of the facts of moral consciousness leave us with
*
a very different impression of his meaning*
*lthough Plato, at the outset, divides his Ideas into ration­ 
al an'd ethical, the former conveniently drop out of consideration, xit
focussed on 
and his main concern is w.ixk the ethical Ideas which appear to
the soul as his models appear to the artist as he strives to imitate
1 
them. So entranced does Plato,become with the similitude that he
carries it beyond the demands of imagery into the region of myth­ 
ology. By the tame of the Phaedrua. the Ideas are no longer des-
beerv
eribed as images floating before the soul but haveA transmuted into 
shining realities existing forejrer in an empyrean realm which was 
the prenatal home of the soul and whither the soul, purged of mor­ 
tal passion, may return in visionary mood, to behold,unimpeded by 
earthly distractions, the divine spectacle of justice and temperance 
and knowledge in their unadulterated glory. Normally,as Plato shows^ 
in the Meno, man is haunted by dim and transient memories of what 
he once beheld face to face, bitt in the Symposium, he draws a clearer,, 
more definite picture of that Uranian love which carries the desires
of the soul upward to a participation in the divine Ideas, and which
2 
in itself constitutes the true philosophy.
The question naturally remains whether Plato himself con­ 
sidered the Ideal world as a metaphor^or are the Ideas in fact 
bodied forms that reveal themselves to us in moments of exaltation. 
To More the answer seemed to be that they were at once a reality 
and illusion,but the very soul of Platonism is to leave these higher
TTCf. IbIa 
2.1b_i4. ,p.
1
matters in their own evasive liberty. None the less for that, 
the concept is charged with an emotional power which, especially 
in the allegory of the cave, seems to offer man the noblest in­ 
tuition of divine and eternal values to which man had yet attained 
and as such, passes from pure philosophy into the realm of religious 
insight.
As the plan for the Greek Tradition unfolded itself more 
clearly during the years succeeding PI at onism* More came himself 
to see that thw Platonic humility in the presence of these mys­ 
teries was inherited, not by any of the would-be Platonic doc­ 
trines which derived in different proportions from the various 
emphases on the three Socratic theses, but by Christianity which 
was also content to abide in the consciousness of human dualism 
without forcing man's experience into a rationalistic reconcilia­ 
tion of the paradox. PI at onism had in the first edition been 
announced as the foundation for a series of studies on the origins 
and early environment of Christianity, and on various modern 
revivals of a philosophic religion. By the time of the Religion 
of Plato(1921), More had modified his previous plan, and now en­ 
visaged the core of the work more or less as it was subsequently 
to be published, its second volume dealing with Hellenistic phil­ 
osophies, not ably Epicureanism, Stoicism and ^eo-Platonism, the third
on Christianity, and "the fourth 'containing a number of essays on
2 fundamental questions raided in the course of the foregoing studies!
A last volume on Aristotle had been contemplated,but remained
1.Ibid.,pp.195-97o
2.More, The_Reli^ion_o_f_Plato,Preface,p.Il.
unfinished on M0re's death.
These together with The Religion of Plato were to form a 
single connected thesis to which Platonism was to serve as an intro­ 
duction. Owing, however,to the fact that when it was written the
whole project of the series was not clearly formed, some things
in it 
were included jirhich belonged more properly to the body of the
work, and some were omitted which might naturally have been expected
there
in an introduction to the whole series* It follows too that had*
of necessity to be a shift of emphasis in order to reconcile the 
Platonic tradition more intimately with what was to come after it, 
and so in the opaning chapter, More proceeds to examine the com­ 
ponents of religion and their relative importance in Greek and 
Christian thought. These he divides into philosophy*, theology and 
mythology. Philosophy, to both classical and the later Patristic 
writers,had 'a double application. At one time it was taken ethically 
or practically,to designate a certain self-mastery in conduct,while 
at another time its sense was intellectual,appearing in More f s judg­ 
ment, to rise into the regions of pure intuition. Nevertheless,even 
when most theoretical, the term philosophy, as he uses it,still re­ 
tains something of its simple practical valuej 'it implies always
a 
theory as concerned with actual life and as resting on ilus definite
2
experience of the soul 1 , thus bridging over the apparent gulf be­ 
tween the two applications of the term, while remaining completely
distinct from f the abuse of reason to which the name of metaphysics
3 
may be restricted', the sense, unfortunately which is all too often
TTThe earlier Christian writers were merely hostile to a mode of
attached to it. The other two components of religion are theology
ness 
and mythology, and in order to emphasise their distinctions from
philosophy, More restricts his use of the term*religion' to them. 
By theology More means the study of the being and the nature of 
God, and again he excludes from his usage of the term the various 
attempts at a rationalised explanation of the divine mystery.Theo­ 
logy finds its natural concomitant in the symbolism of tkK mythol­ 
ogy, a terra the use of which More is careful to explain to orthodox 
believers. 'Because the unsavoury escapades of a pagan god are called 
myths, it does not follow that any disrespect is intended to the 
incarnation of Christ by treating it also under the head of mythol­ 
ogy. A myth may be false and sillyj it may be the vessel, more or
1 
less transparent, of sublime truth. 1
These three elements are common to all the thinkers 
whom More would include within the Greek tradition,from Plato to 
St, Chrysostom. But' to the pagan ^ particularly the Platonist, phil­ 
osophy was the dominating elements this was the starting poinjr of 
religion and the sphere where certainty is attainable by man} hers 
he thought he was dealing with facts and standing on a foundation 
of proved knowledge. In theology he thought he was still close to 
ascertainable truth, yet removed a step from the region of immed­ 
iate experience. Mythology carried him further afield from positive
assurance,though it might be indispensable as the expression, more
2 
or less, symbolical, of necessary truths. 1 The mind of the Christian
moved in the reverse way.Por the orthodox believer, what the pagan
l±Ib_Id.,p.l5r "" 2. Ibid. ,10.17-
called mythology was the starting point of religion and the fielcj 
of certainty. 'The incarnation, with the whole economy of salvat­ 
ion, he regarded as a verifiable event, in which the imagination 
had no part; unless this fact was nakedly and objectively true, 
his faith was vain and his preaching a lie. Symbilism for him 
entered witfc theology; and though he might be ready to perieh for 
his conception of the Trinity, he would not deny that his terms
An
for the relation of the three persons, one to another were A inade- 
quate g translation into human speech of truths that surpassed at 
mortal comprehension. In a acway, his theological definitions were 
admittedly more symbolical than the Platonist's. The divergence 
becomes again complete when we pass to philosophy. Here where 
the Platonist thought he could move secjcurely if anywhere, the 
Christian, so far as he distinguished philosophy from revelation 
saw only the blind groping of a ruined intelligence, which, unaid 
by divine trace, might catch a glimpse afar off and shrouded in
clouds and thick darkness, of its true home, but in the end must
1 
sink into doubt and despair 1 .
At the time of The Religion of Plato, More holds 
the balance evenly between the two approaches to the burden of 
the mystery- His immediate concern is with the Platonic ppproach, 
but he is equally sensitive to the need of many devout men for 
religious sanctions founded on ijythology. The central problem 
of Platonic philosophy is the eiistence of a law of righteous-
&
ness prior to, and if needs be independent of, God, and the
2. Ibid. ,P» 43 «
happiness which comes to the man who lives in accordance with 
it irrespective of his circumstances in this life or in the 
world-to-come. For the religious man, 'whose faith is founded 
primarily on mythology there is no certainty in the life of 
righteousness save in the judgment to come —
"As He pronounces lastly on each deed, 
Of so much fame in heaven expect thy meed'.
Without this expected reversal of the conditions of the actual 
world there is no moral law|right and wrong, justice and in­ 
justice, are but empty namesj we live under clouds of confusion 
and ignorance beyond whi«h rides no sun« For the Christian our 
existence must ever be a state of hope nourished by belief in 
the particular myth of Christ's redeeming act of saarifice, and
if we are deceived in this belief, then are we, as St. Paul says,
1 
"of all men the most miserable".' On the other hand, it was
precisely the hypothesis of Plato that this judgment to come 
should be eliminated, and that by an exaggeration of the appar­
ent confusions of this life, the difficulty of determining right
2 
andwrong should be faced without flinching. To More at the time
of T^e Religion of Plato_ it was still possible to say of Plato
attempted reconciliation of rationalism and morality that 'his
3 method has at least the merit of boldness.'
In PI at on i sm» More's own interest had been cen­ 
tred largely upon Plato 1 8 attempt to solve the problem of know­ 
ledge and justice in the light of this human consciousness of
2.Xhid. »P»46.
3. Ibid. , loc.cit
dualism, but by the time of THBHReligion of Plato, he was pre­ 
pared to probe further into issues which spring immediately from 
it, such as the question of the soul's immortality with which 
Plato dealt in the Phaedo and the Symposium* This question, as 
More admits, carries us to the borderline between philosophy and 
theology, for throughout the whole of the Greek tradition, life 
beyond the grave was intimately bound up with the being and nature 
of the Bivinity. And so it is not surprising that in the Laws, one
of Plato's most elaborate arguments for the immortality of the
1 soul should also seek to prove the existence oitt God. Nevertheless,
as long as in discussing the duration of the soul we build on the 
soul's knowledge of itself, according to Morels definition of phil­ 
osophy, we are still within its province. What Plato, however, 
affirms intuitively, the Christian upholds by an appeal to myth­ 
ology, adhering to belief in an immortality confirmed and illus-
^trated by the Resurrection of Christ. What the Christian finds
f\
symbolised in a myth and afterwards proceeds to discuss philosoph­
ically, Plato affirms philosophically and then proceeds to confirm
2 
and illustrate by a myth.
Similarly when Plato considers the existence of the
Gods, he derives his primary evidence from the soul's own xconsciows- 
ness of itself. Upon this foundation of immediate experience and
imtuition, he builds a superstructure of religion, including both
3 
theology and mythology. The 'philosophy of the soul* taught us
that there is something within us set apart from the sway of passion'____ .
l.More, Religion of Plato, (PrincetonJISB^t), pp. 75-106. P..rMd...PP.66-67. S.liiii.tPl0^-
unchanged amid all that changes,out truer Self; and by analogy,
God,who is conceived in the likeness of the soul,ought also to
1 
be immutable, incapable of falsehood, without blwmish of evil'.
Goodness, wisdom, truth — all moral qualities— these are the
Plato's 
attributes of^God, but of omnipotence, omniscience,ubiquity and
the other abstract qualities of metaphysics, More finds not a
word. It is on this very issue that it seems to him so many of
r 
Plato's would-be followers have gone astay, in the first place
by identifying God with Ideas, and in the second, by denying to
2 
God a personality. God is good and wise and true, but He is not
Goodness or Wisdom or Truth* Ideas are separate and independent
entities, a pattern from which God worked, but not synonymous
Philo 
with God, or even,as j&aiiwu supposed ,conceptions of the Divine
3 
mind. Although hitherto he has stressed the splendour and potency
of the Ideas as self-existent realities, here More tends to turn 
back on his argument as he contrasts them as merely philosophical
entities with the vivid anthropomorphism of God. Of anthropornorph-
4 
ism, he has more to say in another volume. Here he is content to
refute the fallacy that because the Greeks had no term correspond­ 
ing to our 'person', they were deficient in the conception of per­ 
sonality, and the further fallacy that personal immortality is in-
5 
compatible with Plato's Idealism. The God whom Socrates served an
P}ato preached was no empty generalisation of metaphysics, although 
More admits that their reticence before the divine mystery to which 
the Jews had access by prophecy and the Christian through the In-
S.Cf.pp. 4U- i*; 44-3. 
4.#.#.4-60-67.
carnation, left the Platonic Deity 'a pale conception by the side 
of Jehovah or of the divinely compassionate Father, a conception
lacking comparatively in driving force and wanting in some of the
solations 1
deeper human conitiKratiarcs.' Nevertheless, for all that is nec­ 
essary to the religious life of a man, for the large things of 
the spirit, it seemed to More at the time that the theology of 
Plato was sufficient. This much we know— and it is the gist of 
the matter— that 'the souls of men are not set adrift in a soul­ 
less world, either to fortify themselves in the harsh pride of
indifference or to sink down in abject terror at the thought of
2 
their loneliness 1 . The Platonist is not called upon to endure
the blank misgivings of a practical atheism that has not numbed
the imagination into sleep, such as haunted a Lucretius or a
3 
Spencer* Not only is there a Supreme Being, but the religion of
Plato allows the individual believer to participate fully in the 
corporate worship of the state, whilst infusing the traditional
ritual with a new insight which varies with the degree of inspir-
4 
ation to which he has personally attained.
But even with the immediate persuasion that the 
Creator and Sustainer of the universe is just and wise and true 
and immutable, man is still left with apparently insoluble pro­ 
blems. Providence may be the working of God's goodness and wis­ 
dom, the inexorable rigour of divine justice may be the corollary 
of His truth and immutability, and yet the evidence of our senses
' 3.Ibid.,pp.288-91;cf.Ibid.,p.297. 
2.Ibid.,p.126. 4.Ibid.,pp.126-27.
drives us to admit a cetain degree of injustice and confusion in
the lives of men. Plato's answer to the dilemma is to be found in
not 
the Timaeus and elsewhere. God is omnipotent, as metaphysics would
assert, nor was creation an act complete and definitive in itself 
whereby the Creator of his own volition created something out of 
nothing. Rather was it 'the approximate and continuous subjectio^ 
to law and order of a subsisting chaos which never succumbs pe r- 
fectly to restraint and never entirely yields up to its own spasm­ 
odic impulse.' To the age-long questionsUnde malum? Plato returns 
what seems to More the most satisfying answer of all thinkers. TO 
Plato the thought of a Creator and a thing created implied necess­ 
arily the presence of a substance out of which the object is creat­ 
ed* this sullen and resistant substratum of matter he called Nec­ 
essity or Ananke, and from it he envisaged Sod, as the Demi-urge, 
fashioning his creation as far as possible in accordance with the 
pattern of the Ideas. Necessity thus correspond s at the lower end 
of the cosmic scale to the Platonic cinception of Ideas at the 
higher. Within the human soul itself there are two parts corres­ 
ponding to the cosmic dualism of Ideas and Necessity, though as
we have seen before, the division, especially in connection with
2 
Reason, is a delicate and frequently an elusive one. Indeed the
whole creation of the soul of man is seen by Plato as a complic­ 
ated process, for, after creating the lesser gods, the D^mi-urge 
took what remained of a now-deteriorated soul-stuff to create in 
dividual souls wftich he then handed over to the lesser gods for
. ,p.!40. 2.Cf.pp
further guidance and shaping* 'From their hands is derived the 
mortal element of the soul,"having in itself dreadful and compellin 
passions— pleasures first^jthtads tfee greatest incitement to evil, 
then pains to frighten away good, and besides these confidence and 
fear, witless counsellors "both, and wrath hard to appease, and allqrs 
ing hope. Having mingled these with* irrational sensation and love 
that stops at nothing, they composed as they could the mortal soul 
of man 1". It is not that pleasure and pain, or the desires and emot­ 
ions connected with them,are totally depraved in themselves— but 
they contain the principle of evil in so far as they belong by nat­ 
ure to that which in itself is without measure and tends by inertia
i 
to endless expansion. Whereas orthodox Cfcristanity has seen over-
A
weening pride and ambition to be the root of evil in man,Platonism 
finds it in that deficiency of energy, indolence, effeminate slack­ 
ness (rjiath2;mial_whereby the soul of man is kept from attending to 
the higher promptings of the inner check. Without such control,mans
instincts run to evil, and the art of life consisys in discipliningb
them by some external standard which may reinforce the divine veto 
power and counteract the effects of rhathymia, and its cpmpanion
evil, amathia, or ignorance, which are the true enemies of the Del-
2 
p hie oracle,'Know thyself.
Such a mythology does not attempt to solve the problem 
of evil rationally .It leaves evil in the cosmos as a mysterious,
unaccountable fact for which no one is responsible. It leanes room 
too for a personal creating G0d, who is gooi, but not omnipotent in
the Christian or metaphysical sense? whilst in his treatment of
2
psychical evil Plato avoids what More can only call the 'abyss of 
•monism 1 by distinguishing between the mortal and immortal elements 
in the soul, and by the myth of transmigration which sees each suc­ 
cessive state of the soul as the consequence of its conduct in a 
former life, a doctrine as deeply enshrouded in mystery as the 
Hindu Karma. Above all it holds the individual responsible for his 
own conduct; he can choose between lining in conformity with the 
superrational order of Ideas or sinking into the chaos of infra- 
rational instincts, themselves part of the dark substratum of Nec­ 
essity. By this emphasis upon the importance of individual respon­ 
sibility Platonism is allied to Christianity which stresses the 
need of individual perfection. Although Christianity brought into
the world a new sanctity of love and solidarity of mankind which
3i 
More admits one does not find in Platonism, nevertheless both hold
that the primary requisite of salvation is the private harmony of 
man himself with his divine source and end, and £from this spirit­ 
ual atonement, the unison afid concord of society will follow as a 
natural consequence.
These serious rift is not between Christianity and
Platonism, but between the Greek Tradition as it developed, unchanged
&. 
at core between the death of S0 crates and the Patristic period, and
the modern religion of humanitarian ism which dates ostensibly from 
the Romantic Revival but which to More had its roots in the various 
perversions of the Greek tradition which sprang up, both before and 
after the spread of Christianity. As More passes from his studies of
glatonism to those of the_Jfellenistic philosophies which claim to 
l»ISli- , pp. 295-99. , r .,. The C&ffSof,<L Wor(<3 , August IS32, ^- £****? , No. *Xf, P«J=er J EWt, 'he Ch rls |_- ——— i=s-sCTIC' --'* 0m*r More. pf/^5> ^r thevo-ce O
derive from it, he turns from the mainstream of the Greek tradi­ 
tion to consider the way in which its current was diverted into 
tortuous channels carved out by thinkers who were unable to abide 
in the mystery of PLatonic dualism. The interest of the Platonic 
oheresies',as they appear to More, is not merely that of the anti­ 
quarian in delving into buried strata of thought for the sheer 
love of unearthing forgotten secrets. To MQre t the same perver­ 
sions of thought were alive and active in his own day, and to 
expose the excesses to which the ^reek mind could run,once it 
repudiated the difficult but experientially acceptable norm of 
religious dualism,was, he hoped, to undermine the popular cred­ 
ence in their modern counterparts.
The volume on the Hellenistic Philosophies has been 
general!^ acknowledged as the finest and least controversial sec­ 
tion of The Greek Tradition*In the marshalling of historical fact 
and philosophical opinion, More is at his best,blending intimate 
aneddote and recondite argumentation in a lucid survey of the 
various leading schools of post-Socratic thought. Setting aside 
his brief accounts of the Cyrenaic and Cynic schools which are 
of interest mainly as the precursors of Epicureanism and Stoicism, 
we may say that More's interest is focussed upon the four rival 
philosophies of Epicureanism, Stoicism,Neo-Platonism and Sceptic­ 
ism. The aim of each is the same: to attain to tranquillity amid 
the bewildering currents of life. The fabled ataraxy of the Epi-
^pd^Ww
curean, the ajwtfcaj, of the Stoic, the ascent of the Plotinian to 
the Supreme Reality,the One— the flight of the Alone to the Alone
1 
the aloof acquiescence of the PyrrhAnist,, all are attempts to
sol-we the problem with which the Platonist had been concerned, 
the nature of human happiness. Moreover each seeks to find the 
answer to it by the practice of a definite ethical system.Un- 
fortunately, hpvever,not one of them is prepared to abide in the 
apprehension of that wherein the Platonist sees happiness to 
reside.To him,man, in order to attain to harmony, has to take into 
account the inner cleavage in the human consciousness between mind 
and matter, the moral and the physical. This paradox offers a 
stumbling block to the rationalising element in man, and in order
to resolve it,he seeks to explain his own intuitive ethical sense
s
in terms of a detailed comogany, a rationalised system of the uni­ 
verse which is made the basis of his conduct. In this respect, 
Epicurean, Stoic and Neo-Platonist are all alike in being unwilling 
to abide by the paradoxical data of consciousness and to employ 
reason only in the service of such data. They,on the other hand, 
are convinced that reason can transcend the facts of experience 
and explain the nature of things by an hypothesis of its own.Ration­ 
alism in its search for a closed system of cause and effect, has 
invariably tended to escape the implications of dualism by defining 
mind and soul in terms of matter and body,or matter and body in 
terms of mind and soul. Of th* se two,adjustments, the former is
the easier,for the body forces itself upon our senses whereas the
2 
soul is more elusive and can Tw more easily argued out of sight.
> Thus Epicurus came to conceive of all life, in­ 
cluding the soul and ultimately the Gods, in terms of matter,
2.,|bid.,p/77-78.
matter, adopting the Democritean hypothesis of an infinite 
number of atoms in an infinite void as a basis for a purely 
mechanical system notable for the legerdemain by which he
proceeds to bring freedom of will,even voluntary caprice,out
1 
of sheer theoretical determinism. There is to More actually
little to choose "between this and the Stoic attempt by Zeno 
to reduce the immaterial element, call it soul or what one will, 
to a merely mechanical operation "by falling back upon the an­ 
cient hylozoistic philosophies which found the source of nature 
in some primordial stuff possessing the characteristics of life, at
or, more specifically, upon Heraclitus who made an element simi-
2 
lar to fire the universal substratum. From this Zeno deduced an
inexorable physical order in which events obeyed a prearranged 
order, and to which man, in order to find the happiness and se­ 
curity he sought, had to conform. But— and this to More is the 
revanche of Stoic logic— by the very system which ensuerd for
the Stoics the security they so desired— they deprived themselves
3 
of liberty, which is equally k the end and aim of philosophy.
'If Cyrenaic and Epicurean saw in the world a place of liberty 
without security, it ma$ be said that the Stoic universe is for 
the soul 3>f man a place of security without liberty.Yet both
Epicurean and Stoic knew and felt deeply that our security and
4 The 
liberty cannot be severed but are craved as one thing.'
ultimate effects of the mechanistic effects of the Stoic conception
1-Ibid. ,pt).55-56. 
2.Ibid.,p.79. 
3.Ibid.,pp.81-83.
4*TtTTj|. »p»92» For an interesting contrast of the two schools,vid? SEerpurne Essays Vl,pp. I)I -ti*t- ——
of the universe are very little different from those of the E$icur- 
aan physics of chance and change. In both'jthe woilld-be monist,by his 
rejection of human dualism, seems to More to be betrayed into innum­ 
erable subsidiary paradoxes which the true Platonist avoids by the 
acceptance of the one central paradox of human experience.
The future of Greek philosophy, More felt, might have 
been very different had some thinker arisen who would have adopted 
a system of physics and logic based on a Platonic intuition of 
human dualism, and then on that sounder foundation, have adopted and
adapted the larger achievements of the Stoic teachers in the field
2 
of ethics. Such a conversion was to ^ore perfectly practicable, and
the result might have been a body of thought unshakable at the base 
and majestic in its superstructure. He considers at length how the 
ethics of Stoicism might have been transformed and revitalised by
an infusion of Platonic Idealism until 'the bl e ak_negat i on ^of .the
ft 
Stoic ac
The words in italics are, I think, of profound significance. More's 
own version of the inner check, based ostensibly on the Platonic
veto, has so often been condemned by his critics as a merely blank
4 
negation that it is interesting to see him contending here that
the true nature of Platonic Idealism offers a positive and virile 
power of control. It is unfortunate that by his constant emphasis 
upon the negative function of the frein vital, More should have 
undermined that positive and potent appeal which he now attributes
Of^e 7~gelTeni3 1 i c ~Ph 1 1 oTolihTe'sTpP^ 5^5 ^ .154. 4.ur.pp.
2. Ibid. ,p.!61.
3.TbTc[. ,loc.cit«
A.Cf.pp
to Platonism and have given the impressions of the bleak negation 
of Stoicism. There are, I believe, two reasons for this. The one, 
upon which we hare already touched, is that there was ultimately, 
even within Platonism itself, a certain sterility, an inability 
to cope with the final fact of good and evil, of which More became 
fully aware only after his volume on the Hellenistie Philosophies 
while grappling with the Christ of the Hew Testament and Christ 
the Word.And secondly, there was in More hinself, on the side of 
practical,as opposed to intellectual, morality a streak of that 
indomitableness in the face of life's harsher realities which he 
must have inherited from his Puritan forefathers and which gave 
him a natural affinity with the Stoic rather than with the Plat- 
onist. Reinforced by his earlier interest in Manichaeism and Hin­ 
du renunciation and illusion, this natural austerity must frequent­ 
ly have battled within him against his equally natural susceptib­ 
ility to beauty and made him long for some philosophy of life 
which would offer a reconciliation between these conflicting 
tendencies. That is why there is nothing more poignant in the 
writings of Paul Elmer More than the wistful close of the chapter
on Epictetus where he dwells upon the final inadequacies of Stoic-
I 
ism to satisfy the soul of man.
To the Epicurean with his ataraxy and the Stoic with 
his apathy, the good they set out so valiantly to find becomes in 
the end the mere deprivation of evilj in the third great philosophy 
which springs from Platonism, Weo-Platonism,it is significant that
l.Ibicl.pp.169-70.
evil is considered as a mere deprivation of good. Epicurean and 
Stoic both erred to More by reason of ther obsession with a rat­ 
ional and monistic explanation of life's riddle.intellectus sibi 
p_ermissus.Neo-Platonism wag doubly SU8pect$for not only did it 
add to the core of pure Platonic philosophy anx attempted ration­ 
alisation of the mystery of the universe, but it also had its pec­ 
uliar form of mysticism which to More was equally subversive of
2 2L
true intuition. Both the metaphysics of rationalism and of mystic­ 
ism were attempts to ignore or submerge vital distinctions and to 
wrest from,or impose upon,man's dilemma,a unified solution of the 
nature of things.
In dealing with Plotinus, More seeks to distinguish 
as far as possible between his philosophy and his metaphysics,al­ 
though in the original they are intermingled.His philosophy springs
universal 
from that sense of the soul's imperfection and the instability of
15 with 
all its worldly pursuits, which he contrasts some power of which
he ia aware in the soul which stands apart frorn the world of con­ 
fusion and corruption,and aspires to some pure and unchanging 
Reality above itself. Hence the ascent of the soul to God by any 
one of three paths,the aesthetic, the ethical or the intellectual, 
corresponding to Plato's threefold division of Beauty,Goodness and 
Truth. Whatever the repercussions of Plotinian mysticism,More is 
ready to allow that in his description of the ascent,Elotinus was 
drawing upon his own experience.He had,we are told,experienced the 
ecstasy four times,and when he seeks to convey dome intimation of
iTlbid. ,p.28.
. Vit>,p. 2^ff.; TT ,pp.n^_ t<j , And
HeUe.ni&bio "Philosophies, pp. 248 -
vision,his 
the f inal^language acquires a strange and impressive beauty.
So far he was drawing on actual psychological experience; his 
flight from the world and its distractions is an element in all 
philosophy:'the goal of wisdom is always an ataraxy in one form 
or another'. But Plotinus,like Epicurus and ^eno,was not contend 
with what he could learn psychologically of life.Reason,instead 
of limiting its function to analysing and clarifying the psychol­ 
ogical data at its service,sought rather to build up a theory of 
the cause and genesis of the total sum of things,the rerum natura.
in accordance with its own demands for a logical absolute,even if
2 
it meant doing violence to the facts as they stood. This method
of approach,although Plotinus evidently thoughtjit derived from
Plato,comes, according to More,from the influence of Aristotelian
3 
metaphysics coloured by certain Oriental currents of theology.
The whole problem of creation which in Plato is left clothed in 
ultimate mystery,corresponding to the mysterious inter-relation 
of body and soul in man is by Aristotle translated into terms of 
a supposed law of mechanics, so that the whole cosmos id set in 
motion by an initial attraction emanating from a first motor which 
is itself absolutely apart and immutable. T^is is the Unmoved 
Mover,acting upon the world as a final cause, #he end to which all 
moving things aspire,as they are sfet in motion by an innate love 
of the Absolute. Such an Absolute seems to More to come from a 
blending of the Platonic God with the Ideas of the Good and the 
True, whilst eliminating all that,to him at least, was valuable
1.More, Hellenistic Philosophies,p. 195. 3._IMd. ,p.205.
2. Ibid.* ,pp.p.203.
and real in "both. Such a God can be neither Creator, as He is 
entirely remote from HJ,S universe,nor Providence,as He cannot 
"be moved by the needs and destinies of men. He is an Absolute,
an Abstraction,abiding in the complete solitude of self-contem-
1 
plation. By such a definition of God, Aristotle has left the
realm More ascribed to philosophy for the vasty vacuum of meta-
2 
physics,thereby to M0re opening up a long trail of heresies.
It was a simple transition from the mysticism of Plotinus whereby 
the soul lost alii identity in the One,lifted up in a dark vacuity 
above both Mind and Being, to the metaphysical abstraction of Aris­ 
totle. But it was a union fraught with difficulties which Plot­ 
inus could meet only by launching into an Attempted rationalisation
of his cosmology, whereim he too,like the Stoics and the Epicureans
3. 
became lost in innumerable self-contradictions.
As a protest against the material monism of Epicurus 
and Zeno,the spirituality of Plotinus haft a lasting religious 
value,but when , turning from the intuition* of dualism which 
informs its philosophy, it sets up as its metaphjtsic a spiritual 
monism,it also runs into a mockery of tantalising paradoxes no 
less bewildering than those which mar both Epicureanism and Stoic­ 
ism. 'T^e inevitable result of grasping at the forbidden Tree of 
Knowledge is to dissolve philosophy and religion into the limbo
of metaphysics. And the end of metaphysics is a Pyrrhonic agnos-
4 
ticism,or a lapse into gross superstition.'
l.Ibid.,p7211." 
2. Ibid.., pp. 216-17. 
3.Ibid.,pp.228-38. 
4.TE32T. ,pp.258-59.
For the majority of men in the post-Socratic period, the ancient 
Gods of their race had lost ther meaning, and with the "break-down of 
local traditions as ax result of the increasing centralisation 
which came in the wake of the Roawn Empire, superstition brought 
immorality, and immorality, wide-spread disintegration. The need 
was for a new religion which would be able to reconcile intell­ 
ect and emotion. Of the various attempts to meet this need, More vvas
most interested in that of the Emperor Julian who realised man's 
craving for a mediating deity between God and humanity, and whilst 
utilising the older myths which hinted at such an atonement, raised 
the figure of the old Cynic philosopher, Diogenes, to be just such 
an embodiment of the divine amongst men. In choosing Diogenes, 
Julian had entered into the mood of his times. Socrates was too 
much the philosopher of reason, of the intellect, to appeal to a 
generation of heart-hungry and restless men. For centuries, the
world had been growing further away from the old hope of finding
1. 
salvation in the clear conception of truth and knowledge, •'•his was
an insight shared by the Church Fathers— even those most favourable
to Plato— and summed up in the phrase of Ambroses "It hath not
2-. 
pleased God to give His people salvation in dialectic".' Neverthe­
less, looking back over the history of Christ! anity,More asks himself 
whether God meant to save His people by emotions alone any more 
than by the understanding alone, and whether the tragedy of
lbd. ,p
S.Ibid. ,p.299.
Christianity does not lie in its failure to achieve, or at least 
to impose upon the world, a sound combination of dialectic and emot­ 
ion.
T_he_Greek Tradition. is just sucft an attempt to reconcile 
intellect and emotion, combining the desire, on the one hand, for a
working basis of truth, and on the other, for the consolation of a
, . . * **-, -r, ,. ,- Hellenistic living faith. But, as I see it, More, at the time of
Philosophies, was still approaching his would-be synthesis primar­ 
ily from the angle of the head. At heart he remained a sceptic, 
holding judgment in suspense on all issues where he had no intuitive 
proof, and hesitating to commit himself to the positive implications 
of faith. The chapter on Scepticism is more than a survey of an 
attitude held in classical times in opposition to the dogmatic con­ 
tentions of Stoic, Epicurean and Heo-Platonist alike. It is part of 
his own spiritual autobiography, the story of the one defence to 
which he clung against the corresponding modern dogmatisms of posi- 
tivist,pragmatist,and romanticist alike. The triumphs of scepticism 
were his triumphs, and if it fell short and left its adherents ul­ 
timately unsatisfied, it was Paul Elmer >1ore who felt its inadequacies 
and suffered its frustrations.
As he himself had turned to scepticism as a reaction 
on the one hand against romantic sentimentalism, and on the other 
against scientific naturalism, so Greek philosophy turned to Sceptic­
ism from the confusion latent in Epicureanism, on the one hand, and
2 
Stoicism on the other, while the Epicurean took over from Socratic
2. ISLls_,pp. 350-31.
thought its rationalism and hedonism, and the Stoic adopted its
rationalism, tempered with a mood of what More describes, rather
1 
euphemistic ally, as 'optimistic endurance 1 , the stress of the true
Sceptic lay upon the Socratic doubt. To Pyrrho, founder of the 
school, man is the measure of things only in so far as his immed­ 
iate sensations are concerned. His judgments may or may not corres­ 
pond with the nature of things; the complete absence of agreement 
among men shows that we have no criterion to determine whether or 
when they are true. Hence the Pyrrhonic suspension of all certain 
knowledge. In practice, however, such scepticism leads, not to anti- 
nomianism,but to a tacit acceptance of the conventions of his soc­
iety without the Sceptic's trying to establish their ultimate valid-
2 
ity. So far More himself would gladly go with the Pyrrhonist; the
fact 
core of kHSKiKdtgs which comes to us by immediate sEHsai knowledge,
not by inference, he makes the basis of his own attempt in The Scep­
tical Approach to Religion to construct a system of belief confirm-
3 
ed by positive experience. The Sceptical Approach to Religion is
in essence the main conclusions of The Greek Tradition condensed 
within the limits of a single coherent thesis.
But the Sceptic is bound to exceed the evidence of these 
immediate impressions if he is to live fully, and the question nat­ 
urally arises on what basis shall he conduct his life to avoid fall­ 
ing into the same sort of theorising as he condemns in the dogmatists. 
Here More brings once more into play the distinction between 'Philo-
1. Ibid,.p.375. ~~
2. ETTbld. ,p.332j cf.pp.333,554tf.
3. More,The Sceptical Approach th Religion,Few Shelburne_.jSg_sgys 11. 
TPrincetonj 1934), pp . 1 _ 2
sophy,as a manner of life, and 'Metaphysics' as anjabstract system 
of thought. Tjxe Pyrrhonist 'philosophy'asserted fully the right of 
the sceptic to work in the field of science,properly defined and 
limited, though once the scientist sought to go beyond the facts
of observation and their classification, and indulge in abstract
1
speculations,the sceptic was bound to oppose him. The opposition
of a healthy scepticism tends to drive such dogmatists from one un­ 
tenable position to another until at last the absurdity of their
case is exposed for what it is,— a function which scepticism is
2 
seriously needed to perform in modern society.
But although in the intellectual sphere,More feels 
the Sceptic's conclusions would be acceptable to ancient and 
modern PJatonists alike,in the practical and emotional spheres 
Scepticism is handicapped,inspite of its apparently acquiescent 
calm in the face of prevailing traditions,by an underlying de­ 
ficiency. Deriving as it does from the Platonic theses without 
the spiritual affirmation,it cannot fully meet the needs of men, 
and cannot therefore be compared with Platonism itself in which
intellectual scepticism and spiritual affirmation are, as we
3 
have previously seen,both reconciled. The scepticism of the
Platonist stands necessarily on a wider basis than that of the 
Pyrrhonist for the good reason that the Platonist admits as rec­ 
ognisable by the immediate affections a whole sphere of knowledge 
which the Sceptic rejects, the spiritual realm. Because the im­ 
pressions of this whole order of affections are neccessarily less
2. Ibid
M0 re, Hellenistic Philosophies ,pp.354- 38. . , p. 339 . -3TtfT-.-p-.424.
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palpable and more transitory th, an those of the body, the 
reason is apt to explain them away as illusory in order to 
rid itself of an unwelcome dualism. To the Platonist, however, 
who refuses to be'tempted by reason into a betrayal of these
promptings of a higher reality, it is possible to extend into the
in a manner 
spiritual sphere the sceptical attitude tstuuubE parallel to that
in which it operates in the physical sphere.actually his experi­ 
ence of the moral law seems to him more exact and cogent than that 
of scientific law because it comes down to the very centre of his 
being. Hence,for the ataraxy of the Pyrrhonist which consists of 
the mere cessation of the disturbance of physical pain and pleasure 
is substituted the eud.aj.monia of the Platonist,for to physical pain 
and pleasure,the Platonist adds another distinct order of feelings, 
eudaimo.nia(happiness) and misery which accompany our spiritual vol­ 
itions according as we live in conformity with or opposition to,the 
philosophy of Ideas.Eudaimonij. is not necessarily antagonistic to 
ataraxy^.but supplements and transcends ataraxy as a rule of conduct 
owing to its vastly greater significance and cogency in the full­ 
ness of life. T^is it is which appears to More,at the end of his 
Hellenistic Philosophies, as the motive power impelling men to 
live inx accordance with the canons of justice,for by virtue of 
his complete scepticism, the Platonist may attain to a peace in 
the soul incomparably more precious and more complete than the 
bare imperturbability of mind boasted,but rarely attained,by the 
Pyrrhonic half-sceptic.
(ll) The Inornate Word* 
'After all, any true philosophy of God demands the Incarnation*.
We hare preyiously seen that Plato's assertion that 
happiness was possible to the just man eren under the most 
frightful persecution was nerer legitimately riadieated, and 
because of his diseorery of this,More's thinking, by the time 
he comes to write The Christ of The Hew Teatamaat has under­ 
gone a radical change, for some light upon the way, in whi«h he 
reached his new conclusions, we must tura to The Sceptical 
Approach to Religion • Here he recounts step by step the way 
in which his belief in the ralidity of the Christian Rerelation 
was built up on a basis of pure obserration of those immediate 
affections of which he was aware on a spiritual, as opposed to 
a physical, plane. Man's intuitire perceptions tell him he is a 
free and purposire and responsible being, but another order of 
perceptions deriving from obserration show him that in common 
with the rest of nature, he is bound by a predetermined pattern 
orer which he has no control.
To this paradox, man may react in three ways. The true 
sceptic, refusing to admit the claims of reason to legislate 
between these two orders of experience, seeks to hold judgment 
in suspense, although ironically the claims of practical lirihg 
make it increasingly hard not to fall into the temptation of
more, Pa^es Fren an Oxford Diary, flection X>n -xxn.
theorising, with the result that all too often would-be sceptics
h 
pass imperceptibly into the second category which includes fcose
who, accepting the data of cbserration as true, reject by explicit 
cr corert inference, the contrary data of intuition as illusory.
Intc this category, as we hare seen, More puts all the modern ex.-
1 
pcnents cf erclution from Huxley on » they to him are dogmatists
masquerading as agnostics* But if the members cf this second 
group seek tc resolre this paradox by dismissing the facts of in­ 
tuition in farour of the data of obserration, there is a third 
grcup which rererses this procedure. It consists of 'those who, 
accepting the content of intuition as ralid, reject, if not the
data of abserration, at least the dogmatic inferences therefcrom,
2 
as illusory. Both the second and third are therefore emphases on
a single aspect of experience which thereby gains in importance 
until the other aspect comes to be regarded as an illusion. The 
second category More equates with rationalism, the third with 
faith; and this, when it directs and controls man's liring, becomes 
religion.
At the time of his essay on ^ewman in The ^rift of Roman­ 
ticism More condemned both these attitudes equally as expressions 
of the dogmatic spirit, which he contrasted on the one hand with 
true scepticism and on the other, with true mysticism, as opposed
to the rarious forms of spurious Taystieism with which we hare seen
3 
him dc battle. But by the time of The Sceptical Approach to Reli
B* More has rerised his attitude to religion, largely, I sus-
rg, ______________________ __________________________________
l.Hew Shelburne Essays 13/.pp78-10.
3.
pect, as a result of the aggressire attitude of modern science* 
Whereas inference from obserration seemed to him by nature fan­ 
atical and sweeping, denying man's basic intuitions of freedom, 
responsibility and purpose as mere illusions, he felt the atti­ 
tude of faith was more modest and reasonable , transcending rather 
than rejecting the inference from obserration. Obriously More is 
not here concerned with certain sects of fanatical belierers who 
reject out of hand ercni the best established scientific facts 
which hare come to light during the past century, but with those 
men of good will who, whilst accepting the discoreries of science 
as ralid upon the purely physical plane, yet beliere that the whole 
truth of which man id capable cannot be confined tc a physical 
interpretation* f In other words faith normally does not transfer 
our consciousness of freedom and responsibility and purpose to, 
or into, the cbserred phenomena of the object ire unirerse, but
rather infers the existence of a free and responsible agent, whose
operatire 
purpose is Kfc^u&txs in the world, while He Himself is transcend-
1 
ent to the world. 1 That is, faith is prepared normally to reside
in the consciousness of the dualism of spirit and matter, and to 
concern itself primarily with the intuitions of spirit. -°elief in 
such a God as we eoneeire by faith mrnst react in turn upon these 
intuitions of ourselres from which faith draws its content, there­ 
by both consummating and justifying our sense of freedom, respon­ 
sibility and purpoie by belief in a cosmic, as well as a personal 
teleology*
l.More. Hew Shelburne Bseays
'If cosmic teleology is an inference from a teleologieal know­ 
ledge of ayself, if faith is a transference of this triple form 
of consciousness to a Being who transcends the world, then we
are bound by our faith to a corresponding conception of the nat-
1 
ure and operation of such a Being*. More sees the same inference
of freedom> purpose and responsibility in religion at all its 
stages: in the mysterious object of primitire worship as well as 
in the God of the most adranced theism. The true derelopment of 
religion, to him, is marked by a increment, not away from anthrop­
omorphism, but 1 in the direction of a deeper and broader anthropo-
2 
morphism. ' But if God is enrisaged as a purposeful Being, He must
be imagined as working out a design, just as man is conscious of 
doing, through some sort of obstacle or hindrance, and through the 
lingering processes of time. This is the Platonic conception of 
God and creation • More finds it impossible to eonceire of pur­ 
pose apart from the existence of obstacles to be orereeme. again, 
like man, God will be responsible to the momal law, although man's 
own 'knowledge* of these two aspects of the spirit may itself be 
moderated as his experience grows greater. Thirdly, God's freedom 
will correspond to man's liberty of choice, dereloped to that
determination to choose only good which man sees as the far-off
3 
goal of his own endearour'.
Such a God will be rery different from the Unmered 
Merer of Aristotelian metaphysics, lost in remote and solitary
, p. 17
self-contemplation, and entirely detached from the wcrld of men.
the 
Too nuch of^Aristeteliaa conception came latwr to colour the
Church's own conception of God, but More seas the primitive and
unadulterated beliefs of the early Fathers to hare corresponded
1 
to his own Tiew of anthropomorphism. The choice to More seems to
lie between the abstract Absolute" ^eity of Aristotelian meta­ 
physics, or the Creator- ^edeemer God to which his own intuition 
has led him; and he decides in farour of the. inference of faith 
agaimst the abstract reasoning of pure logic. That such a decision 
is determined by the needs of the human heart More is the last to 
deny* In his Pages From an Oxford Diary, he wrote: f Perhaps I cling 
to the notion of purpose in the world and to the corollary notion 
of a persona® God because without that the whole sum of things 
becomes to my mind horrible beyond endurance I ---'Now the thought 
of a naked soul journeying for eyer on and on through inanimate
Ideas with no personal guide or consoler, with no glimpse of the
eternal 
majestic spirit whose home is there— the thought of such a jour­
ney sends a shudder through me. I cry out: Lord, I belieye, help
2 
Thou mine unbelief* '
Such a statement seems to lead a foundation to the 
attitude of the modern who, like John Dewey, calls faith a 'wish­ 
ful belief, 'a defence attitude', and goes on to suggest that we
belieye(in God, the soul and immortality) simply because we wish J
3 
to belieye, because we are afraid not to belieye* More does not
2. More", Panes Prom an Oxford Diary. Section Xv.
3. More, ITew Shelburne Essays 11, pp. 19-20.
attempt to contradict such an identification of faith with desire. 
This was the rery position adopted by the writer to the Hebrews 
when he spoke of faith as the 'substance of things hoped for.'
But with regard to the challenger's assertion that the theist
8tcrner 
is afraid not to beliere, More adopts a xtxixixx attitude. In the
first place, to make such a statement whilst claiming to be an 
'agnostic',i.e. a sceptic, is to abandon the position of true 
scepticism for a positire dogmatism. In actual effect, the posi­ 
tion of practical scepticism is impossible to maintain. One is
forced to decide either for or against belief in a world with a
1 
purpose, and to More the rejection of this intuition demands an
2 act of eren more strained credulity than does its acceptance.
The choice is between belief in an order corresponding to man's 
deepest intuitions, or in the world enrisaged as a 'rast deter­ 
mined machine, imperrious to man's sense of purpose and free­ 
dom and responsibility* But religion to More is more than lip- 
serrice to the greater probability; it requires the decision of
the will to lire in accordance with faith, an unremitting deter-
a 
mination to transmute DUE probability of belief into a truth of
3 
experience', and here it is that most men find infidelity much
easier, the 'facile surrender to the streaming impressions that
crowd upon us from the outer world and to the tides of sensation
4 
that ebb and flow within us.'
But if God is such as our intuitions of His nature
l.Ibid.,pT22l™ 
2.Tb:.d.,pp.23-25. 
3«Tb! d. ,le«.cit. 
4.
lead us to suppose, is it likely that He would leare us to grope 
after Him, unaided by sojne outward confirmation of our faith? 
So it is that More is brought to accept the ineritability of the 
Incarnation. Our intuitions lead us to think of God as aperson, 
and as suwh, He is one who can be rerealed to man by an assumption 
of humanity, although our intuition of a unirersal dualism leads 
us to expect that He can do so without forfeiting thereby His
dirine nature. But further than that*{ir own Sense ©^responsib­ 
ility to God Himself leads us to expect a God who, as a person, is
morally implicated in the responsibility of His actions. 'By the
^
Tery necessity of His supreme role, God could not easily shift 
from his shoulders the heary burden of the world's life. In some 
sense the imperfection of the creature is the weakness of the 
ereatorjno amount of sophistical theology can arcid the shudder­ 
ing conclusion that tracks the causes of eril back to the first
2 
iause of all 1 . Plato had tried to face the problem of eril inherent
it 
im the Tery nature of thirgs by attributing^te dark unfathomable
Necessity, but he had shrunk from bringing his God as the creatire 
Demi-urge into contact with this obstinate residue of chaos by 
inyenting the lesser gods to bear the responsibility of the actual 
faulty work of genesis* Herein enters the boldness and splendour 
of the Christian riew, although, to More, the Church has not faced 
up entirely to its full implications*
fThe Epiphany, as it shows God suffering in the world, might hare 
taught the wonderful lesson that in some way and in some measure
l.More. Pages From an Oxford Diary, Section XXl^XHli.—————— 
2*Ibid*,Section XX11.
responsibility for that Buffering, 
He is implicated in the tTaf*KY«w*T»firtfc»y*wMy^yfct»ii that the
terrible lecessity clings about Hie robes as it does about the
1 
robes of Plato's fashioning deities'. The Christian idea of the
Creation needs therefore to "be supplemented by its idea of the
Redemption*
'If there be any meaning in the tragic end of the Incarnation, if
the Cross hare any cosmic significance, it must be simply this,
that as God is the Author of an imperfect world, so through His x
2 
suffering He made Himself roluntarily its redeemer'*
Indeed More came to look upon the two processes of creation
and redemption as fundamentally one and the same. In The Catholic 
Faith
More sees the act of creation as inrolring the imposition
of form upon the formless substratum of matter, thereby delirering 
it from its inherent impotence. Creation and delirerance are thus 
in the case of matter, one and the same act regarde respectirely
A
from abore and below? God creates, matter is delirered from the 
bondage of Necessity. Similarly there is in the human soul such 
a principle of inertia and disorder as in the physical world. To 
Plato, man himself was called upon to tm bear a part in the work 
of creation and redemption by the imposition of form upon the 
formless) to the Christian, this redemption is accomplished in some
mysterious way by the mediation of Christ, the legos, delirering
5 
the soul ef man from the bondage of Necessity, or Sin. More had
come to beliere that as eril and in-voluntary pain were in some in-
l*Ibid. .loc.ci/U
2. Ibid. , Section XXlll.
The Catholic Faith.PP* 154-55 Cf. More's conception of the
tm Up°D the incrt »att« with which
explicable way bound together as part of dark Necessity,in seme 
* equally inexplicable way, evil might be redeemed by roluntary 
Buffering. On Galrary the grand peripeteia took place, the demands 
of Necessity were satisfied, the awful responsibility was acknow­ 
ledged, the debt of creation paid. God in Christ roluntarily assumed 
not only H^s own, but man's share of the responsibility for the 
wreckage of human life. The Incarnation was thus seen indeed as 
a work of vicarious atonement, though in rather a different way 
sense from its Calrinistic interpretation which had so long proved 
a stpmbling block to More. He had found something savage and repul­ 
sive in the idea of a so-called righteoud Deity sacrificing an inno­ 
cent Christ to satisfy His divine wrath, as he had met it in the 
works of Jonathan Awards and the other Puritan theologians who had 
shaped the thought of thetChurch in Which More had been brought up. 
But he had been held back too by another factor, his unwillingness 
to admit the need for forgiveness or to accept grace. He resented 
the idea that he was incompetent to shape his own destiny*, or that 
he in any way merited divine displeasure. But with his gradual 
shift of emphasis, More had come to see that evil was not a private 
concern, and therefore to accept the humiliating limitations which 
are common to all men* God and man are linked together in a great 
struggle against the stubborn residue of evil in creation, and we 
need to seekfthe pardon of God because we have been'false to One who 
has counted upon us for aid in the bitter war against Necessity, 
ungrateful to One who has honoured us with the call to partake in 
the glorious order and beauty and joy* and by doing so we 'have
wrought confusion and in our little blind egotism hare added to the 
eril of the world, to the misery of ourselres, and— so the tragedy 
of the Incarnation would telljus — to the burden of the ^reatof*' 
Nor is it man alone who has come, through the Atonement, to realise 
this need for forgireness. It seemed to More that there too God was 
asking the forgireaess of man for the suffer .ing in which Ho had 
inrolred him by the imperfection of His handiwork and was redeeming 
the eril of the world by participating in the penalties of that 
imperfection*
T^e Incarnation is then no accident or afterthought in the 
dirine economy, but an integral part of the eternal purpose, a nec­ 
essary condition in God's final end of imposing order upon chaos* 
As such it is reasonable to expect that it will be no isolated act 
inrelring a complete break with all that has gone before, but the 
crowning act of a long series of preparation* The whole aim of THe 
Greek Tradition from now en is to show that the Incarnation was no 
contradiction, but the natural consummation, of the highest insight 
into the dirine to which Greek philosophy had attained. 'Platonism 
and Christianity are at one in their rision of cosmic creation and 
delirerance, and we can see how in its young enthusiasm the new 
religion needed the wisdom of such a philosophy to preset-re it from 
erroneous orergrowthsshow the doctrine of Ideas might restrain a 
jealous monotheism from plunging into a fatal monism, and hew the
doctrine of Necessity might sare theology from entangling itself in
2 
the insoluble problems of eril 1 .
iMore. Pages Fora an Oxford Diary Section XXIV.____________ 
t.More, The Catholic faith,p*155*)For a fuller description of the 
^Inter-relation of Christianity and Platonism,ride fih~<a* *•**
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More has, I belieYe,oTeremphasised the idenity of the 
Platonic and Christian conceptions of Creation, and thereby 
minimised the Hebraic influence upon the Christian Yiew. Whereas 
Plato, in his attempt to account for the presence of eril in the 
unirerse, represented it as an essential constituent in the act 
of creation, the Old Testament Genesis has no place for eril in 
the initial dr ana. The refrain of the Creation story ist'God saw 
that it was geod.'Eril only finds its way into the world after­ 
wards as an essential consequence of the defection of man, although 
man too, in his original state, was good, 'made in the image of 
God'« Man's tragedy was his failure to accept his finite, and 
therefore necessarily subordinate, position in the diyine econ­ 
omy, a sin, not of the flesh, but of the mind and will* In Hebraic 
thought about man, there is no clear-cut antithesis between mind 
antimatter* Man is a phyeho-phyieal being in whom pride of spirit
A
leads to corruption of the body. 'T^e Christian faith in God as 
Creator of the world transcends the canons and antinomies of 
rationality, particularly the antinomy between mind and matter, 
between consciousnes and extension* God is not merely mind who 
forms preriously giren formless stuff* God is both ritality and 
form and the source of all existence* He creates the world. This
world is not) but it is not eril because it is not God. BeingA 1 
God's creation, it is good!
'The consequence of this conception of the world upon the 
view of human nature in Christian thought is to allow an apprec-
i.Reinhold Niebuhr. The Nature and Destiny of Man. (Hew York t
pp.12.
iation of the unity of body and soul in human personality which 
idealists and naturalists hare sought in rain. Furthermore it pre- 
rents the idealistic error of regarding the Mind as essentially 
good or essentially eternal and the body as essentially eril. But 
it also obriates the romantic error of seeking for the good in raan- 
as-nature and for eril in man-as-apirit or as reason.
according to the Biblical riew, a created and finite existence in
spirit, 
both body and xp£titl Obriously a Tiew which depends upon an ultra-
rationalbresupposition is immediately endangered when rationally 
explicated; for reason which seeks to bring all things into terms 
of rational coherence is tempted to make one known thing the prin­ 
ciple of explanation and to derire all other things from it. Its 
most natural inclination is to make itself that ultimate principle f 
and thus in effect to declare itself God* Christian psychology and
8
philoophy hare nerer completely freed themselres from this fault,
which explains why naturalists plausibly though erroneously regard
1 
Christian faith as the rery fountain source of idealism. *
With the part of this paragraph which I hare italicised 
Paul Elmer More would hare been in complete agreement. It is simply 
a statement of the dangers threatened by the Demon of the Absolute. 
Where he would disagree with Niebuhr is on what has gone before, his 
classification of Plato with the rest of the Greek philosophers as 
a rationalist, and the tacit inclusion of Platonism itself, as op­ 
posed to the Neo-Platonism of Flotinus,as a rationalistic idealism. 
More*s whole contention, as we know only too well, is that the 
1.Ibid.,pp.12-15.
the Platonic conception of creation and eril and the nature of 
Go* are all based on an intiitire.not an intellectialistie, appre­ 
hension. We are thus faced with two contrary flews of man, both 
of which are elaiaeljc by their exponents to rest on an intuition 
of truth-More would claim that it is the Platonic Tiew with which 
the Christian riew is to be identified, but in so doing, it seems 
to me that he misses, a little wilfully perhaps, the indisputable 
influence of the Old Testament conception upon the thought of the 
Hew Dispensation, and thus finds eril eren more firmly entangled 
in the robes of the Creator than the Biblioal picture suggests. 
The darker cast of More's imagination, I hare no doubt, is a restige 
of the influence of llaniehaeasm upon hie thought during one of its 
most format ire periods, and it is against this deep distrust of 
the material world that he had to struggle, torn as he was between 
his keen emotional reeponsireness to beauty in the physical world 
and his constant suspicion of the eril of matter.
That there is an element in Christianity which does not 
derire from Platonisra he is, howereras,ready to admit. T^is is its 
sacrificial element. The idea of atonement through the slaying of a 
sacred rictim is to be found among* the early cults of most tribes, 
but it comes to Christianity strengthened and purified from Judaic 
tradition* The sceptic would see in the common origin of the prin­ 
ciple of sacrifice proof that the Christian idea of redemption 
through the death of Christ was but another Torsion of an age-eld 
superstition. To others, howerer, More amongst them ,the analogy
would seem t© point in the opposite directions the rery unirersality
of the idea of sacrifice would suggest to them that behind the its
the reality of a profound truth whether it "be 
recurrent forms there must be the principle of costingness or some
law * 1 
other less obvious fmxm of man's being. This would fit in with the
idea of a cosmic teleology consummated in the Incarnation* If we 
accept the teleological conception of the unirerse, it is natural 
to expect some kind of development in religious thought, either 
through a clearer manifestation of the working of the divine agent, 
or through man's increasing ability to grasp the significance of 
the truth already manifest* Although it was generally agreed that 
there had been an intense afcd concentrated preparation for the 
coming of the Word in the experience of the Jewish people, Christian 
writers in/the past had been kept from finding any development in the 
idea of the coming of the Messiafe by their belief in an absolute and 
direct rerelatien* Migher criticism, on the other hand, has: traced 
the development of the idea,-though minimising or rejecting the 
teleological significance of the process,- ledding to a consummation 
in a historical Messiah. As the heat of the strife engendered by 
the new approach dies away, there afe signs of a rapprochement of
the teleological and the evolutionary views in which Mofe himself
2 
is obviously seeking to play a part. He sets out to trace sereral
strands of development running through the Ol*d Testament to their 
final apotheosis in the Incarnation. The idea of God, of morality, 
of redemption, the nature of the ciltus, and finally, the concept­ 
ion of the Messiah and his Kingdom, all meet and are consummated in 
* »P»1*°« 2>More t Few Shelburne Essaysll.pp. 118-19.
1 
in the advent of Jesue Christ. Thus the true telos of Judaism
was in Christianity, and in Judeo-Christianity mankind has its 
only true example of a complete teleology of evolution. The 
Greeks had come to the verge of such an insight with Plato, "but 
had slipped back into a rague pantheism or an ineffective trans­ 
cendentalism for the philosopher, and for the populace at large 
into a welter of daemonic cults. Even the highest form of a teleo- 
logical philosophy had been impotent to maintain the spirit of 
man on a consistently high level of insight. Christianity went 
beyond the best Flatonism could do, and so philosophy was trans­
muted into religion, by the introduction of another element — —
2 
the myth. $He whole story of the Incarnation answers to the infer­
ence of a divine purpose revealing itself progressively in the 
stratified phenomena of creation.
Originally it had been More's intention in writ­ 
ing TJae Greek Tradition to limit his study of the Hew Testament 
to an episode in that treatise. But direct treatment of his sub­ 
ject brought home to More the fact that it was impossible to 
bring Christianity into The Greek Tradition_ without a fuller 
consideration of the person and teaching of Jesus, and so the 
f episode* had to be extended into two complete volumes. In the
development of Christianity More sees two main elements uniting, 
eschatologieal
the etherworldliness of Jesus, inherited by St. Paul, and the*
more abstract otherworldliness of Plat*. The eschatology of Jesus 
is bound up with the p_arusia, the coming of the Messianic Kingdom,
gJ3y.gp!" 8a';4;*A c £* IheChrisjTgf ThTgew"Te8taaent. PP. 25-44. 
. 2331 Christ of Tfle New Testament. pp. 29S-93. ———————
envisaged now in typically Jewish fashion as a national restor­ 
ation, now in terms influenced by Iranian mythology, as a vast 
cosmic regeneration* In either case the imagery in which the 
parusia is described is concrete and tangible and it is this 
power of visual appeal which held the secret of the triumph 
of Christianity. Platonic cschatology had its imagery too, in 
addition to its wider and more spiritualised conception of the 
eternal world of Ideas but it was the second element which 
triumphed in Platonism, becoming fused with and eventually 
superceding the Hebraic vision of the Day of the LoAd. More 
discusses at length Jesus' own attitude to tbe Parusia. and
the extent to which the delayed realisation of His Messianic
1 
sayings has affected the validity of His claims.
effects 
Certainly the delay was to have far-reaching xl
upon the development of the early ChArch. There is an element 
of truth , says More, in the theory that the whole inner history 
of the Church turns on the procrastination of the Parusia • and 
on the effect wrought in the minds of believers by the contin­
ued disappointment of their hope* the growth of religion has
2 
been the slow'de-eschatologieing' of Christianity. For three
centuries after the death of Jesus the evolution of Christianity 
was marked by a slow merging of the eschatological other worldli- 
ness of Jesus with the philosophical otherworldliness of Plato, 
as gradually the Kingdom o< Heaven lost its mythical actuality,
l.More, Christ of'The Hew_Teatamgnt t p.79ff.
and became transformed into a name for life in the eternal world 
of Ideas, as it had become, for example, by the time of St. Basil 
in the Fourth Century. Nevertheless, the true motive power of 
Christianity lay, not in the disembodied vision of a Basil, but 
in the cincrete eschatology of Christ. 'That is because to him 
belonged in a supreme degree the gift if spiritual imagination, 
the divine energy of vision without which all teaching and preach­ 
ing fail to move the will, and so leave the hearer wondering per*- 
haps but unconverted. For Christ the other worltf was the one ab­ 
sorbing reality, and it could possess this reality for him and 
for others by standing forth in palpable living images. It was so 
with Plato also, who created the Ideal philosophy by the poetry 
ef the Phaedrus and the Symposium/ But there was needed something 
more than the poetical philosophy of Plato to stir the sluggish
heart of the world and that something was given by Jesus the
1 
Prophet of Nazareth 1 . And so ,despite the delay of the Parusia»
it is within the symbolism of Christ's view of the Kingdom rather 
than in the Platonised view of the Church that truth and power re­ 
side; and in that hour of death when thingd visible and invisible 
change places that hidden truth shall be revealed without its veil
of imagery bringing to the individual soul a full realisation of
2 
its responsibility in the sight of Gud.
The eschatology of Jesus was inherited in both its 
native and Iranian elements by St. Paul who added to it a new 
and potent idea in the identification of the Messiah of Jewish
expectation with the crucified Jesus of history. To this More 
believes St. Paul came through his realisation of the inadequacy 
of the Jewish Christology to provide a Saviour who should stand 
between the sinning soul of man and the final condemnation of God. 
But then Paul would remember the principle of vicarious suffering— 
the animal ceremony of the scape-goat and the mystical imagery of 
Deutero-Isaiah— and by a fusion of these ideas, would come to see 
in the crucified Jesus the Christ who, to overthrow the power of 
evilf had first to bring salvation to men by vicariously suffering 
the penalty of death and satisfying the Law. Prom this insight grew 
the whole of Paul's soteriology, 'the new Gospel, the astonishing 
truth that gave saving power to the old Mes si an ism, the full signif­ 
icance of which can be understood only in the light of Paul's deep- 
seated aversion to transience and death, and to that sinfulness
1
which combines with death to form the horror of corruption.'
But Paul, like certain of the Greek philosophers whom
2 
we have already seen, was not ready to abide in the intuition of that
3 
which had its basis in his own psychological experience. He sought
to explain the operation of the new soteriology, to give a rational 
account of the process whereby man is saved through! the death and 
resurrection of Christ, thus fathering a number of harsh and contra­ 
dictory doctrines. More points out especially the discrepancy between 
Paul's two doctrines of justification by grace and justification by 
faith. For the latter there are psychological grounds «for its
l.Ibid., pp. 190-91.
2.Cf7pp. HI -52,.
3«More, The Cftrist of the New Testament.pg.i9p.pQA.
support, although in Paul's case the issue is complicated by his 
identification of faith with belief in a series of eschatological 
events which are seen as a mere prolongation of the chain of his­ 
tory, but the former is to More simply another'form o^nonistie 
rationalism' from which, as we might expect More sees springing 
a whole crop of antagonisms and paradoxes, which are quite con­ 
trary to the spirit of Jesus, and which, by the time of the Ger­ 
man Reformation and the growth of the Presbyterian Church in Eng­ 
land, had driven the mind away from the true dualism of religion 
into a pure naturalism or into the half-wa^ house of a humanitar­ 
ian Christianity. It is because the Greek Church, on the other 
hand , on account of its intense concentration on the Incarnation, 
dimply passed by the antagonistic aspects of Pauline doctrine that 
More looks to it for inspiration in his attempt to reconcile the 
two great dualistic intuitions of Platonism and Christianity,
The weakness of Pauline theology resides therefore in 
its metaphysics, not in its mythology. It is not the spiritualimx 
realism af his setting of the religious life, nor the corporeal 
dimensions of the whole economy of salvation which proves the
le.
stumbling block to More. Indeed he cannot see how^without a tangibj 
imaginative attire , religious perceptions can be made real to the 
mind of man. Apart from spiritual realism, theology is apt to be­ 
come diluted go the metaphysical idealism of the German inter­ 
preters of Paul. 'The difference lies in the use of the imaginat­ 
ion. In the realism of St. Paul the imagination works unconscious-
5T.Ibid77pp205-10.
ly or involuntarily: the figures which clothe for him the life of 
glorfc are regarded as substantial realities. In the metaphysical 
theology of the German stamp the things of the spirit are kept 
apart from the imagination, or, if the fancy enters at all,into 
play, it is a kind of voluntary and conscious poetry. This means 
practically that to the modern mind things of the spirit must re­ 
main unexpressed and, as a consequence, unreal, for the good reason 
that, as we are mentally constituted, we possess no other mode of
expressing and realising such things than just the spatial and
1
temporal figures of the imagination. 1 Herein lies man's deep em­ 
barrassment} he can no longer accept the realism of St. Paul which 
imparts significance and vigour to religious hope, nor has the 
religious life any driving power without it.'I see no escape from 
this dilemma 1 ,adds More in what , I believe, is one of the most 
significant passages of T^e Greek Tradition for an understanding 
of the sacramentalism which was to become the key to his deepest 
problems,'save into a kind of symbolism which admits the complete 
duality of spirit and matter, Ideas and phenomena, yet at the same 
time knows that the figures of the imagination may correspond with 
the facts of the inner life, and hence may be profoundly true.That 
was the essential character of the Platonic philosophy which suc­ 
ceeded in making the laws of the other world at once consciously 
imaginative and ethically realistic; and as we have seen this was 
was the turn given to the eschatology of the Kingdom and the Parusia
1.Ibid.,p.205.
by the master thinkers of the ^^Kirch, building on the foundation
c 
laid by Paul. Such a jymbolitH use of the imagination, hovering
midway between realisa and metaphvsiea. may Bee« to auffer fr>*r* 
the instability attendant upon all compromises; it does certainly 
require an effort of the will to prevent the mind from slipping 
into one of the two extremes ef materialism or metaphysi cal r acu­ 
ity. W,» shall learn, as we go on, that the great advance of 
Christianity over Platonism lies in the addition of the new 
element of religion— faith in the dual nature of a person. which
demands no euch compromise ef the imagination as does faith in ~~ I~~ 
the dualism of things. '
In addition to the purely eschatologieal element 
in the teaching of Jesus and the complementary thought of St. 
Paul, there is also all ethical element intimately bound up with 
it. Repentance not only looks up to the otherworld;it alst implies 
such a change of life as would ensue upon the awakening of faith, 
and is thefefore t« More a link between otherwerldlineas and what
he sees as its fellow- constituent in religion, morality. The two
ly Christian virtues 2 3 
essential^ aTeUKftKif are to him purity and humilityf both ef which
hare their counterparts in the Platonic scheme. Humility involves 
the humbling, not only of the intellect, but also of the imagina­ 
tion, and it would appear that it is in this very quality of
humility that the poetical imagination is transformed into the
4 
Ethical or Religious Imagination, touched with a sense of supreme
. ,p7207- (The italics are minejl 
2.IbTd. ,pp. 94-99. 
3.l¥id. , pp. 103-104, 106, W9-10. 
,p.!06.
awe before the wonder of God.But not only is there a humility 
before God, but also before nan,and M°re sees the two-fold
aspect of religious humility expressed in the petition,'For-
tres 
gire us our ftKktpasses as we forgire them that trespass against
us' and in the equiralent command, 'Judge not that ye be not 
judged*. The most practical utterance of this spirit is found 
in the Golden Rule, which has its parallels in all great relig­ 
ions and philosophies? but whereas in its Judaic and Hindu and 
Chinesse forms, it is negatire in nature, the Christian form of 
the command is positire* It is worthwhile here recalling that hith­ 
erto, in outlining his doctrine of the inner check,More has stress­ 
ed the purely negatire and prohibitire function it performs* 
In the light of that fact,the significance of the words that 
follow is heightened, as though More were admitting that, whereas 
on the humanist plane our highest authority in matters of right 
conduct is a negatire inner check, on the religious plane,a 
new and positire spirit prerails. 'How superficially considered 
it might seem to make little difference whether you say, Do net 
do unto others as you wou not hare others do unto you, or Do 
unto others as you would hare others do unto you) but in that 
shift from the negatiye to the positire there does enter some­ 
thing new, an emotional content that connects the Golden Rule
<C
with the more distinctire Christian rule of lore. 1
Actually More interprets the Golden Rule as
r7Ibtd.p*l68. >AS yg *«ttld tnat men should do to you, do ye also
to"T5em likewise'.Luke 71,31.
S.Ibidvplll-
he reads its significance in the Otspels more in terms of purity
and humility than of the law of l«ve en which the Church has
subsequently laid its stress Aid which to More, still haunted
by memories of heresies ancient and modern* is liable to con-
1 
fusion with sentimentalism, eroticism and humanitarianism.
More finds it easy to say what Christian lore is not: when it comes 
to stating its positive nature, lie can only define it as the
affirmatire aspect of the function of the Religious Imagination,
^ humble 
of which humility is the negative aspect.'T^e knti&fcjc man, in
the religious sense, is he who sets a cheek upon the tendency of 
the imagination to magnify his personal importance abore that 
of other persons, or to visualise himself, so to speak, as a real­ 
ity in the world to the over shadowing of other selves. LoVe,as
we define it, would be that outreaching power of the imagination
2 
by which we grasp and make real to ourselves the being of othere,*
a task to be accomplished, adds More, only in so far as we are
3 
enabled to make real to ourselves the presence of God.
Contrary to the school of Liberal thinkers who hold 
that Christianity taught only an Interimsethik* a morality valid 
only for the brief and exceptional period before the imminent 
Paruaia. More sees Christianity presenting an ethic of univeraal 
and eternal significance. He does not minimise, however, the diff­ 
iculty of that ethic for the majority of men who live on the plane 
of average daily relations. He falls back on the distinction
1. Ibid.,pp.113-16.~~
2. Ibid.,p.123.
3. Ibid..P.12*.
between the religious and the humanist morality which he first 
made as early as the First geries of the Shelburne Essays in»$he 
Religious Grounds of Humanism1 .The law of Humanism is the Golden
Mean, its ideal is that honesty which seeks as its reward a fair
2 share of earthly pleasure for a life of wise actirityjthe law
of Christianity is the Golden Rule and the Great Commandment,
them but taken literally, as Christ intended xx to be taken, they
are hardly relerant to the complexities of society as it stands. 
T^e choice lies between the role of mediation and 4f meditation}
and the important thing for saint and humanist is to realise
3 and accept the implications of his choice. The danger comes
from an attempt to mergex the two realms, as, for example, in 
seeking to make the 1914-18 War, which belonged to the world 
of human compromise, a religious issue, thereby throwing the 
two realms into utter* confusion.
But eren though we elect to lire on the shifting 
plane of humanism, we still hare need of the saints. Without 
Jesus and Plato and the slender line of their true disciple^s, 
Western cirilisation would be deprired of its richest inheritance. 
*So closely knit is the organisation of society,so much of our 
best we possess by a kind of ricarious participation in the lires 
tf those who are strong and know.It is the thought of their liber­ 
ty which supplies a place of refuge and refreshment for the imag­ 
ination of those who at times must fret under the bondage of
rj if ore. Shelburne Us s ays 1,pp.-2^5-S3.
2.More, The Christ of the Hew Testament.p.156.
3.Ibid..p.139.
compromise 1 . 1 It IB in the clear unwavering proclamation of the 
unaltering truths of religion that the voice of Jesus has still, 
amidst the mechanised complexity of our day and inspite of all 
the exacting analysis of historical criticism,a note of arresting 
conviction.
But in addition to the eschatology and the ethics of 
Jesus there is also a third element within the New Testament, 
primarily within the Gospel of John,where Jesus appears to be 
speaking, not so much as the Jewish Messiah, but as the Saviour 
of the World, basing His claims to loyalty, not on any predicted 
glorification, but upon present authority of a spiritual order. 
The whole trend of modern liberal/theology has been to disprove 
the superhuman nature of Jesus.Strauss had assumed that nothing 
supernatural could be historical. But More's whole thesis has 
been directed towards proving that such a preconception is phil­ 
osophically unjustifiable and that, on the contrary, the supposi­ 
tion of a higher nature resident within our own nature is of itself 
no more irrational than that operation of mind and body which
every act of existence forces us to accept. Even More is ready
it does not automatically follow that 
to concede that because the union of the divine and human is not
to be rejected out of hand as psychologically impossible, Jesus 
of Nazareth was actually divine as He claimed to be. Nor is it 
within the scope of MOre's purpose here to defend the validity 
of those claims. Enough if each reader will honestly entertain 
the possibility of the divinity of Christ and weigh the consequences
But if indeed Jesus did possess supernatural qualities, 
how could he have fallen into the serious mistake regarding His 
own mission? Hew can we marry such ignorance to such a being? 
Here, once more,More falls back on the mystery of dualism} in 
the hard language of the C0uncil of Chalcedon,Christ was both 
man and God, From this paradox so repugnant to reason,orthodox 
theology has frequently tried to break away} the early heresies 
of the Church were attempt* to circxumvent it, and from the time 
of Cyril of Alexandria, the Church itself has inclined to avoid 
it by minimising,or eliminating,the humanity of Christ, whilst 
emphasising His divinity. Faced with Christ's own admission of 
His ignorance regarding tbe -^ay of the Kingdom,those who uphold 
His 'infinity of knowledge' must take refuge in the so-called econ­ 
omical reserve of Christ which led Him to pretend, for the salvat­ 
ion of His hearers, to be ignorant of what He really knew.But this 
is contrary to the formulation of doctrine en which Christianity 
still rests:,it makes nonsense of the Gospel record, for,if any­ 
thing is plain,it is that the Jesus of the New Testament,whatever 
else He may have been,was one who lived under the conditions of 
humanity.He was 'in all points tempted as we afe, yet without sin'.
The hated paradox of dualism cannot be argued/away into a ' rational -
1 
ised monophysitism'.
How it ip that the divine and human could dwell to­ 
gether without cancelling each other out, More cannot undertake to 
explain,but this alone makes sense of the mystery of the Kenosis_. 
whereby the_preexistent Son of God submitted to the voluntary inval-
idating of HAs divine powers, including knowledge, while yet His 
lordly prerogative remained intact. In turn the doctrine of the 
Kenosis throws new light on the relation of Christ's spiritual 
claims to His Messianic role. 'Suppose He was the divine Son, the 
L0gos, tut was only taguely, perhaps increasingly, aware of this 
through the veil of H^s manhood. His consciousness would be col­ 
oured by His environment. He would think and speak in the language 
of the Messianic hope of His people and His age, though, even so, with 
a profounder grasp of its real importjwhile occasional! y the sense
of E^s universal mission of revealer of God and Saviour of mankind
1 
would break through'. There h-d been something of this in the Proph­
ets, speaking now as though only Israel was to be saved, now as if all 
the righteous of the earth were to be gathered in. Only in Israel,\tiaee3, 
with its tradition* of prophecy could the divine economy of salvat­ 
ion have been effected; it is inconceivable that the new faith could} 
be grafted on to the popular mythology of Greece. 'No, the Incarnation 
in its divine simplicity cannot be imagined outside of Israel, nor in 
Israel save at that juncture of history. And the Incarnate could not 
have appeared to the Jews who first accepted Htm save as their Mess­
iah, nor could His appeal to repentance have been effective save
2 
through the preaching of the immediately expected kingdom'. All that
involved in
is what Strauss and the other Liberal theologians try to dismiss as
A
the self-deception of a mere fanatics if Jesus was, as they said, a
3 
Schwarmer* adds More, the word thus viewed, loses its sting.
rpd t p
2. Ibid. , pp. 254-55.
3. Ibid. , p. 255.
When he comes to discuss the lxesurrection,More dismisses 
the Disciples' evidence that they beheld the corporeal presence 
•f Christ.These appearances More holds to hare been of tfcesame 
nature as the reTelation to Papl on the Damascus Road, but that
does not mean thjat he refects them altogether as mere hallucin-
1
ations, after the manner of Strauss.,'The appearances of Christ
may be regarded as subjectire, but not necessarily therefore as 
Tain and illusory dreams. T?vey would have been genuine manifest­ 
ations of spirit to spirit, the warranty of knowledge,based on 
miraculous intervention, that he whom they mourned as dead was 
living with God, their Saviour and victorious King,the dispenser 
of the Holy Ghost. So the Resurrection would be the supreme act
/*
of grace, the divine confirmation of our faith in the other-world 
as an ever-present reality behind these veiling clouds of pheno­ 
mena} without it the Incarnation would be left a tale of sound
f 
and madness,signifying nothing.*
Though it may be inconceivable that Christianity, 
as a religion of compelling power should take its rise anywhere 
but Palestine,or in any other way than through the preaching of 
the Messianic kingdom, it is equally inconceivable that it should 
become a world religion unless it was translated into the universal 
more spiritual terms of Greek intuition. The Messianic kingdom, 
valuable as it was,and always may be symbolically, fades, in the 
larger light of history to a temporary expedient, and the hard
I.Ibid.,pp.272-75;——————————— 
2«rpTd. .pp. 279-80.
fact soon* forced itself upon the attention that the Messiah did 
not appear in any such realistic fashion as He had prophesied. 
On the other hand, the Ideal philosophy of Plato, with its verific- 
ation in immediate experience and spiritual consolation beyond 
which the mind cannot warrant ably pass, could not conceivably
•become a religious power until its intuitional conjectures were
r relation. 2 
confirmed by the cetainty of rexxg±«n. Platonism, as we hare seen,
commenced with a philosophy and thence developed a theology and 
a mythology with diminishing claim to certitude. Christianity 
started with a myth, and to the Christian, theology, as a system, 
and philosophy were true only in so far as they could be made sub­ 
servient to his faith. The extraordinary thing to More is that, 
despite the alien source of the new myth, the theology and philo­ 
sophy of the Greek fathers should have turned/out in essential 
matters so thoroughly Platonic, or even more accurately, should 
have been adopted from Plato with so few modifications. Such a 
coalescence, says More in the opening chapter of Christ the Word, 
may lead us to conjecture that the mythology which Plato sought 
ton substitute for the old tales of the gods was not so much anta­ 
gonistic to the Christian faith as imperfectly Christian. He goes 
on to point out how the poetical flights of the Phaedo and the 
Republic and the Timaus need only to be stripped of their more 
fanciful elements to fall bodily into the Christian scheme, and 
how, from the hints scattered through the Dialogues, it may be
1. Ibid., p. 287. 
,p.291«
surmised that Plato himself was di$ly aware of a theophany to
1 
come of which hie allegories were a prophecy.
The chief agent in the attempt to reconcile Christ­ 
ianity and Platoniem during the Patristic period was Clement of 
Alexandria to whom More looks back with reneration. The trend of 
modern theology has been to repudiate such a synthesis? the need, 
s* it seems to More, is rather to correct it where it was left
O
unfinished, and 'so to make of Christianity a home adequate for
2 
the ever-questing spirit of man 1 . 'Truth, for Plato,Clement says,
lay in the Ideas of justice and beauty and the like, whose being
ir
can be inferred from the^operation in the world while they them­ 
selves dwell in remote isolation} but to the Christian these 
Platonic Ideas are known as the eternal Word of God which has 
been uttered in the process of creation and at the last made 
manifest in the flesh."I am the truth",said Christ, and in that 
sentence the hard problem that had so vexed Plato's philosophy 
seemed to be solved. We need no longer inquire how phenomena 
participate in Ideas,or look for the bond between the abstract 
and the concrete, the universal and the particular; in the 
person of Jesus the two are actually brought together dynamic­ 
ally by the union of his divine and human nature, and truth
3 
has been made, as it were, visible and invisible!
But all too few were able to hold this just balance 
between the divine and human elements of Christ's nature. The
1.More.^Christ the Word.(PrincetoniT927).p.6; cf.pp.27-29.
2.Ibid.,p.193
3.Ibid..,p. 102;,cf.p n8.
rationalising intellect at work in the early Church, as it had 
been among the philosophers of ancient Greece, drove many to re­ 
pudiate such a dualism for a monism which absorbed the divine in 
the human or the human in the divine. Hence the incidence of sects 
and heresies which struggled within the bosom of the Early Church 
during the first four centuries. Christ the Word is a study of those 
particular heresies which arose from the rejection of the intuition 
of dualism in the Christology of the Church; it is in that sense 
a companion volume to Hellenistic Philosophies which had been a
survey of the particular heresies which arose from the rejection
1 
of the Platonic intuition of dualism.
More's detailed description of
The reader's first reaction to the various controversies,-*
Gnosticism,Sabellarianism, Arianism,NestorianiBm,Dyo&heleticismf 
Monophysiti8m,Apollinarianism— is to feel that it is the time- 
honoured pettifogging of Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-Bee, and then 
one recalls More's outburst on a former occasion when discussing 
the Plotinian attitude to evil: 'Oh, it is not the case of Tweedle-
*L*
dum and Tweedle-dee — far from that. T£ese speculative differences, 
though they seem to be spun out of thin air, have a way of react-
£**
ing on our attitude towards the very solid facts of life 1 . One 
recalls too Professor G.R.Elliott 1 s story of one of his few per­ 
sonal encounters with More when the latter was en route, for a 
lecture engagement. Elliott had witten him a critical letter in
A
rej»ly to which More called upon him in his study. 'He was warm 
with his new convictions; and the weather was provokingly hot.
ITCf. Ibid., pp. 136-3«j 144, 27172
2 . Mo re f Hellenistic Philosophies , p . 2 34 .
He accepted a glass of cold milk, nothing else; and somewhat to 
«y surprise, he to^k off his coat and rolled up his white shirt 
sleeves."Now",he said grim-smilingly, with a light flourish of 
his right arm, as though wielding a rapier— instead of B bbitt's 
broad sword— "now you will please to tell me plainly your relig­ 
ious beliefs and I shall then inform you just what sort of a 
hwretic you are".
'I told, or tried to tell, and he proceeded to pierce me 
through and through, sippnig his milk the while. I could not well 
parry his swift logic or hold my ground against his amazing know­ 
ledge of the history of theology,orthodox and unorthodox.He so
fascinated me that I forgot the heat.But now I have also forgotten 
just 
"what sort of a heretic"! was.In fact,It seems that I was several
1 
sorts all mixed up together'.
To the unsympathetic observer this might have appearde 
a mere display of pedantry; to More himself it was a matter of 
meat and drink.A man's beliefs were the most important thing 
about him,and his interest in his fellow-men might well be 
measured by the degree of his concern with what they believed. 
The distinctions which divided heresy from heresy, and heterodoxy 
from orthodoxy were to More vital to a correc^perspective of life. 
Without them man fell prey to the Demon of the Absolute, and ran 
to one extreme dr other of a rationalistic or mystical metaphysics. 
'Reason in its progress towards a transcendental monism and the 
imagination in its progress towards a pantheistic monism may seem
l/The AmericanlevieWtApril 1937,Vol.IX,No. 1,6.R.ElliottT
Christology',p.S7.
along
to be moving in divergent ft* routes, but the difference is only ap­ 
parent; their starting point is the same desire to escape the lim­ 
itations of experience, and in the end they lose their identity in 
an indistinguishable abstraction. So at the £ra6 Of our period we 
find the two ultimates of pantheism and transcendentalism wedded 
together in the maystical rhapsody of the pseudo-Bionysius, where 
the mind jumps from the "positive way" of regarding God as the sum 
of all Being to the"negative way" of regarding Him as pure Non-Being 
or vice versa from absolute isolation above the world to absolute 
confluence with the world, and back again,with no appreciation of 
its acrobatic agility in these dizzy heights.,~
Pinnacled dim in the intense inane. 
And, indeed,when once you have overleapt the barriers of common
sense it makes little difference in which direction you turn,and
1 
whether you say that Goat is all or that God is nothing.' Por the
personal compassionate Fatherhood of God for which More craved
there is substituted the abstract metaphysical One of Aristotelian
2 
rationalism. Similarly once you repudiate intuition in favour of
metaphysical speculation, Jesus the Logos, the Son of God, combining 
mysteriously the divine and human natures in one person, becomes 
rationalised into a mere emanation of the divine nature whose 
humanity is but an illusion as in Gnosticism and Sabellarianism, 
or into a purely human Jesus as in Arianism. Such are the two ex­ 
treme terms of the Christological heresy, involving not only the
t the Jgord,pp.33-54. 
2. 1bid.»PP« 71- 75 '
actual nature of Christ, but the relation of the Son to the Father^ 
The great debate of the 'homoousios 1 and the 'homoi-ousips* was not 
merely the verbal contention of Tweedledum and Tweedle-dee: it re-
\
presented to More the vital insight of the Church, embodied in a
single gigantic figure, Athanasius, pitted against the rationalis-
1 
ing tendencies of the various groups of heresies. By the decisions
of the great Councils of Nicea in 325 and Chalcedon in 451, a halt
was called to the presupptuous attempts of reason to explain away
2 
the mysterious paradox of the Incarnation. *There was needelfeays
More,'just such a statement of orthodoxy as that provided by Chal­ 
cedon— a formula which, in hard,precise,immitigable terms, should
a 
set «px check upon the claims of reason to extend the faith in one
direction to the exclusion of the other. It had come to this pass* 
either the central fact of Christianity had.to be abandoned, or 
such claims of reason had to be transcended. You may rationally* 
reverence Christ as an inspired man (at least yiu may if you do not 
inquire too closely into the meaning of inspiration)»or you may 
rationally (if it so pleases your fancy) dissolve an event of his­ 
tory, into a fiction of the mythopaeic imagination, and to one or the 
other of these extremes all the heresies were inevitably sloping.
you cannot rationally worship the incarnate Saviour, as both the
orthodox and 
most ixxzuuKXgmt all but the most intransigent heretics under-
3 
stand worship 1 . In some respects the various heresies had their
1. Ibid.. ,pp. 168-69. 
2.Ibid.,p.239. 
S.lfrid. ,pp.240-41.
advantages; on its positive side each of these sects laid hold of 
a necessary aspect of the truth and developed it to the utmost,so 
that the sum of all their contentions was to bring out the infinite 
riches of the faith. 'But individually, and on its negative side, 
each of these major heresies was a blow levelled at the very spirit 
of faith and worship which it sought to elucidate, in the one case 
by slurring over the function of the Saviour as representative of 
the human race, in the other case by clouding his mission as revealer 
of God* More than that— and the point I would now make would be 
clearer if the innumerable subsidiary heresies had been brought into 
our survey— in the period under consideration every possible means 
of reconciling the Incarnation ,ghat"thing truly paradoxical" as
Athanasiue admitted, with the monistic demands of reason had been
1 
tried, and all had ended in logical confusion and moral disaster*.
That the Church in the face of so many conflicting
emphases was enabled to safeguard its peculiar insight into the true 
nature seems to M re the surest proof of its God-given inspiration. 
After Chalcedon, with the growth of the legalist and shholastie theo­ 
logy of the Roman Church,More saw it frequently falling away from its 
highest point of vision, by substituting the transcendental One of 
Aristotelianism for the God of an thrpomo rphi sm envisaged as a father 
suffering and caring and providing for men, and by stressing the 
divinity and omniscience and omnipotence of Christ at the expense of 
His identification with mankind. The insight of the Greek Tradition
l.Ibid. pp.259-40.
at Nicea and Chalcedon becomes to him a point of repair to 
which he resortd from the clamour and turmoil of conflicting 
creeds, and the cold inhumanity of the Thomist scheraw. Yet More 
in accepting the Incarnation as tne Revelation of God in time 
which consummates the highest attainment of Plato, accepts too 
the fact that, if God has revealed Himself to man , He will have 
provided a means of safeguarding that fievelation for future 
generations. This receptacle, if one may so call it,for God's 
redemptive act, is the Church through which the consequences 
of redemption may be transmitted. The particular means of this 
transmission id the Eucharist. But immediately the question arises: 
how can a Church which has so oftn betrayed and perverted and
A
renounced the peculiar dualism which More holds to be her true 
inspiration in favour of varied rationalised speculations be the 
instrument of God's activity in the world? Again More sees the 
confusion artsing from man's obsession with Absolute solutions. 
If God has desired to reveal Himself to the world, argues the 
undisciplined reason , He will have done so absolutely. In so 
far as there has been no cataclysmic Parusia , no Absolute 
Supernatural appearance, the would-be rationalist looks for 
revelation_,still absolutely— through an infallible book to the 
Protestant, through an infallible Church to the Roman Catholic. 
But in the light of historical criticism, the honest man finds 
it impossible to accept an infallible book or an infallible 
Church. There is, to More, but one solution for anyone who would 
be both honest and critical. 'He who today would retain at once
his faith as a Christian and his integrity of mind can do so 
only by denying the right of logic to set up any such dilemma, 
and by arguing for the probability of a revelation which is
authoritative without being absolute, and reasonable without
1 
rationalistic* The position of the Protestant believer in 'the
verbal inspiration' of the Bible is easily undermined by the 
application of Higher Criticism, although to Mote the central 
message has come down to future generations with more rather
than with leu,cogency, on account of the very vagueness and
2 
elusiveness of its outer fornu It is not so easy to attack the
a priori claim of the Catholic Church to absolute authority* 
but in fact More sees its claims intimately bound up with the 
authenticity of the Bible record as the depositum fideii why, if 
any word spoken by human lips can be clothed with the precision 
of infallibility, should the message of the Incarnate Word come
down to us in a form open in so many details to doubt and per-
3 
plexity? Moreover, the evidence of history makes us reject
even further the Catholic claim, especially at times when the 
Popes themselves have come near to the skirts of heresy,or 
fallen into immoral practices. Nor has Catholicism avoided the 
rigid literalism which has brought about the weakening of the 
Protestant position with regard to the Bible, but has rather ex­ 
tended its petrifying influence to include all the teachings
of the Church,..I_t_i.B impossible, therefore, to exclude Roman 
The Catholic PaithlPrincetonil951JJ_____________________ —————————.171.
d 
Catholicism from the jugment historical criticism is boun<£
*9 pass against the authority of fundamentalism.
At first it would seem there are but two positions, 
the fundamentalist and the agnostic, as both fundamentalists 
and agnostics would assert, holding that he who renounces the 
one must of necessity run to the opposite extreme and espouse 
the other, Between the two, however, there is the intermediate 
position of those who profess to follow the inner light of spir­ 
itual insight without accepting any organised form of worship,vJhich, 
indeed, they assert frequently,tends to raise a barrier between 
God and man, and to deaden the finer intuitions of the soul. 
Such a position had indeed long been More's fwn and it is of 
the utmost importance to an understanding of his inner develop­ 
ment to notice his reflections upon it. T^at it may in the case 
of such people as the better Quakers yield a rich inner reward 
he does not denyj Ufhittier may be taken as a case in point.But 
although in comparison with the 'withering graces of Protestant­ 
ism 1 ,More can ddmire the more manly independence of a whittier,
com m u n 11 M
on the ordinary level the spiritualAhe sought appears to More 
terribly fragile and precarious, lacking even at its best what 
a true chureh can give. For the greater part, however, the 
'religious 1 aspirations of those who seek to dispense with 
traditional forms of worship are mere cant,dissolving into the 
vaguest sort of pantheism or the flimsiest aura of transcenden­ 
talism. He who does not deign to join in public praise or prayer
does not in most cases, worship or pray in private, nor read the
any 
Bible or^other devotional book. Tn*e God he worships requires of
him nothing,gives to him nothing, and is rarely in his thought
at all*'his faith costs him nothing, and is priceless in the sense
of being without value 1 . Ant in answer to the question*What have
these individuals got to show for their faith? More can only say
2 
that, if we put away cant, the answer is Nothing.
In order to justify and nourish his spiritual affirmation, 
man needs the corporate worship of the Church.'For our growth 
and sanity in religion we rnvst have something to supply what the 
inner light will not afford to the isolated souls of men,some- 
thing to make us conscious of our citizenship in the communion 
of the saints, to supplement our limited intuition with the ac­ 
cumulated wisdom of the race, and in our moral perplexities to 
fortify KX the individual conscience with the authority of an­ 
cient command,some agent to present before our eyes in consecrated 
form the eferlasting drama of the divine condescension and to 
force upon our understanding the symbolism of these transient 
phenomena and the spiritual potentialities of this material 
world, some organ to express our wavering faith in an abiding 
creed and to help us utter our common instinct of praise and 
prayer in the beauty of holiness* And thorn Church, so far as it an­ 
swers to this spiritual need, we hold to be an inspired institut4
3 
ion*.
1.Ibid.,?•201.
' Cf.pB.97-100. f*r an extension.of this theme to the iftea e" the communion of saints.
Such a church is not infallible or absolute. No finality 
is granted us here more than in any other fields of life.Although 
religion is net individualistic in the sense that jnan can dis­ 
pense with communal worship, it is individualistic to this extentt 
that no man can waive the ultimate responsibility of either choos­ 
ing the form and dogma of the Church as complying with the verity 
of his pwn inner life or rejecting them as expansions in the 
wrong direction* But the wise man will hesitate to set up his 
private judgment against a formulated tradition, and willjprefer 
te abide in humble, yet not abject,submission to the authority 
of a wider experience than his own.'He may even find his peace 
by uniting himself to a corporation with which he is not in com­ 
plete sympathy,and by participating in a liturgy which he cannot
interpret to himself in quite its literal sense,knowing that only
2 
by such concessions can any stability of worship be maintained 1 .
This is what More means by an authoritative,as contrasted with 
an absolute Church.Such a religious attitude does not,like the 
Roman position, after the first plunge of abnegation,relieve us 
of all the anxieties of decision} it demands the constant exer­ 
cise ofi our own will and intelligence in making an adjustment 
never quite final. In the words of his essay on Baron Von Hugel
it is the position of mediation,which More there equates with that
3 
of Anglicanism; its characteristics are tension and costingness.
The tension arises from the fact that ewery man, even the least
l.For the penalties of spiritjtoj. individualism,cf. Ibid. .t>.96 
2* Ibid* .P.202. Contrast Ep^'P-fl. ——— * 
5*More« Hew Shelburne Essays.lll f pp.l63-fU.
introspective, finds himself drawn in two directions,owing to the 
dualism of human naturej but 'with reflection and deepening exper­ 
ience' , i.e. through the awakening of a definite religious sense,
a 
'this polarity of attraction becomes xlwxmore permanent factor of
consciousness and a more sharply defined division of •bligations 1 . 
To the Christian,this polarity of experience appears objectirely 
in a contrast between the Greater and the creature, and subject- 
irely in alternations between attachment and detachment in vary­ 
ing interests and occupations, ranging from the purely physical 
to the spiritual, worship,prayer and adoration.'This tension of 
the inner life is the distinctive mark of humanity. It may be 
very low$;men drift from attachment to detachment,from worship
•f the Creator to obsession with the created,as merely passing
strong-willed
moods* On the other hand, in many men , attachment to worldly ob­ 
jects predominates. But to Baron V0n Hugel, and here I think More
might well hare been speaking about himself,'both worlds were
Z 
powerfully and coincidently present*. His interest in both was
vividly real, and the whole set of his will was to lire in both
3
'by comprehension rather than by aternation'. 'Hence the polar­ 
ity which ordinarily produces only a fluttering from side to side 
is felt by him as a constant problem of consciousness in the an­ 
swer to which lies the measure of the fullness of xlifel
'The measure of the fullness of life'.That,I am 
sure, was what More had been looking for all along.So acute had 
been his consciousness of the two worlds that he had been tempted
at one time,during his 'Brahmin 1 period, to resolre it by a 
renunciation of the one pole, the material. But the sacrifice 
would hare meant the deadening of senses all too keen to the 
beauty of the created world,so he found refuge in a P^atonistic 
humanism where rirtually he lired in the two worlds by alter­ 
nation, seeking to hold a balance between the apprehensions of 
the 0ne and the Many.The passage to Christianity did not mean 
for him the easing of that humanist tension} one almost wishes 
the aged pilgrim could have found rest in the ethereal raptures 
of mysticism to which,undoubtedly} he felt a strong attraction, 
but his feet were two firmly planted on the earth.Tfcera was no 
escaping* the burden of mortality.But what the acceptance of 
Christianity did for him was to deliver him from the fear of
the material world of which he had retained an almost Manichaean
1 
suspicion, and allow him to enjoy the stimulus of the tension
in which he now found 'the measure of the fullness of life 1 .
Of his religious position there have been many crit-
icismsjMercier has censured his exploration of realms where the
2 
psychological positivism of Humanism no longer holds good,a writer
in the Catholic World has reduced the Greek Tradition to 'the 
last word in private judgment' and suggested that we may con­ 
clude from his works that in M0re's own opinion he 'is the only
3 
man liring today who understands Christianity!The latter,inspite
of More's distrust of higher critics,relegates him to their com­ 
pany, whilst Professor G.R.Elliott,on the other hand sees his
iTfif -pp.34t/^4.and Tv.e Catholic Faith,'Buddhism and Christianity',pp. .L J.l.lIercier.op.clt..T)p.Aoi PP. Ptt«.rJB*rt 1-75.^ 
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Christology,not as too* advanced' , but too static and conservative.
of 
To Professor G.S.Brett^More 1 s writings both critical and relig-
U|>*V * 
ious,it can be said, as it was of Paradise Lost, that 'i* proved
nothing*, but that they too are essentially works of art, as well
2 
as a sincere profession of faith. All these criticisms are inpart
true. It was his misfirtune that he had to use the medium of ± 
rational argument to define a position that was not reached prim­ 
arily by such argument, and that as a result, his attitude necess­
arily gave rise to criticisms which seem to cancel each other out
3 
by their inconsistency. Further, to those who distrusted authority
he seemed to be setting up a Demon of the Absolute as tyrannical 
as those he sought to overthrow, while to those who wanted the
strong support of orthodoxy, his views seemed perilously individ-
4 
ualistic and unorthodox.
This is not the place for the weighing up of the
respective merits and demerits of these criticisms. The important
found 
question is what these new-ftatdtefs beliefs meant to More himself.
He himself might shrink in horror from so personal and pragmatic 
an evaluation of his religious position, but in the last resert, 
its value must be decided by its effects upon the inner life ®f 
the believer.Tfyat is not to deny the existence of an ultimate 
Truth, nor to bring it down to the plane of relativity. It is only 
to allow that there may be different paths along which the pilgrim 
may journey to it: whether he has finally arrived can be humanly
S.Cf.pp. 34-35-. 4. Alien Tate,o£._cit. ,pp.
$6,
ascertained only by the reflection of its joy and serenity in 
his life in the present dispensation and the strength of his 
sense of affinity with the eternal order.
How More's position worked in practice we see from 
two essays in The_Catholic Faith? 'T#e Creeds' and'The Euchar- 
istic Sacrament',In the former,More takes individually the 
various articles of the Apostles' Creed and considers the 
possibility of assenting to them on different levels of belief, 
literal,psychological and symbolical. More is fully aware of the 
possible objections to such an 'approach.He knows that 'a certain 
type of mind, more honest than subtle',will receive all he has 
to say with moral indignation.Why, if the traditional creed can­ 
not be accwpted without the reservations and accommodations More
suggests,should it not be jettisoned ftn toto, or at least the
s 
dubious part of it, and a new profession of faith be compiled
to express precisely what the modern intelligence can beliene? 
In answer to this, More sees two objections,one negative,the 
other affirmative. On the negative side,it would be impossible 
in our day for a single man or body of men to formulate a creed 
likely to meet with general acceptance! and on the positive side, 
to rewrite the creed in terms to meet the more rationalistic de­ 
mands of the present would be to lose its power over the hearts 
and imaginations of men. The Apostles' 6reed is to More 'the 
lyric, or rather the brief epic, of Christianity— poetry in 
the sense that behind the symbols,vivifying and justifying them, 
lie truths of the eternal spiritual life as revealed in the
divine economy of the Incarnation.' Superficially it would appear 
that More was on the in verge of a danger we have previously not­ 
iced, a danger common to men who have desperately desired faith
in an age of intellectual doubt,that of substituting aesthetic
2 titillation, as More himself calls it,for spiritual conviction.
But then we remember how strenuously he seeks elsewhere to dis­ 
tinguish between the Religious Imagination and the Poetical Imag­ 
ination; and how, in the last resort, the imaginative appeal of 
the beautiful is given eternal and universal validity by his acce 
tance of the Platonic Ideas as its objective co-relative,existing 
in their own right with a reality of their own. It is this fusion 
of Platonism and Christianity which forms the peculiar basis of 
More's syBbolism and sacramentalism,the ground upon which he takes 
his final stand and on which he attains to that spiritual satis­ 
faction for which he had long been in quest.
The full force of this position becomes apparent in tie- 
article on 'The Eucharistic Sacrament 1 .A* the Incarnation is the 
central and essential dogma of the Church to which alone it is 
all-import ant that a man should cling, so the Eucharist is the 
central and essential sacrament,prolonging throughout the ages the 
historic revelation of the Incarnation.In what light then should 
the modern Churchman regard it? The first prerequisite to More 
is that he shuold not seek,as modern liberal theology does,to 
explain away the mystery. The reformers seemed to him to have
T".lffnre f The Catholic Faith.p.117.
pronounced, for their successors, something like the death 
warrant to true religion when they rejected,expicitly or 
implicitly,any mystery connected with the celebration of 
the Eucharist. THe sacramental ordering of life now seemed 
to More essential to Christianity of any colour, and without 
the specific sacraments of the Church,centring in the mystery
of the Mass, worship lost its significance and the sacramental
1 
life was rendered thin and precarious. It might be wise,before
proceeding further, to consider just how More uses this word 
'sacrament41*. 'The sacramental idea,I take it, is a distinguish­ 
ing iioteofwestern religion generally and more particularly 
ef Christianity.Itx rests ultimately upon a dualistic concept­ 
ion of the wyld in accordance with which matter and spirit are 
essentially distinct yet mutually interdependent. It implies
on the one side that matter can be indefinitely adapted to spir-
~" " uses, and "
itual IEKX^KKKV on the other side that spirit requires now, and
so far as our knowledge and imagination reach,will always re­ 
quire the. aid of some corporeal instrument. It points to a
divine purpose unfolding itself in a continuous process wherein ——————————————————————————————nrcrtnrct————————
the stuff of existence is miraculously transfrrainl into an ever 
finer medium of order and beauty and righteousness and joy. 
And in this schemes it holds that men are called to play a sub- 
ordinate part under the eye of the supreme Artificer,and that
1.Ibid..p.127.
their every act, even the least, may be dedicated to this end*
A servant with this clause
Ifakes drudgery divines 
Who sweeps a room, as for Thy laws'
Makes that and the action fine*
This is that famous stone
That turneth all to gold* 
For that which God doth touch and own
Cannot for less be, told*
Something like this, an alchemy that would transmute the leaden 
mat erials of life into a finer element, is meant by the sacra* 
mental faith of Christianity* It requires from him who would 
accept it, let us admit, that he should sit somewhat closely 
to the immediate reports of the senses and to the dictates of the
narrower reason} for h«re, as everywhere in religion, the law is
ef 
fixed that the path* assurance in the world of the spirit is
1 
closed to all but sceptics of the physical world 1 .
It is in this sense that the Church Fathers thought 
of the Eucharist as involving some mysterious or miraculous 
change in the elements, a 'metabolism' in the Catholic sense of 
the word. Rarely, if ever, is there evidence of their regarding 
it, in the Protestant sense, as a purely commemorative act.Un- 
forttJinately, however, the Roman Church at a fairly early date, 
faced with two alternative interpretations, chose the one which 
could be the more easily perverted into a crude materialism»0f 
the realistic interpretation left by Ambrose, or^sthe symboli­ 
cal interpretation suggested by Augustine, the Western Church 
chose the former, identifying the Eucharistic body with the
I7lbid77ipp^l22..23. (Tfoe~ italics are mine~T
th« actual historical body of Christ, and so the Roman attitude 
became hardened into the dogma of transubstantiation,giwing rise 
on the one hand to the gross and sensuous realism of a Paschas- 
ius Radbert or a Humbert, or the elaborate mediaeval scholastic­ 
ism of St.Thomas Aquinas, on the other. The Church, however,was 
not entirely misguided in its choice, for the Augustinian symbol- 
in the hands of a Berengar or a Ratramn,appears,upon closer exam­ 
ination, to give only a pale imitation of the sacramental metabol­ 
ism by confining the change in the elements to their being made 
capable of producing a spiritual effect of which before they were 
incapable.This,to More,however, is no substitute for belief in the 
real presence and is little better than the purely commemorative 
act of Protestantism the efficacy of which depends entirely on the 
faith of the communicant. How then is the antinomy of a gross mat- 
reialism and an insubstantial spirituality to be resolved? And her 
More turns once more to the Platonic system of Ideas for what is 
obviously the crowning stroke of his whole philosophy of religion. 
Repudiating once more the Plotinian tendency to evaporate them int 
merely subjective ideals,he recalls that they constitute a separ­ 
ate oreder of being,distinct from the world of phenomena,although 
phenomena may participate in them, or in other words,they may dwe 
in phenomena as a real presence. A beautiful object participates 
in the Idea of Beauty,or, in other words, the Idea of Beauty is
indwelling in the beautiful phenomenon.How this may be Plato fails 
to explain rationally.In a late dialogue, the Parjaenides, he
brings every logical conclusion forward against this belief in 
the doctrine of participation,or the real presence, yet in the
end has to affirm that without such a belief,we see the world
1 
fall into mental and moral chaos*
What Plato,however, failed to prove rationalist- 
ically, He seeks to confirm my tho logic ally in the Timaems. where 
in the allegory of creation,involving both Ideas and Necessity, 
More finds a sacramental approach to the co^ological problem. 
The word to him signifies the purposeful adaptation of material 
resources to spiritual ends, whether it be seen in the cosmic 
work of Providence or in some specifilt act of human designs the 
realisation of purpose in righteousness and beauty; and in the 
picture of creation which depicts God imposing order,as far as 
Necessity will allow, upon the formless resouraes of matter 
More finds a parallel of the process of redemption wherein man 
co-operates with God in the imposition of order upon the form­ 
less chais which forms the substratum of our humanity. The act 
of creation is performed in accordance with the pattern of Ideas 
which are thereupon present in the model fashioned in their like­ 
ness.Similarly in the act of redemption,may it not be that the 
Logos who descended amongst men in the Incarnation, is present 
once more in the material elements through which He seeks to im­ 
pose order upon £he restless chaos of man's unredeemed nature? 
True,More sees the Eucharist as all this, and more} for to the 
sacramental Idealism of Plato Christianity brought its own pecu- 
1. Ibid. ,"pp.T51"527
liar intuition of the principle of costingness, as it had been 
apprehended by the Jewish tradition of sacrifice. The God of 
Platonic Idealism,apart from His one act of creation,retires 
from active participatipn in the world He has called into being, 
leaving even the task of producing and governing concrete phen­ 
omena and mortal souls to the lesser gods. 'He initiated, gave 
the chiquenade.to the sublime drama of deliverance out of the 
bonds of Hecessity. But there His part ends. He pays nothing,sacri­ 
fices nothing, suffers nothing. He is 'good* and 'without envy', 
and by His creative will He is the source of all cosmic purpose! 
but scarcely could he be said to love the world of His begetting; 
He is the author of deliverance, but not of redemption at a price. 
'It was just this principle of redemption, implicit in the
religious instinct of mankind, that by the historic event of the
1 
Incarnation was made the corner-stone of the new f aith. f
But if PIatonism was entiched** and deepened and broadened 
by the infusion of the Christian passion of sacrifice,Christianity 
needed equally the clarification of the sacramental Idealism ofPlato. 
Although the ultimate meaning of things remains a mystery of which 
no rational explanation is possible,it is none the less possible to 
build a reasonable edifice upon a superrational foundation,for to 
More,'rational' and 'reasonable' are far from synonymous.«it is a 
reasonable attitude towards the faith to hold that the Spirit of 
Christ may descend upon the elements for a diwine purpose in the 
same way as, according to the theory of the Timaeus,Ideas are im­ 
posed upon the inert stuff of Necessity, not as a substance sup-
planting another substance, nor as a substance mechanically con­ 
joined to another substance, but as actual powers of creative ad­ 
aptation*
It is a quieter of many doubts to hold that, as the Idea 
of Beauty is really present in material phenomena and renders the 
beautiful to the eye, while yet the Idea abides in its own unique 
and glorious integrity, s4 the Logos may be really present in the 
bread and the wine t making of them its own body) and by their mat­ 
erial instrumentality imparting itself to the embodied souls of 
men. In this way the miracle of the Real Presence becomes only
one aspect of the ultimate mystery that confronts us in the dual-
1 
ism of mind and body, and whithersoever else we turn, 1 Further
it takes on to More anx entirely different aspect when the rite 
is no longer regarded as an isolated miracle, but falls in with
the 'most imposing and most satisfactory philosophy the brain of
2 
man has devised 1 . 'To the Platonic Christian the Eucharist is thus
a visualised epitome of a consistently sacramental philosophy. 
Looking upon the spectacle of the Mass, he sees, as it were re- 
enacted there before him, the vast drama of creation concentrated
inti a moment of wonder, T-^e magic of order and beauty felt in the
of nature 
wide prospects^all remembered joys and exul tat ions, are brought
together in a little space*
'He hath made every thing beautiful in its timej 
Also He hath set the world in their heart.' 3
Such a sacramental attitude to the world and to material phenomena
1. Ibid*. pp. 167 -68
2. Ibid., p. 167.
is very different from the Oriental's attitude which sees no 
ultimate purpose of creation but only illusion in the phenomenal 
world, where deliverance is regarded as the utter escape of abneg­ 
ation rather than as a gradual transmutation to the Everlasting 
Yea.
With his attaining to a sacramental attitude to life, 
More is at last set free from his former uneasiness in the pre­ 
sence of nature which we have already noticed. No man was more 
romantically susceptible to the beauty of nature: his descriptions 
of the sea are a delight and a wonder. In his brief cameo of his
own experience of reading Homer beside the sea-shore at Maine one
1 
catches the eternal whisperings of timeless tidesj and his
picture of the boyhoott of Walt Whitman beside the sea is alive
2 
with the sounds and the smell of the vast Atlantic. -°ut if in
the presence of nature he was frequently illat ease, it was 
because of his fear of setting his heart on that which in the 
last analysis is ephemeral, and transitory. He had sought through 
his incursions into the fields of sociology, philosophy and relig­ 
ion to find a permanent point of repair amid the chances and 
changes of the phenomenal world. This he was to find in the co­ 
incidence of the deepest insights of Platonism and Christianity, 
and in the light of his new-found faith, he was to discover too 
the sacramental nature of all life, physical and spiritual, 
material and immaterial, humanity and nature. There was no longer 
any need to shrink from the beauty of the temporal, for indwelling 
within the temporal was the Eternal; and the glory he saw he now
l.puoi z. More , ^ nel'frqi'He Egs-a..y P i jfe , pp
recognised as "but a shadow of the greater galory to be hereafter.
Unfortunately this new attitude to life came to More too
r 1 late for it to have far-reaching effects on his witings, bit it
is, I believe, of the greatest importance to a retrospective 
appreciation of his mental and spiritual development. Only in the 
light of what he became can we fully understand the tendencies 
of his earlier work. His final position was the consummation, not 
the denial or repudiation, of what had gone before, but that 'is not 
to see it merely as the logical conclusion of his Humanism. Some­ 
where between the first edition of Platonism and Christ the Word 
there had burst in upon him the joy of a new discovery which was 
to irradiate hie later work. Not that it made the blackness of
contemporary chaos as he saw it in the work of Joyce and Proust
2 3 any less black, or Satanism of Baudelaire any less Satanic. To
his adversaries the More of On Being Human was as intolerant and 
reactionary and wilfully blind as the More of Aristocracy and Just 
ice. But e»en though at present he saw the whole creation groaning 
and travelling in pain together, he had come to believe too in the 
future redemption of the whole creation, of nature as well as of 
man, and that belief lent to the outlook of his latter days the 
sense of meaning and purpose and freedom which he was swift to op­ 
pose to the futilitarianism and irresponsibility of so much of 
modern art. He could say with C.S.Lewis from whose paper on THe 
Personal Heresy in Criticism he quotes?
1 "Surely the dilemma is plain. Either there is significance
l.t¥eoTo:gy~'fo"da'y .ApriT 1948, Vol. ^ $o.l7~lyjm~KaroTd. Hough, 'i'auT"JSlmer More' , pp. 78-80.
in the whole process of things as well as in human activity,or 
there is no significance in human activity itself.It is an idle 
dream, at once cowardly and arrogant,that we can withdraw the 
human soul, as a mere epiphenomenon,from a universe of idiotic 
force, and yet hope, after that, to find for her some faubourg 
where she can keep a mock court in exile. You cannot have it both 
ways. If the world is meaningless,then so afe we} if v* mean* 
something,we do not mean alone. Embrace either alternative, and you 
are free of the personal heresy.••
More chose to embrace the latter, that man and nature 
meant intensely; and iff they did not here and now mean good,man at 
least had been called to be a co-worker with God in the task of 
delivering both himself and his universe from the clinging vestiges 
of dark Necessity, to bring a bit of cosmos out of chaos, so that 
when the greater and the lesser Creator should survey His handiwork, 
He might see that it was good. And in the discovery of this teleol­ 
ogy of both human and natural evolution, More found the teleology 
of the evolution of his own criticism, the last of life for which
the first was made. To him as to a greater artist before him,
2 
'Ripeness was all*.
1.Mure,Hew ShelbUTTTe EBS^B lll.p. lie. 
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Appendix E. 
Sympathy and Egotism as Elements in the Bevelopment
of Naturalism. 
The evolution of sympathy as an active principle in philosophy
and politics dates, according to More, from the eighteenth
1 
century and had its origin in England. Renaisaance thinkers
had recognised that the majority of men were governed by motives 
of self-love or egotism, and thrdughout the seventeenth century 
philosophers and politicians alike based their creed upon a
recognition of this principle. Halifax accepted that egotism
2 
was the strongest motive underlying human conduct, the maxims
of La Rechefoncauld suggest that man can be saved from his 
lower self purely by the prom^ings of his a/mour-propre; and the 
same principle was developed by Hobbes into a philosophy of 
State. The condition of natural man was one of constant hostility 
towards his neighbour, but because such a condition would 
ultimately bring about the destruction of all those involved in
•
it, the members of the primitive society had made a compact 
whereby, in order to enjoy security, they had been prepared to
make certain mutual concessions in order to ensure as far as
5 
possible a communal life.
On the other hand, the opposite principle of 
natural sympathy had been made an active element in communal
1. Shelburne Essays, mXtad&gjS/ Vl,pp215-gP4
2. Shelburne Essays, X, pp. 63- 64.
3. Shelburne Essays, Vlll, pp. 156-157-
living by such pioneers as Grotius, and a sect known as the 
levellers, who drew the sanction for their faith in sympathy 
from a belief in the will of an active and providential God. 
This belief was still shared by their opponents, in spite of 
their apparent cynicism, and Hobbes' reputation for atheism. 
With the eighteenth century, however, and the advent otf deism 
the belief in the benevolence of a divine love intervening 
actively in the world of men became a vague sens^f the power 
behind the universe, removed to/ the infinite inane. The idea 
of the consciousness of men, largely as a result of Locke's 
'ffssay concerning the Human Understanding' published in 1690. 
Locke does not deny the existence of the supernatural, but the 
practical effect of his jfewgc theory of ideas and sensations 
was to bring^he human soul entirely within the scope of the 
phenomenal laws of nature. Locke's doctrine was carried one 
step further by Hurae's discovery in naturalism of a sufficient
principle of human conduct without recourse to any external
1 
law. To some extent in Hume the two rival motives of egotism
and sympathy are shown as active in human behaviour- Man is seen 
as basically governed by self-interest, but his own interests 
can only be assured by allowing the interests of others, even 
though they appear tp conflict with his own. Justice is therefore 
not an attempt to act in accordance with an abstract and a priori 
principle of virtue, but virtue itself is a product of justice,
l.Ibid.,pp.157-160.
N/llf
the sense of satisfaction derived from a mutual reconciliation
of our own interests with those of others. The sensation of virtue
comes from throwing ourselves into the place of others and seeing
our 
how am action will be indirectly profitable to ourselves. Once
however, the individual becomes conscious of the springs of KJSJI& 
conduct, there is no room left for belief in absolute virtue and 
absolute vice} they are seen to depend entirely on sensations, 
agreeable or otherwise.
Twenty years after Hume's Treatise of Human
Nature (1739-40) there appeared Adam Smith's Theory/ of Moral
1 
Sentiments. Not only is man now seen to enjoy a senslof virtue
resulting form sympathy with an act of justice, but he is 
himself led to act justly through a sense of sympathy with the 
feelings H£ his conduct will inspire in others. Further, by his 
habit of reflection, to feel thefsame sympathy or antipathy with 
his own conduct as he would feel towards the conduct of others; 
and so his actions came to be motivated, not so much by love
of neighbour or concern with his good opinion, as by love of
2 
his own estimate of himself. The word 'sentiment 1 from then on
began to recur with incresing frequency. This was 'nothing else 
but the logical outcome of Hume and Adam Smith's theory of
sympathy entirely dissevered from any supernatural principle as
I 
the source of virtue'
The mood of universal benevolence which came to
1.cf. Hgw Shelburne Essays, pp.147-149.
2.nore.Shelburne Essays, VI. pp. 25784.258. 
.".Mjre,Shelburne Essays^ Vlll p. 1655 cf.pp.166-168/
/x.
dominate the end of the eighteenth century had been already 
fore-shadowed by Shaftesbury and itself anticipated the spread 
of humanitarianism during the two ensuing centuries. This was 
given a new and far- reaching impetus by being allied to 
Rousseau's doctrine of the natural goodness of man which, more
c
than any other doctrine of the period, was to colour all K 
subsequent thought. Like Hobbes, he saw society founded on a 
contract granting mutual concessions to its members, but such 
a measure he saw not as a safeguard against anarchy, as Hobbes 
envisaged it,but as the root of all subsequent vice, contention 
and inequality, and a state therefore tp be annulled in favour 
a return to the freedom and innocence which he believed to have 
been the primitive condition of man. Such was his doctrine in 
his Discours sur 1'In6£alite(l755) but by the time of his 
Contract Social (1762) there had been a basic change in his 
attitude. He no longer envisages men as independent and self- 
sufficient entities, living each in his own small world, co-
£ 
equal and 1 co-virtuous 1 with his fellows, but he sees them rather
as bound into a community of the spirit by a mystical element 
known as the yolonte' x ge'ne'rale, absorbing the individual desires
of members of the State into one harmonious and all-embracing
? X purpose! Men are united in a common bond of brotherhood? not by
reason, but by the emotions and impulses they share. To find a 
touch of nature which makes the whole world kin it is necessary
X-
to dive into the flux of desires which all men have in common. 
Reason analyses, distinguishes, divides; pure feeling breaks 
down distinctions, synthesises, unites. It is not surprising 
therefore, that the movement of humanitarianism should find its 
main impulse in the thought of Rousseau.
But if the guiding principle and original impulse 
of this romantic revolution came from England and were translated
into a homogeneous social code in Prance, their conversion into
2 
a metaphysical formula had yet to be accomplished by Germany.
There the Romantisjie Schule transmuted the Rousseanistic 
doctrines of the natural goodness of man and his inherent sympatKy 
with his brother into a mystical rapture of love so potent that 
eTen in the hearts of the most depraved it was able to move them 
to deeds of complete unselfishness, as in Schiller's play, 
The Robbers. It is significant, however, that in the country 
where the theory of natural sympathy found its most complete 
expression in literature, the most violent reaction was to set i 
in, and by the end of the century, Neitzsche should have been 
extolling the Superman, he Hh£XKX$XKXx£x who represses every
prompting of sympathy ahd altruism in favour of a ruthless
* 
egotism. The significance of this resides in the fact that
whenever iixisxfixKfaEKi men give free rein to an indiscriminate 
and idealistic sympathy, there results almost invariably a 
corresponding outburst of egotism and tyranny. Sympathy, More
l.See Babbitt, Masters of Modern~rench Criticism,ppS8-5Q.5g.9~
2. Ibid. ,p.!69<.
3. Shelburne Assays.Vlll.
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allows, is good, but whenever it is prefaced by 'social 1 , it 
takes on a dangerous connotation, in £XK± that the responsibili 
ity for individual conduct is now thrown upon society, with 
thw result that man sees himself as a vicjrim to be pitied and 
pampered rather than as a responsible human being answerable 
for the consequences of his behaviour.
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Appendix^., 
Note on H.Bamford Parkes' "Paul Elmer More, Manichaean", from
Horn anfl Hound, 0 c tober~T951 ^ Tummer~1932^'VoI7~T^~pp7I^8l^82 .
Mr. Parkes, in enumerating the reasons given for More's 'con­ 
version 1 , mentions the 'need for a supernatural world and after­ 
life in order to make virtue and happiness identical: in this life, 
the virtuous man, if unfortunate, can only by ah abuse of language 
be called happy.' This, he goes on, 'as More shows, was Plato's 
conclusion' but what More never points out is that it Is utterly 
inconsistent with the hedonism he shares with Babbitt and which 
he advocates in the first volume of the seriesseither the purpose 
of morality is to make men happy in this world in which case unhap- 
piness proves merely that the morality is wrong,or else the laws 
of morality are transcendental and not empirical which destroys 
the whole humanistic philosophy'. This, it seems to me, errs in 
two directions* on the one hand, by identifying More's views with 
Babbitt's even in the first volume of The iffreek Tradition, and 
secondly, by not taking sufficiently into account the difference 
in More's own point of view which develops between the earlier and 
later volumes of the series,
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